Some thoughts on the state of India’s war on terror

Col R Hariharan

[Some of the points contained in this article were included in a TV interview in Chennai as a part of its coverage of the death of Major Mukund Varadarajan and Sepoy Vikram Singh in an encounter with terrorists in Shopian area (J & K).]

How do you see the death of Major Varadarajan who belonged to Chennai? What does it indicate about our fight against Jihadi terrorists in J and K?

Never before in Chennai had I seen such public participation in a military funeral as that of Major Varadarajan. This should remind all those who talk of Tamil separatism that the spirit of nationalism in Tamil Nadu is stronger now thanks to the martyrdom of young people like Varadarajan.  However, regrettably the national TV media had little time for it. It devoted more time to the trivia uttered by Priyanka Gandhi in her electoral skirmish with Narendra Modi.

The death of two soldiers at the prime of their life is stark reminder to the nation that the war on terror in the country particularly in Jammu and Kashmir is far from over.  According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal data, in J and K alone over 43,554 lives have been lost from 1988 (when terrorist activity was scaled up) to April 20, 2014. Among those killed were over 14, 676 civilians and 6,104 security forces personnel, the rest being terrorists. This works out to an average of about 145 lives lost every month! And that too in J and K alone!

If we consider the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) – the other major threat to our national security – the picture is even more shocking. In nearly eight and a half years from 2005 to April 2014, we lost a total of 6403 lives – an average of 64 people a month.  

Of course, these casualty figures do include the number of terrorists and extremists killed. But we have to take them into reckoning as they represent the loss of young productive human resource of the nation. The nation simply cannot afford to continue to lose over 200 lives a month due to terrorism and extremism.  By very nature in a democracy the war against unconventional threat is prolonged and time consuming. And in a developing nation like ours terrorism cramps governance, stifles development programmes and depletes scarce resources.

In Jammu and Kashmir we should not let our guard down. In the year 2013, Pakistan army’s ceasefire violations in the state had more than doubled to 196 instances as against 93 in 2012. These violations are mostly covering fire provided by Pakistan army fire and troop intrusions across Line of Control (LOC) to help the infiltration of terrorists from their bases in POK.  So it is not surprising that total fatalities went up to 181 in 2013 as against 117 the previous year. Already in the first four months of this year we have lost 14 lives.

There is an escalation of Taliban terrorist attacks in Pakistan. And after the U.S. pull out of its troops from Afghanistan this year, we can expect a progressive increase in terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir.   

The Jammu and Kashmir terrorism has to be considered as a part of overall threat to our national security from Pakistan as it is sponsored and supported by Pakistan government and the army. The Pak-based terrorist threat to national security has linkages with domestic terrorist groups like Indian Mujahideen.

Our national counter terrorism is still not fully matured though we have made some progress. We need to overcome our political inhibitions to treat terrorism for what it is – a threat to democracy, national security, stability and progress. This should be on top of the agenda of the incoming government in New Delhi.

 

Do you mean to say the terrorist activity is due to failure in government policy?

The answer is not a simple yes or no. There had been some improvement in the government approach to combating terrorism. The efforts started by the Home Minister P Chidambaram after the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai have made halting progress. However, the integrated structure involving Central intelligence and police organizations and their counterparts in states is not yet fully in place. It has to progress at faster pace with greater commitment both at the central and state levels.

Modernisation of central armed police forces (CAPF) is well under way. In the interim budget for the financial year 2014-15, the allocation for this has been increased by 16 percent to Rs 59,387 crores. This will enable CAPF to procure modern equipment including night vision devices, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment and anti-IED devices. The allotment for improving state police forces is double the amount allotted to CAPF. However, the state level the modernization has not progressed with equal vigour in all states. Police commission reforms are yet to be implemented by many states. Same is the story in coastal security arrangement. States have huge deficiencies in human resources; both qualitatively and quantitatively they have to be beefed up.

Structurally also some progress has been made. These include the launch of Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) that connects nearly 2000 CCTNS stations in 25 states. The much delayed National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) has at last been launched. The NATGRID is a crucial initiative and its successful implementation can improve our real time response to terror attacks.

Thanks to these efforts, notable success has been achieved in preventing a repetition of the 26/11 type of attack. During the year 2013 there were four terrorist bomb blasts in Hyderabad, Bangalore, Patna and Bodh Gaya. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) terrorists responsible for masterminding the blasts in these places, except Patna, have been rounded up. In fact, the arrest of Tahseen Akhtar, leader of IM involved in organizing a number of terror strike across the country since 2010, in Nepal border in March 2014 was a significant achievement. The subsequent arrest of Bhatkal, said to be his successor, has literally decapitated the IM and exposed the entire network.

Similar success has been achieved in apprehending key leaders of Maoist extremists also. Militancy in the Northeast has been largely weakened thanks to Bangladesh’s leadership cooperating with India in denying sanctuaries to them in its territory. Myanmar is also regularly interacting with India to curb Indian militants seeking sanctuaries on its soil. However, much more is required to be done in Myanmar.    

In the prevailing political climate of suspicion among parties has resulted in friction between the Centre and states. This has continued to affect country-wide integration of efforts in fighting terror. This is affecting speedy implementation of decisions taken to improve national internal security capability. Some of the weaknesses are affecting the fostering the spirit of nationalism in border areas affected by militancy. The never ending controversy over the use of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir is a typical example of this. This is one area which cries out for improvement. 

A new government will be coming to power in New Delhi shortly after the parliamentary elections. What would be the key issues it would be facing in handling terrorist threat, particularly from Pakistan-based terrorists?

As stated earlier, the Af-Pak region is going to face increased Taliban terrorist activity after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. So we can expect Taliban to intensify their militant and terrorist attacks to destabilize not only the elected government of Afghanistan but India as well. India has made huge investments in the development of Afghanistan and has agreed to provide security assistance to it. So the worsening internal security situation there will impact our own strategic security priorities. 

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Nawaz Sharif government has failed to achieve success so far in its efforts to bring the Taliban terrorists to the negotiating table. On the contrary, terrorist attacks have continued even as the talks proceed in fits and starts.  The Pak army is suspicious of the government effort as it is locked in its own war against terrorists. Despite these internal developments, Pakistan has not made any significant effort to curb Hizb and Lashkar terrorists operating against India from bases across the LAC.  So we can expect the terrorist efforts to destabilize J and K not only to continue but to be intensified at politically opportune moments. 

The Centre cannot afford to drop its guard against terrorism. It will have to sustain its efforts to integrate its efforts with the state and ensure that terror strikes are neutralized at formative stages. The Centre needs to take special measures to improve its relationship with states to achieve this.  This has to go in tandem with efforts at international level to curb Jihadi terror. The war against terror is an unending one and vigilance is the watchword for its success. 

Lastly, while we have made considerable progress in providing teeth to CAPF, the same cannot be said of armed forces. There had been serious deficiencies in all the three services affecting their military capabilities. This is largely due to poor leadership at both the political and ministerial levels. The new government has to urgently address this issue as armed forces are the backbone of national security.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)

Comments on South African mediation in Sri Lanka

Col R Hariharan

[This is the text of answers to a set of questions raised by the Editor, Political & Defence Journal, a diplomatic journal through e-mail.]

1.  What are your views on the South African initiative to mediate between Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority? South African President Jacob Zuma has appointed Mr Cyril Ramaphosa as its envoy on Sri Lanka and he is due in Sri Lanka next month to take stock of the situation. 

According to a report in the Sunday Times, Colombo of April 20, President Zuuman told the South African Parliament on February 13 at the request of Sri Lanka Government he was appointing Cyril Ramaphosa as South Africa’s Special Envoy to bring about peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Ramphosa is expected to visit Sri Lanka in May 2014. 

Ramaphosa, deputy leader of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), is probably the ideal man for the job of a mediator. He headed the ANC negotiation team in talks with the National Party government in Pretoria at the end of apartheid regime. He was also the chairman of the South African Constituent Assembly which finalised the post apartheid constitution.  Now he is a potential presidential candidate. 

The Sunday Times has also published an interview with R Sampanthan, leader of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) on the South African mediation issue. At the invitation of South Africa he led a TNA delegation to Pretoria.  He has explained that President Rajapaksa had sought South Africa’s help in resolving the reconciliation process when President Zuma visited Sri Lanka to attend the CHOGM in November 2013. South Africa had invited the TNA delegation as a part of this initiative. 

For a long time Sri Lanka had been against any foreign initiative for resolving the Tamil issue, whether it was insurgency or reconciliation. Of course, India had been an exception to this; even Indian involvement had been muted ever since its political and military intervention (1983 to 90) failed to yield expected results. And the Norwegian-led initiative did not fare any better.

Even on the specific issue of South African style of reconciliation, Sri Lanka had shown its reluctance as late as May 2010. According to a BBC report of that period, while answering a question whether the ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)’ would be similar to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Media Minister Keheliya Rambukwella termed it an alien experience. The government would be looking to “an indigenous approach, something home grown” to address the issue of reconciliation and lessons learned in the country’s Eelam conflict, he added.

Sri Lanka had to change its rigid stance after it was repeatedly hauled up before the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) for its flawed ‘indigenous’ approach to human rights violations and accountability. The UNHRC scrutiny had exposed the deficiencies of Sri Lanka’s much touted LLRC process in resolving the issues of accountability and reconciliation. Apparently, this had prompted President Rajapaksa to involve South Africa to in the process in order to gain some credibility.

2. What is the Indian response to this development?

The South African initiative would probably take shape only after Ramphosa’s visit to Colombo next month. So it is too early to talk of Indian response to the initiative. At the same time, India had been stressing the need for resuming the stalled reconciliation process which had been delayed by the negative tactics adopted by President Rajapaksa.  He formed yet another parliamentary select committee (PSC) to make recommendations on the issue. With most of the opposition parties including the TNA boycotting the PSC, its credibility has been eroded even before it finalised its recommendations.  

India’s stress had been on resuming the political process for reconciliation and considers the full implementation of the 13^th amendment to the constitution fundamental to the process. During the last UNHRC discussion on Sri Lanka, India’s representative Dilip Sinha explained the Indian stand. He said, “… much more needs to be done by the Government of Sri Lanka towards a meaningful devolution of powers. It needs to continue to take specific measures towards broad-based, inclusive, meaningful and genuine reconciliation with the minority Tamil community.” He called upon  on the Sri Lanka Government “to make purposeful efforts to fulfil its commitments, including on the devolution of political authority through the full implementation of the 13th Amendment of the Constitution of Sri Lanka and build upon it....As the closest neighbour with thousands of years of relations with Sri Lanka, we cannot remain untouched by developments in that country.” 

India should be happy if South African mediation can bring this about. India has excellent relations with South Africa rooted in their shared history of struggle against colonial masters. They are also active members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) initiative. So India would probably have no objection to South Africa chipping in to trigger the political reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. And we can expect South Africa to keep India in the information loop when it undertakes mediation in Sri Lanka.

On the flip side, strategically South Africa’s entry into Sri Lanka introduces yet another external influence in what used to be India’s sphere of influence. However, the Indian sphere of influence is undergoing rapid change on two counts: the entry of China in South Asia (including India) and the expanding Indian interest in Southeast Asia with the implementation Look East Policy. So we can expect India to take South African involvement in Sri Lanka in its stride.

In any case, a new government is likely to come to power in New Delhi shortly. And India’s Sri Lanka policy is likely to undergo some change at least in form (if not content). So it will be better to watch the situation as it develops rather than speculate about India’s response at this stage.

3. Does India think that Pretoria will succeed where others have failed? 

Answer to this question is in the realm of speculation for reasons given earlier.

South African mediator will be facing a difficult task, if we go by Indian and Norwegian experiences of the past. But unlike them, fortunately South Africa does not have to deal with either Prabhakaran or the LTTE. It has to deal with the TNA, which despite its periodic fulminations, has enough moderate elements who want the reconciliation process to succeed. The same applies to Sri Lanka, though President Rajapaksa seems to have been unduly influenced by the post war triumphalism that is preventing the adoption of a pragmatic approach. He will have to rethink his approach.

Both the government and the TNA will have to move from their frozen mindsets and be prepared to move forward for reconciliation. This is where South Africa is likely to encounter major problems. Apart from this, there are structural issues connected with the reconciliation process.

For instance, if South Africa suggests a solution based upon its own Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) model it may not be acceptable to Sri Lanka. Mrs Naveneetham Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who had participated in the TRC in South Africa, in her annual report on Human Rights issued released on February 24, 2014, had explained that it would not be “permissible for any truth mechanism to grant amnesties that prevent the prosecution of individuals who may be criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights, including gender-specific violations.”  Unless Sri Lanka is ready to accept such conditions TRC cannot become a reality.

She has suggested “any such truth commissions should be complemented by comprehensive and coherent transitional justice mechanisms and processes that include prosecution, reparations, vetting and other accountability or reform programmes.”  For achieving productive results, the South Africa mediator will have to cobble up a model that includes some of these major aspects.

Other questions

There are three other questions:

a.       Will Rajapaksa be more sincere in meeting the Tamil aspirations this time as he has failed in the past?

b.       How will India cooperate in this South African initiative because its cooperation is vital for any sort of reconciliation?

c.      Is it a tool of the Sri Lankan president to deflect pressure from the international community after UNHRC vote? 

Some of these issues have been partly answered in earlier questions. These questions can be fully and meaningfully answered only after the South African mediator visits Sri Lanka and meets with the stakeholders, and a new Indian government takes charge in New Delhi.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)  

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies C3S Paper No.2088 dated April 26, 2014 http://www.c3sindia.org/india/3973
Published as "Sri Lanka -South African mediation" in South Asia Analysis Group   Paper No 49661 dt April 26, 2014 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1507

Sri Lanka: Tweaking the Muslims

Col R Hariharan

Why Sri Lanka President Rajapaksa is tweaking the Muslim community, which by and large had been his loyal political partner? 

Since 2012 the Buddhist fringe organization Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) has continued its attacks with impunity on individuals, institutions and businesses connected with Muslim cultural and religious practices and identity like places of worship, religious education, wearing of burkha, and Halal meat. Churches have also had their share of such hate campaigns.

In the latest infamous episode, last week BBS thugs disrupted a press conference organized by the Jathika Bala Sena (JBS) in Colombo at which the JBS founder General Secretary Watareka Vijitha Thera had threatened to expose the BBS leader Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara. The JBS General Secretary had been leading a campaign against BBS attacks since 2013. 

The BBS was founded by two monks - Kirama Wimalajothi and Galagoda Aththe Gnanasaara after they broke away from the right wing monks party the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) saying it was not militant enough in protecting Buddhism. So true to their sentiment the BBS has been militant since its start.

It has been thriving on the paranoia generated by the belief Sri Lanka is not a multi-religious country but a Sinhala Buddhist one. Its core theme appears to be that Sinhala Buddhist identity needs to be protected from the threat of Islam and Christianity. Islamic extremism which was never a reckonable threat in Sri Lanka has provided the BBS a convenient whipping horse thanks to Jihadi terrorism’s global record. 

According to an Associated Press report of January 14, 2014 at BBS rallies monks claim Muslims are out to recruit children, marry Buddhist women and divide the country. BBS monks make many accusations about Christian pastors making suicide bomb kits, Muslims taking children away to train in Pakistan without offering supporting evidence. It quoted the BBS General Secretary Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara as saying "This is a Buddhist nation, so why are they trying to call it a multicultural society?Not everyone can live under the umbrella of a Buddhist culture."

The BBS has been able to channelise the Sinhala Buddhist chauvinist passions by providing visible manifestations of Islamic and Christian identity as targets to vent their anger. These include mosques and churches, Sunday schools, religious gatherings, religious injunctions like halal meat slaughtering and certification, and wearing of burkha by women. Some of BBS concerns like the demand for abolishing birth control measures and advice to Sinhalas to stop using them to have five to six children to increase the Sinhala population might appear bizarre.  But at least in some sections of people such demands are finding support.  

By doing some deft tight rope walking between the two communities, Muslims have economically prospered. Some sections of Sinhalas and Tamils feel the Muslim have taken advantage of the period of LTTE insurgency when the Tamil business community was under siege. So there could be a class angle to the support extended to the BBS.

The BBS tactics seem to be working as its strength is growing in direct proportion to the heat generated by its message and the number of protests it organises against Muslims and to a lesser extent on Christians. In a show of strength, more than 1300 Buddhist monks and 15,000 people attended a BBS rally in Colombo on February 17, 2013. 

In the year 2013, barely a year after it was founded in 2012, BBS carried out approximately 241 attacks against Muslims while Christians fared slightly better with 61 instances of attacks on them according to a report compiled by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

The 50-page SLMC report titled “Religious violence in Sri Lanka in Sri Lanka” was handed over to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mrs Navanetham Pillay by none other than the Minister of Justice Rauf Hakeem, leader of the SLMC!

MrsNavanetham Pillay, presumably drew upon the SLMC report  when she spoke at the last UNHRC session. In her oral report on Sri Lanka she spoke of the surge in incitement of hatred and violence against religious minorities, including attacks on churches and mosques, and lack of swift action against the perpetrators.

Apparently the success of BBS has unnerved the JHU which had considered itself as the sole protectors of Buddhism. It has added its penny’s worth to inciting anti-Muslim sentiments with its share of hate speeches. And other copy cat organizations of the BBS like the Ravana Balaya have come up to add to the mischief.  

Many religious leaders including Buddhist prelates, civil society organisations and leaders of political and social spectrum have condemned the activities of BBS as a threat to national unity.  But at the same time, BBS’s theme and some of the demands have found support from some of the Island’s prestigious Buddhist religious heads like the Assigiriya Maha Nayake. Some educational institutions have banned the wearing of burkha by Muslim students.

It is difficult to imagine such acts of lawlessness taking place against a politically important minority community without the knowledge of the hands-on President Rajapaksa. Beyond appealing to the people for national unity, the President seems to have done little to ease the growing feeling of insecurity of Muslims and Christians.

One would have expected the President to take serious notice of BBS’ anti-Muslim activities particularly after the SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem had presented his report to the UNHRC. But Rajapaksa’s immediate response was to severely reprimand Rauf Hakeem for submitting such report to the UNHRC. Other partners of the UPFA coalition accused the Muslim minister for “washing dirty linen in the public.”

The official line trotted out to explain government inaction is ludicrous. In early 2014, Media Minister Keheliya Rambukwella called the anti-Muslim acts "minor agitations that are normal in any multicultural society." According a report he said it was intended to encourage community members to work out their own problems adding "If things get more serious, we will take action...These kinds of things can ruin a nation, we are aware of that."

The BBS is also involved in a slanging match with the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) led by Minister for Industry and Commerce Rishad Bathiudeen after the BBS accused of Muslims of illegally settling in Wilpattu forests. The activities of BBS seem to have unnerved Bathiudeen who had been a long term loyalist of President Rajapaksa. The ACMC rejoinder said the apparent impunity with which BBS was acting raised questions whether it was running ‘a parallel government’ like the LTTE during its existence. The ACMC called for a ‘Commission of Inquiry’ to look into post-war incidents against minorities in general and Muslims in particular.

The Minister for National Languages and Social Integration, Vasudeva Nanayakara, who had been critical of BBS, in a recent interview to Ceylon Today said it should be proscribed by law, as it was disrupting religious harmony in the country. He said the dormant attitude adopted by the police, especially with regard to the BBS and its actions, was due to the political immunity that the organization enjoyed through the intervention of a high-ranking government official.

Significantly he said, "I can clearly say that the BBS is enjoying support from a high-ranking State official. That is why its members are behaving in such a manner. Even the police are lenient towards them owing to this. There is someone impeding the police from carrying out investigations against the BBS."

The Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had shown some interest in the BBS. He was the Chief Guest at the opening of Meth Sevana, the Buddhist Leadership Academy started by the BBS on March 9, 2013.

According to a media report the Defence Secretary in his speech on the occasion had said that he decided to attend the event “after realising its timely importance…. these Buddhist clergy who are engaged in a nationally important task should not be feared or doubted by anyone.” According to the BBS, it was Gotabaya who ensured products displaying Halal certification were withdrawn from the market.

Whether he would support the BBS’ unsavoury activities, unless it is a part of a political agenda is the moot question.

The Muslim community in Sri Lanka is barely two million strong, forming just 10 percent of the island’s population. Most of them speak Tamil, and like Sri Lanka Tamils, have links with their brethren across the Palk Strait in Tamil Nadu. Muslims, like other Tamil speaking minority, are divided vertically and horizontally along sectarian, and class and occupational affinities.

Despite these limitations they have been great survivors – both politically and socially – during the difficult years when they had to survive the LTTE-led Tamil insurgency. In fact, they had developed the fine art of survival not only in the war between the government and the Tamil Tigers but between the two major parties – the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

It is evident Muslim political partners of President Rajapaksa are feeling frustrated sy the failure of the government to rein in BBS and curb its anti Muslim agenda. If unchecked, the President runs the risk of alienating the Muslim community. Together with the Tamils who already feel let down by Rajapaksa, the two communities make about 20 percent of the national vote share which is vital for success in the Presidential poll.

Can the President afford to alienate these votes with the hope of increasing his support among Southern Sinhalas?

Of course, continued government inaction in checking the BBS’ free run would also belie the government’s sincerity in attending to minority concerns. And it is not going to help Sri Lanka’s case at the UNHRC when it seriously takes up implementing the resolution.

So what is the larger political agenda at work in allowing space for Sinhala chauvinist activities of the BBS kind?  People of Sri Lanka would start demanding answer for this question from the President when the time comes.  

 (Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)  

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Sri Lanka Update No 243 Note No 715,              April 22, 2014-04-22                       

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1502