India-China cooperation in counter-terrorism: Q & A

Col R Hariharan

Here are my answers given to a columnist’s e-mail questions on the subject.

1.       The main source of anti-India terrorism is Pakistan. In the event of a hijacking, for instance, by a Pak-based group, will Sino-Indian co-operation be possible? What is the scope of operational cooperation in counter-terrorism between India and China?

This question on operational cooperation in counter-terrorism between India and China covers two different issues: one pertains to aircraft hijacking and the other relates to the scope of such cooperation in general.

China is a party to two multilateral treaties relating to hijacking. Under the Hague Hijacking Convention of 1970 (Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft), China has agreed to prohibit and punish hijacking of civilian aircraft (other than aircraft of customs, law enforcement and military). Based on the principles of this convention China must also prosecute the hijacker if he is not extradited.

As a signatory to the Beijing Convention of 2010 (Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation) adopted after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist hijacking, China has also agreed to criminalise terrorists using civil aircraft as a weapon and the use ofa dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets on the ground as well as for the illegal transportation of bacterial, chemical and nuclear weapons.

So if India seeks China’s operational cooperation in a case of hijacking, China will be expected to positively respond under these two conventions. One can expect China to conform to this requirement, as it increasingly wants to be accepted by the international community as a responsible power in keeping with its growing global influence. Moreover, China is a promoter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) formed with the primary aim of fostering cooperation and coordination through networked action among the member-countries against terrorism.  And China has invited India to join the SCO.

However, as if the hijacking is carried out by a Pak-based terrorist body, China’s response is likely to be qualitatively different. If the hijacker lands the aircraft in Chinese territory we can expect the response to be swift as it would be difficult for the Chinese to discern the aim of the terrorist group. China hates Pak-based Jihadi terrorist groups and suspects their hand in the increasing Uighur extremist acts in Xinjiang. It is also wary of Tibetan insurgency sprouting once again.

However, Indian Special Forces are unlikely to be permitted to carry out the operation to apprehend the hijackers on Chinese soil. The PLA Special Forces have been carrying out intense training in refining their anti-hijacking drills. Anti-hijacking, hostage rescue, and bomb disposal now form part of the counter terrorism training regime of the Police and People’s Armed Police (PAP) also in the last three years after Uighur extremists’ stepped up their acts. So China would not like India or any other country to carryout operations against hijackers. To do so would be a loss of face for China.

However, if Pak-based hijackers are apprehended, Pakistan would not want China to hand them over to India. As Pakistan is a close and long-standing strategic South Asian ally of China, Beijing would be averse to handing over the apprehended hijackers to India. So the extradition process could be delayed using bureaucratic and legal process as a ploy. China might provide provided secret access to Pakistan to meet with the hijackers in custody before India is extended the same facility. In the unlikely event of the hijackers managing to take off (or being let off) in the aircraft after using Chinese territory as an intermediary stop, China can be expected to share all available information with India. Of course China is likely to take into consideration of Pak sensitivities while sharing such information.

2.       To what extent have joint military exercises contributed to confidence building between India and China?

Mutual confidence is built by understanding achieved through cooperation between the two countries. Even between two democracies, say the U.S. and India, military plays only a small but important part of the confidence building process. Joint military exercises provide hands on opportunity to build professional and social networking between the two forces at various levels which helps the Process to progress.

Indian and Chinese armed forces enjoy have a totally different say in the overall confidence building measures between the two countries.  Indian armed forces are creatures of the government. They have a very limited say in even in strategic security issues. Progressively their role has been pruned over the years to that of being on ‘listening watch’ (to use military terminology).

Nothing illustrates this better than the India-China Defence and Security Consultation programme meeting held in New Delhi February 24, 2014. It was co-chaired by Indian Defence Secretary RK Mathur and Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA General Wang Guanzhong. The decision to hold the joint military exercise Hand-in-Hand 2014 was taken at this meeting.

Unlike Indian armed forces, the PLA enjoys an exalted status as one of two ‘sword arms’ (the other being the government) of the Chinese Communist Party to further the Party interests. This gives PLA a vastly superior status in deciding national policy let alone on strategic security policy. Moreover, the Chinese General Staff Department lays great emphasis on military diplomacy and has a foreign relations institute to train its officers.

Indian armed forces at present can play only a peripheral role in confidence building measures between the two countries.  And as a corollary, the joint military exercises serve as the barometer of progress of the confidence building process between the two countries rather than a major influence in shaping it.

China’s joint military exercises with most of the other countries including the U.S. are at platoon or lower levels. The focus of these exercises is mostly on basic techniques of counter-terrorism or “drills” as the Chinese call it.

The fourth “Hand-in-Hand” India-China anti-terrorism joint exercise lasting nine days has concluded last week. The armies of the two countries organised the first-ever “Hand-in-Hand” joint exercise in Yunnan in 2007 as a part of the overall confidence building measures agreed upon by the two countries. The second Hand-in-Hand exercise was organised in Belgaum in 2008. About 60 troops (a company minus) from both sides participated in these exercises.

The exercises were to be an annual feature. However, India called off the 2009-exercise after China denied a regular visa to the Army Commander of the Northern Common to attend a meeting in China as he belonged to Jammu and Kashmir, which it said was a disputed territory. However, both countries agreed upon resuming the annual training event after China relented and started issuing regular visas to Jammu and Kashmir residents last year.  

The third joint exercise was held in Chengdu in November 2013 with 144 troops (nearly two companies) from the Sikh Light Infantry and an equal number of PLA troops participating. According to the Chinese media, the 10-day exercise included demonstration of weapons, exchange of tactics and training in arrest to suspects and rescue of hostages.

These low level, basic exercises have limited value in confidence building between the two armies. At best they contribute to providing a window of opportunity towards confidence building at higher levels in the future.

However, naval forces are an exception to this; the world over they have a culture of joint exercises and cooperation at sea. Indian Navy and PLA-Navy also have taken part in joint and multilateral exercises at sea.   

3.       Have all the military exercises between India and China so far focussed on counter-terrorism only? Why?

This question is probably best answered by the army chiefs of both countries. PLA’s main focus in training for the last four years has been at two levels: on refining its joint operation capabilities in a modern C3IS battlefield scenario and the other on improving their basic drills at subunit level.

China has been using joint exercises with the armies of other nations to broaden the PLA’s military knowledge as well as understand their operational techniques particularly relating to counter-terrorism. Indian army has a rich experience in combating extremism, and insurgency and its Special Forces are trained in counter-terrorism strategies. So China’s interest in Indian army’s combat techniques in counter-terrorist setting is understandable.  

PLA has been carrying out regimental level combat group (equivalent to Indian army’s brigade combat group) exercises mostly with Russia to improve its ability to optimise its modernised weapons and delivery systems and logistics by improving the coordination between the three wings of armed forces in what the Chinese call ‘informatized’ scenario (it refers networked command, control and information systems using land, sea, air and space) of modern battlefield. Even in these exercises the emphasis has been on counter-terrorism operations at the regimental group level.    

China’s singular focus of China on counter-terrorism is probably related to the CPC’s concern in maintaining internal harmony due to ethnic minorities dominant in the border regions of the country like Tibet and Xinjiang, which have sustained movements demanding independence for over five decades.  China has a long history of warlords from these regions challenging the central authority. Considering this, it would be reasonable to conclude India-China joint exercises also focus on counter-terrorism at the request of China.

4.       Aren’t other agencies like NSG and CRPF the ones who will respond first in a terrorism situation? Why then do the Sino-Indian counter-terrorism exercises involve the

China considers all unconventional armed anti-state threats as terrorism.The PLA controls the armed police forces used in counter-terrorism operations along with troops. These operations are controlled by the military district accountable to the military regional headquarters. Police work is also closely coordinated with the military operations.  

In India the Home Ministry of the state or the Centre controls uses state and central police forces and paramilitary forces for operations against unconventional anti-state threats including terrorism. The operation against Left Wing Extremism is a case in point. Of course armed forces Special Forces are also requisitioned in certain operations i.e., 26/11 operations. Army is given charge of operations in exceptional circumstances as in Jammu and Kashmir or in the North East when the Centre feels the situation is beyond the capability paramilitary forces. The command and control of such operations has always been amorphous as we have not been able resolve it satisfactorily between the Home and Defence departments.

With such doctrinal differences between the two countries in handling such threats, it probably makes more sense for China to organise joint exercises with Indian army rather than with central paramilitary forces.  

Written on October 23, 2014

[Col R Hariharan a retired MI specialist on South Asia is associated with Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group.   E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ]

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies Paper No. 2069 dated October 31, 2014 http://www.c3sindia.org/india/4596 

Sri Lanka: Comments India and the ECJ annulment of the LTTE's inclusion in the EU's list of terrorist organisations

By Col R Hariharan

[Here are answers to e-mail questions raised by a legal analyst on the recent ECJ judgement annulment of the inclusion of the LTTE in EU terrorist organisations list.]

General Court of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 138/14 Luxembourg, 16 October 2014 Judgment in Joined Cases T-208/11 and T-508/11  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) v Council

The Court annuls, on procedural grounds, the Council measures maintaining the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on the European list of terrorist organisations.  However, the effects of the annulled measures are maintained temporarily in order to ensure the effectiveness of any possible future freezing of funds.

The Tamil Diaspora is quite large here in the West but do you think that if the LTTE ban was removed in India, it would pose a threat to our national security in India? A step towards this was done in Europe by removing the sanctions on the group by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) just few days ago.

Fortunately, the ECJ does not advise Indian government on its policy. It does not matter to European Union if they nurture one more terrorist organisation as they have given refuge to scores of them historically in the past. These included Chechen terrorists, Jihadi supporters, and Tamil terrorists till they posed no threat to EU members.

But India has been fighting extremism, insurgency, terrorism and a number of armed separatist and anti-state armed movements for over five decades.  Any threat posed by the LTTE remnants to India's national security would be minuscule.  The ban on LTTE was not imposed based on its capability to pose a threat to national security but based on its long history of extremism and terrorism and waging war on a friendly neighbour using India as a source of assistance.

The ban on the organisation which had engineered the assassination of former PM Rajiv Gandhi and scores of others who had sought refuge in India is unlikely to be removed in the near future for two reasons.

At least three instances of LTTE remnants attempting to revive the organisation using Tamil Nadu as a base to recruit/train potential cadres for induction into Sri Lanka have come light.  Secondly, the threat of Jihadi terrorism using Sri Lanka as a launch pad has become real after the apprehension of a few agents belonging to Sri Lanka.  And Tamil Nadu has been targeted by Jihadi elements in the recent past.  The unearthing of links of Bangladesh JMB Islamic extremists in West Bengal have raised questions about their possible linkages in Tamil Nadu. 

The  LTTE has in the past used   other extremist organisations like Maoists in India to further its aim. So it would not be beyond the realm of probability for Jihadi elements and LTTE using each other to further their interests in India and Sri Lanka.

No security agency would agree to take that risk of lifting the ban on LTTE at present. 

Do you think the LTTE remainders have learned to embrace India since IPKF days?

This question is not understood. Who wants LTTE to "embrace" India?

Since the IPKF days, LTTE assassins murdered Rajiv Gandhi and 14 leaders and cadres of EPRLF in India. Even after being wiped out in Sri Lanka LTTE remnants have not "learned" to carry out a realistic assessment on their leadership and organisational failure in the last Eelam War. The LTTE remnants  are still carrying out a black campaign against India for LTTE's failure to win a war they "embraced" when they were offered a chance for peace with an honourable agreement; not only that even now India is blamed for  all that is going wrong for Tamils in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.

I doubt whether anyone in India including Kalaignar Karunanidhi and Ms Jayalalithaa who support Tamil Eelam referendum want the LTTE anywhere near them. For that matter even among Tamil Diaspora many do not want LTTE to come near them, let alone its "embrace".

I don't see any chance of a "Tamil Eelam" without Indian support but of course I agree that the people who committed the atrocities in the last days of the war should be punished.

Are you asking me to comment on this? If anyone still expects India to support "Tamil Eelam" they should revisit India's record against the creation of Tamil Eelam as an independent entity. Support for united Sri Lanka is an article of faith in India's Sri Lanka policy. It is also commitment India made in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. Every Indian prime minister has reiterated this commitment to Sri Lanka.

I agree with you that all those committed atrocities in the Eelam war (why last days only?) should be punished. But that should include the LTTE including remnants who have sought refuge abroad.

​(Col R Hariharan, a former MI officer, served as the head of intelligence with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90). Email:haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info)

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 5808 dated Oct 21, 2014 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1639#sthash.5ks9m4Zn.dpuf

Sri Lanka: Comments on military presence in Northern Province

Col R Hariharan

[Answer to a print media question on the subject is given in this article.]

The Northern Provincial Council has asked the Sri Lankan defence forces to vacate from their province. According to the TNA leaders the army occupies nearly 25 per cent of the total land area in the province. But according to the Sri Lankan ministry of defence the total area under the forces in NPC is less than five per cent. Isn’t the army justified in occupying a small portion of land in a former conflict zone? What are your comments?

This is a slightly complex question linked to the post war socio-political environment in Sri Lanka and Northern Province.

Right to station troops anywhere in the country 

There is no doubt the Sri Lanka Government has every right to station troops in Northern Province or anywhere else in the country. Nobody would have questioned it in normal circumstances. Northern Province was involved in an armed conflict waged by the LTTE and the govt for over 25 years and together both sides have lost a total of over 100,000 lives in the serial wars. After the rout of the LTTE, the people of Northern Province who had lost their kith and kin, livelihood, properties and much more are yet to fully recover from the trauma of war.

During the last five years the government’s efforts have been mostly to revamp the public services and infrastructure. It has failed to attend to their political, social and survival problems As a result the government has failed to create climate of security and trust in its actions among the public. Had the government approached the problem of rehabilitation with greater sensitivity probably nobody would have objected to the continued presence of army in the midst of predominantly Tamil province.  

Un-kept promises on devolution

Ever since he came to power, President Rajapaksa had made repeated promises to India and the international community to devolve reasonable powers to Northern and Eastern provinces.

In a report in The Hindu of October 29, 2008 of an interview with the President said:  “Asked about the contours of the political solution he had in mind, Mr. Rajapaksa explained his four ‘Ds’ approach – Demilitarisation, Democratisation, Development, and Devolution. When the 13th Amendment was introduced in the Sri Lankan Constitution at the instance of the Indian government, it could not be implemented in the North and the East because “there was no political will on either side to implement it.” But as a political leader, he had announced his government’s “intention of implementing this for the first time. We have given that assurance to the Tamil people of my country and to the international community. We are going to do it. This is not to satisfy anybody. It is my duty by the people of this country.” But he never kept up his promises; all that has happened since then was he stopped speaking about 4 Ds and 2 Ds – demilitarisation and devolution – have been forgotten.

India extended support to President Rajapaksa's Eelam War despite severe domestic opposition from Tamil Nadu because Rajapaksa promised to implement not only the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (giving a level of autonomy to Tamils) but go beyond that (13+). He has not given what he can or cannot give when TNA presented its demands when they held 15 rounds of meetings. He has used the ploy of leaving the job of evolving a consensus solution to the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) in which no opposition party is participating as they suspect its credentials.

This PSC was a needless exercise as in the history of Sri Lanka as many as five commissions have examined in detail the different aspects of Tamil autonomy question. So clearly Rajapaksa is trying to buy time using PSC rather than resolve the issue. This has created a crisis of confidence not only among Tamils and opposition parties but in India as well as among international community about Rajapaksa's credibility. This is affecting the perspectives of various stakeholders in viewing other related issues like the presence of army in Northern Province.   

Structural problems 

Records of ownership documents of land of people affected by war are not readily available. So through process of inquiry  to decide the rightful ownership of land is being carried out by administration. This is a slow process and has provided an opportunity for others including the army to delay the return of the land to the owners. Actually a case filed by over affected people is pending in the courts to speed up the return of the land seized by the LTTE and later by the army from the LTTE to the owners.

The chief minister of Northern Province can hardly fulfil the promises TNA made during the elections on restoration of land to the rightful owners. He can do little about it because he does not have a say even in the appointment of a chief secretary of the province let alone major issues. In this environment only mutual hostility between Colombo and Jaffna seem to be flourishing. Naturally theTNA is peeved.

TNA's burden

The TNA had acted as the political proxy in parliament for LTTE before the war. Some of its members who are ardent supporters of the LTTE and independent Tamil Eelam have not been able to come to terms with the failure of LTTE's war which cost at least 80,000 young lives to achieve the goal of separate Tamil Eelam. Their latent sympathies have been fanned by overseas remnants of the LTTE who are trying to stage a comeback in Tamil areas.   Though they do not enjoy support from most of the people, even their failed attempts are enough to raise the suspicion of the army as they would never allow separatist insurgency to raise its head anywhere once again.  

This has helped to create paranoia about the revival of Tamil militancy among Sinhala population. Politically it suits Rajapaksa to keep this paranoia alive to retain Southern Sinhala support intact. It also provides a justification for the army’s continued presence in strength in Northern Province. On the other hand TNA often speaks in two voices due to schism within the leadership in taking a more pragmatic approach to curb separatist and militant voices within the leadership. So the ethnic suspicions continue to remain in Sri Lanka colouring all political actions.  

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of intelligence with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ] 

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies www.c3sindia.org   

Sri Lanka Perspectives – September 2014

Col R Hariharan

Presidential poll

There is widespread speculation about a snap presidential election early next year around January 9. President Mahinda Rajapaksa who returned  after attending  the UN General Assembly session, is expected to  take a final call on this soon. He was said to be waiting to decide on the presidential poll after the Uva Provincial Council election which has concluded now. According to media reports the Government has already started the preparatory work for an election likely to be held early next year.

Already some of the coalition partners like the right wing the Jathika Hela Urumaya(JHU) have indicated that their partnership of the UPFA should not be taken for granted. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) which had been on a war path with President Rajapaksa,has sought legal opinion from foreign experts for advice on the Constitutional propriety of  Rajapaksa contesting for a third term before completing his full term of six years ending only in November 2016. 

Already allegations of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) misusing government servants for their electoral preparations have started coming. UNP leader Karu Jayasuriya alleged eight prominent government officials and 62 chairmen of government institutions had participated at the opening of the SLFP election propaganda office in Colombo on September 25 for the presidential election. He feared the presidential election would not be held in a free and fair manner because the UPFA Government had already decided to deploy the entire state machinery in its campaign for the election.

Uva Provincial Council elections

The opposition UNP staged a comeback in the Uva Provincial Council elections winning 13 seats as against 7  seats it won in the 2009 poll. Though the UPFA retained the majority, its winning tally came down to 19 (including two bonus seats for securing the highest number of votes) from 25 seats  in the last provincial election. The JVP managed to secure two seats while former Army Commander Fonseka’s Democratic Party drew a blank.  

Though Uva is the smallest province with a national vote share of about 7%, many consider the results as an indication of increasing disenchantment of voters with the UPFA alliance. The UNP leader Harin Fernando has emerged as the hero of UNP victory. The UNP’s improved performance was probably helped by the patching up between Ranil Wickremesinghe and the challenger for leadership mantle Sajith Premadasa at least for the time being. 

The media has alleged the ruling alliance of indulging in widespread violence and offer of cash to voters during the run up to the elections which appears to be an increasing factor in Sri Lanka elections. Some locals have attributed the ruling alliance’s failure to loss of confidence in the UPFA and to two senior cabinet ministers from the Province indulging in widespread corruption.

Though the UNP’s mood is upbeat after the election, the ruling SLFP party appears to be confident of Rajapaksa leading the UPFA to victory.

President Rajapaksa at the UN

Political parties in Tamil Nadu had vociferously taken up the litany of Tamil Diaspora activists calling upon the UN not to allow President Rajapaksa to address the UN General Assembly meeting held during the month. But Indian government chose to ignore it. Even in Tamil Nadu the mood was not upbeat on the subject.

President Rajapaksa addressed the UN General Assembly and explained his objections to the UNHRC initiated inquiry commission. He also had a cordial meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. A day after that, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Flavia Pansier submitting a summary of the update urged the Sri Lankan Government to keep the channels open with regards to the UN investigation on Sri Lanka.

In the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) update, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein urged the Sri Lanka Government to end the climate of intimidation, threat and harassment against civil society actors advocating for justice and human rights, as well as incitement to hatred and violence against the country’s Muslim and Christian minorities, which would only undermine the prospects for peace and reconciliation.

Miscellaneous

Myanmar’s anti-Muslim monk in Sri Lanka: Myanmar’s controversial anti-Muslim Buddhist cleric  Ashin Wirathu, leader of the 969 Movement, visiting Sri Lanka at the invitation of Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) known for its anti-Muslim activism has announced that his movement would join hands with the BBS “to protect Buddhists all round the world," against Islamic extremism. The Myanmar cleric was addressing a BBS convention held at Colombo. Sri Lanka had allowed the controversial Myanmar monk to attend the BBS convention despite objections from Muslims in Sri Lanka.

India’s assistance: India has set up a language lab in Kandy to improve Sri Lanka’s general level of proficiency in English language. The initiative aims to familiarise English teachers with recent trends in English language teaching to upgrade their skills.

Chinese submarine berths in Colombo: A Chinese diesel-electric Type 039 "Song-class" submarine berthed in Colombo for the first time.  The Chinese government said the submarine had made a replenishment stopover in Sri Lanka on way to the Gulf of Aden for escort and anti-piracy operations, as was the "common practice" for navies around the world. This is yet another indicator of the ever-increasing forays of the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) after gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka.   

Written on September 30, 2014 

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, October 2014, Vol.8 No.9

www.security-risks.com