Col R
Hariharan
Prime Minister Narendra Modi spelled
out his vision for India in his Independence Day address on August 15 at New
Delhi. From this and from his speeches at various national forums, major components
of the vision would appear to be:[i]
- Boost India’s industrial growth by inviting investors and manufacturers from all over the world to invest to infrastructure building and to make things in India. This would unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of Indian youth to work towards manufacturing in the country and generate jobs.
- To upgrade digital infrastructure as a priority to upgrade information and services to the people ‘in a timely and effective manner.’ Smart cities would be planned to towards this end.
- Public services at the grass root would be improved to provide better governance, quality of education, healthcare and clean environment through empowered administration and peoples’ participation while maintaining social cohesion with gender equity.
- To retain India’s strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region and enlarge it in keeping with its growing global economic power.
The Prime Minister launched a series of
foreign policy initiatives within the first 120 days in office. These included
visits to Bhutan and Nepal in India’s immediate neighbourhood, attending the
BRICS summit at Rio de Janeiro and visits to Japan and the U.S. In New Delhi he
received a number of visiting foreign dignitaries. Notable among them were the
Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
Breaking away from India’s traditional
laid back foreign policy mould, Modi’s foreign visits and interactions were
well publicized and conducted with a lot of pizzazz. He was proactive, clear
and assertive. Of course, his style grated the sensitivities of some of the
experienced senior diplomats and bureaucrats. They found it loud and at times
abrasive and his speeches unabashedly nationalistic.
However, Modi managed to
catch the attention of people and leaders wherever he went because he could
relate to the common people and make India relevant to them. Moreover, the
emerging international geo-strategic environment has made global leaders take
notice of India’s new and highly visible leader as never before for their own
reasons.[ii]
Both at home and abroad Modi
articulated India’s desire to be treated on equal terms by big powers like the
U.S., China and Japan. He assured that small countries would be treated as
equals regardless of their size. There were two common threads running in all
his interactions India’s readiness to build a cordial and harmonious
relationship with all nations; and invitation to international business and
investment to benefit from his initiatives to revamp Indian economy by building
a better business environment. His objective was clearly to attract foreign
investment to boost in Indian manufacturing and infrastructure industries
without sacrificing India’s interests as the Make in India slogan emphasized.[iii]
His readiness to listen to the business
community on restructuring the business environment and bureaucracy to make it
easier to do business in India showed his primary aim was to market India as a
favoured destination for foreign business and investment. It would be
reasonable to expect this would apply even to countries which do not enjoy a
cordial strategic equation like China and Pakistan.
Modi’s visit to Bhutan and Nepal within
first few weeks in office appeared hastily planned, allowing little time for
the hosts to be ready. But read along with his invitation to SAARC leaders
(including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) to attend his swearing-in as
Prime Minister, his message was clear: India’s first priority in foreign
relations would be to improve the bonding with India’s South Asian neighbours.
Modi’s priority is understandable because India’s political, economic and
strategic relations had suffered neglect under the earlier regime. With China
making huge inroads in the neighbourhood, India’s strategic influence has become
hostage to enlarging Chinese presence in South Asia.
The invitation extended to Pakistan
Prime Minister and cordial meeting Modi had with him showed his readiness to
resume talks with his Pakistani counterpart which had come to a halt sometime
back.[iv]
Of course, there was no progress beyond that presumably due to the Pakistan
Prime Minister’s internal problems with the army which continues to influence
foreign policy decisions of the government.[v]
Big power initiatives
Modi’s talks with Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe of Japan, President Xi Jinping of China and President Barak Obama had very
large strategic content. Equal weightage has been
given to economic cooperation as well. They brought out the contours of
Modi’s foreign policy discourse. Apart from discussing bilateral issues linked
to visa restrictions, strategic initiatives and trade and commerce, he
discussed multilateral issues like regional security, freedom to interact and
transact, global warming and intellectual property rights. His talks with the visiting Australian Prime Minister Tony
Abbot in New Delhi resulted in an agreement to import uranium from Australia
for India's civil nuclear programme. This fitted well in the overall strategic
security picture he was mapping.
Former Sri Lankan diplomat Dr. Kathira
Pathiyagoda analyzing India’s soft power in an article in The Diplomat found
that with “some diplomatic craftsmanship, Delhi can convert its somewhat
ethereal values-based soft power advantage into hard strategic and economic
gains. Modi’s government seems to have recognized this and is building on
Congress’ initiatives to enhance India’s public diplomacy toolkit. India’s soft
power has rare characteristics when compared with the other great powers of the
emerging multi-polar world: U.S., China, Russia, Japan and Europe (as a unified
entity).”[vi]
He found India’s relatively neutral,
non-threatening image would make “India
a uniquely attractive great-power
partner for countries looking to hedge against future fallout between the U.S.
and China, and not wanting to antagonize either superpower. Australia has
chosen a wise time to solidify ties with one of the world’s most dynamic rising
powers.” Despite Dr Pathiyagoda’s positive observation Modi is likely to find the
task of balancing India’s strategic relationships with the two antagonists -
Japan and China - a tough foreign policy challenge. And if the U.S.-China
relationship also worsens, it could get even more complicated.
Relationship building with Japan
Modi has been enjoying a close personal
equation with Abe even before he became the Indian Prime Minister. He chose
Japan as the first overseas destination outside India’s immediate
neighbourhood. Abe appreciation of this gesture found a mention in his Joint
Statement with Modi.[vii]
The Joint Statement also mentioned Modi’s decision to visit Japan first as “a
reflection of Japan’s importance in India’s foreign policy and economic
development and her place at the heart of India’s Look East Policy.” On the other hand, though President Xi
Jinping was keen to visit India for his formal meeting with Modi. However, his
visit had to be postponed at India’s request and he met Modi only after the
Indian Prime Minister came back from Japan. The importance Modi attached to
meeting with Abe first would not be missed by China.
Modi courted Japanese business with the
mantra of ‘Make in India’ and 3Ds (Democracy, Demography and Demand) that make
India best place to do business. There are mixed views about the results
achieved by Mr, Modi in Japan. The Economic Times’ list of ten takeaways from Mr. Modi’s
Japan visit include the upgrading of Special Strategic Global partnership,
which has ominous portends for China in the context of its ongoing
confrontation with
Japan.[viii]
The Abe-Modi Joint Statement
suggestively titled “Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Strategic and Global
Partnership” said “a closer and stronger strategic partnership between India
and Japan is indispensable for advancing peace, stability and prosperity in the
world, in particular, in the inter-connected Asia, Pacific and Indian Ocean
Regions.” The statement also underlined the “importance of the 2 plus 2
dialogue, involving Foreign and Defence Secretaries for their growing strategic
partnership,” and the decision to seek ways to intensify this dialogue
indicating the future course for chartering India-Japan strategic relationship.[ix]
But Modi is unlikely to be swayed by Abe in entering
into a multilateral strategic arrangement with Japan as it would inevitably be
pitted against China with which India shares nearly 4000 km of border; moreover
it would not further his agenda to leverage China’s economic muscle for India’s
economic development.
The Joint Statement’s reference to the
“enormous future potential for transfer and collaborative projects in defence
equipment and technology” between the two countries, on cooperation in US-2
amphibian aircraft and its technology and launch of working level consultations
between the two countries to promote defence equipment and technology
cooperation assume importance in view of India’s decision to open up defence
sector for private sector with higher foreign participation.
Such statements frequently referring to
strategic relationship drew serious attention from China. Modi’s statement:
“Everywhere around us, we see an 18th Century expansionist mindset:
encroaching on another country, intruding in others’ waters, invading other countries
and capturing territory” while addressing business leaders in Tokyo with strong
connotations for China’s power assertion in South China and East China seas.
This was perhaps a little too much for
Chinese media. This was reflected in the editorial of Global Times, which
reflects the China’s Communist Paty(CCP)’s views, on September 2, 2014 aptly
titled “Modi-Abe intimacy brings scant comfort”.[x] The editorial said: “Japanese and western
public opinion view his remarks as a clear reference to China, although he did
not mention China by name. This interpretation made some sense because Modi is
more intimate to Tokyo emotionally. Therefore, it is perhaps a fact that he
embraces some nationalist sentiments against China.” And probably this is
what makes China a little less comfortable and uncertain with Modi than with
his predecessor Dr Manmohan Singh.
Overall, Modi’s visit to Japan probably achieved less than
what he aimed at. But Japan’s promise to invest $ 34 billion in India spread
over the next five years gave a boost to Mr. Modi’s to kick start Indian
economy. It is significant that they were mostly in sectors where China would
be in competition. On the other hand, the much awaited India-Japan civilian
nuclear deal did not come through; the two leaders only agreed to accelerate talks on a nuclear energy
pact. But Japan’s interest in building the strategic relationship and
cooperating with India in defence technology and manufacture are important
inputs to upgrade India’s military capability.
Reviving India-U.S. strategic partnership
Prime Minister Modi’s
two days of talks with President Obama during his visit to the U.S. removed any
doubts the Americans might have had about Modi’s readiness to mend relaations
with the U.S. Modi and Obama agreed to deepen U.S.-India cooperation on
maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation in what Reuters news agency
said amounted “to a response to China’s muscle flexing in Asia.”[xi] The Modi-Obama Joint Statement said Obama
and Modi agreed "to intensify cooperation in maritime security to ensure
freedom of navigation and unimpeded movement of lawful shipping and commercial
activity, in accordance with accepted principles of international law."[xii]
It is interesting to note the similarity in the wording of this part to the
Modi-Abe Joint Statement.
The Joint Statement also noted the “decision to renew for ten more years the 2005 Framework for the
U.S.-India Defense Relationship and directed their defense teams to develop
plans for more ambitious programs and activities. The two leaders also
agreed to reinvigorate the Political-Military Dialogue and expand its role to
serve as a wider dialogue on export licensing, defense cooperation and
strategic cooperation.” The reference to establish a Task Force “to
expeditiously evaluate and decide on unique projects and technologies which
would have a transformational impact on bilateral defence relations and enhance
India’s defence industry and military capabilities” is a key indicator of the
future course of Indo-U.S strategic relationship. .
India-China relations
There was huge expectation from
President Xi Jinping’s visit to India because China was the first to reach out
to Modi soon after the elections. Premier Li Keqiang was the first foreign
dignitary to call up Modi to congratulate him after the election. There was
adequate preparation for the meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi visiting
India in June 2014. Both President Xi and Prime Minister Modi had expressed
their desire to build harmonious and cordial relations when they met briefly on
the sidelines of BRICS Summit at Rio de Janeiro on July 14.
Modi
broke the tradition to receive the Chinese President in Ahmedabad instead of
the national capital. Presumably the
idea was to show case what has been achieved by Chinese investments in Gujarat
to prime him for extending it to the rest of India. It had all the paegentry we
are increasingly seeing in the Prime Minister’s initiatives to create a less
formal atmosphere. It went off well with the Chinese agreeing to invest $6.8
billion in two industrial parks in Gujarat and Maharashtra. So this vetted the
expectations from the Chinese when President Xi met Prime Minister Modi in
formal talks in New Delhi.
Their
talks in Ahmedabad and New Delhi were held in a cordial atmosphere and both
sides discussed the full range of issues including political and security
issues, economic relations and people to people contact. The positive take was
the Chinese agreeing to invest $20 billion in next five years and President Xi
agreeing to take “concrete steps to attend to Indian concerns on slowing down in
trade and India’s worsening trade imbalance. He also assured Modi to improve
market access and investment opportunities to Indian companies.
But the
positive vibrations generated earlier were disturbed by the news of over 1000
Chinese troops intruding across the line of actual control in the Ladakh region
even as the two leaders were in discussion on September 18. This was evident
from the body language of the two leaders at the joint media interaction after
the talks. A significant aspect of the Xi-Modi talks was that there was no
joint statement.
In his
statement at their joint press interaction, Modi said “we discussed how to strengthen cooperation, we have also exchanged
views on outstanding differences in our relationship in a spirit of candour and
friendship.”
Touching
upon the border intrusion he said India’s
“serious concern over repeated incidents along the border” were raised in the
discussions. “We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region
constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for
realizing the full potential of our relationship. This is an important
understanding, which should be strictly observed. While our border related
agreements and confidence building measures have worked well, I also suggested
that clarification of Line of Actual Control would greatly contribute to our
efforts to maintain peace and tranquility and requested President Xi to resume
the stalled process of clarifying the LAC. We should also seek an early
settlement of the boundary question.” This is an unmistakable declaration of
what the two countries have to resolve if China wants durable friendly
relations with India.[xiii]
President Xi had no worthwhile reply to explain the intrusion and his assurance
on troops withdrawal came into effect only after a few days.
It must have come as a disappointment for President Xi that
he could not carry Modi on joining the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road, for which he has already bagged the support of Maldives and Sri Lanka.
China has invested a lot of resources to create strategic assets for the
project. Without Indian participation it would not be very profitable in economic
terms. Even for the Bangladesh-India-China-Myanmar (BICM) Economic Corridor vigorously
promoted by China, Modi expressed only conditional support. He said India would
consider the project when “peaceful, stable and cooperative environment” is
created in the region.[xiv]
Conclusion
Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy
initiatives show increasing role of multi-lateral influences impinging upon
bilateral relations with not only neighbouring countries but with big powers as
well. China is challenging Abe’s desire to give
Japan a greater strategic role in Asia-Pacific with increasing assertiveness
bordering on belligerence in South China and East China seas.
Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy
forays have set the stage for triggering big power participation in realising
his vision of India emerging as a strong economic power. While a lot of
promises have been generated both in India and in Japan, the U.S. and China
substantive progress can be expected if only India takes the follow up actions expeditiously.
Investments promised by Japan (nearly $34 billion) and China ($20 billion + $
6.8 billion in Gujarat) over the next five years are no small amounts. With the
U.S. also holding out promises, Modi’s achievements in such a short time are
substantial. And with Japanese investment declining rapidly in China (and
doubling in ASEAN countries) it would be logical to expect Japan to enter India
in a big way.
But these economic initiatives can
achieve productive results if only industry and business friendly structural
frame is evolved with suitable amendments to existing labour and land
acquisition enactments. There is greater need for coordination and cooperation
between ministries to produce results with the same urgency Modi has been
showing in his initiatives.
On the strategic front, the Indian
Prime Minister is facing bigger challenges. The Modi-Abe personal equation
while benefiting India economically, comes with Abe’s desire to rope in India
in a strategic alliance against China. In the words of Stephen Harner, “Abe has been tireless in pursuing
throughout the Asian region his “Proactive Contributor to Peace” anti-China
coalition building strategy. Much more than the Philippines or Vietnam,
recruiting India into a coalition would be strategically game-changing.”[xv]
China’s strategic space in South Asia
is poised to increase when the 21st Century Maritime Silk route and
the Silk Road Economic Belt (to the West) become fully operational. “A belt and
a road” as President Xi Jinping sees is
perceived as “the path to mutual benefit and
win-win cooperation.” This would enable China not only to productively use the
land and maritime infrastructure assets it had been creating in
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives and Sri Lanka but also increase its
strategic access to South Asia and Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This has serious
strategic connotations for India. This is more so in Indian Ocean security
where India had been a reckonable naval power. As the PLA Navy modernizes, it
is increasingly venturing into IOR increasing its threat potential.
Although China is poised to further eat
into India’s strategic space and influence, it wants India to join the Maritime
Silk Road and the BCIM eastern economic corridor. It would open up the vast
Indian markets for Chinese business. India’s presence would remove the stigma
of Chinese expansionism and improve its international image.
Despite the lack of progress in
resolving the contentious issues between the two countries, both Xi and Modi
are keen build a friendly relationship that would benefit the economies of both
the big powers of the region. While this is an attractive proposition for
India, China will have to go the extra mile to speed up the border talks,
remove the lopsided trade balance in favour of China and remove trading
restrictions on Indian products and investment.
These
changes in the Asia-Pacific environment would require critical examination to
calibrate India’s strategic relations and formal interactions with Japan, the
U.S. and China. It would help India to structure its stand on both bilateral
and multilateral issues that affect its national interests with the three big
powers as well as with India’s neighbours.
India knows its strategic
relations with Japan will always be conditioned by Japan's umbilical relations
with the U.S. In case of any India-China confrontation, this could act as rider
on Japan's support for India (unless of course in the unlikely scenario of
Japanese state also facing a Chinese threat at the same time). This limits the
scope for India-Japan strategic relations to flourish.
Lastly, as the Global
Times observed it was South Asia “where New Delhi has to make its presence
felt. However, China is a neighbour it can't move away from. Sino-Indian ties
can in no way be counterbalanced by the Japan-India friendship….Both as new
emerging countries and members of BRICS, China and India have plenty of
interests in common. Geopolitical competition is not the most important thing
for the two countries, at least at present (emphasis added).”[xvi] This
is perhaps the best common sense argument for shaking hands with China while
keeping the powder dry.
[Col
R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia, is associated with the
Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ]
Written on October 15, 2014
Courtesy: World Focus, December 2014
issue cnfworldfocus@gmail.com
[ii] Michael Schumann,
September 18, 2014 “Why the world’s powerful leaders really love India?” http://time.com/3396865/china-india-japan-narendra-modi-xi-jinping-shinzo-abe-trade-economics-asia/
[iii] ‘PM Modi launches
ambitious Make in India project’ September 25, 2014 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/gallery/pm-modi-launches-ambitious-make-in-india-project/1/12900.html
[iv] Narendra Modi, Nawaz
Sharif touch base, discuss terror and agree to stay in touch, May 28, 2014 Indian
Express.www.indianexpress.com
[v] Ankit Panda,
‘India-Pakistan talks cancellation; what went wrong?’ August 10, 2014 http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/india-pakistan-talks-cancellation-what-went-wrong/
[vi] Kadira
Pathiyagoda, September 17, 2014, ‘India’s Soft Power Advantage’ http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/indias-soft-power-advantage/
[vii] Tokyo
Declaration for India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership, September 1,
2014 http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23965/Tokyo+Declaration+for+India++Japan+Special+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership
[viii]
‘PM Modi’s
visit to Japan: 10 takeaways’ September 2, 2014 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-02/news/53479892_1_india-and-japan-bullet-trains-pm-narendra-modi/2
[ix] Stephen Harrier, “A
Japan-India Anti-China Alliance? No. This is about Economics” http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/09/03/a-japan-india-anti-china-alliance-no-this-is-about-economics/ “Under the “2+2”
format, the annual agenda inevitably focuses on security and defense issues,
with the agenda and policy proposals emanating almost entirely from defense and
security agencies. Diplomacy and foreign affairs agencies are left playing
largely public relations roles.”
[x] ‘Modi-Abe
intimacy brings scant comfort’ September 2, 2014 editorial Global Times,
www.globaltimes.cn
[xi] ‘Obama,
Modi work to deepen improving U.S. –India ties’ October 1, 2014 Washington, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/modi-obama-meeting-usa-india-idINKCN0HP1I320141001
[xii] U.S.-India
Joint Statement, September 30, 2014 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/us-india-joint-statement
[xiii]
Press
Statement by Prime Minister during the visit if President Xi Jinping of China
to India (September 18, 2014) http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htmdt
[xiv] Dr Srikanth
Kondapalli, “Five big takeaways from Xi Jinping’s visit to India” http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-19/news/54109239_1_prime-minister-narendra-modi-president-xi-jinping-maritime-silk-road
