How Modi is becoming Gandhi 2.0

Like the Mahatma, the prime minister promotes his ideas on social change with a great deal of showmanship.

Colonel R Hariharan @colhari2
 

POLITICS | 4-minute read | 26-01-2015 |

On the eve of Mahatma Gandhi's death anniversary, two images of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent creations come to my mind. I know it will shock the purists, but please bear with me.  

Image One: Modi gingering up the Republic Day parade which has fallen into a rut by the sheer routine it had followed all these years by making "Nari Shakti" its theme this year. As an old army hand I was thrilled to see "lady officers" - let us not fool ourselves they were pretty girls in trousers (as the MCP in me says) - from the armed forces proudly marching in front of the presidents of India and the US. I was not the only one to be impressed. Everyone who saw the women in uniform said so, as though they were waiting for a visual endorsement of an idea feminists have been trying hard to sell for a century.  

Of course, the same feminists may find fault with Modi for showcasing women soldiers marching together in the parade, although they were serving individually alongside men in their units. But Modi is selling an idea they could not to the national audience on a show with the highest TRP rating. 

Image Two: The Beti Bachao Beti Padhao scheme launched by Modi heralding a multi-modal approach to improve the rapidly falling child sex ratio in the country. The idea of saving the girl child is nothing new. Various state and central governments had largely entrusted its implementation in bits and pieces to their overburdened bureaucracy, while the leaders made speeches about it. BBBP aims at hitting at the core issues - respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of girls and women and ending gender based violence. Knowing Modi's style of working, social welfare departments and their netaji ministers will be sweating it out for the next few months to achieve targeted results.  

Mahatma Gandhi was perhaps the archpriest of marketing ideas of social change in applied politics. He transformed the humble khadi worn by the poor people into a product of brand equity for the freedom struggle. And it still lives, though unfortunately it has become the armour worn by political class to make them impervious to shame. He made the primitive spinning contraption "charkha" into a powerful weapon of warfare in his non-violent struggle against the British.  

Perhaps his biggest marketing coup was converting Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a proud Pathan of the hardy warrior class living in Afghan frontier who spoke only with their guns, into a man of non violence.

The Mahatma can only be slotted in a 'hallowed' class of his own because he defied traditional branding of a politician. He mixed religion, politics and the fight against social inequality to dish out palatable doses of homespun wisdom that made sense to the poor as much as to the rich.

After sweeping garbage as part of his morning chore, he could easily palaver with the Viceroy of the British India later in the day. Mahatma Gandhi promoted all his ideas with a lot of showmanship. This enabled him to use mundane day-to-day actions in showy promotion of ideas on social change. Of course, now and then they were interspersed with shocking concepts like advising virtues of Brahmacharya forgetting he was a married man. But every piece of his action served to strengthen the "Brand Gandhi" that made it easier for him to sell other ideas. The durability of Gandhi as a brand is such that it still lives on around us.  

After the Mahatma was assassinated 57 years ago by a former RSS cadre Nathuram Godse, we have the irony of another former RSS organiser Narendra Modi picking up the Gandhian ideas on marketing social change by mixing it in political discourses with great effect. The two recent examples I had given at the start of this article bear testimony to this. This is in sharp contrast to the Congress' forgotten Gandhian discourse, even though the Mahatma spent his political life nurturing the party.

It is holding on to its symbols while wallowing in self pity to prop up its modern day icons brought down by none other than Modi. It would be unfair to equate Modi with Mahatma Gandhi. But Modi seems to have read Gandhi thoroughly. He is doing what his fellow Gujarati from another century did: sell his ideas on social change with a lot of showmanship. Modi may or may not succeed as much as the Mahatma did, but at least he is trying. With every attempt, his brand is getting strengthened. While Mahatma Gandhi's latter day followers like Acharya Kripalani and Acharya Vinoba Bhave would not have appreciated such brand building, I am not so sure about Bapu himself. He may have just grinned.

#Republic Day, #Mahatma Gandhi, #Narendra Modi

 http://www.dailyo.in/opinion/how-narendra-modi-is-becoming-mahatma-gandhi-20/story/1/1686.html

The mighty fall of Rajapaksa

Power is a heady drug and can make one feel invincible. As Lanka’s former president alienated his own party and minorities with strong-arm tactics, the electorate handed him a defeat he least expected

By Col R Hariharan | INDIA LEGAL January 31, 2015 |GLOBAL TRENDS| Sri Lanka polls

THE recently concluded Sri Lankan presidential elections belied President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s confidence as he was beaten by Maithripala Sirisena, former health minister and a long- term colleague of his. People seem to have preferred “unknown angel” Sirisena to “known devil” Rajapaksa, as he described himself in an election rally.

Rajapaksa was so confident of winning the people’s mandate for a third term that he advanced the election by two years before his second term ended. But Sirisena, general sec- retary of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), emerged as a challenger on the eve of the election announcement.

According to the official results, Sirisena won by a 3.7 percent margin over the more crafty Rajapaksa and was preferred by 51.38 per-cent of the 121 million voters. This may not appear to be a bad performance if we consider that in 2005, Rajapaksa’s scrapped through with a wafer-thin 1.86 percent majority over his rival Ranil Wickremesinghe to become president. But a decade later, Rajapaksa went to the polls with the enormous executive powers of a serving president. In 2009, he used the popularity he earned after the victory in the Eelam War to gain two- thirds majority in parliament for his United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition and also handsomely wIn the presidential election for a second time in 2010.

Despite these advantages, Rajapaksa seemed to have lost direction and that cost him this presidency. But the central reason for his electoral debate has been the loss of support within his own party and the people at large, particularly minorities.

Two major aberrations—concentration of power in the hands of the Rajapaksa family and the misuse of executive presidency— marked his second term as president. Since 2010, he used his parliamentary majority to consolidate his power base. In the process, he manipulated it to pass the 18th Amendment to the constitution, neutralizing the 17th one which gave a role to parliament in appointments for national institutions such as the judiciary, election commission, etc, and which made the president more accountable. But the 18th amendment gave the president overriding powers to appoint candidates, who did the damage control caused by poor governance.

CHINESE PRESENCE

Typically, many mega projects like the construction of Hambantota Port and airport complex and Colombo port development were financed by Chinese loans offered at usurious interests and executed by Chinese contractors. The whole process lacked transparency, as there was no open bidding. There were also reports of widespread corruption in public sector bodies, draining the exchequer.

Opposition efforts to inquire into allegations of corruption came to naught. Instead, threat and intimidation were often used to discourage them. For instance, the opposition United National Party (UNP) Commission that looked into allegations of corruption in the Hambantota project was threatened in public by a pistol-waving SLFP deputy mayor. The Bribery Commission and the Police were ineffective in taking quick follow- up action in such cases. Scribes who criticized these aberrations were hounded out of the country. The army, instead of the police, handled trade union protests and other civilian activities, indicating increased militarization of public affairs.

The writ of the president’s two brothers, Basil and Gotabaya, who were minister for development and secretary for defense and urban affairs respectively, seemed to influence most government decisions.

Thugs and ruling party goons, often led by elected representatives, were involved in many a criminal case and disrupted political meetings of the opposition and terrorized the free press. This did not stop even in the pre- election period. Ruling party goons attacked the residence of former president and estranged SLFP leader, Chandrika Kumaratunga and the election offices of Sirisena and the UNP. The Campaign for Free and Fair Elections received a record 574 com- plaints of election-related incidents, including 500 cases of election law violation. There were 47 cases of election violence, 16 relating to the use of firearms.

SIDELINED LEADERS

Overall, Rajapaksa family’s enormous clout and its arrogant use of power seem to have alienated many senior leaders of the SLFP like Sirisena, who were sidelined in decision- making. The decline of Rajapaksa’s public image, coupled with his failure to carry his team, probably disillusioned Sirisena and as many as 26 MPs and scores of UPFA provincial council members crossed over to the opposition. This gave an opportunity for Chandrika Bandaranaike loyalists to encourage Sirisena to contest against the president. She joined hands with Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the UNP, and former army commander Sarath Fonseka, who gave up their own presidential aspirations to field Sirisena as a common opposition candidate. Surprisingly, this seems to have energized other UNP leaders, who were wrangling for control of the party. Their sole aim was to defeat Rajapaksa using Sirisena.

Even the Buddhist right-wing party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya, a long-term ally of Rajapaksa and the UPFA coalition, deserted him to support Sirisena when he did not respond satisfactorily to its complaints of poor governance, cronyism and corruption.

Rajapaksa fared no better with his Muslim allies, who generally supported him. Muslims, who form about 10 percent of the island’s 20-million population, had their faith in Rajapaksa shaken after he failed to prevent anti- Muslim activities of Buddhist fringe groups. The Bodu Bala Sena led an anti-Muslim riot in Alutgama that quickly spread to Beruwala (close to Colombo) on June 15, 2014, leaving three killed, over 80 injured and nearly 200 houses and property of Muslims torched and destroyed. Over 2,000 were rendered homeless. This forced the two major Muslim partners of UPFA—the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the All Ceylon Makkal Congress—to cut loose from the ruling alliance. Their support to Sirisena brought him the solid support of Muslim votes.

IGNORED TAMILS

Despite Rajapaksa’s unchallenged power after the Eelam War, he didn’t kick-start a political process to resolve the Tamil minority’s long-standing grievances. He did not fulfil even the basic demands of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which captured power in the Northern Provincial Council elections. Though Sirisena offered no specific plans to address the Tamil issue, TNA decided to support him to remove Rajapaksa, and this paid him dividends, as the Tamils voted in his favor.

As promised in the election manifesto, Sirisena was sworn in as president and Ranil Wickremesinghe as prime minister. Siri sena’s manifesto focuses on three weaknesses of the Rajapaksa rule—corruption, cronyism and accumulation of power in the hands of the president and his family. It promises to replace the “present autocratic executive presidential system” with a “constitutional structure with an executive that is allied to parliament through the cabinet”. Sirisena hopes that within 100 days, he will form a multi-party National Unity Alliance government to address urgent issues, and then, hold parliamentary elections to repeal the 18th Amendment by bringing in a 19th Amendment to free national institutions from the president’s control in the next six years.

This is a tall order, because his New Democratic Front does not control the parliament. However, after defections, the UPFA’s strength has also come down. So Sirisena is likely to face a turbulent time in the next 100 days.

Whether he succeeds or not, democracy has succeeded in Sri Lanka, freeing it from the autocratic rule of Rajapaksa. Only time will tell if Sirisena can redeem the peoples’ faith in democratically setting things right.

(Col R Hariharan, is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia and served with the IPKF in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group)

Written on January 14, 2015

Courtesy: INDIA LEGAL January 31, 2015  www.indialegalonline.com

Strategic perspectives on China’s South Asian connectivity

Col R Hariharan

[This is the full text of a presentation made at a conference on "China in Transition: Implication for Asia" organized by the Chennai Centre for China Studies on 8^th March 3014 at Chennai.]

Introduction

China’s presence in South Asia is now firmly established. Most of the South Asian countries including India are trying to take advantage of China’s desire to increase its trade and economic relations with the subcontinent. China’s readiness to invest and execute infrastructure projects speedily has generally been welcomed by South Asian countries to improve their poor infrastructure development. 

China’s economic prosperity has enabled it to emerge as the global leader not only in manufacturing but also in consumption of raw material. This has triggered China’s appetite for energy and natural resources enormously, setting it on a global quest to meet its needs. And South Asia’s natural resources are likely to be increasingly exploited to meet China’s needs.

The global economic downturn four years ago has had its adverse impact on China’s export based economy slowing down its double digit growth rate. China has taken a number of corrective measures including improving internal consumption and opening up new markets of Asia, Africa and South America. China is also increasing its trade and investment in these new markets. The modernisation of the PLA during the last two decades in tandem with its economic growth has increased China’s confidence in its capability to protect the country’s economic and strategic interests worldwide.

China’s increasing strategic presence in South Asia has to be viewed in this global environment. China’s moves would undoubtedly contribute to optimize the rapid growth of the vast underserviced South Asian markets while increasing the import of Chinese products. However, these developments would progressively reduce India’s dominant influence in the sub continent and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with the progressive increase in China’s strategic reach to the Indian Ocean littorals. 

Strategic impact of leadership change

These activities have increased ever since President Xi Jinping and Premier Le Keqiang came to power in March 2013. They are functioning under the guidelines set by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 18th National Congress held in November 2012. In accordance with these guidelines, Xi Jinping’s development targets for China are:

•        Strategic vision: “Realizing a prosperous and strong country, the rejuvenation of the nation and the well-being of the people” (combining personal ‘dreams’ with national dream). [i]

•        Strategic goal - economy: Establish an ‘affluent, strong, civilized, harmonious, socialist modern country’ by 2050 around the year around the 100^th anniversary of the CCP. In economic terms to achieve a GDP $ 4 trillion by 2020, and to provide per capita income of $ 3000.

•        PLA: To make PLA a loyal force of the CCP command and provide reliable and professional support to protect China’s core interests during the strategic development 

Xi has set about clean up the public image of the CCP and the PLA launched the ongoing large scale anti-corruption drive to weed out and prosecute corrupt party bosses and army officers. 

Xi is also paying special attention to bring the PLA’s professional competence on par with the modern armies of the West. The modernisation of the PLA is focused on intense training for joint operation skills in a C3IS networked system. 

Increasing attention is being given to improve PLA Navy’s fleet operation skills with the addition of an air craft carrier, and submarine and surface ships. Thus the PLAN is emerging out of the South and East China seas to meet its aspirations to become blue water naval force by the next decade. 

PLA’s progress has enabled President Xi to assert China’s power in support of its territorial claims in South and East China seas and India. This has caused concern not only among China’s Asian neighbours, but also to the U.S. as it poses a direct threat challenge to the U.S.’ allies and poses a challenge to America’s domination of the Asia-Pacific region.

The emergence of China as a major power has increased its profile in the international arena including the UN. The U.S. has made extremely cautious in dealing with China. Countries like Japan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Russia, who have unpleasant historical experiences with China have also become equally cautious.  China has tried to rework its strategic equation with the U.S., European Union, Japan, ASEAN region and India in keeping with the changing global environment. These developments also have strategic connotations for India. 

China-South Asia connectivity 

China’s South Asia connectivity projects underway also have a broader context to the ambitious China Western Development (CWD) plan started in 2000. It involves six provinces (including Yunnan) and five autonomous regions including Tibet and Xinjiang bordering India. As per 2002 estimate this backward region forms 71% of China’s area but contains only 28.8% of its population contributed only 19% of China’s economic output as of 2009.

The multi-faceted CWD plan involved development of transport, hydropower plants, and telecommunications infrastructure, improve ecological protection, promotion of education and retention of talent within the region for exploiting the abundant natural resources. 

The 1956 km long Qinghai-Tibet rail link between Xining and Lhasa was completed and now trains regularly run from Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai, and other important cities to Lhasa. They have increased PLA’s strategic mobility to the sparsely populated areas of Xinjiang and Tibet which have been facing unrest among Uyghur and Tibetan ethnic minorities. Similarly China’s logistics and military capability have been augmented with the road communication to the Sino-Indian borders improving the access to support China’s territorial claims in India.

These developments carried out under the 12^th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) is giving form to the country’s vision to economically integrate its backward western regions with the hope of neutralising separatist separatist influence.

China’s influence will further increase in South Asia on the completion of the four road links and port infrastructure it is building. These are designed to improve China’s physical and maritime access to Pakistan, Nepal, India and Sri Lanka. China also has plans to construct railway lines from Xinjiang and Tibet to provide rail connectivity from China to South Asia.  China has also started promoting the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road to ensure the port infrastructure it has created in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are made commercially viable. Chinese projects to construct pipelines for transporting petroleum resources using some of these ports would also increase China’s strategic sustainability free of choke points in sea lanes of communication in Southeast Asia.

Pakistan Economic Corridor (PEC)

The PEC now under construction with China’s aid and assitance is an ambitious development programme  that connects Gwadar port in Southwestern Pakistan with Kashgar in Xinjiang autonomous region by road, rail and pipelines for transporting petroleum resources. It consists of three segments –

a.   Karakoram Highway (KKH): The 1300 km long KKH runs through the Khunjerab Pass linking Xinjiang with Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan. The highway now being upgraded will open up Pakistan’s backward region to trade and tourism from China and increase trading opportunities for Xinjiang. At the same time it also opens up China’s access to India’s western flank bordering Pakistan. It runs in the close vicinity of Siachen increasing India’s threat potential from both China and Pakistan either singly or collectively.

b.   Indus Highway: The four lane 1264 km long Indus Highway (N-55) runs along the Indus River and connects Karachi Port with Peshawar. The highway completed in 2008 provides China an alternate route to Afghanistan border using the PEC. It is a vital road as it runs through the rich heartland of Pakistan parallel to Indian border.

c.    Makran Coastal Highway (MCH): The 653 km long MCH known as N-10 forms part of Pakistan’s national highway network connecting Karachi with Gwadar Port. The road running along the Arabian Sea coastline is now being upgraded. The road from Gwadar has now been extended to provide alternate road connectivity to Iran. China now enjoys direct access to Arabian Sea and Straits of Hormuz particularly after China Port Holdings gained control of Gwadar port operations in 2013. This could be valuable in increasing PLAN warships capability and reach.

China-Nepal connectivity

Among South Asian nations, India’s relations with Nepal are perhaps the most complex, subjected to periodic crests and troughs. Nepal is sandwiched between the two Asian giants India and China. This makes it vulnerable to political changes in either country. In a way Nepal may be called “India-locked” as former Nepalese Prime Minister Bhattarai once described as the country’s socio-economic interactions have been almost exclusively with India. For some years now, Nepal had been trying f to free itself from India’s overwhelming influence. Geographically Nepal remains the soft underbelly of India’s strategic security because of its domination of the fertile Gangetic plans of India linking Eastern India.

China does not have the historical socio-political baggage India carries in its relation with Nepal. China has used Nepal’s desire to follow an independent foreign policy to step up its influence after the fall of monarchy in Nepal. China has now mustered Nepal as a partner in its ambitious plans to extend its strategic land and railway links to South Asia.

The Friendship Highway links Lhasa to Zhangnu on China-Nepal border leading to the Sino-Nepal friendship bridge at Kodari in Nepal. This 800 km long road also forms part of the China National Highway 318 from Shanghai to Zhangnu. From Kodari the Araniko Highway provides road access to Nepal’s capital Kathmandu.

In 2007-08, China began constructing a 770-kilometre railway connecting Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, with the border town of Khasa in Nepal which was completed last year. Nepal had requested China to extend the rail link to Kathmandu. When China fulfils this project, it would significantly improve China’s strategic access to India’s most populated regions in the North. Chinese are also involved in other communication projects now underway beyond Kathmandu.

Among them, China’s plans to build a road link between Kathmandu and Lumbini, an important Buddhist pilgrimage site located very close to Indian border, is the most important one. The Chinese government-backed Asia Pacific Exchange of Cooperation Foundation (APECF) agreed to provide $ 3 billion assistance for the Lumbini Development Project (LDP). The APECF had also to begin a survey for construction of a direct fast railway link between Kathmandu and Lumbini as part of the LDP. Though the funding got mired in controversy and stalled the project, it is likely to be revived when the concerns of India, Japan and South Korea are resolved on its impact on the holy seat of Lumbini.

Strategic concerns on Northeast connectivity

China has been keen to promote its direct connectivity to India’s northeast through two major routes. These are the Chumbi Valley route (from Lhasa-Shigatse-Chumbi Valley-Natula) and the Burma-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor. Both have significant economic and strategic implications for both India and China. These are related to China’s dispute over the alignment of Mc Mahon Line which forms the Indo-Tibet border in Arunachal Pradesh as well as China’s claim over the entire Arunachal Pradesh (termed as Southern Tibet by the Chinese).

The Chumbi Valley geographically forms a wedge between Sikkim and Bhutan. India’s traditional trading route runs through the Chumbi Valley to Shigatse, an important communication centre. After the Lhasa-Shigatse road was developed Shigatse has become a strategic communication hub as it connects the roads from North, South, West and East increasing PLA’s logistics and mobility to Indian border.  

Sikkim is strategically situated astride the narrow land corridor linking Northeast states with the rest of India. In case of a military confrontation with India, development of China’s road and rail access through Chumbi Valley in conjunction with the opening up of BCIM corridor will increase China’s strategic options cut off India’s Northeast from the rest of the country. It could also compromise India’s control over Arunachal Pradesh.  

BCIM Corridor

The BCIM is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative to increase sub-regional economic cooperation among the member nations (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar). It envisages the development of the infrastructure facilities and road, rail, water and air connectivity to improve interconnectivity for free movement of goods and promote trade among the four member nations. It is estimated to benefit approximately 440 million people from Yunnan Province of China to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India’s eastern states including Bihar.

India had been reluctant to join China in promoting Northeast connectivity. On the other hand land connectivity with China looks inevitable as it will trigger economic development of Northeast states contributing to the neutralisation of separatist insurgencies in this neglected region of India.

This has induced India to agree in principle to join China to promote the BCIM Economic Corridor after Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Le Keqiang met in May 2013. They signed a MoU to establish their own study groups on the BCIM economic corridor to promote this initiative.[ii]

India’s Northeast states as well as Bangladesh have been upbeat about the BCIM corridor. The BCIM concept also fits in well with India’s ‘Look East Policy’ as well as its multimodal connectivity projects to link north eastern states with ASEAN region and to provide them sea access to Myanmar’s  Sittwe port.

However, India has concerns about the BCIM corridor because it would open up a direct eastern axis from Yunnan to support China’s large territorial and border claims in Arunachal Pradesh. The BCIM passes through vital communication bottlenecks astride logistic routes of all the seven states in the region. China had in the past supported separatist insurgencies of this region. Though it has ceased to do so since 1989, it will have the option to do so easily when the BCIM corridor comes up. Moreover, the progress of the BCIM corridor as well as its optimal use could be affected unless separatist conflicts are neutralised. So the BCIM may take some time to come to fruition.

Reviving the Maritime Silk Route

In October 2013, President Xi Jinping announced China’s intention to launch the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) plan to link the Pacific and Indian Ocean during a visit to Southeast Asia. After Premier Le Keqiang announced the setting up a $ 495 million (Yuan 3 billion) maritime cooperation fund to support MSR, its promotion has become China’s key diplomatic initiative. China has sounded most of the nations of Asia-Pacific including Malaysia, Singapore, India, Sri Lanka and the Gulf countries on the initiative. 

Though details of the MSR came out much later China’s intentions in taking up this project in South Asian perspective appear to be three fold.

a.    To assist China’s increasing profile in South Asian countries and protect China’s growing economic and strategic interests in the region.

b.    To profitably use maritime assets created with Chinese investment in developing port infrastructure in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota and Colombo (Sri Lanka) and Myanmar. It is poised to develop Chittagong port (Bangladesh) also. The MSR would enable China to promote its interests among Indian Ocean littorals

c.     The MSR could facilitate the PLAN’s ambitious plan to assert its strength in Indian Ocean as well to protect China’s sea lanes of communication in the region 

Though MSR will also promote India’s economic activity it would increase China’s threat to India’s maritime power projection in Indian Ocean Region. It could also enhance China’s electronic snooping and human intelligence capabilities.  

Conclusion

China has developed a large network of roads both to the border and laterally between key communication centres of Xinjiang and Tibet while India has lagged behind in doing so in its border territories. This gives China a definite advantage in protecting and securing its territorial interests relating to India. Conscious of this China had objected when India embarked upon development of road infrastructure in border areas.

This situation has continued even after both the countries signed a Border Defence Agreement (BDA) to manage such differences. Thus India’s vital border communication development continues to be subject to the vagaries of China’s interpretation of the agreement. This has to be borne in mind while handling China’s desire to increase connectivity to India and the rest of South Asia.

In spite of this, India should encourage and foster cooperation with China to improve road and transportation connectivity because it would contribute to the rapid development of trade and commerce between the two countries. 

However, there is a need to exercise caution to ensure the projects do not increase our strategic vulnerability. Suitable caveats should be included in any agreements on such projects to ensure that they do not compromise either the security of sensitive areas or assist China in giving form to its territorial claims over Indian Territory.  

There are a whole lot of strategic security concerns for India on the Western sector bordering Pakistan ever since China started implementing the PEC project.  The PEC on completion would give China strategic access not only to Arabian Sea through Gwadar port but also to the sensitive areas of POK and India’s border with Pakistan. As Pakistan is China’s close strategic ally, the PEC can give form and content to bring greater convergence in their strategic interests relating to India. 

There are similar concerns about China’s growing connectivity and linkages with Nepal also. However, Nepal-India relations are age-old and bound by each other’s interest. While Nepal’s desire to take advantage of China for its own development is understandable and improvement in connectivity is inevitable, India needs to factor this while shaping its Nepal policy.

There is no doubt that the BCIM corridor would enable the backward regions of both India and China to join national developmental mainstream. It would tremendously increase two-way trading opportunities of both China and India, benefitting Yunnan province of China and Northeast Indian states, apart from Burma and Bangladesh.

China would also gain a more convenient and direct land access avoiding Himalayan passes to reach the huge Indian market and also the under exploited markets of other South Asian countries. On the other hand, India would be able to add more vigour to the Look East Policy by gaining speedier land access to the markets of ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This could result in increasing economic opportunities for Indian youth in troubled North-eastern states, providing them incentive to give up extremism.

On the other hand, BCIM opens up a strategic axis from Chinese mainland to enter Northeast India. It cuts across chokepoints on the lines of communication to India’s disputed border areas in Arunachal Pradesh. In the past China had provided arms and military training to separatist insurgents from the North-eastern states in the corridor. While China has given up this policy, it still retains the option to do so. 

Even now extremist groups from Nagaland, Manipur and Assam deal with Chinese gun runners. Such clandestine activities would be made easier when the BCIM corridor is wide open. India should be strategically ready to factor these aspects while opening up the BCIM corridor for China. 

Overall the issue of China’s strategic connectivity to South Asia is directly related to India’s security interests in the region. Building greater understanding and credibility between India and China is the only way to take advantage of the opportunities it offers to develop India. This process could take time and present global and regional strategic climate augurs well for India and China to embark upon this. 

[Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ]

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Notes

[i]  http://news.xinhuanet.com/English/indepth/2013-04-29/c_132349167.htm

[ii] Joint Statement- A vision for future development of India-China strategic and cooperative partnership, October 23, 2013 http://mea.gov.in