Tamils And Sinhalese Unhappy With UNHRC
Resolution; Army Apprehensive
Col R Hariharan
Sri Lanka agreed at the 30th session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
at Geneva last week to what it had resisted for six years: International
intervention in investigating alleged war crimes and human rights excesses
committed during the Eelam War. But handing over the whole process to
international judges and staff in a hybrid international court as suggested by
the UN human rights chief Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein would be politically
suicidal for the Sri Lanka’s ruling duo – President Maithripala Sirisena and
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Their government used the international goodwill accrued from their actions to improve governance and accountability since coming to power, which was favourably referred to by the UN human rights chief in his report, to get the US draft resolution modified by bringing the international judicial involvement within Sri Lankan judicial jurisdiction and process. US secretary of state John Kerry expressed “US support for a credible domestic process for justice and reconciliation in Sri Lanka — one that is led and owned by the Sri Lankan people and is conducted in cooperation with the UN and with international support.”
Sirisena had the difficult task of repairing the damage done not only by the scathing UN’s official investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) report presented at the UNHRC meeting but also the erosion of Sri Lanka’s credibility during President Rajapaksa’s regime. He had failed to convincingly respond to international concerns on Sri Lanka’s human rights aberrations and alleged war crimes repeatedly expressed in the UNHRC sessions since 2009. Instead Rajapaksa tried short-term stratagems like forming the Lessons Learnt and Reconstruction Commission (LLRC) and army commission to inquire into war crimes etc which bombed due to lack of credibility.
Not only that, Rajapaksa had also damaged Sri Lanka’s equation with influential nations like the US by calling the allegations an international conspiracy to tarnish his victory in the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorism. This triggered a strong response from the US and its allies that culminated in the UNHRC creating the OISL. Rajapaksa shot himself in the foot when he failed to gauge the international mood and did not cooperate with the OCHR in both letter and spirit.
The passing of the modified US draft resolution by consensus showed the UNHRC members would like to give Sri Lanka an opportunity to redeem itself under the new dispensation and if they lean on Sri Lanka too much it would be politically counter-productive. President Sirisena has the unviable task of completing the process envisioned by the UN body within a period of 18 months -- March 2018. Given the pulls and pressures of national and international politics and judicial interventions by Sirisena’s detractors to delay the implementation, it is doubtful whether Sri Lanka would be able to meet the deadline.
There are a few other bottlenecks. Neither Sinhalese nor Tamils seem to be happy with the resolution in its present form. High expectations of Tamils after hearing the OISL recommendations for full international enquiry have been belied. Even others, like Tamil National Alliance chief R Sampanthan who supported it because it addresses both the issues of accountability and reconciliation, have sounded skeptical about a credible domestic process coming through.
On their part, Sinhala nationalists and even some liberal sections consider the resolution as an affront to Sri Lankan sovereignty thrust upon them by the machinations of the US and other external powers. They feel the US had been selective in picking on smaller countries to task for human rights transgressions, while it carries its accumulated own baggage of such allegations of war crimes in its war on terror in Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria. The stark reality was brought out a day after the UNHRC resolution was passed when the US acknowledged its fighter aircraft had by mistake struck a hospital in Afghanistan, killing patients and staff.
The two-lakh Sri Lanka army has earned a pride of place in the nation by putting an end to Tamil separatist insurgency. Though Sirisena had discussed the issues with the top brass of the army and the police before the resolution was passed, the rank and file may not take kindly to their decorated heroes of war being hauled up for war crimes.
Lastly, there is Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sirisena’s bĂȘte noir, waiting in the wings to pull him down. Any slip-up by Sirisena would be costly. Yet, if the resolution is not implemented honestly, then it would leave all the stakeholders including India with a bad taste.
(Col R Hariharan, a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group)
Their government used the international goodwill accrued from their actions to improve governance and accountability since coming to power, which was favourably referred to by the UN human rights chief in his report, to get the US draft resolution modified by bringing the international judicial involvement within Sri Lankan judicial jurisdiction and process. US secretary of state John Kerry expressed “US support for a credible domestic process for justice and reconciliation in Sri Lanka — one that is led and owned by the Sri Lankan people and is conducted in cooperation with the UN and with international support.”
Sirisena had the difficult task of repairing the damage done not only by the scathing UN’s official investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) report presented at the UNHRC meeting but also the erosion of Sri Lanka’s credibility during President Rajapaksa’s regime. He had failed to convincingly respond to international concerns on Sri Lanka’s human rights aberrations and alleged war crimes repeatedly expressed in the UNHRC sessions since 2009. Instead Rajapaksa tried short-term stratagems like forming the Lessons Learnt and Reconstruction Commission (LLRC) and army commission to inquire into war crimes etc which bombed due to lack of credibility.
Not only that, Rajapaksa had also damaged Sri Lanka’s equation with influential nations like the US by calling the allegations an international conspiracy to tarnish his victory in the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorism. This triggered a strong response from the US and its allies that culminated in the UNHRC creating the OISL. Rajapaksa shot himself in the foot when he failed to gauge the international mood and did not cooperate with the OCHR in both letter and spirit.
The passing of the modified US draft resolution by consensus showed the UNHRC members would like to give Sri Lanka an opportunity to redeem itself under the new dispensation and if they lean on Sri Lanka too much it would be politically counter-productive. President Sirisena has the unviable task of completing the process envisioned by the UN body within a period of 18 months -- March 2018. Given the pulls and pressures of national and international politics and judicial interventions by Sirisena’s detractors to delay the implementation, it is doubtful whether Sri Lanka would be able to meet the deadline.
There are a few other bottlenecks. Neither Sinhalese nor Tamils seem to be happy with the resolution in its present form. High expectations of Tamils after hearing the OISL recommendations for full international enquiry have been belied. Even others, like Tamil National Alliance chief R Sampanthan who supported it because it addresses both the issues of accountability and reconciliation, have sounded skeptical about a credible domestic process coming through.
On their part, Sinhala nationalists and even some liberal sections consider the resolution as an affront to Sri Lankan sovereignty thrust upon them by the machinations of the US and other external powers. They feel the US had been selective in picking on smaller countries to task for human rights transgressions, while it carries its accumulated own baggage of such allegations of war crimes in its war on terror in Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria. The stark reality was brought out a day after the UNHRC resolution was passed when the US acknowledged its fighter aircraft had by mistake struck a hospital in Afghanistan, killing patients and staff.
The two-lakh Sri Lanka army has earned a pride of place in the nation by putting an end to Tamil separatist insurgency. Though Sirisena had discussed the issues with the top brass of the army and the police before the resolution was passed, the rank and file may not take kindly to their decorated heroes of war being hauled up for war crimes.
Lastly, there is Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sirisena’s bĂȘte noir, waiting in the wings to pull him down. Any slip-up by Sirisena would be costly. Yet, if the resolution is not implemented honestly, then it would leave all the stakeholders including India with a bad taste.
(Col R Hariharan, a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group)
Courtesy:
Times of India, Chennai edition, October 6, 2015