'To have a war or not is in Chinese hands'

Courtesy: Rediff.com |July 27, 2017 | http://www.rediff.com/news/interview/to-have-a-war-or-not-is-in-chinese-hands/20170727.htm

'India is a huge market for Chinese goods. I don't think a war stands to logic when you have economic compulsions, but then Chinese are known to do illogical things.'

 What is China up to? Does it really want a war with India? Can China ignore the huge Indian market for Chinese products? Is it just tough Chinese posturing?

Colonel R Hariharan (retd), a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia who had served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence, discusses with Rediff.com's Shobha Warrier what the standoff between India and China in the Doklam plateau means.

Is China playing a game right now? If so, what kind of game are they playing?

There are three ways to look at what is happening. One is from the perspective of the international environment.

The second is the bilateral relationship between India and China and the third angle is the changing strategic equation in South Asia.

Internationally, after Ukraine was partitioned, there is a growing sentiment in NATO against Russia supported by the US.

(US President Donald J) Trump has used this issue to suit his political agenda. There is a possibility of this confrontation going out of control and in such a scenario, Moscow needs Beijing as an ally.

China is a powerful entity, more powerful than ever before. It is competing to be the number one in the world's economic power engine.

The Belt and Road Initiative linking China with Europe, through the old Silk Route, is a success from China's point of view.

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor is also an important linkage of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Even in the South China Sea, a confrontation has been going on and China is not letting it go.

China has taken a confrontationist posture against many countries. It did not accept the judgment of the International Court of Justice when its claims to the South China Sea was turned down.

So, it is in this background that we have to look at the overall assertion of Chinese power.

Why I am mentioning all this is, we should not see the India-China standoff in Doklam -- which is not even a confrontation -- as an issue that would give rise to a war or not.

We will have to look at it from a larger perspective.

The other issue is the bilateral relations between China and India.

At present, in Asia, there are three highly assertive leaders: President Xi Jinping of China, Prime Minister Narendra D Modi of India and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.

All three harp on nationalism or national identity as a rallying call for the country. Xi came to power saying he would make the Chinese dream of making China the centre of the universe a reality.

China has been under a severe inferiority complex after the opium war and it is trying to live down the image of the sick man of Asia.

We can say it has succeeded as progressively it has upgraded the life of the common man.

Xi has cleansed the system of corruption, nepotism and cronyism and after 2012, he has established himself as the strongest man after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping as the man who controls the government, the army and the Communist party.

Is it the desire to control the world that has given China this confrontationist attitude?

No. It is to restore Chinese pride, you can say.

Japan has amended the constitution so that it can have an army for the first time after the second World War.

Japan can now manufacture and export arms and enter into an alliance with other countries.

In India, Modi also has a vision for India with development as the key.

So, you have these three powers within Asia trying to find space beyond their domain.

The global economy which was controlled by the US and the European Union, has shifted now to Asia.

Naturally, there will be conflict among the three Asian powers.

What does China want to show India by taking control of India's neighbours like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, etc?

It wants to reduce India's influence among its neighbours.

You saw it in Sri Lanka even though the present government is close to India.

You saw it in Nepal.

You saw it in Bangladesh.

They have already established themselves in Pakistan.

Now they are trying to do it in Bhutan.

China is wielding its economic power. It is not a direct military confrontation, but a confrontation to increase its influence.

This is what is happening in Bhutan where the borders are not properly demarcated. They have areas which are claimed by both sides and the Doklam plateau is one such area.

The Chinese have enormous patience in dealing with foreign powers and they will do it when it suits them.

So, I do not expect this to end immediately.

Why is the Chinese media aggressively attacking India all of a sudden?

You must remember that it is a State controlled media.

I would say China has won the propaganda war because as a democracy, we only reproduce the Chinese claims and counter claims; we have not contradicted the stories.

Is this a very planned strategy by China?

Of course, it is. Because of their efforts, now we are so much concerned about whether there would be a war with China or not.

The question that I encounter all the time is whether a war would break out tomorrow.

Personally, I feel China has succeeded in creating such a hysteria in India though the Government of India has been trying to negate it.

The other day, the Government of India issued a statement that there was no additional build up along the border.

Whatever the Chinese are doing, they are building up their capability.

Are we falling into the trap they are digging?

That is not possible. We know what we are. The issue is whether we can prolong the issue.

The Doklam area is a plateau over the valley. It is essential for China as they can occupy the dominant ground.

It is a winding mountainous road and the Chinese have constructed 28 km of road and they are constructing another 22 km. Then they can reach the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction. This is the crux of the problem.

That is why (External Affairs Minister) Sushma Swaraj told Parliament that China is creeping into the tri-junction.

How dangerous will it be for India as the north east is connected to India through the corridor?

This tri-junction is very important for our strategic security point of view because the closer the Chinese come, it would threaten our Siliguri corridor, which is about 30 km from there.

It is the land link between northeast India and the rest of the country.

But this is not the first time the Chinese are doing such things.

When Xi came here for the first time in September 2014, and while Modi and Xi were talking, Chinese troops entered Ladakh and came 1 and ½ kms inside.

So, at all critical points, China is trying to assert its superiority and there was some indirect pressure at the top to bring home the Chinese dispensation.

India allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh was not well taken by them.

Do you think India is reacting the right way to Chinese aggression?

There is no right way and wrong way.

When there is confrontation at the border, it is handled in three ways.

India had signed a friendship agreement and a standard operating procedure during Manmohan Singh's time in case the troops enter into confrontation in the border areas to avoid any military conflict.

So, at the local level, it is settled between the Chinese troops and the Indian troops with restraint.

Next is at the diplomatic level. Our national security advisor is in Beijing to attend a meeting. There, the issue will be raised.

It will be a loss of face for India to withdraw troops and China to stop road construction. So, we have to first defuse the tension.

Can India afford to take a tough stand against China?

We have not reached that point.

Internally, there is a political reshuffle taking place in China.

The Chinese Communist Party will decide Xi's fate. The next generation leaders will be picked up at the party congress in the autumn. In August, the top party leaders will meet at a resort (Beidaihe) near Beijing.

So, I don't expect any action be taken to upset such an important event by going on a full-scale war with India.

To have a war or not is in Chinese hands.

At the same time Xi also would like to increase his popularity when Chinese nationalism is on the rise. And the Communist party wants to cash in on that.

But where they are occupying is not a good place to start a war; it is where India can surround them from three sides.

As a military man, my reading is that this kind of skirmishes will continue till September.

What about the Indian market for Chinese products?

China has a business of around $70 billion with India. 70% mobile phones in India are Chinese made. That is why there will be talks to ease the situation.

We heard from the Chinese side that this will not affect business. India is a huge market for Chinese goods and they know that.

So, the fact is, China would not like to have a huge confrontation with India.

Pakistan as an ally is a great asset for China. That is why it is important for India to retain friendships with Afghanistan and Iran.

I think India is acting very correctly as we do not want a war.

Do you think China would like a war with India?

I don't think so. India is a huge market for Chinese goods. I don't think it stands to logic when you have economic compulsions, but then Chinese are known to do illogical things.

India will also lose in a war as war is a very unproductive thing.

Do you think if the skirmishes continue, it will lead to a full-fledged war?

No, I don't think so.

When confrontations prolong, skirmishes take place sometimes.

The Indian Army has fought three wars, but the Chinese army has not fought any war.

Yes, the Chinese army is modernised. I am not underestimating the Chinese, but it is an untested force whereas the Indian Army does military exercises in 34 countries.

We have 50 years of experience in operating aircraft carriers. You cannot become an expert in aircraft carriers in just two years' time. China is a toddler in international navies, but they are compensating it by missile systems.

They have developed very good missile systems and very effective submarines. So, if there is a war, it would not be a Western style war.

Indo-China stand-off: A Battle of Nerves

The confrontation in Doklam area is not just about Indian intrusion into a disputed territory near Bhutan. It is about India showing that it can no longer be taken for granted. Will it fulfill the obligations of Article 2 of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty?

By Colonel R Hariharan | 29 July 2017 | Courtesy: India Legal |   http://www.indialegallive.com/top-news-of-the-day/focus/indo-china-stand-off-battle-nerves-31616

Although it has been over five weeks since the face-off between Indian and Chinese troops started in the strategically important Doklam area in the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction, there is no sign of easing of tensions. It all started in mid-June when Indian troops joined the Royal Bhutanese army to physically prevent Chinese PLA engineers from constructing a road in the disputed area.

When the news hit the Indian media with visuals of Indian and Chinese troops scuffling with each other, China’s state-controlled media let loose a barrage of propaganda, misinformation, threats and reminders of PLA prowess. The provocative tone of the op-eds on such a subject in the Communist party tabloid, Global Times, is nothing unusual. But when Xinhua and China Daily also joined the chorus, reminding India of its 1962 defeat, it probably was an indication that the Doklam standoff may well be part of a larger campaign to “cut down India to size”.

This should be seen in the light of growing Indo-US defence cooperation, particularly after Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Donald Trump for the first time in June. This resulted in India acquiring state-of-the-art military equipment and augmenting defence capabilities in sea, air and land. Also, India indicated that it would not sacrifice its national interests and territorial sovereignty in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in order to join the Belt and Road Initiative which Beijing had convened. India had no other option but to stay out of the summit after the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) not only violated Indian territory, but qualitatively changed its strategic equation with both countries.

The Doklam standoff is not merely related to Indian intrusion in 269 km of disputed territory along the Bhutan border. It is a moment of truth for India as well as China in furthering their relations peacefully. India’s patchwork relations have come a long way since Modi spread out the red carpet to Chinese President Xi Jinping. India has become more assertive and articulate in stating its case at international forums, whether it is China’s selective approach to Pakistani terrorism or its admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The standoff is already impacting Indo-China relations at the bilateral, regional and international levels. Even when both sides decide to cool their rhetoric and sit down to devise a face-saving measure, we can expect this to influence relations at the strategic, economic and political levels.

President Xi is looking for a second term in office from 2018. The Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in September 2017 will decide this. By all indications, he would probably be re-elected. During the first five-year term, he carried out sweeping reforms to eradicate corruption in the CPC, PLA and the government. His contenders have fallen by the wayside. He has emerged as the most powerful leader of China after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and controls all three arms of China—the party, PLA, and the government. So he cannot afford a loss of face by simply shaking hands with India after its troops entered Doklam Plateau.

High expectations were built when Modi embarked on his jhoola strategy to win over Xi during his visit to India in September 2014. Xi also seemed to reciprocate it. Despite sticking to their national agendas, both showed maturity in not allowing the compulsions of realpolitik to allow their relations to drift. Though the Doklam incident has the potential to reduce it to an aspirational level, sheer economic compulsions, where overall trade between the two countries is $70 billion a year, may force them to bury the hatchet. Wars are expensive and counter-productive.

But not to be missed in the Doklam incident is China’s use of a national strategy where psychological warfare was waged using multi-media, propaganda and legal props. This was evident when sober Chinese media like Xinhua played down the stand-off initially, but slowly changed their tone after the Modi-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit at Hamburg three weeks ago failed to ease the tension. Their meeting, despite the smiles, hearty handshakes and five-minute exchange of pleasantries, showed that India and China were not on the same page on finding a solution to the Doklam gridlock. Their mutually appreciative references to each other’s contribution to BRICS indicated that their act was carefully calibrated to prevent relations from being strained further.

After G-20, there was no stopping the Chinese media and it went into an overdrive with a cleverly plotted propaganda campaign. It carried veiled threats of an imminent attack on India and probably even planted fake news of 158 Indian troops killed in clashes in Pakistan’s TV channel Dunya (later denied by the Chinese). It also had reports of a massive build-up of PLA troops and movement of armaments and testing of new tanks for fighting in Tibet. Even a routine military exercise was painted to show as a preparation for war, with a reminder to India of its defeat in 1962. The Chinese media campaign was mixed with fact and fiction, appeals to patriotism, citing of international law to interpret boundaries and treaty obligations, raising the five principles of Panchsheel and interspersing these with reports of PLA’s prowess and the dangers of India “day dreaming”.

Most of these stories were faithfully reproduced in India’s free media, which carried wide-ranging op-eds advising the government not to give an inch of territory and not to go to war as it would kill the country’s development agenda. Some defence analysts like Lt Gen Harcharanjit Singh Panag reminded the Chinese of the high costs of a similar adventure in 1967 in the same area along the Sikkim border. That’s when the Chinese lost 400 lives while Indian losses were barely one-fifth of it.

Overall, the Chinese seem to have won the propaganda war because Indian media stories were reactive or mere reproductions of Chinese statements. This is the price democratic societies pay for protecting freedom of expression. In times of war, this can hobble India, unless it takes the impossible option of blocking Chinese media.

There was also the orchestration of foreign policy objectives which suited China’s system of governance. There were the usual blow hot, blow cold statements from the Chinese foreign and defence ministries. For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement on July 25 that Indians had “admitted” to entering Chinese territory and the “simple solution” was for its troops to “conscientiously withdraw” indicate that “withdrawal” was the core issue for China. Its foreign ministry spokesman, Lu Kang, elaborated it in a media briefing a day later: “…the crux of the incident is that the Indian border troops illegally trespassed into Chinese territory and the solution….is for Indian troops to pull out unconditionally. This is a precondition basis for any meaningful dialogue between the two countries.” On the other hand, Chinese defence ministry spokesman Col Wu Quan warned India not to “push your luck” and underestimate the PLA. “China’s determination and resolve to safeguard national security and sovereignty is unshakable,” he added.

Intrusion of troops into disputed territory between the borders of both countries is not uncommon because it is part of showing their claim to the territory. The Chinese often flaunt their military muscle by intruding into India’s border, particularly when its leaders visit India. Even when Xi was on his maiden visit to India in September 2014, Chinese troops had intruded nearly one-and-a-half kilometres in sizeable strength across the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. Similarly, a few days before Chinese premier Li Keqiang was to visit India in May 2013, there was a face-off when Indian troops stopped intruding Chinese troops in Ladakh.

But the Doklam stand-off is not like other intrusions. This was the first time India entered Bhutan’s disputed area in aid of Bhutanese troops.  The Chinese seemed peeved that India intruded into Chinese territory with impunity and muscled into a bilateral issue between China and Bhutan.  All these years, China had been accustomed to India playing down Chinese intrusions.

This time, India showed that it could not be taken for granted and that it would support Bhutan to fulfill the obligations of Article 2 of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty 2007. Article 2 states: “In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.”

In fact, uncontrolled entry of Tibetan grazers and Chinese soldiers in Doklam Plateau had figured during 24 rounds of border talks between China and Bhutan. Indian troops went in to support the Bhutanese army which had protested when the Chinese started constructing a road through the Dolam (Bhutanese name for Doklam) to the tri-junction area. The tri-junction is close to the Siliguri corridor, a narrow 21-km strip of land that provides the lifeline between the North-east and the rest of India. China has a history of providing arms to insurgent movements in the North-east. So there was no question of India allowing the Chinese to occupy Doklam Plateau as it would compromise the security of India and Bhutan.

Clarifying India’s stand in the Rajya Sabha, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said that any unilateral altering of the border by China would amount to a “direct challenge” to India’s security. She said they brought bulldozers and earth excavators to build a road and their “intention is to reach the tri-junction of India-China-Bhutan…. If there is to be sit-down talks, then both countries should withdraw their soldiers”. This was India’s bottomline.  Indications are that China would reciprocate by defusing an explosive situation.

Indian troops are placed in a tactically advantageous position in the Doklam Plateau which overlooks Chumbi Valley in Tibet. So it may not be prudent for the Chinese to fight a battle there. But that does not prevent its troops from indulging in muscle-flexing. They also have the option to create another confrontation along the Arunachal-Tibet border like they did in 1987 at Sumdrong Chu overlooking Tawang. Unless, the situation is eased off diplomatically, these may well remain the military options for China.

India and China have working modalities in place to handle such situations and avoid armed confrontation. This arrangement had been working reasonably well because both sides want to maintain peace along the border. Ajit Doval, India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) who was in Beijing to attend BRICS, discussed the issue with his Chinese counterpart and other leaders. Moderate sentiments seeking to avoid a conflict in social media increase hopes that the NSA will succeed in a plan to ease the confrontation at Doklam Plateau.

Perhaps the weakest link in our ability to wage war is the amorphous and opaque national security decision-making process. In times of war, if Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has to handle the defence ministry as well, he would need to become a superman to excel on both fronts. Both the ministries have a heavy backlog of work and after years of tinkering with patchwork solutions, they suffer from non-performing assets of a dubious value. It is baffling why Modi, who has been keen to carry out structural reforms and systemic improvements in many of the ministries, has not done so in defence. The reforms carried out so far are too few and too slow.

Unless there is a full-time defence minister accountable to the nation, in times of war we may well face a repeat of 1962. This disastrous war is an example of “the three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army” to quote Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War. Sun Tzu’s list includes:

·         Hobbling the army by “commanding the army to advance or retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey;

·         “Attempting to govern the army in the same way he administers a kingdom being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in the army. This causes restlessness in the minds of soldiers.”

·         Employing the officers of the army “through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers”.

Can we change this style if we are serious about the nation’s security? Let us hope so.

Sri Lanka Perspectives - June 2017: Gnanasara Thero rides again

Colonel R Hariharan   | 30-06-2017 |  

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, July 2017 Issue. www.security-risks.com

Sri Lanka’s infamous Buddhist monk Gnanasara Thero, who led his followers of the Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) fringe group to attack Muslim businesses, places of worship and property in 2014, has staged a comeback to energise anti-Muslim activities once again.

During the last two months, anti-Muslim hate crimes have escalated; according to Reuters 20 attacks on Muslims have been recorded since April 2017. In the Vesak period in the second half of May 2017 alone, 12 attacks have been reported. These include attack on Muslims, destruction of shops belonging to them and mosques.  

By and large the Sinhala community has cordial relations with the Muslim community. However, a small number of Buddhist fringe elements had been spreading hate campaign against Muslims for a few years now. The BBS group led by Gnanasara is perhaps the largest among the loose knit Buddhist fringe organisations; these include the Sinhala Ravaya, Ravana Balaya, Sinhale and Sinhala Jathika Balaya.  These fringe groups accuse some Muslim organisations of radicalizing the community and forcibly converting people to Islam. Muslim leaders have strongly denied these accusations. However, Saudi-funded efforts to spread the fundamentalist Wahabi sect in Sri Lanka coupled with the spread of Islamic terrorism in the Arab world and gulf countries have not helped in allaying the fears  of jihadi terrorism spreading to Sri Lanka.

Though Gnanasara Thero had been stoking the hate campaign, the BBS had denied its involvement in hate attacks. However, many of the recent attacks have followed Gnanasara Thero’s provocative speeches made while visiting the area.  He was reported present during an attack in Onagama in Polonnoruwa on May 14 and during an attack on a mosque in Kurunegala on May 21, 2017. However, the police present on the location did not arrest him. Police seem to be lethargic both in preventing such acts of violence, as well as in taking up follow up action after receiving complaints.  

This has given rise to a feeling of déjà vu among minorities, particularly Muslims, at Maithripala Sirisena government’s abysmal failure to put an end hate campaigns just as the Rajapaksa government dithered during the 2014 anti-Muslim violence. In fact, minorities voted to elect Sirisena as President after he promised to investigate anti-Muslim hate crimes and put an end to them.

Nothing illustrates the ambivalent political attitude to anti-minority campaigns better than Justice and Buddha Sasana Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe’s threat to debar human rights lawyer Lakshan Dias. In a TV discussion, the lawyer had alleged that over 190 incidents of violence, harassment and intimidation against Christians and churches had taken place in Sri Lanka since January 8, 2015.  The minister demanded a public apology from the human rights activist within 24 hours for making the “anti-national” statement. Describing him as a traitor, the minister said the lawyer’s mission was to spoil the reconciliation process. However, the Minister did not use such strong language to condemn Gnanasara Thero and the BBS, though they were causing more damage to ethnic harmony in the island.  The human rights activist is reported to have fled the country to seek safe refuge abroad after he received many threats to his life.

Quite a few Sri Lanka columnists have pointed out the political context for the resurgence of violence against minorities. Writing in the Colombo daily Island columnist CA Chandraprema said “the latest spate of anti-Muslim violence” unleashed by the BBS was “orchestrated by elements within the Yahapalana government” to win over a section of the Sinhala Buddhist vote gravitating “heavily” to the joint opposition. He further added that the Minister for Megapolis and Western development Champika Ranawaka and President Sirisena “had an interest in using the BBS to split the Sinhala Buddhist vote” and that “the impunity enjoyed by the BBS in the past several weeks is due to patronage at highest levels of the government.”

Champika Ranawaka, leader of the right wing Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) party, has a history of absolving BBS’ role in inciting anti-Muslim activities, including the Aluthagama riots, during the Rajapaksa rule in 2014. Gnanasara was in fact a member of JHU.  So even if media comments on Ranawaka’s role in the present situation are conjectures, minorities will always view his role with some trepidation.

Gnanasara had been taking advantage of the government’s hesitation in taking action against Buddhist monks and fringe elements for fear of political backlash among Buddhist majority.  Moreover, the government is generally chary of offending the Mahanayakas, Buddhist prelates who oversee and regulate clergy. The Mahanayaka of Asgiriya chapter, though he does not condone the behaviour of Gnanasara Thero, has warned the government and public not to refer to the errant monk in disrespectful terms, presumably in a bid to safeguard the reputation of monkhood. This would explain why the police pussy footed for three weeks after charging the BBS leader for blasphemy and instigating religious violence but failing to arrest him. However, Gnanasara was formally arrested when he surrendered at the Fort Magistrate’s court on May 21. He was released on bail the same day after the police recorded his statement.

The moot point is will Gnanasara Thero and the lumpen followers of BBS be brought to book to put an end to the hate campaign against minorities? It is doubtful as long as political parties continue to fringe groups to whip up religious passions among the people. 

The inept handling of the anti-Muslim violence has shown the Sirisena government’s failure to live up to its repeated promises to bring in good governance.  Western diplomats including those of the US, Canada and Australia have called upon the government to take strict action to ensure security to Muslim minority.  This is likely to further tarnish of the reputation of the Yahapalanaya (good governance) government eroding its credibility even before it completes two years in office in August.  

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog: http://col.hariharan.info