Friday, 10 November 2017

Weathering the winds of change in Indian Ocean security

COLONEL R HARIHARAN |Op-ed |Ceylon Today| 10 October 2017


It looks like Sri Lanka’s balancing act in the China-India power play in the Indian Ocean is going to get more and more difficult the coming months and years. China’s assertion of economic and military power is poised to grow stronger in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) if we go by President Xi Jinping’s speech at the recently concluded Communist Party of China (CPC) 19th National Congress.

According to Xinhua, President Xi “announced the new era: China has stood up, grown rich and become strong. It will move toward center stage and make greater contributions for mankind. By 2050….China is set to regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the world.”

The Congress has elevated President Xi Jinping’s status on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping by adopting “Xism” – Socialism with Chinese characteristics for the New Era – as its creed.  With the Congress making Xi to head the country, the party and the PLA for yet another term, he combines enormous power. He is perhaps exemplifying poet William Cowper’s words “I am monarch of all I survey, My right there is none to dispute, From the centre of all round to the sea, I am lord of the fowl and the horde.” In simple terms, Xi now has a free hand to relentlessly push, to make China truly the Middle Kingdom and realise the China dream.

The CPC Congress has also amended the party constitution to include One Belt One Road initiative (including 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) making it an important strategic vehicle to “move toward the centre stage.” The OBOR amendment passed, ignoring the objections of India and the US and Japan, indicates Xi’s determination to fulfil his strategic vision in the face of big power objections.    

The China-Pakistan strategic alliance is likely to become an important vehicle of China’s strategic thrust in South Asia and IOR. The mega China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) infrastructure project is rapidly improving China’s land access to Gwadar port on Arabian Sea coast. This would make it a vital strategic asset for China’s articulation of the 21st century maritime silk route.  With China’s help Pakistan is improving its naval assets and maritime infrastructure in Gwadar to handle the threat of Indian Navy’s domination of IOR.

India’s relations with China continue to be haunted by trust deficit, though both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi have repeatedly stressed peaceful development as their objective.  China’s periodic acts of belligerence like the recent military confrontation in Doklam Plateau on India-Bhutan-China border has not helped the situation, though India-China trade is growing exponentially, heavily weighted in favour of China.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision for Indian Ocean articulated in 2015 which includes the SAGAR (Security And Growth for All) has to be viewed in this emerging strategic scene backed by his ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. The initiative is holistic and addresses issues relating to economic revival, connectivity, security, culture and identity. India’s strengthening of relations with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Bangladesh is part of this strategic initiative. Indian Navy’s acquisition of naval assets from the US – particularly P8 reconnaissance aircraft and landing craft country as well as development of missile capabilities – point to India’s determination to protect the IOR.

India’s Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj speaking at the 2nd Indian Ocean Conference in Colombo in August 2017 emphasized that for the Indian Ocean economic revival to be sustainable, the waters must not only be better connected, but they should remain free from non-traditional and traditional threats. She also added that it was imperative that all stakeholders abide by a rule-based global order. Apparently, she was hinting at China defiance of UN laws of the sea by ignoring the international arbitration tribunal ruling against China’s illegal development of disputed islets in South China Sea.

HAMBANTOTA

China’s maritime assets created in the IOR, including Hambantota, extend now from Djibouti on the West to South China Sea. This is disturbing not only India’s strategic construct but also the US, Japan, and its Pacific allies. They are coming together to build their collective strengths to challenge to China’s westward march in Asia and the IOR.  With these moves, the centre of gravity of global strategic power is shifting slowly to IOR.

PM Narendra Modi and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe enjoy close rapport in shaping India-Japan strategic relationship. Towards a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific – the title of the joint statement issued during PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to India on September 14, 2017 eloquently underlines the strategic focus of the relationship between the two countries.

Japan government spokesman explaining the concept said the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ rested on “two oceans” – Indian and Pacific – and “two continents” – Africa and Asia. He said the new strategy was aimed at preparing Japan to deal with the fast changing global and regional order and threats from China and North Korea, based on “diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the world map.” It was to create a free and open Asia-Pacific region which connects pars of eastern Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia with Western Pacific Ocean region and Japan.

Indo-US strategic relations have matured in tandem with the growth of their shared goals in keeping the ocean ways open and free and ending the scourge of jihadi terror.  President Donald Trump has repeatedly stressed India’s role in ensuring the Indian Ocean remains free and safe for international shipping. The US is also revamping its Pakistan policy after it has shown reluctance in reining in jihadi terrorists operating against India and Afghanistan.   Significantly, US has opened the access to defence technology to India, which would make sea change in the country’s China-centric military capability in land, air and sea.

Thanks to its geographic location, Sri Lanka may find itself in the eye of the storm, when the winds of change blowing in IOR get too strong. The pulls and pressures of strategic jockeying for power in the IOR may well prove too complex for Sri Lanka. 

Sushma Swaraj explained India’s inclusive view of the Indian Ocean “as an engine for growth and prosperity in our region and beyond, it is of utmost importance that those who live in this region bear the primary responsibility for the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indian Ocean.” So Sri Lanka views will continue influence India’s IOR strategies because both the nations are Indian Ocean powers too close to ignore each other’s interests.   

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog:http://col.hariharan.info

Saturday, 4 November 2017

Role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka politics

Col R Hariharan | 31-10-2017 | 

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, November 2017 Issue. www.security-risks.com

Sri Lanka has the longest history of Buddhism among Buddhist countries in the world. Ever since Buddhism was introduced in the 3rd century BCE, it had faced threat of survival due to overwhelming cultural and religious influence of Hinduism, internal jockeying for power between the Mahayana and Theravada schools and Colonial sponsorship of Christianity and Islam. In such periods of turbulence, Sinhala kings sought the help of two other Buddhist countries – Myanmar and Thailand - to strengthen and revive Buddhism.

Over a period of time, the orthodox Theravada Buddhism has come to terms with some of the popular Mahayana practices among the people. So it is not surprising, despite Theravada orthodoxy, historically Sinhala kings had not only allowed Hindus and Muslims to practice their religions, but also protected them from Dutch and Portuguese colonialist-sponsored onslaughts against them.

However, it was Anagarika Dharmapala, the father of modern Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, who gave the momentum it needed in late 19th and early 20th century to response to the British Colonial rule. Cumulatively, these historical experiences have left a deep impression in the psyche of many Buddhists. They believe Sri Lanka is the last bastion of Theravada Buddhism. This feeling also gave rise to ultra nationalist fringe groups like the Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS), self-styled guardians saving Buddhism and the distinct identity of Sinhalas. So they consider their vicious anti-Muslim campaigns as legitimate actions. Sometimes, the vigilantes go berserk, as it happened in 2014 and 2017, to attack and destroy Muslim-owned businesses and places of worship of Muslims. 

Such acts of Buddhist vigilantism has been seen, not only in Sri Lanka, but also in Myanmar and Thailand. In all the three countries, the archpriests of anti-Muslim rhetoric are Buddhist monks – Golagodatthe Gnanasara in Sri Lanka, U Wirathu in Myanmar and Maha Aphichat in Thailand. The veneer of religious justification they provide to their hate campaign attract some of  the gullible population.

The spread of Wahabism, which provides religious legitimacy for the Islamic jihad of the Al Qaeda–kind in many countries of the globe has whipped up feeling of insecurity among Buddhist nationalists. This suits Buddhist vigilante groups as it provides warped justification for their hate campaigns. Inevitably, Buddhist nationalist right wing political parties have provided political context to the hate groups.

Even mainstream political parties in power are long on rhetoric to condemn the activities of fringe groups but ponderous in taking immediate action to bring the culprits involved in such attacks on Muslims. They are wary of offending conservative nationalist segments among the people, who might dub it as a “unpatriotic”   conduct This has considerably damaged the Sinhala-Muslim relations with their adverse political fallout. Covert support given to Sinhala nationalist elements by some leaders of political parties has deepened the suspicion about their sincerity in addressing grievances of Tamil minority, who are mostly Hindus and Christians, and Tamil-speaking Muslims.

Perhaps in deference to the sentiments of 70 per cent Theravada Buddhist population of the country, Sri Lanka’s 1978 constitution gave Buddhism a special status, while not calling it the official religion. The constitution chapter II, Article 9 states “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring a foremost to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14 (1)(e).” These two articles provide all citizens the freedom to adopt, practice and teach any religion of their choice.

Though constitutionally Buddhism might enjoy only the nebulous status of “foremost place,” in reality Buddhism dominates the political and socio-cultural discourse of the country, just as the 80-ft tall Buddha statute in Kandy, said to be the tallest in the world, dominates the skyline. Buddhist monks have always played an active role in the country because ethnic and religious issues are interwoven in politics of the country.  The Mahanayake thera, chief prelates of monastic fraternities (Nikaya) who oversee and regulate Buddhist clergy, wield a lot of influence over their followers. This has enabled them to have a political role, like their counterparts in Myanmar. Often, they are loudly vocal even on issues of governance and politics.

Their blessings and patronage are avidly sought by all political leaders; it is not uncommon to see the newly sworn in president and prime minister making a beeline to them to seek their blessings. The Mahanayake also have their favourites among national leaders and often come out in support of their favourites. So top political leaders have little option, but, to woo the Mahanayake for their support.

Both Buddhist clergy and Sinhala-Buddhist-nationalism are conspicuously influencing the exercise now going on to draft a new constitution. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe embarked on the process to fulfil their electoral promises to make the executive presidency more accountable and to fulfil the aspirations of minorities.  In July 2017, a special Sangha Council attended by Mahanayakas of three Nikayas (including the prelate of Asgiriya, a known supporter of former president Rajapaksa) and 75 other Thera, met in Kandy to unanimously decide that there was no need to bring in a new constitution or an amendment to the present Constitution, negating the peoples mandate given to the ruling UNP-SLFP coalition.

Not to be out done, President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe met the Prelate of the Malwatte Chapter, a known support of the UNP, and assured him that the new constitution would neither in any way lead to a separate or federal state, nor abolish the foremost place given to Buddhism. After their meeting, the Prelate came out in support of the effort to draft a new constitution.

PM Wickremesinghe has maintained the refrain that all political parties and religious leaders across faiths had “no issue in giving priority to protect Buddhism in the country” to assuage feelings of many Sinhalas, who are suspicious about the intentions of the government after the interim report on the constitutional draft submitted to parliament gave two options for adoption on the special status given to Buddhism.  Of course, Sinhalas who feel Theravada Buddhism is under siege, want Buddhism to be declared as the state religion. However, Tamil National Alliance parliamentarian MA Sumanthiran has opposed giving primacy to one religion (Buddhism) in the face of equality of all religions; though he was not averse to “some kind of recognition to Buddism and Buddha’s teachings.” This probably reflects the minority view.

So the constitution-making exercise continues in typical Sri Lankan and South Asian style, with endless discussions by everyone trying to outdo others, rather than hear each other to build a consensus. In all likelihood, Buddhism will retain its special status in the new constitution when the final draft goes for a referendum before the people next year. Whether the people would approve it, remains open ended question. However, I believe majority of Sri Lankans are enlightened enough to approve it as their bitter memories of three decades wasted in fighting Tamil insurgents are still fresh.

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog:http://col.hariharan.info