The annual budgets for the armed have shown
declining outlays for modernization, thus affecting new projects. It’s more to
do with the government’s mindset
Col R
Hariharan|My space|Defence|Funds crisis|
India
Legal February 26, 2018
PRIME MINISTER Narendra Modi is
probably happy to see leaders of foreign governments, one after the other,
making a beeline to New Delhi because it indicates increasing recognition of
India as an important global player. Modi has partly succeeded in managing
India’s strategic influence from being overwhelmed by China’s increasing power
play in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region. The Maldives slipping into China’s
fold, disregarding India’s objections, has shown India fulfiling its strategic dream
is still in the making.
The Chinese dragon will continue
to roll on because President Xi Jinping is trying to live the China Dream. His strong
global pitch is not only backed by deep pockets but PLA’s military muscle to defend
China’s increasing global assets.
Though India has overtaken
China’s in its GDP rate of growth, surprisingly its armed forces are still to
make up their decades of deficiencies even to meet the essential needs to
defend the country, let alone safeguard India’s increasing global assets. Nothing
illustrates the crisis situation better than the army informing the
parliamentary standing committee that it does not have enough money to pay for
ongoing schemes, emergency procurement and weaponry for 10 days of intense war,
future acquisitions and also strategic roads along the China border. The report, which the committee tabled in Parliament,
quoted Lt General Sarath Chand’s deposition that the defence budget “has dashed
our hopes” and “marginal increase in it barely accounts for inflation and
doesn’t cater for taxes.”
This year’s defence budget has
been increased by only 7.81% to Rs 295,511 crores from Rs 274, 114 crores last
year. The defence outlays is about 1.58 % of the GDP, the lowest such figure
since the 1962 war with China. It had been steadily declining in percentage
terms as the economy expanded. With the chances of collusive threat from
Pakistan and China, we need to double it if armed forces are to manage the
current threat.
The annual defence budgets have
shown declining outlays for modernisation affecting new projects. About 80% of
the outlays are for committed liabilities for financing arms deals inked in
earlier years. This has meant that the armed forces will continue to grapple
with critical operational shortages even to wage conventional war.
But it is not about money but
more to do with the mindset of those in government. Successive governments have
been tall on talk but short on making the armed forces fit for war. Otherwise,
the Raksha Mantri’s operational directives and the 15-year Long Term Integrated
Perspective Plan have never received the attention they deserved from the
government. There is a clear disconnect within the government; otherwise it
difficult to explain the finance ministry failing to approve the 10th
(2002-07), 11th (2007-12) and 12th Five Year Plans
formulated with the existing threat perceptions.
I am writing this with a feeling
of déjà vu; I remember what
former
army chief General VP Malik wrote in 2012, twelve years after the Kargil war.
Twenty days after taking over as Army chief, while addressing the PM and the
Cabinet Committee on Security in a combined commanders’ conference on October
20, 1997, the general described the state of the Army as “the spirit is strong
but the body is weak,” indicating the high deficiencies of arms, ammunition and
equipment.
In March 1999, just before Kargil
war, he wrote to the then Defence Minister George Fernandes stating “The army
is finding that major acquisitions get stymied for various reasons and a
feeling of cynicism is creeping. By and large, the prevailing situations is
that nothing much can be done about the existing hollowness in the Army. By
denying essential equipment, the armed forces would gradually lose their combat
edge, which would show adversely in future conflict.” And it showed up during
the Kargil conflict when ammunition for Bofors guns was procured from
international market and rushed post haste to battle front. Are we waiting for another
"Kargil" to happen once again?
Winston Churchill once said “Generals
are always prepared for the last war.” Our generals have belied him; they want
to fight today’s wars with modern weapons. However, whether the government is
even prepared for the last war is a disturbing question.
There is no point in finger
pointing, because the problem is past that stage. Though I am no great admirer
of Churchill, I cannot but quote him from War Memoirs, “United wishes
and good will cannot overcome brute facts. Truth is incontrovertible. Panic may
resent it. Ignorance may deride it. Malice may distort it. But there it is.”
So our priority should be to
immediately make up 10 days war reserve to start with; we can talk of two-front
or two-and-half-front wars thereafter. Otherwise, India’s failure to attend to
these long standing deficiencies may well prove to be PM Modi’s tripping point
in realising his strategic dreams.
I hope the PM realises the
urgency of the crisis armed forces are facing, particularly when the situation
along LoC has become incendiary, with the Army hitting hard Pakistan army bases
supporting terrorist infiltration, under the gaze of China –Pakistan’s
strategic partner – which keeps reminding us of Doklam.
The writer is a military intelligence
specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies
and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute