Beijing does not appear to be in a hurry to change its stand on trans-border terrorism.
POLITICS | 6-minute read | 26-10-2018
COLONEL
R HARIHARAN @colhari2
The series of
follow-up decisions taken together by India and China after the informal summit
between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan in July 2018 seem to indicate both are trying to mend their relations
frayed in the wake of the 2017 military standoff at Doklam. But much will
depend upon how soon their mutual confidence building measures are turned into
trust building actions.
Perhaps, the most
significant move was the signing of an agreement between the two countries on internal security cooperation to “strengthen and
consolidate discussions and cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism,
organised crimes, drug control and other relevant areas”. It could be
path-breaking if pursued in earnest. (The caveat is Chinese official statements
frequently contain the word “relevant” to suit the country’s ambivalent stand
on some of the related issues.)
A notable feature
was China’s grudging acceptance of minister of state for home Kiren Rijiju presence as
part of the Indian delegation. Rijiju, who hails from Arunachal Pradesh
(claimed by the Chinese as their territory), drew the wrath of the neighbouring
country when he accompanied the Dalai Lama, who was invited to participate in a
religious ceremony at Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) in April 2017.
The apparent acceptance of Rijiju’s presence indicates nothing
more than China’s situational management of its “traditional” objections to
suit its specific requirement. It would be facile to interpret this as an
indication of a possible change in China’s stand on territorial claims in the
Northeast.
Equally significant is China not accepting India’s request to support its long pending
application to the UN to include Masood Azhar, chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) and mastermind of the 2016 Uri attack, in the global list of
terrorists. China’s foreign office has categorically stated that there was no
change in its stand to decide on the issue on its “merits”.
China’s on Masood Azhar is a show of solidarity with Pakistani
perceptions on the Jihadi terrorist despite China’s own heavy crackdown on Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang under the pretext
of fighting Uyghur separatists. The Azhar case would probably “merit”
favourable action from China, when it seeks a “trade off” from India, ie, when
a Uyghur separatist seeks refuge in India.
At the talks,
India had also requested China not to give shelter to United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) leader Paresh
Baruah, who had been on the run. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson’s terse
comment on the request was that there was no change in China’s adherence “to
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries”. By
early 1990s, China officially abandoned its policy of supporting insurgent
groups in India’s Northeast and Myanmar.
However, Chinese-made weapons continue to find their way to Naga
hostiles and Manipuri and ULFA extremists holed up in sanctuaries in parts of
Myanmar close to the Indian border. Apart from this, China is increasingly
influencing the politics in India’s neighbourhood. In such an environment, China’s
much avowed “principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other
countries” lacks credibility. So Paresh Baruah is likely to be held as yet
another trump card of minor value in China’s suite in its dealings with India.
It would seem that despite the rhetoric on strengthening and
consolidation of “cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism, organised
crimes, drug control and other relevant areas” contained in the internal
security agreement, China does not appear to be in a hurry to change its stand
on trans-border terrorism. So, we can expect this to continue to be an irritant
in the relations between the two countries.
Even otherwise, the fundamental asymmetry between India and
China in tackling the terrorist threat can come in the way of furthering
cooperation. China has introduced draconian counterterrorism laws; these are
heavily loaded against Uyghur Muslim separatists denying the entire population
freedom to practice their religion and culture. China has brazenly justified
curbs against Islamic and Tibetan Buddhist religious practices and the brutal
suppression of Uyghur minority’s struggle to preserve their cultural and
linguistic identity.
On the other hand, India is a strong functional democracy that
guarantees freedom of expression and religion. Government actions to curb
insurgency and terrorism are frequently challenged by civil society activists
and human rights watch dogs. India’s strong judiciary continues to be the
guardian of citizens’ rights and freedom of expression. In this environment,
the moot question is can India meaningfully cooperate with or learn from China
in countering terrorism except for symbolic military training in counter
insurgency?
In this respect, the decision to conduct the seventh edition of
Hand in Hand, the annual joint military drill in November 2018 in Chengdu in
China is only restoring the joint training exercise which was disrupted in the
wake of Doklam standoff. The military drill continues to be more symbolic than
substantive in scope and size. Military cooperation has the potential to be
scaled up as Indian and Chinese armies are now working together in UN forces
and exercising jointly in groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO). Better understanding at forces level could help avoid a flare up of the
Doklam-kind along India’s troubled border. Hopefully, it would also hasten the
process to establish direct one-to-one communication between the two armies at
the top level.
The launching of the first ever India-China joint training
programme for Afghan diplomats is one of the joint projects Modi and Xi had
agreed upon at Wuhan. It is significant that India has replaced the US with
which China had earlier agreed to conduct the joint training of Afghan
diplomats. It indicates China’s acknowledgment of India’s role in Afghanistan,
in spite of Pakistan’s objections to Indian presence there. It also recognises
India’s contribution in developmental activity in Afghanistan.
However, multi-national initiatives involving China had not
progressed well in Afghanistan in the past. Probably, China would like to avail
of the widespread goodwill India enjoys in Afghanistan, to further its
presence in the war torn country.
The controlled handling of the Maldivian elections and its aftermath by India and China, despite their clash
of interests, shows both the countries are prepared to factor in each other’s
interest in their decision-making. However, how far and how long they can
maintain such a spirit remains a question. Both countries face strong internal
pressures in their own way; both are also subject to the dynamics of strategic
environment and realpolitik in the Indo-Pacific region.
This makes it imperative for both countries to deliberate upon
their actions if they want sustained peace in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
region. That would require not allowing their age-old trust deficit to overtake their decision-making; so they
will have to go beyond confidence building to build trust.
Col R Hariharan, a retired Military
Intelligence specialist on South Asia, has rich experience in terrorism and
insurgency operations.
Courtesy: India Today opinion portal
DailyO
