Col R Hariharan | 31-12-2018 | Courtesy: South Asia Security
Trends, January 2019 | www.security-risks.com |
Undoubtedly, 2018 will go down as a discreditable year for Sri
Lankan politics, if we go by the 51-day political impasse created by President
Maithripala Sirisena’s ill-conceived actions to dismiss Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe and install former president Mahinda Rajapaksa as PM. The
Rajapaksa government flaunting all the perks ruling the country for 51 days,
without a parliamentary mandate was the height of political ignominy.
However, refusal
of the parliament to endorse Rajapaksa as PM and the Supreme Court striking
down all actions of the President that created the political crisis as
unconstitutional, showed there is hope for democracy to survive in the coming
year.
Though
Sri Lankans don’t eat ‘the humble pie’ as they prefer hoppers, President
Sirisena had to do just on December 15, 2018 when he swore-in Wickremesinghe once
again as PM, after declaring, not once but twice a month ago that he, “will not make him prime minister ... not in my lifetime." Also
forgotten were his comments at his party meeting: "He [Wickremesinghe] is corrupt. His economic policies are
not good for local industries. He pursued an extremely liberal form of
government that is not compatible with our culture."
Perhaps the President
forgot that people voted him to power because they wanted a liberal government
after President Rajapaksa’s authoritarian rule.
The President also directly attacked PM Wickremesinghe for
appointing Arjuna Mahendran as the Central Bank Governor and the Bond scam,
which was against the very principles on which the UNF government was elected
in 2015. He said “Today the main suspect (Mahendran) is absconding and the
Yahaplanaya Government and the UNP partners have been slow to act, thereby
protecting the corrupt. They stifled investigation or subjected those
investigating to threats.”
Evidently, this Bond issue will be milked to the full in the
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe tug of war in the run up to the next general elections;
but the moot point is will the politicians involved in the scam be prosecuted
and punished? Successive governments in Sri Lanka have never covered themselves
with glory in this regard. A recent example is the slow progress in a large
number of criminal cases filed against the Rajapaksa family members. Despite
all the political rhetoric and publicity, it is still work in progress.
Going by all indications the political situation is unlikely to improve even after Wickremesinghe’s
return as PM. PM Wickremesinghe was clearly outwitted when Sirisena and Rajapa
hatched the plan to dethrone him from power. Earlier, in his political career,
Wickremesinghe has demonstrated his inability to astutely read political
developments in real time. Can he overcome this leadership weakness?
Even in the recent political crisis it is the overwhelming
public and civil society’s protest against President Sirisena’s cavalier action
in sacking Wickremesinghe that strengthened his hand. This showed there is a strong,
vocal public constituency that still believes in Yahapalana ideology. The media
had also picked up the public mood and made common cause with them against the
President’s actions.
PM Wickremesinghe’s success in 2019 would very much depend upon his
ability to retain the support of this constituency. So the key question is can
he meet their expectations, that is fulfilling the incomplete agenda of the
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe combine. A few incomplete parts of the agenda have
defied easy solution; these include drafting a new constitution which could
satisfy the aspirations of Tamil minority while maintaining the unity of Sri
Lanka.
The US, European Union and Japan had rallied to the support of
Wickremesinghe during the political crisis in the hope that he would meet their
expectations on implementing the UN Human Rights Council resolution on a host
of issues of accountability for human rights aberrations including alleged war
crimes and forced disappearances of civilians.
These politically loaded issues require commitment and the
ability to carry the government and the coalition to resolve them. Does the PM have
the commitment to do so? If PM Wickremesinghe wants to make a difference, he
has to find answers to these troubling questions.
Rajapaksa may be down but not out. Despite the recent setback in
his political bid to become PM, Rajapaksa’s loyal support base among Southern Sinhala
rural constituency is intact. A strong-willed leader Rajapaksa will do his best
to bounce back to power. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has decided to form
a broad political alliance with the SLPP and other partners of the UPFA
coalition including the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, Communist Party, Lanka Sama
Samaj, Nation Freedom Front etc. The weakness of this combine is the lack of
adequate support from minority parties.
And the recent political impasse had exposed Rajappaksa’s
limitations in attracting the support of minority Tamils and Muslim parties. When
Rajapaksa was in power, he had indulged in political double speak in handling Sinhala
Buddhist fringe elements which whipped up violent anti-Muslim activities. These
Buddhist fringe groups might be encouraged to stage a comeback in the coming
months, taking advantage of the political turbulence.
Though political headwind is blowing in PM Wickremesinghe’s
favour, reviving his presidential ambitions, there are too many uncertainties
that could dissipate the advantage as the presidential election is due only in
November 2019.
Overall, the year has ended with disillusionment for the people,
who voted Sirisena-Wickremesinghe combine to usher in good governance. After
three and a half years their dream is shattered as good governance seem to be
illusive because politicians do not seem to have changed their change their
style. In this pessimistic environment, one can only hope the year 2019
will be a better one.
Col R Hariharan,
a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace
Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai
Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law
and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info