Monday, 9 September 2019

De-radicalisation in J&K 2.0: Unfang the Terrorists

With the Jammu & Kashmir in a socio-political flux, it is an attractive rallying point for militants. This has led to increased radicalisation of youth


J&K has morphed into J&K 2.0 after Parliament passed a resolution abolishing Articles 370 and 35(a) of the Constitution in August. It not only deprived J&K of its special status, but downgraded it to a Union Territory. This was a watershed moment in India’s seven-decade-long quest to fully integrate J&K with the rest of India on equal terms.
Unfortunately, the abolition of Article 370 provides an attractive rallying point for militants, particularly when there is a socio-political flux. In other words, J&K 2.0 can bloom into a “Paradise on Earth” only if jihadi terrorism and separatism cease to be extra-constitutional agents interfering with the socio-political life of the average Kashmiri.
Islamist militancy and separatism are not new to J&K. However, when the J&K Liberation Front gave a call for azadi, Nizam-e-Mustafa (Rule of Muhammad) became the call of Hizbul Mujahideen and Jamaat-e-Islami militants supported by Pakistan’s ISI and gingered up by Afghan militants. This led to escalated violence in 1989-90 and resulted in the coercive eviction of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley with the state government soft-pedalling the situation.
Since then, though separatism has taken a backseat, Islamic radicalism continues to condition the socio-political discourse in the state. This has been taken advantage of by PoK-based jihadi groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to create a climate of fear as well as to attract young people to their fold.
Globally, there has been a qualitative change in Islamist terrorism after the advent of the Islamic State (IS), a clone of Al Qaeda. With its ruthless tactics and superior net-based propaganda technique, the IS dethroned Al Qaeda from the leadership of jihadi terrorism. Though it was defeated in Iraq and Syria over 2018-19, it still remains a potent force attracting educated Muslim youth from all over the world. Its successful lone wolf attacks and use of social media for propaganda and recruitment have set new standards in refining jihadi terrorist operations, particularly in J&K.
According to Shadi Hamid, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Centre for Middle East Policy, the IS “draws on, and draws strength from, ideas that have broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations. They may not agree with its interpretation of the caliphate, but the notion of a caliphate—a historical, political entity governed by Islamic law and tradition—is a powerful one, even among more secular-minded Muslims”.
Pakistan had been using AQ affiliates like the LeT and JeM operating from sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the LoC to carry out attacks in J&K. This is part of the Pakistan Army’s strategy to “bleed India” to compensate for limitations of its security forces. Pakistan PM Imran Khan had admitted recently that there were 40,000 jihadi terrorists in the country, while claiming that his country too is a victim of terrorism.
It is not surprising that in the charged environment, radicalisation of young people, including some well-educated and employed youth, has been taking place for quite some time now. Their numbers had gone up from 131 youths who joined terrorist outfits in 2017 to over 200 in 2018. Some new terrorist outfits such as ISIS–Kashmir and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, aligned respectively with the IS and Al Qaeda, have come up in the past few years.
So any master plan for J&K 2.0 must have de-radicalisation (DR) at its core. It should be holistic and not merely confined to militants in captivity. DR should not be confused with the Army’s Operation Sadbhavana carried out since 1998. Under this programme, the Army has tried to improve the quality of life of people in five focus areas: education, infrastructure development, health and sanitation, women and youth empowerment and community development.  During the last decade, the Army has spent over Rs 550 crore in J&K under the programme and runs 50 Army Goodwill Schools and health clinics and improved communication in remote areas.
But DR goes beyond this to remove the effects of radicalisation. Radicalisation is a product of protracted psychological conditioning of minds. It is carried out through madrassas, mosques, political propaganda, and print and social media. Such venues of radicalisation need to be sanitised vigorously. DR requires an enduring strategy that focuses not just on targeting the external and internal actors who fuel radicalisation, but also on the processes through which it is carried out.  The International Centre for the Study of Islamic Radicalisation and Political Violence of King’s College, London, studied DR programmes in eight Muslim majority states. It covered Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Radicalisation of the population in these countries and the techniques adopted varied from soft to hybrid to hard approaches. Though the study was done in January 2012, just before the advent of the IS, the six “general lessons” it provides are useful while designing the DR effort in J&K.
·        The need for a national consensus for such policies is the first priority. So in J&K, a national consensus will have to be evolved for undertaking DR, which has to be sustained over a period of time. Building a consensus is likely to take time but it is a must. Saudi Arabia’s success with DR is attributed to the national consensus.
·        Secondly, successful DR policies need committed and charismatic leadership for initiating a change of approach to violent extremism. The study recommends “soft” policies to build confidence and trust to create and maintain a consensus around them. Bangladesh and Egypt carried out DR with the support of the government.
·         The State alone does not have all the tools necessary to counter violent extremism. Engagement with society through civil society organisations with wide experience and resources is likely to provide new ideas and reinforce the State’s efforts. The Bangladesh DR relies heavily on NGOs to get in touch with vulnerable groups in local communities.
·         Violent extremists in prison require “a professional, comprehensive and financially sustainable” DR programme. It should be designed as part of prison policy to prevent hardening of radicals and attempts to radicalise other prisoners.

Without an environment of governance, successful DR cannot be carried out. Such an environment requires the ability to sustain high growth rate, check corruption and inequity. Any deficiencies and grievances, particularly in socio-economic conditions, are usually exploited by extremists.
According to the study, religious dialogue and counselling alone will not curb violent extremism. Other non-ideological, social, economic and political factors also may contribute to radicalisation. In an increasingly globalised world, national DR programmes cannot be framed in isolation. This is very much relevant in J&K as Pakistan continues to be an external source of support for radicalisation. With the US-Taliban talks in the final stage, we can expect the US to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, legitimising the role of the Taliban in the power-sharing arrangement. Its fallout on jihadi terrorism is not known; however, this will have to be factored in in India’s overall plans for J&K.
Successful DR has to be consistent with J&K’s culture and be sensitive to “what is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies” as the study says. In tandem with DR, a counter narrative has to be developed for countering radical and extremist propaganda, particularly through social media.
—The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for Chin

Friday, 6 September 2019

Sri Lanka Perspectives - August 2019


Col R Hariharan| 31-8-2019| Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, Aug 2019 | www.security-risks.com |

Gota in presidential race  

The decision of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) to field Gotabaya Rajapaksa, former defence secretary and brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, as its candidate for the presidential election due in December 2019 was not unexpected. However, it indicates President Maithripala Sirisena’s hope of SLFP joining hands with SLPP to nominate a common candidate to fight the UNP has ended. Joint Opposition(JO) leader Mahinda Rajapaksa has said talks with SLFP will not change the SLPP decision on Gotabaya’s candidacy. 

UNP deputy leader and Minister Sajith Premadasa is making a strong bid for UNP nomination. He is banking on his father Ranasinghe Premadasa’s   long association with UNP. The elder Premadasa served as PM from 1978 to 1988 and President from 1988 to 1993, during the crucial years when Indian forces were fighting the LTTE in Sri Lanka.  Sajith has made clear of his intention to contest the presidential election. 

However, the party chief Ranil Wickremesinghe does not seem to be keen to nominate Sajith as there are other senior leaders like Karu Jayasurya, with rich political experience. Forty UNP MPs out of the party’s 77 members are said to have signed a letter requesting the UNP chief to nominate Sajith. MP Hesha Withanage speaking on behalf of the Sajith group, has said UNP legislators functioning as ministers at different levels would give up their position unless Premadasa was named as the party candidate. However, the UNP chief seems to be still undecided. The delay in UNP picking its candidate has given Gotabaya a head start in the presidential race.  

As architects of victory over the Tamil insurgent group LTTE, Gotabaya and Mahinda enjoy wide popularity among the people, particularly among Sinhala nationalist segment.  The last time people went to polls - the local government elections in 2015 - the SLPP-Joint Opposition (JO) polled 42 percent of the votes indicating that Mahinda has retained his support base, despite losing the presidential election. Gotabaya would build upon this Rajapaksa-loyal segment for his election campaign.

In the run up to the election, Gotabaya is likely to flaunt his achievement in ending the Tamil insurgency in contrast to the security failure of the government to prevent the Easter terrorist blasts despite advance information. With his reputation as a strongman and disciplinarian, Gotabaya will capitalize on the fear psychosis among sections of the people after the Easter attacks. Accepting his nomination Gotabaya  at a party conference  aid “I will accept responsibility to your safety and the safety of your children and your loved ones,”

Infighting between President Sirisena and PM Wickremesinghe has introduced an element of instability in the performance of the government. The backlash against Muslims after the attack has brought back the incendiary mixture of national security and ethnic confrontation to the political centre stage. So Gotabaya’s campaign is likely to be built around the themes of security and political stability, rather than weightier issues like abolition of executive presidency and fundamental rights.

However, there is a seamier side to Gotabaya’s candidature. His reputation as an authoritarian figure with disdain for democratic norms and rule of law dogs him.  Doubts have been raised about his Sri Lankan nationality as he has renounced his US citizenship only recently. There are also reports of immigration irregularity when he served as the defence secretary under President Mahinda Rajapaksa. In utter disregard to humanitarian laws, he is alleged to have ordered the execution of LTTE cadres holding white flag to surrender in the final stages of Eelam War in 2009.   

During his tenure as defence secretary, his name was linked in some of the infamous white van abductions. A CID report presented on at a Mt Lavinia magistrate’s court March 20, 2017 said  Gotabaya led a unit that was accused of assassinating Lasantha Wickrematunge, editor of Sunday Leader newspaper. The report said "Testimony from the former army commander [Sarath Fonseka] shows that there was a special secret unit outside his authority and controlled by Gotabhaya Rajapaksa through the then-chief of national intelligence Kapila Hendawitharana." The report further added “the unit was operated outside the army command structure and was used to target journalists and other dissidents."

Conscious of these allegations, Gotabaya addressing a lawyers convention said he proposed “to lead a future government that will always revere and uphold democracy, and always safeguard the rights of the public” Describing the allegations of human rights violations in the last stage of the war against terrorism as false narrative, he said it “blithely ignores the many delays in the pursuit to victory that arose from our strong commitment to protect and uphold human rights.” He said they chose to use only light arms instead of using heavy artillery, because 300,000 innocent Tamil civilians were entrapped by the LTTE. And this resulted in thousands of war heroes sacrificing their lives. 

Gotabaya’s chances of getting elected as president are high at present. However, his weak spot is lack of support among minority Tamils and Muslims. Already the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has decided not to support him as bitter memories of the forcibly disappeared and war crimes  continue to haunt Tamils. Similarly, Muslims would remember how under President Rajapaksa’s rule Buddhist fringe groups carried out attacks on Muslim homes, madrasas and shops in Aluthgama in June 2014. These memories are likely to enable UNP-led front to garner most of the minority votes in the presidential poll.   

Controversy over army chief’s  appointment

President Sirisena appointed Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva as Commander of the Sri Lanka Army on August 18. As commander of 58 Division during the Eelam war General Silva was credited with capturing LTTE strongholds including Elephant Pass, Kilinochchi, and Puthudkudiiruppu. However, in the final stages of the war in May 2009, he was implicated in an incident when white-flag carrying LTTE cadres who were surrendering were alleged to have been executed after they were assured safety. After the war, he served as Sri Lankan ambassador and the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Headquarters.

Not unexpectedly, his appointment as army commander has triggered strong reaction from civil society both at home and abroad The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet in a statement said she was “deeply troubled” by his appointment, “despite the serious allegations of gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law against him and his troops during the war.”

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights referred to alleged human rights violations linked to 58 Division. She said his appointment as Army Commander severely compromises Sri Lanka’s commitment to promote justice and accountability in the context of the Human Rights Council Resolution of 2015 co-sponsored by Sri Lanka and undermines reconciliation efforts. She said it sets back security sector reforms.

The US embassy in Colombo has also issued a statement expressing its deep concern at his appointment. It said the appointment undermined Sri Lanka’s international reputation and its commitment to promote  justice and accountability “at a time when the need for reconciliation and social unity is paramount.”

President Sirisena’s appointment of General Shavendra Silva as army commander is only reiteration of his known stand against bringing to book army officers considered as heroes of the Eelam for alleged war crimes. With the presidential election to be held in the next quarter, he probably considers it not prudent to even consider it. This is also evident from PM Wickremesinghe’s pregnant silence on the appointment. 

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis. Email: haridirect@gmail.com Blog:: https://col.hariharan.info