Thrust of 20th CCP National Peoples Congress: Questions & Answers

Col R Hariharan

[Here are my answers to some media questions fielded on October 20, 2022, on the recently held Chinese Communist Party’s 20^th Peoples Congress (NPC) and President Xi Jinping.]

Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a report to the Congress, which made a mention of word ‘security’ 52 times. In his speech at the inauguration, Xi also didn’t renounce the use of force to ‘reunify’ Taiwan. Clearly, there is a focus on security aspects rather than the economic ones as far as Xi’s prospective strategy is concerned. Can we expect a greater pushback from China against the U.S’ Indo-Pacific Strategy? 

As President Xi was addressing the CCP’s 20^th NPC, I shall attempt to answer the questions  in the backdrop of his ideological thrust lines, identified by the Party in his speech.

The Global Times, the CCP tabloid, has published “major takeaways” from President Xi’s “report” to the Party’s 20^th NPC meeting. GT’s takeaways focus’ appear to be on Xi’s efforts to kindle nationalism among the people to support his CCP agenda under his guidance.

The very first takeaway is in support of the Party’s dedication “to achieving lasting greatness for the Chinese nation and committed itself to the noble cause of peace and development for humanity” through Xi’s brand of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. It reinforces Nationalism will continue to be the core element.

The second point is on self-reform to ensure the Party does not change its conviction or character. It goes on to focus on the need for flexibility and the need to fight corruption.

On reunification of Taiwan, Xi is emphatic: While China will continue its efforts to strive for peaceful reunification, “we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”

Presumably, this is an assurance to the people that China will not waver from the goal of reunification; it is equally a warning to the US, Taiwan and their allies that China will not hesitate to use force if needed till it is achieved.

China already considers the Hongkong issue as closed. Xi considers reunification of Taiwan will lead to rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “must be completed.”

However, China’s option to use the military to force reunification has become complicated by the emergence of the QUAD (quadrilateral) framework with the US, India, Japan and Australia as members. Its core aim is to ensure freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the signing of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-US) trilateral security pact in September last year, has further complicated China’s maritime power play in the region. The recent visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, in spite of vehement opposition from China, has sent a clear signal to China that the US has a sustained interest in Taiwan, regardless of its acceptance of the one-China policy

Under these circumstances, Xi may have second thoughts about using the military option to subdue Taiwan’s aspirations to be independent. It may not be cost effective for China to do so in the unsettled global strategic realignment in the wake of the Ukraine war. The war has adversely impact on global trade and economy. China is also facing these effects.

A better option for China will be to resolve the issue politically. Taiwan will be going for presidential election in 2024. The incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party is not eligible to contest as she has already served two terms. So, it will be smarter for China to politically ensure the election of Pro-China KMT Party candidate as President. Last September, China welcomed the election of potential presidential candidate Eric Chu, as leader of the KMT. Though the KMT Party has denied it is pro-unification, China can expect under KMT rule Taiwan to be more amenable to its overtures for peaceful reunification.

Q: What does China’s greater focus on security mean for India and the South Asian neighbourhood?

Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China has invested in all neighbouring countries of India except Bhutan. This has whittled down India’s influence in South Asia over the years. China’s biggest investments are in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which are vital cogs in China’s strategic foray in South Asia and Indian Ocean region. It has built strong strategic relations with Pakistan and its focus on developing infrastructural connectivity through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) increases threat potential on India’s Western borders. China is also building Pakistan’s naval capability which will enhance PLA navy’s capability in Western Indian Ocean in tandem with bases in Djibouti and Gwadar.

India considers secure and stable Indian Ocean as central to its security environment. Geographically, India also enjoys a great strategic location dominating the Sea Lanes of Indian Ocean. Shedding India’s years of strategic neglect, PM Narendra Modi since coming to power in 2014 had been following “neighbourhood first” policy giving priority to building close relations with India’s neighbours, notably island nations of the Indian Ocean. 

As early as 2009, Robert Gates the then US Secretary of Defense suggested that India be a “net security provider” and this is becoming a reality with India becoming a member of the QUAD framework. Besides, India and France signed a military logistics agreement in 2018, which gives reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities. Now India can enjoy the use of French bases in Reunion and Mayotte in Western Indian Ocean.  India has signed similar logistic agreements also with the US, Australia, South Korea, Singapore and Japan. This has expanded India’s geographical reach.

India has also strengthened the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral maritime cooperation with the periodic meeting of National Security Advisor (NSA) level participation from the three countries. This has facilitated the collaboration of the three countries to improve their maritime capability by conducting trilateral exercises biennially.  Mauritius and Seychelles have attended the meeting as guest countries.

Though China has established firm foothold in Sri Lanka, so far its efforts to build a counter-narrative to India’s efforts to remain as a dominant maritime power in the region. With the formation of the Quad initiative, China’s desire to establish its strategic maritime writ in the IOR will become a little more difficult to realise in the coming days.

Q: A PLA soldier who fought in the Galwan Valley clashes with Indian Army was present at the Congress. A movie released by Global Times today also documented the Galwan Valley clashes to emphasise the valour of the PLA.  

What do you make of it, as far as the India-China boundary question is concerned? What does it mean for India-China relations?

India shares nearly 4000 km long land border with China (Xinjiang and Tibet). China continues to occupy Aksai Chin on the northwest and has not accepted the Mc Mahon Line as India-China border in the Northeast India. So far 22 rounds of talks between the two countries have failed to resolve the border issue. However, both the countries have agreed to stick to existing border management protocols to avoid confrontation between the troops guarding the borders along the line of actual control (LAC) in the West and the McMahon Line in the northeast.

The clash between Chinese border troops and Indian forces at Galwan on the LAC happened on June 15/16, 2020 because India objected to China’s troop concentrations along the border and interfering with Indian border patrolling. These were in violation of existing border management protocols. Though 14 corps commander level meetings have taken place so far, still China has not vacated its troops in two contentious areas.

China using PLA’s ‘Galwan Hero’ at the Winter Olympics staged in China in February 2022 and now at the 20^th CCP Congress shows its readiness to use the incident to whip up nationalist sentiments among the population. It also shows that in China’s reckoning, repairing the adverse effect of the Galwan clash on India-China relations does not enjoy the same priority as boosting Xi’s national image.

India’s minister for external affairs S Jaishankar has maintained in recent months that relationship with China cannot be normalised till there is peace and tranquillity on the LAC. Speaking at a conference at New Delhi on October 20, he said that must prepare to “compete more effectively, especially in our immediate periphery.” On the international stage, building deeper relationships and promoting better understanding of India’s interests strengthens the country. This indicates that India will considering the relationship with China in the broader context of India’s concerns in Indo-Pacific region as a whole. He again reiterated “peace and tranquillity in the border areas clearly remain the basis for normal relations. From time to time, this has been mischievously conflated (italics added) with the sorting out of the boundary question.” This shows the border issue is far from resolved; probably China will continue to use as a pressure point against India, when required.

Q: The Zero covid strategy has been hailed as a success, in spite of the punitive costs imposed on the economy. China has also delayed the release of its official report on GDP which was expected to reveal the revised growth forecast. Given China’s economic position, how do you view the future of BRI?

China will be celebrating ten years of BRI in 2023. So we can expect China take stock of it, particularly with the economy taking a big hit thanks to its Covid pandemic strategy.  BRI can be seen as a strategic initiative for China’s global domination in keeping with its role as a political and economic superpower supported by PLA. It can also be seen as China response to its industrial overcapacity, slowing down of local demand and a vehicle to boost export growth, which is lagging now.  

China has claimed that so far 147 countries have joined the BRI. By March 2022, 140 of them have signed MOUs to become part of the BRI. BRI investments have stabilized by 2021 at $59.5 compared to $60.55 bn in 2020. BRI investment trends underperformed global trends of FDI into emerging markets.

BRI beneficiaries in Africa and South Asia have been hit hard by the global economic downturn in the wake of Covid pandemic and the Ukraine war. Infrastructure and energy projects have been laggards in Pakistan and the projects are being reviewed. Sri Lanka saddled with huge debts to service went bankrupt; it  is now undergoing an economic reset under the watch of IMF. Maldives has fared no better. BRI projects have not taken off in Nepal and China is trying to speed them up. In Bangladesh there are 27 BRI projects with Chinese support. However, out of the promised $20 bn financing, so far only $3.8 bn has been disbursed to keep them going.

Considering this gloomy picture, we can expect China to review and scrutinise the projects and take corrective measures. Its future investment can be expected to be for smaller projects in areas which will showcase China’s global concerns i.e. renewable energy. Considering China’s problems with economic recovery and global economic uncertainties due to the Ukraine war, it is doubtful whether China will be able to enhance its 2021 BRI performance. During the year, Chinese enterprises invested $20.3 bn in non-financial direct investments “along the Belt and Road” as Chinese call it.  

The economic crunch is likely to affect the outlay for new BRI projects.  So BRI projects are likely to be small; those that can achieve Xi’s  political objectives and enhance his global image are likely to be preferred. Green technology and renewable energy projects using science and technology as key enablers coming under this category are likely to be the choice. 

India’s Realpolitik

India’s long held position is that country specific resolutions are never helpful and dialogue is the way forward. Does its surprising abstention from voting on human rights in China serve its national interest?

By Col R Hariharan | Columns| India Legal Magazine | October 15, 2022

https://www.indialegallive.com/magazine/india-china-uygur-xinjiang-unhrc-abstention/

 

India’s abstention from voting on a draft resolution at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to debate on the human rights situation in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on October 6, has surprised many at home and abroad. The draft resolution, moved by a core group of eight nations—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US—could find support from only 17 members in the 47-strong Council. Nineteen others, led by China and most of the Islamic countries, including Pakistan, voted against it, confirming our neighbour’s clout in the UN body.

Since 2017, international civil society organisations and media have been highlighting China’s increasing rights violations to systematically brainwash and subjugate the Uygur people. Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet had recently submitted a scathing report on China’s coercive conduct against Uygur in XUAR. Had the resolution been voted, China would have been hauled up for the first time in the history of UNHRC to account for its terrible human rights record in XUAR. 

It was reasonable to expect that India would vote for the draft resolution, particularly as China’s conduct at the UN had been hurting its interests on several issues relating to Pakistan’s support to jihadi terrorist operations. This has been going on for quite some time to suit China’s emerging strategic interests in the Af-Pak region.

Two years ago on January 20, at the behest of Pakistan, China tried to revive the Kashmir issue for “closed-door consultation” under “AOB” (Any Other Business) at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Its attempt miserably failed after all the other 14 members of this Council rejected it. That is a small consolation for India as China has also been repeatedly blocking the UN listing of jihadi terrorists based in Pakistan as global terrorists under the UNSC 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee. China had been placing them on “technical hold” without giving specific reasons for its action.

Last month, China had blocked for the third time in four months, a proposal by India and the US at the UN to blacklist Sajid Mir, a mastermind of Lashkar-e-Taiba in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008. The UN listing of Mir as a global terrorist would have led to the freezing of all his assets and subjected him to travel ban and arms embargo. Mir was the most wanted 26/11 terrorist in India. He also figures in the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists and carries a bounty of $5 million for his capture and arrest. As early as August 2012, the US Treasury Department had designated Mir as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, freezing all his property in the US.

In August, China blocked yet another proposal by the US and India at the UNSC to blacklist Abdul Rauf Azhar, the brother of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar and a senior leader in the terrorist organisation. He had carried out the attack in Pulwama on February 14, 2019, killing 40 CRPF personnel. For long, China had blocked the listing of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist by the UNSC, though he was the chief of JeM, which is listed by the UN as a global terrorist organisation. After blocking similar moves in 2016, 2017 and 2019, China relented only in May 2019 for the UN to declare Azhar as a global terrorist.

Some reports claimed the reason for China’s change of mind was “new factual evidence” of Masood Azhar’s activities provided by some countries. However, its action was probably prompted to help Pakistan’s case for removal from the “grey list” of the Paris-based international terror-financing watch dog—the Financial Action Task Force. This was evident from the alacrity with which Pakistani authorities issued orders to freeze assets of Azhar and slapped a travel ban immediately after the UNSC ruling.

After Pakistan became a key member of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s strategic interests in the region have become multifaceted. First and foremost is to protect China’s growing investments in BRI projects in Pakistan. The other is to ensure the safety of an increasing number of Chinese ex­patriates working in Pakistan. According to a Geo-TV report on September 22, 2021, over five million Chinese are expected to be working in Pakistan by 2025 under various development, industrial and other projects, according to a senior public health expert. Their security has become a major concern for China, particularly after targeted attacks against them in Balochistan.

China would also like to strengthen its strategic links with the Taliban after it came to power in Afghanistan. It has been maintaining contact with the Taliban all along to prevent any support to the Uygurs’ anti-China agitation in Xinjiang. In fact, China’s ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin was the first senior diplomat of any non-Islamic country to meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2000. Omar is said to have assured him that the Taliban will not allow Uygurs in its ranks to launch attacks inside Xinjiang. It is significant that there have been no major attacks by Uygurs against the Chinese in Xinjiang in recent times.

Taliban’s rival Salafist outfit, the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), has become active once again after the Taliban subdued it in and around Kabul and Nangarhar province in 2021. On August 19, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb blast in a mosque in Kabul which killed 21 worshippers, including Rahimullah Haqqani, an influential Taliban-linked cleric. The ISIS-K is said to enjoy financial and political backing from the parent organisation. This must be worrying for China because the members of the outfit have the ability to operate across the borders in Xinjiang.

China’s crackdown against the Uygurs, Kazakhs, and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, carried out in the name of fighting terrorism since 2017, is well documented. Given this background, why did India abstain when the UNHRC debated China’s human rights violations against Uygurs in Xinjiang?

Answering the question at a press briefing, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said: “India remains committed to upholding all human rights. India’s vote is in line with its long held position that country specific resolutions are never helpful. India favours a dialogue to deal with such issues.” 

“We have taken note of the OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China. The human rights of the people of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region should be respected and guaranteed. We hope that the relevant party will address the situation objectively and properly,” he added.

The MEA explanation may sound Machiavellian. But India has traditionally voted against or abstained on such country specific resolutions at the UNHRC. Generally, India’s stand at the UN is nuanced to serve its national interest while maintaining its focus on core issues. In other words, it is an expression of realpolitik. 

A recent example was India’s abstention on the resolution on “Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka”, adopted by the UNHRC at the 51st Session in Geneva. Twenty of the 47 members voted for the resolution, seven against, including China and Pakistan and 20 abstentions including India, Japan, Nepal and Qatar.

In a statement during the adoption of the resolution, India’s representative Indra Mani Pandey said that while India has taken note of the commitments by Sri Lanka on implementation of the measures in the spirit of the 13th Constitutional Amendment and the early conduct of provincial elections, “we believe that the progress towards the same remains inadequate.” In other words, while India stood for the promotion of reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka, it would like the island nation to fulfil its commitments to India as per the 13th Constitutional Amendment and conduct the much-delayed provincial elections.

This is amply borne out by India’s stand on a spate of resolutions at the UNSC, UN General Assembly and UNHRC relating to Russia’s war in Ukraine that started in February. It took India six months before it voted against its trusted friend Russia for the first time during a “procedural vote” at the UNSC. It was in favour of inviting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to address a meeting of the UNSC through a video-conference; Russia cast the lone vote against it.

A few days ago, for the third time in the past few months, India voted against Russia when it wanted a secret ballot on a draft resolution to condemn its “annexation” of four regions of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly. The resolution will be coming up for voting during the week. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar was asked at an interaction in Lowy Institute in Canberra about how India would vote on the resolution? He replied: “Nobody puts their decision to vote out in front. You take the call when you have to…A large part of the world today is hurting because of this conflict…because their lives are impacted in a very damaging manner.”

Jaishankar in his book “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World”, written after his retirement from the MEA and before he became a minister, explains the essence of foreign policy making by the present government. It calls for realism in terms of a policy which is not idealistic. A policy that does not believe achieving peace is easy and cheap. And a policy which perceives national security as a key component of foreign policy. This forms the backdrop of India’s stand on various issues in international relations. 

—The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies

My Talk "Emerging Paradigms in India-Sri Lanka Relations" on March 22, 2002

Sri Lanka Politics of Protests

Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives September 2022| South Asia Security Trends, October 2022  www.security-risk.com

Overview

During the month, Sri Lanka government made some progress in the measures it had initiated earlier for economic recovery. After holding the staff level meetings with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government is hopeful signs of $2.9 bn loan materialising. However, some other measures it has taken like the formation of a bloated cabinet for political reasons, declaring focus areas of Aragalaya protests as high security zones (HSZ) and the use of draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to arrest some of the protest leaders have drawn flak both at home and abroad. These negative aspects have provided a rallying point for opposition political parties to come together and articulate their stand against the Wickremesinghe government.

Actions of the government to suppress public protests found a place in the report on Sri Lanka by the outgoing High Commissioner of Human Rights Michelle Bachelet made at the 51^st session of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) at Geneva.  The session slated to end on October 7, is likely to extend the time given Sri Lanka to fulfil its commitments to the international body on the accountability for its human rights aberrations during the Eelam war. At the same time, it is likely to add negative riders in the resolution on the way the government has been handling public protests.

Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa who fled the country for his safety on July 13, returned home to a warm official welcome on September 2. Though he had been keeping a low profile, his return has reinforced the belief that the Rajapaksas will continue to call the shots in the Wickremesinghe government.

Politics of protests

The Aragalaya public protests that had dethroned the Rajapaksas from power have shaken up the political parties of all shades as much as the government. Recovering from the shock effect of four-month long socio-political protests, political leaders seem to have realised the Aragalaya phenomenon as the expression of the unheard, unheralded and deprived citizens who are fed up with the existing political order.

Prof GL Peiris, Chairman of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), in an interview in the Daily Mirror aptly described the Aragalaya as the alternative of ideas, of policies of freshness. “A new departure. The Aragalaya had a visionary aspect to it. Later it degenerated into violence. That is not to be condoned in any manner.” He found “a kind of renaissance about it.” The SLPP leader, who has chosen to sit separately in parliament from most of the SLPP members supporting the government, saw in the creations of protestors as “an expression of creativity and deep desire for a system change. To reorganise the system.” Prof Peiris, while acknowledging that some of the measures taken by the government to revamp the economy and ease the fuel and food shortages have yielded results, said a bloated cabinet cannot bring a systemic change.   

There were fewer public protests during the month. However, the ultraleft elements of the JVP and its student body seem to be using the Aragalaya to rekindle the embers of the protest movement to expand their political influence.

In June 2022, before Wickremesinghe was elected president, the Sri Lanka government had told the members at the UNHRC in Geneva that it was imposing a moratorium on the use of the PTA. Even a month later when protestors were forcibly evicted from “sensitive areas,” the newly elected president assured foreign diplomats in Colombo that the government will uphold both Article 21 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 14 (1) (b) of the Sri Lanka Constitution which govern the right to peaceful assembly. However, these promises seem to have been forgotten by President Wickremesinghe after his election. The President who had once called the Aragalaya protestors as fascists, seems to be trying to weed out their influence, using teleological methods. This was evident from the mass arrest of protestors under the PTA.

The detention of several activists of Aragalaya under the PTA including the convenor of the Inter University Students Federation (IUSF) Wasantha Mudalige was condemned by many political parties across the ethnic spectrum. This may be considered a positive outcome of the protests.  This was seen in the participation of many leaders of the opposition parties, civil society and trade union activists and retired public servants, in the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK)’s mobile signature campaign against the PTA.  When the protest launched in Jaffna reached Galle Facethe presence of former defence secretary Austin Fernando and trade union activist Joseph Stalin, apart from leaders from political parties like the ITAK, SJB and SLMC like Sumanthiran, Rasamanickam, Hirunika Premachandra and Rauf Hakeem, underscored its relevance in the present political environment.    

Similarly, the government notification of several areas around key government buildings and their adjoining roads in Colombo as High Security Zone to prevent holding of public meetings and protest marches has also been condemned by large sections of society. SJB leader Sajith Premadasa called the setting up of HSZ as “acts of a dictatorship.” He said the cabinet had recently given the nod for setting up a committee to regulate and control media. Premadasa said it was a dictatorial move and warned the party “will take to the streets against all these moves in the future.”

President Wickremesinghe has sworn in a jumbo cabinet to satisfy the members from assorted parties, who support him. Apparently, he considers it only as a political exercise and not an effort to revamp the system in keeping with public sensitivities over the style of governance. Perhaps, conscious of this shortcoming, Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena successfully moved a unanimous resolution in parliament to constitute a ‘National Council’ (NC) after three rounds of talks with all parties.

The NC will be chaired by the Speaker with the PM, leader of the opposition, Chief government whip and not more than 35 MPs representing all parties as members. According to a statement the NC will determine the priorities for the formulation of national policies, agree on short and medium term common minimum programmes to stabilise the economy. It will also organise special meetings with cabinet ministers, the NC, the chairpersons of special committees and observers from youth organisations.

However, for the present the public is likely to view the formation of the NC as a political expediency. JVP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake speaking in the parliament said the JVP will not support the NC project. He called the NC as “a facade. It is another attempt to dupe the people and the rest of the world.” He said the NC would not help solve problems. Few would dispute the JVP leader’s description of the prevailing political culture as “tainted by corruption, no respect for the rule of law and politicians enjoying perks and benefits and placing themselves above the law.” Unless the NC can address these issues, it is likely to end up as yet another glorified commission, whose findings are confined to the archives.

Sri Lanka’s problems are not merely economic or political but much more organic, reflecting the disconnect between the polluted political system of governance and the ordinary people. Aragalaya is a manifestation of this disconnect. Unless the President and the political parties are able to rework their equation with the people, politics of protests is likely to continue as the norm.  

Tailpiece: Visiting BJP leader Dr Subramanian Swamy called upon Gotabaya Rajapaksa, after the former president returned home. In fact, Swamy was the first foreign visitor to call upon him. Swamy, a close friend of the Rajapaksas, was in Colombo to attend a conference on national security at the Kotelewala Defence University. He also met with former president Mahinda Rajapaksa and attended the Navratri pooja at his residence. The Indian leader is well known for making shocking one-liners. In his twitter on July 11, he said the Sri Lanka crisis was engineered and India should ensure that later ‘this mob’ does not become refugees of India. What was he up to in Colombo? That is a question for twitterati and WhatsApp university to debate. [Written on September 30, 2022.]

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com  Website: https://col.hariharan.info]