Col R Hariharan |Magazine| Special| India Legal | December 16,2023
https://www.indialegallive.com/magazine/maldives-mohamed-muizzu-priorities-india-troops/
Under its new president, Mohamed Muizzu, Maldives’ foreign policy priorities have changed. His various travels ever since he was elected is evidence of that. On December 6, he ensured Maldives skip the 6th Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) meeting of National Security Advisers (NSA) of India, Sri Lanka and Mauritius held in Port Louis. This was in direct contrast to last year when Maldives—a founder-member of the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral framework for maritime security—had hosted the 5th edition of the meeting at which it was agreed to expand CSC by including Mauritius. Bangladesh and Seychelles attended the meeting as observers.
The CSC was specifically conceived to protect the maritime
interests of the member countries, particularly their Exclusive Economic Zone
in the southern Arabian Sea. Cooperation under the CSC includes the area’s
maritime safety and security, countering terrorism, combating trafficking and
organised crime, cyber security and protection of critical infrastructure and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Ships and aircraft of the Indian
Navy, Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) and Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) jointly
train and operate to fulfill the CSC mandate.
Maldives has been the biggest beneficiary of the CSC security
framework as it has helped MNDF in training, planning and conduct of its
security operations. President Muizzu is probably astute enough to understand
that Maldives cannot afford to give up its participation in the CSC. So we can
expect Muizzu to evolve a face-saving formula during “discussions” with India
on the subject.
President Muizzu probably wanted to play down the importance of
the India-centric CSC as it suits his current political idiom of distancing
Maldives’ association with India. Ever since Muizzu came to power, he has
repeatedly said that he wants to distance the country from the cheek-by-jowl
relationship with India crafted by his predecessor President Ibrahim Mohamed
Solih. Of course, this was not unexpected as Muizzu’s electioneering theme was
“getting the foreign troops out”, a euphemism for the presence of Indian troops
in Maldives.
Muizzu preferred to travel to Turkey, an extra regional power,
instead of India—the preferred choice of earlier presidents. This was perhaps
to show he was not under Indian influence. Though he called upon Turkish
President Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, he met Prime Minister Narendra Modi
on the sidelines of COP-28 to request him to withdraw Indian “troops” from
Maldives. It was a repeat of the formal request he made to Union Minister Kiren
Rijiju when the latter called on the president a day after the swearing in. The
president hoped that India would “honour the democratic will of the people”. He
also brought up “the issue of Indian military personnel present in the Maldives
for operating aircraft for medical evacuation and counter drug trafficking
purposes”.
The Indian “troops” the president referred to are 77 IAF
maintenance and flight crew stationed in Maldives to operate Dornier
surveillance aircraft and two Dhruv casualty evacuation helicopters, gifted by
India. They were operating under the guidance of the MNDF. The fact that the
Indian crew helped evacuate over 500 patients since the induction of aircraft
is a matter of detail that would not have escaped the notice of the astute
president.
In a bid to further reinforce his “hands off” message to India,
the president sent Vice President Hussain Mohamed Latheef to attend the
China-sponsored 2nd meeting of the China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on
Development Cooperation (CIORF) being held at Kunming in Yunnan province on
December 7 and 8. This contrasts with President Solih who chose to skip the
first meeting of the CIORF organized as part of 6th China South Asia Expo at
Kunming in November 2022.
The CIORF is organised by the China International Development
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) to expand the country’s influence in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR) to counter, not only the CSC, but also PM Modi’s SAGAR
(Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative to promote maritime
cooperation and development in IOR. Probably, the Indian Navy’s biennial Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium meetings meant to help improve naval cooperation in IOR
was also factored in China’s IOR narrative.
Luo Zhaohui, head of CIDCA and former ambassador to India, while
speaking at the meeting, said that pushing forward Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) and Maritime Silk Road (MSR) was one of the three reasons for organising
the conclave. Promotion of BRI in the IOR has become urgent for China as all
the three big debtors of BRI—Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives—are located
there.
Vice President Latheef, addressing the COIRF meeting, said China
has been crucial to Maldives development and highlighted the two countries
“solid shared commitment to a people-centric strategy” to promote social
development, peace and prosperity. He said President Muizzu and his
administration are dedicated to fortifying long-standing relations between
China and Maldives. He expressed eagerness to explore novel avenues of
collaboration and cooperation with China, fostering a dynamic partnership
bringing tangible benefits to both nations.
Though Latheef made no reference to BRI in his speech, China is
likely to ginger up its BRI projects in Maldives as it is located close to
India, astride the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. When President Xi visited
Maldives in 2014, then President Abdulla Yameen (a political ally of Muizzu
till recently) formally joined the BRI. During Yameen’s tenure till 2018, China
executed a number of infrastructure and investment projects. The Male-Hulhumale
bridge, costing $210 million, was constructed by China Harbour Engineering
Company. Beijing Urban Construction Group completed the Male International
Airport expansion project at Hulhumale in 2018. Yameen also signed a free trade
pact with China. This has been a cause of concern to the Maldives trading
community and Muizzu can be expected to take the FTA issue with the Chinese in
the future.
Maldives is the smallest country in Asia with less than half a
million-population living in 26 atolls spread over 90,000 sqkm with a land mass
of 298 sqkm only. Its land mass is barely a foot above the sea level, making it
highly vulnerable to nature’s fury and climate change. This makes its survival
as a nation dependent not only on the vagaries of nature, but also upon
international goodwill, particularly its nearest neighbour, India. Ever since
Maldives gained independence on July 26, 1965, India has emerged as its biggest
partner in trade and tourism industry. Everyday needs of Maldivians, whether it
is rice, potato, onion or cereals or construction material (including river
sand, a rarity in Maldives) is sourced from India. Indian teachers, doctors and
healthcare workers are serving the people in every atoll.
Last, but not least, India has also been the traditional
guarantor of Maldives security. India has responded in real time on three
occasions when Maldives faced crisis situations. Indian para-commando forces
carried out Operation Cactus in 1988 to crush an attempted coup by mercenaries
to dethrone the government. In 2004, India responded generously within hours
when the tsunami struck and devastated the country. Similarly, when Male was
hit by fresh water shortage in 2012, Indian naval ships reached Maldives within
hours to provide relief to thirsty citizens. In all the three occasions, India
withdrew its forces from Maldives when its tasks were completed.
Even former President Yameen, despite his pro-China stance, had
probably understood this unique feature of India’s “hands off” Maldives policy.
Yameen signed the Indo-Maldivian Action Plan for Defence during a visit to New
Delhi. Under the agreement, India was to install 26 radars to link up all the
atolls with the Indian coastal command. Indian Navy and MNDF carry out joint
surveillance and patrolling as well as joint exercises. India has funded the
Uthuru Thila Falhu island site for a new harbour for the Maldivian Coast Guard
which came under Muizzu’s rhetoric of foreign interference. India is also
involved in a number of major infrastructure projects like the Greater Male
Connectivity project, cargo vessel services and capacity building and training
of MNDF and Maldivian civil servants and the Gulhifalhu Port Project.
Lastly, President Muizzu has internal political compulsions
peculiar to the country, a late entrant to multi-party rule. Its democratic
constitution was ratified only in August 2008. Political leaders are mostly
related to each other and cronyism is the rule rather than exception in
politics.
Muizzu, the politician, is cutting loose from his mentor and now
disgraced former president Yameen, probably to carve out his own constituency
in the corruption-ridden, loyalty-less and inbred party politics with endemic
corruption. These find their echo in political polemics in Maldives politics.
In this environment, China has been carefully cultivating sections of the
Maldivian polity, eating into India’s traditional benevolent-big brother role.
As a result, Maldives politics has become the scene of China’s muscle flexing,
which uses local leaders as proxies to whip up anti-Indian rhetoric,
particularly during elections. This suits fractious politicians who thrive in
unsettled party politics of Maldives. President Muizzu’s actions and utterances
are to be understood against this political backdrop.
There are external factors too. Muizzu will also have to deal
with the US with which Maldives had signed the “Framework for US Dept of
Defense-Maldives Ministry of Defense and Security Relationship” in September
2020. Under this, the US helps Maldives to strengthen democratic institutions,
civil society, fiscal transparency, maritime security, counter terrorism and
law enforcement. The US has also provided $36 million since September 2018 in
bilateral foreign assistance for maritime security.
These are strategically awkward times in the Indian Ocean
region. The never-ending Ukraine-Russia war has dislocated global supply
chains. The more recent Israel operation in Gaza against Hamas terrorists is
becoming a genocidal war. It threatens to damage US influence in the Middle
East. Amid all this, China is flexing its military muscle to aggressively
assert its claims in the South China Sea and Taiwan. These developments are
impacting not only Europe and the Middle East, but also the Indo-Pacific theatre,
including the Indian Ocean region. This could lead to the creation of new power
blocs and alignments. Big powers jockeying for power in the Maldives
neighbourhood is likely to make it difficult for President Muizzu to execute
his agenda.
To sum up, President Muizzu seems to be trying to evolve his own
narrative in the island nation’s internal and external problems. These include
cutting down the overwhelming influence of the giant neighbour India, while
wooing China. During his visits to Turkey and the UAE, he tried to cultivate
Islamic countries and motivate expatriate Maldivians to promote their culture
specific linguistic nationalism and Islamic identity.
So, President Muizzu is adopting different strokes for different
folks. But his success is directly related to not merely how he manages India,
but how India responds to his moves. Indian foreign policy has become dynamic
and we can expect it to show a lot of patience and understanding in its
dealings with the Maldivian president.
Winston Lord, Henry Kissinger’s aide, in his eulogy of him
in The Times said: “Diplomacy involves agonising
choices and trade-offs, aligning values and national interests. One cannot
allow the perfect to become the enemy of the good.”
It is a useful quote for President Muizzu when he confronts his
problems not only externally, but internally as well. In the island nation,
external and internal issues are two sides of the same coin.
—The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on
South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies
Box
Hydrographic pact not renewed
In the latest development in Indo-Maldives ties, Maldives has
announced that it will not renew a pact with India on conducting hydrographic
surveys of its waters. The agreement was valid until June 7, 2024. The MoU
between the two countries on cooperation in the field of hydrography was for
five years ago and signed on June 18, 2019, during Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s visit to Male.
According to the pact, if one of the signatories wants to
terminate it, it has to inform the other country at least six months before the
term ends, otherwise, it will automatically renew for five years more. The
Maldivian government, under the new president, Mohammed Muizzu, wants to do
away with pacts signed by the earlier administration that they believe will
endanger their independence and sovereignty. Is this also an indirect signal by
Maldives to China about its anti-India stance?