Distant thunder

India’s decision to fence the 1,643 km-long border with Myanmar and abolition of the Free Movement Regime stems from its concerns about the country’s civil war threatening the security of north-east states 

By Col R Hariharan | Magazine |Special | India Legal |February 16, 2024

Distant Thunder - India Legal (indialegallive.com)

The spill-over effect of the civil war in Myanmar, going on since the Tatmadaw (armed forces) seized the country on February 1, 2021, is reminiscent of what Satyajit Ray’s 1973 classic movie Ashani Sankhet (Distant Thunder) depicts. The movie shows the social impact of World War II, resulting in famine in a distant village in Bengal far from the battlefront. The movie’s allegorical portrayal of the indifference, political corruption and apathy of those in power aptly describes the situation in Myanmar.

Throughout its history, democracy in Myanmar has had a perilous existence. Since 1960, it has grappled with military dominance, ethnic conflicts and human rights violations. Since then, the Tatmadaw (armed forces) had been playing a pivotal role in shaping the country’s troubled journey through various models of controlled democracy. Even the present so-called “democratic” constitution introduced in 2008 was conceived largely by the Tatmadaw. It is designed to legitimise Tatmadaw’s role in both executive and legislature. 

The constitution ensures that one-fourth of the seats in both the upper and lower houses are filled by nominees of Tatmadaw. Two vice-presidents, the ministers of border areas and internal affairs are nominated by the army. The anachronism is that the army chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, running the military government through the State Administrative Council (SAC), now talks of “truly democratic elections” after himself overthrowing the democratically elected government. 

The Myanmar civil war is also impacting India in many ways. Internally, it has introduced an uncertain external factor in the sensitive north-eastern states bordering Myanmar. In the election year, it can queer the government’s pitch to develop the north-eastern region. 

The ambitious allocations for this region’s development during the financial year 2023-24 have a budget outlay of Rs 5,892 crore. This is 114% higher than the revised estimate for 2022-23 of Rs 2,755 crore. The Northeast Special Infrastructure Development Scheme at Rs 2,491 crore is about 67% higher than the amount allotted for 2022-23. Lastly, the allocation for Prime Minister’s Development Initiative for North-East scheme at Rs 2,200 crore is four and half times that of last year.  

Many ethnic insurgent groups in the north-east have links across the border in Myanmar. The government is negotiating with a few of them in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur to bring them back to the mainstream. The success of insurgent groups across the border and the sight of over 1,200 Tatmadaw soldiers fleeing from the intense fighting and seeking refuge in the border states can embolden Indian ethnic insurgent groups too.

The impact of Myanmar’s civil war close to the border areas has spurred the Union home ministry to come up with a proposal to fence the 1,643 km-long border with Myanmar. It will run through Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and end in Mizoram. New Delhi has also announced the abolition of the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which had allowed the local population on both sides of the border to travel without a visa up to 17 km.

The FMR was part of PM Narendra Modi’s Act East Policy to encourage border trade between the two neighbours. During 2020-21, the bilateral border trade reached $197 million, nearly double the previous year’s figure of $105 million. The ministry of external affairs said “the trade relationship plays a crucial role in enhancing economic ties and connectivity between India and Myanmar, especially given their shared border and cultural affinities”. However, after the civil war started, the border trade came to a screeching halt.

The proposal to fence the border as well as to cancel the FMR facility has received mixed reactions in the north-east. After the conflict between the Meiteis and the Kukis in May 2023, Manipur is limping back to normalcy. Manipur Chief Minister N Biren Singh has welcomed the proposal to fence the border as it will to prevent illegal smuggling of drugs and trafficking of people. It also suits him politically to keep the delicate ethnic balance in the state, precariously perched between the Meiteis and the Kukis.

On the other hand, Mizoram CM Lalduhoma has urged Union Home Minister Amit Shah not to fence the Mizoram-Myanmar section of the border even if it is erected in Manipur. Civil society members of the state have also appealed to Shah not to fence the state border and not to abolish the free movement of tribals across the border. Their concern is for the tribal kins living in conflict areas in Chin state in Myanmar. The Mizoram government is sheltering 31,000 Chin refugees who fled the conflict there. They include families of Chin National Army members fighting for self-determination in a federal union. Interestingly, about 12,000 Kuki-Zo people escaping from the Manipur tribal conflict had also sought refuge with their kinsmen in Mizoram, emphasising the strong tribal identity of the region.

A disturbing aspect of the civil war, not widely reported, is the significant increase in drug trade after the military coup in Myanmar. According to a report from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), the area under poppy cultivation in Myanmar increased by 33% in 2022, reversing the downward trend started in 2014. Moreh in Manipur and Champhai in Mizoram are the favoured entry points for heroin and meth from Myanmar. According a Diplomat report, drugs like ephedrine, acetic anhydride and pseudoephedrine, used for manufacture of addictive drugs, are procured in India and smuggled to Myanmar. Drugs worth over Rs 2,000 crore have reportedly been seized in north-eastern states from Myanmar smugglers during 2022-23, and over 300 people, including Myanmar nationals, have been arrested. A report in The Hindu throws light on the ingenuity of Indian smugglers. It says smugglers in Mizoram used excavators to build a 10-km jeep track in Myanmar to create a new route for drug traffic, avoiding Manipur after the civil war shifted close to its border with Myanmar.

So from an internal security perspective, the fencing of the border as well as cance­lling FMR makes eminent sense. But these measures have the potential to set the clock back on the Act East Policy, in which Myanmar has a key role in furthering India’s strategic, political and trade links with ASEAN. The Policy had a stimulating start in Myanmar in 2018-19. In spite of the western embargo on Myanmar after the coup, in 2021-22, India’s overall imports from Myanmar increased by 90.19%, while exports grew by 15.53% compared to the previous year.

India’s total investment in Myanmar as of March 2023 stands at $1.736 billion. This is across various sectors, including telecommunications, energy and aviation. Some of the major Indian companies investing in the country for several years include big pharma companies such as Ranbaxy, Wockhardt and Cipla. India has made strategic investment in the Shwe oil and gas project since 2002. ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) is part of a consortium that includes companies from South Korea, India and Myanmar which are actively involved in exploration and development. The project has been generating positive cash flow since 2014. In fact, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs chaired by the PM approved additional investment of $121.27 million by OVL for further development of blocks A1 and A3. This has become an important part of Act East Policy’s concept of developing Energy Bridges with immediate neighbours.

Kaladan Multi Modal Transit (KMMT) Project aims at connecting Kolkata and Mizoram via Sittwe port in Myanmar. The $484 million project is considered strategically important in the face of China’s presence in Myanmar and the region. Sittwe port was developed in 2016 at a cost of $120 million. However, the Kaladan project’s last leg remains incomplete due to fighting between ethnic insurgent groups and the junta.  

India’s relations with Myanmar’s ruling junta are entering the zone of uncertainty after its losses on many fronts mounted since October 2023 at the hands of ethnic insurgent groups and the Peoples’ Democratic Force (PDF). The PDF is the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG) led by Aung Suu Kyi, formed by elected legislators after the coup. The NUG has managed to muster the financial support of diaspora to support the war through innovative use of electronic money transfer. The war is likely to drag on unless the ruling junta can evolve a face-saving formula.

Nearer home to Indian borders, the Arakan Army (AA), the 30,000-strong ethnic insurgent group of Rakhine, has been having remarkable success in its operations against Tatmadaw in Rakhine and Chin states. So far, the AA has captured 170 junta outposts, three towns and at least three battalion headquarters. After AA captured Paletwa, the port town on Kaladan River, in the vicinity of the Shwe oil and gas project and the Sittwe port-KMMT transit project zone, MEA issued an advisory not to travel to Rakhine state. Those based there have been urged to leave immediately.

India must have discussed these issues during the 20th round of India-Myanmar Foreign Office Consultations held in Delhi on December 6, 2023. Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra and Myanmar Deputy Foreign Minister U Lwin Oo led their delegations at the talks. According to an MEA statement, the discussions covered the situation along the border and security, trade, commerce and connectivity, status of bilateral development projects in Myanmar and concerns on transnational crimes. India also expressed its continued support for connectivity projects among other people-centric projects. The Indian side reiterated its support to Myanmar for its transition towards a federal democracy.

The only consolation is that China, a major stakeholder in Myanmar’s security, political and economic interests, is facing bigger dilemmas in the country. China has been the saviour of the Myanmar junta and has faced flak in the UN Security Council. Despite this, China has a complex relationship of support to Myanmar’s ruling junta while emerging as a key mediator to facilitate peace between it and ethnic insurgent groups operating along its border. At the same time, it cannot ignore anti-Chinese sentiments prevailing in the country.

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Naypyidaw in January 2020 to promote Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, particularly the Kyaukpyu port near Sittwe. China is also facing uncertainties of civil war, particularly after the success of the AA ethnic group in Rakhine state. China Power began the construction of the $180 million Kyaukphyu gas steam combined cycle power plant project. It is expected to help the operations of the deep sea port and SEZ.

Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish words are apt for Myanmar: “The metaphor for Palestine is stronger than the reality of Palestine.” This is because its future is unpredictable. The history of democracy in Myanmar is written in blood in patches, with the Tatmadaw ruling it either directly or indirectly. Will NUG succeed in taming the Tatmadaw? Will ASEAN mediation succeed in bringing peace in Myanmar? Probably, both India and China are hoping it will happen as they are weary of taking up the job.

The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies

'India should not behave like a big brother towards Maldives'

By SHOBHA WARRIER, February 5, 2024 

https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/r-hariharan-india-should-not-behave-like-a-big-brother-towards-maldives/20240205.htm 

'India should respect Maldivian nationalism and their desire to be not over-dependent on India.'

First, an anti-India tenor to Mohammed Muizzu's presidential election campaign in the Maldives. Then a boycott-Maldives social media campaign in India, followed by President Muizzu's visit to China.

During the visit, the Maldives signed not just agreements with China in tourism cooperation, disaster risk reduction, blue economy and investment in the digital economy, but also elevation of their bilateral ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership (CSCP).

What makes the small island so attractive to China?

Who gets upper hand in this situation? China or India?

"By signing the CSCP agreement with China, President Muizzu has sent a clear signal to India that the Maldives' dealings with India will be on a different plane than before," Colonel Ramani Hariharan, a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia who is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, tells Rediff.com's Shobha Warrier.

How did the anti-India campaign start in the Maldives?

Maldives is an archipelago of tiny islands with scant resources. This has made it totally dependent upon India for almost everything. This has been resented by sections of nationalists like Muizzu. He rallied the nationalists to launch an anti-India campaign during the election.

Maldives is a conservative Islamic society with the presence of strong radical Islamic elements. During the times of ISIS, Maldives had the highest per capita number of people joining the terrorist group.

Muizzu wanted to take advantage of both the radical Islamists and the latent anti-India feeling among the public unlike the earlier pro-Indian government of President Solih.

President Muizzu, even during his first foreign visit to Ankara in Turkey, was trying to whip up Maldivian nationalism, rather than projecting the Islamic aspect.

He also visited the UAE to address Maldivian expats employed there. In Turkey also, he addressed the expats and asked them to project Maldivian nationalism.

I don't consider Muizzi merely used anti-India as a slogan to get elected. He is fully aware the Maldives cannot exist without India's support. But he is trying to reduce the over-dependence of the Maldives upon India for everything.

Though he is importing some rice from Turkey, the UAE and Pakistan, India will continue to be the main source of rice imports.

Maldives also imports sand from India, which is essential for the reclamation of land, and India is the nearest source. The harsh reality of the Maldives is that the highest point in the country is just 18 inches above sea level.

The island nation cannot wish away these harsh realities..

Is China's interest in the Maldives because it is close to India?

Not at all. China doesn't see India as a main factor in the Indo-Pacific, though India may look at China that way.

China under President Xi Jinping is on an international power projection. After all, it is the second most powerful economy in the world. So, it wants to assume its place in the world to match that image.

That's why China is talking about a New World Order. The Belt and Road Initiative and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road are infrastructure initiatives for China's strategic power projection.

Maldives is astride international the shipping route of the Indian Ocean. As many as 15 ships pass through the Maldives channel every minute.

That is one reason China is wooing the Maldives. In 2014 itself, two years after coming to power, Xi visited the Maldives as it was an important part of China's domination of Indian Ocean security.

So, to expand its economic power, China needs countries like the Maldives. Does that mean, the importance of smaller countries increases because of their strategic location?

Economic power is one of the factors that dictate international politics. Politics is also run like a profitable business and all that you see in business, you see in politics. And the geographic location of a country plays an important part in it.

The Maldives is also important in the overall scheme of Indo-Pacific security, because a US base is located in Diego Garcia. It is an island claimed by Mauritius and is 700 km from the Maldives.

That's one reason why China would like to have a friendly Maldives.

That is also why we should not see everything happening in the Maldives from an anti-India, pro-China angle.

You talked about Indian tourists boycotting Maldives, but it had more tourists from China than India during the pre-covid days. It shows how important China is to the Maldives.

Moreover, China has invested a lot in tourism in the island. As a part of the BRI initiative, China has also invested enormously in infrastructure projects in the island nation.

Also, Maldives' debt to China is $1.7 billion, which is 20% of its public debt.

The next debtor is Saudi Arabia which includes loans, grants, real estate and religious activities. The third largest debtor is India.

The most important advantage the Maldives has is, it is geographically positioned like a 'toll gate' between the western Indian Ocean chokepoints of the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz on one hand, and on the other, it also connects the Strait of Malacca in the eastern Indian Ocean.

But unlike other neighbouring nations like say, Sri Lanka, the Maldives is very much dependant on other countries. For example, there is no fresh water in the Maldives. Once when they ran out of water, India sent a naval ship with fresh water.

Why has the island turned against India?

They have not turned against India; they are trying to reduce its over-dependence on India.

Muizzu is using this as a political ploy. It is not the first time a president is getting elected on an anti-India platform. His mentor Abdul Yameen also got elected on an anti-India platform. After he was thrown out due to corruption, the next president was elected on a pro-India platform.

They want to replace its dependence on India to a certain extent with China. That's why Muizzu is seeking China's help in many areas in the island.

By signing the CSCP agreement with China, President Muizzu has sent a clear signal to India that the Maldives' dealings with India will be on a different plane than before.

Muizzu said that the majority of the sea routes of the Indian Ocean pass through or in proximity to the Maldives, and that securing sea lanes of communication was as vital to the Maldives as it was to the wider Indian Ocean region, global trade and commerce.

He wanted the Maldives to be contributing in the discussions and discourses on Indian Ocean security; not as an observer, but as an active partner in upholding a rule-based international order.

In short, he wants the Maldives to be treated on par with big powers like India and China.

But the fact is, it cannot just wish away India, its closest neighbour.

So, my point is, we should not look at India-Maldives relations as anti-India or pro-China.

India should respect Maldivian nationalism and their desire to be not over-dependent on India. India should not behave like a big brother towards Maldives as many times, we tend to behave like that.

The fact is, for regional security, the Maldives is an important component. In the army, we call the frontline forces, vanguard. If Sri Lanka is the vanguard for India in land, Maldives is India's vanguard for maritime security.

So, a prosperous Maldives is in Indian interests.

So, you should not see India-Maldives relations in the binary of China-India relations.

Does the Maldives need India more, or does India need Maldives more?

Of course, the Maldives needs India more as it is a small island country, and India has been providing the wherewithal.

My point is, India should not behave like a patriarch. India should not have a big brotherly attitude.

Why did Xi Jinping go to Maldives in 2014? Beause he knew the importance of the island as vital for China's strategic power projection. 

For the same reason, it is important for India also. In fact, it is more important for India as we are close neighbours.

Sri Lanka: Sparring for presidential election

Col R Hariharan

 

Sri Lanka Perspectives January 2024 | South Asia Security Trends| February 2024 | https://www.security-risks.com/post/sri-lanka-sparring-for-presidential-election    

During the month, Sri Lanka politicians were struck by presidential election fever, though people were locked in survival struggle as cost of living touched new highs. In the next two months, we can expect the leaders of amorphous political groupings to change their colours many times. Then depending on their candidate preferences, they will come together to form support coalitions to elect their ‘chosen’ presidential aspirant in the elections in September-October 2024. The president is elected for five years on a preferential voting system where the voter ranks the top three choices among candidates. The candidate securing 50% or more of the votes polled is elected winner. So far in all the presidential elections, there had been no need for transfer of the preferential votes as the winners had secured more than fifty percent of the votes polled. In the last presidential poll in 2019, the winner Gotabaya Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP)   secured 52.25% of the votes polled. 

 

As of now, President Ranil Wickremesinghe, Samagi Jana Balawegaya leader Sajith Premadasa and the National Peoples Power (NPP) formation leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake appear to be in the fray. Sample survey carried out regularly on voter preferences by the National Health Policy Institute, indicate AK Dissanayake maintaining a steady lead of 50%, while Sajith Premadasa held on to 30% with Wickremesinghe polling only 13%. The survey results indicate only trends and not necessarily translate into electoral votes that determine the winner. Other names mentioned, at least once, as probable presidential candidates include former president Maithripala Sirisena, the Rajapaksa scion Namal Rajapaksa and former president Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga.

The SLPP which fielded the successful candidate in the last presidential poll and secured a majority in the parliamentary poll that followed, is yet to recover from the aftermath of the Aragalaya popular uprising in 2022. The popular protest resulted in the ignominious exit of the Rajapaksas, with Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party (UNP) requested by the Rajapaksas to step in as interim prime minister. Since then, with both Gota and Mahinda keeping a low profile, the SLPP is facing pulls and pressures from different power centres within. Namal, the youngest of the clan, has emerged as the most voluble of the Rajapaksas.

 

However, given the profile of the party’s support base among conservative Southern Sinhala Buddhist nationalists, Namal is unlikely to make the cut. The moot question is does SLPP retain the Rajapaksa-loyal support base which had stood by the family. A new front has been launched by Ministers Susil Premajayantha and Nalin Fernanda along with parliament members Nimal Lanza and Anura Priyadharshana Yapa. Media reports quote Yapa as saying the new front would include more SLPP members. It plans to eventually support an alliance at the presidential elections, based on the outcome of discussions and public meetings. In other words, the front is in the formative stage only.  

 

Ranil Wickremesinghe is likely to exploit the shake up in the Rajapaksa family to garner as many votes as possible from their support base. As an interim president brought for ‘damage control’ Wickremesinghe had been able to skilfully manoeuvre in politics of economic disaster. managed to draw upon India’s financial help to withstand the tectonic shock of the country going bankrupt. He managed to strike a favourable equation with the West, which has helped him secure the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bail out as well as loans from the World Bank. He managed to do this, while kow-towing to the Chinese to manage the debts the country owes them.

 

Of course, he had to make some compromises to oblige the Rajapaksa-loyalist lobby, which are evident in the first review of the IMF evaluation. The ‘First Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility’ is tracked by the Verité Research. According to it Sri Lanka met with 60 of the 73 commitments due by end November 2023. Of the remaining 13 commitments, eight have been carried forward for the second term. Five were irreversibly not met. The IMF has now modified or extended the due dates of 27 commitments scheduled after November. They have been classified as ‘pending; along with eight others carried forward.

 

The interesting part is the first review focused on commitments that were due by June. There are four governance and transparency related commitments that were ‘not met’ even by the end of November. Foremost among these are: launching an online transparency platform related to public procurement and tax exemptions; and establishing a transparent and merit-based selection process for the directors of Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) in the Anti-Corruption Act. A case in point is the disappearance of the ministry minutes taken into custody by CID in a case of fraudulent procurement of immunoglobulin involving former health minister Keheliya Rambukwella. There are many more such cases of corruption at various levels.

 

The Tamil voter base, where Wickremesinghe enjoys better support than Rajapaksas has also become uncertain with the election of Sivagnanam Shritharan as president of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), the erstwhile Federal Party. The ITAK is the largest Tamil political party, which had rallied the fragmented segments of Tamil polity to form the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The TNA led by veteran politician Sampanthan had become the focal point of support during the presidential election. The TNA partners are fragmented and the first task of the new ITAK president will be to bring them back. Shritharan is a known proponent of Tamil nationalism, who considers 13th Amendment to the constitution as an unsatisfactory solution to the Tamil quest for equity. Whether he will be able to rally Tamil political parties to revive the TNA is an open question. Under the circumstances, implementing the 13th Amendment in full is the least President Wickremesinghe could do to muster the support of Tamil voters during the presidential election. 

 

Former president and chairman of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) Maithripala Sirisena is talking of forming a broad political coalition under the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). Sirisena speaking after a UPFA executive meeting, said several political parties and individuals have expressed their desire to join us. “This alliance will be strong and we can win,” he added. Sirisena as President had a poor record under his watch. He dithered in taking timely action to thwart the Easter Sunday attacks as well as investigating the failure in its aftermath.

 

Before the presidential elections are held in September-October, there will be many rallies with political leaders, whipping up emotions with a religious, racial and language slant, while speaking on lofty issues of human rights and democratic freedom. The SJB protest rally organised on January 30, may be considered a tame curtain raiser for such activity. SJB General Secretary Ranjith Madduma Bandara in a press briefing said the protest would serve as “the initial warning towards toppling the present government of President Wickremesinghe.” Apparently hijacking the ownership of last year’s Araglaya, as “the peoples uprising in 2022”, Bandara declared the party’s intent to do so again.

 

Though he declared “The IGP or anyone else can attempt to impose restrictions, but we will defy them and bring 50,000 people to Colombo tomorrow,”, in the end 15-20,000 people are said to have turned up at the rally. Police fired teargas shells at the rally, held in defiance of court orders against obstructing normal activity. In all, eight people were injured. We can expect more chest thumping at rallies, backend palavers and trading of political support in the coming months. Will they attend to the common man groaning under the high value-added taxation which has sent the food prices skyrocketing?

 

Tailpiece- Maldives opts for Sri Lanka for emergency treatment: An air ambulance service between the Maldives and the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) will start on March 1 this year. The announcement followed a meeting between visiting Maldives Transportation and Aviation Services Minister Capt Mohammed Ameen and Sri Lanka minister for aviation and shipping Nimal Siripala de Silva in Colombo. Apparently, this is one more effort by Maldives to reduce its dependence on India for emergency evacuation and treatment.  The Maldivian minister added, “considering the quality of emergency treatment in Sri Lanka, the Maldivian government has decided to direct such patients to Sri Lanka hospitals in future.”

 

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com, Website: https://col.hariharan.info]