Emerging trends in Sri Lanka - An Indian perspective

By R Swaminathan

A quarter century of LTTE-led militancy and terrorism in Sri Lanka came to an end in May 2009. Some of the trends that have been and are emerging in “post-war” Sri Lanka need to be noted and considered by policy-makers in Sri Lanka, India and elsewhere.

Sri Lankan Government

The armed forces of Sri Lanka are entitled to their happiness and pride in having “eliminated” the capabilities of LTTE to mount conventional military operations. Some competent analysts have gone to the extent of praising President Rajapakse as the first leader to have successfully terminated terrorism by military means alone. The Sri Lankan Government (SLG) has claimed that the armed forces of some countries have approached Sri Lanka for training in counter-terrorism techniques.

With the “intoxication” induced by all these goodies, the doubt arises as to whether the overall vision of SLG is becoming blurred by “triumphalism” and/or by the “chauvinistic” demands of its supporters, leading to the ignoring of ground realities. The president and his advisers seem to have concluded that the military defeat of LTTE has at the same time ended the struggle of the Tamils for “equal” citizenship. I would like to sound a note of caution that, while the militant leaders of a major terrorist group have been eliminated or neutralized, the seeds of militancy and terrorism will remain as long as the basic grievances and deprivations are not addressed and effectively resolved. The seemingly low priority accorded to any meaningful progress in evolving a consensual political solution to the Tamil ethnic issue poses the threat that, with the basic causes existing and a solution by peaceful dialogue being indefinitely delayed, other groups or leaders may emerge who once again feel pushed into militancy. US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and former Ambassador to Sri Lanka (Robert O Blake) has also warned that Sri Lanka's failure to share power with minority Tamils after the end of the war could lead to renewed violence.

History has shown that a political solution, delivered or credibly promised, is an essential component of reconciliation, in situations as in Sri Lanka. Positive and negative examples can be found in India (the partition of India instigated by the British policy of “divide and rule” when discussions - as advised by Rajaji - might have resulted in an indigenous solution, secessionist and anti-north noises in Tamil Nadu, militancy in Punjab and Mizoram, etc.), erstwhile Soviet Union, China and in many other areas of the world. History has also shown that a mono (ethnic / linguistic / theistic / ideological) State cannot survive for long in a nation whose peoples are multi (ethnic / linguistic / theistic / ideological). Such states have either to perish (as in the Soviet Union) or change (as in USA in mid-1880s, China during its economic turn-around); but the nations survive, with their multi ethnic / linguistic / theistic / ideological nature intact. The lessons of history can be ignored only at one’s own risk.

War consists of a series of actions by the parties involved in the confrontation, but peace is a combination of a state of mind and harmony between all the different ethnic groups that populate Sri Lanka. The president had earlier hinted that a political solution would be offered once the military operations ended. There was also the hint that when the report of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC - under Tissa Vitharana.) was finalized, it would be implemented. Later, the non-participation of the TNA in the formulation of a policy for reconciliation was stated to be delaying progress. The president subsequently convened the All Party Meeting for Development and Reconciliation – without any linkage between political solution (power devolution) and reconciliation. Meanwhile, local body elections were held in Jaffna and Vavuniya without a clear definition of the issues, with very low turnout and with mixed results. President Rajapakse has also reportedly stated that he needs a fresh mandate for working towards a political solution. It is difficult to comprehend as to why separate mandates are required to wage war and to make peace, as making peace is the natural culmination of a successful war effort. These apparently dilatory tactics generate scepticism about a real intention to evolve an equitable political solution. Robert Blake has also warned that if SLG keeps on delaying announcing a political solution, "there is a possibility that they will alienate the Tamil community further and again exacerbate the divisions, and perhaps even give new opportunities for the LTTE”.

It should be obvious that rehabilitation, reconciliation, development and restoration (of democracy) are the most essential measures to be taken without delay. There should be no rigidity in attempting these measures sequentially, as apparently opined by SLG, and efforts need to be made to tackle them almost simultaneously. With the elimination of the military capabilities of the LTTE, SLG can negotiate from a position of strength. It should recognize that the LTTE had indeed brutalized Tamils everywhere and that the LTTE, despite its own grandiose claims, was never synonymous with all Tamils of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese can and should deal with their Tamil fellow-countrymen in a non-patronising but magnanimous manner and seek national reconciliation. Although the president has repeatedly promised to be generous to the Tamil minority, the fine points of the government’s position are yet to emerge. The deep disappointment of USA with President Rajapakse for relegating the devolution of power in the Tamil majority areas to the back-burner until after the presidential election has been publicly expressed by Robert Blake. He has urged that SLG should figure out ways to have an early dialogue with the Tamil community.

The decision to prohibit the use of ethnic or linguistic identities in the names of political parties is fraught with dangerous possibilities in a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country. One can only hope that better counsels would ultimately prevail.

Armed Forces

It is not unknown for grateful governments to grant higher ranks to military leaders who have successfully led the armed forces to a significant victory. However, the quick restructuring of the command setup, with the appointment of General Fonseca as Chief of Defense Staff and the vesting of extraordinary powers in the CDS and the Defense Secretary, are intriguing. The accountability of the armed forces to the civilian authority of a cabinet may be diluted.

Normally, the end of war operations results in the reduction in the strength of the armed forces, through demobilization and diversion of excess manpower. However, SLG proposes to expand the armed forces and regularly deploy military units in the north and the east. These new (permanent) deployments are likely to be in the nature of cantonments, i.e. family stations. Depending on the ethnic profile of the deployed forces, this may become another cause for resentment. Also, apart from any effects on the demographic profile of these areas, these trends raise the distinct possibility of the armed forces becoming an additional and credible power center in Sri Lankan politics.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)

More than 250,000 refugees (somewhat euphemistically referred to as Internally Displaced Persons - IDP) are in “relief” camps and additional thousands had been semi-permanently “displaced” in earlier years. There are credible reports that the conditions in these camps are as good as could be expected in the current circumstances, but there are contradictory reports (including one by a BBC correspondent who had recently visited one of the camps) that these are in fact internment camps. The president has said that these IDP cannot yet go back to their homes, which (in his words) are “jungles”. A delay in total de-mining of their home areas is one of the reasons cited for their continuing in the camps. The “screening” of the refugees is another cause for delaying their rehabilitation. The claim that more than 40,000 Tamil families have already been rehabilitated in their homes severely strains the credibility of an analyst.

Makeshift hovels in unsatisfactory conditions would be fertile breeding grounds for resentment and the seeds of further future unrest are being nurtured there. The frustration, anger and neglect of legitimate grievances of an already marginalized Tamil population are bound to make ethnic reconciliation and lasting peace distant dreams. There is need for a sense of urgency in resettling the refugees in their old homes. International support and help would certainly be available if the SLG comes out with viable and verifiable procedures. In the meantime, SLG could usefully bring in more transparency in the administration of these camps, by forming monitoring groups with members from different shades of the political spectrum, including Tamils.

The US has also demanded that steps should be taken to ensure that the international community, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross and others have access to the camps, so that it could be verified that everything that goes on in these camps is up to international standards. The Tamil leadership should, at the minimum, pursue this idea vigorously. They should also demand that their representatives should have access to the camps and to the refugees.

Human Rights

A certain amount of restrictions on human rights would have to be expected when a government is prosecuting a war. The situation should, however, be reversed as soon as possible after the war ends. On the contrary, the current indications are that the president and SLG are increasing intolerant of criticism or dissent, particularly from the media. The “white car” activity and “missing persons” phenomenon are said to be continuing. Except during Eelam War IV, Sri Lanka has had a fairly good record in the area of human rights – if one considers ethnic violence from both sides as an unfortunate national aberration. President Rajapakse would be well advised to take personal initiative to improve the respect for the human rights of all citizens and residents of Sri Lanka.

Economy

Every war imposes severe economic hardships on all citizens. Conversion from a war-driven economy to a peace-dictated economy is even normally slow and painful. The general downturn in global economic activity would make it even more difficult for SLG. There is a school of thought which believes that, if the policies of SLG do not bring about a quick turn-around in the peace-time economy, the sufferings of the people would increase. The possibility that economic discontent may bring the Sinhalas and the Tamils together in their common disaffection against the SLG’s handling of the economic difficulties is also being spoken about. In my personal view, the ethnic division has been made so deep-rooted in the last few decades that the economy has probably reach a near-collapse situation, for the ethnic animosities to be forgotten in attempts to forge a common anti-SLG front. The highly developed survival instinct of the president and his supporters may not let such a situation come about.

Tamil Leadership

The civil leadership of Sri Lankan Tamils had surrendered, not necessarily voluntarily, their leadership role to the LTTE for more than twenty years. They now seem unable to recognize and discharge their new (but natural) responsibilities and opportunities. Their public inactivity and seeming non-involvement in the speedy evolution of a political solution, coupled with the president’s ability to take unquestioned unilateral actions, give the impression that they also subscribe to the SLG’s view that the entire Tamil movement had been defeated when the LTTE was administered its military defeat. It is time that the Tamil leadership get out of their LTTE-imposed stupor and start functioning again as responsible leaders of a marginalized and “deprived” community.

It would perhaps be out of place for me to suggest courses of action to the Tamil leadership, but they could usefully consider some of the following measures:

a. Openly and clearly disown the militancy of LTTE and seek a peaceful resolution within the framework of a unified Sri Lankan nation.

b. Use the delays imposed by the president, to organize themselves into cadre-based parties working amongst the people, with whom they have had little interaction or meaningful contact for two decades.

c. Be politically active and mobilize public opinion throughout Sri Lanka, in favour of ethnic reconciliation at the national level.

d. Consider a coordinated effort by all the Tamil parties, through a “Joint Action Committee”, to demand and urge forward movement on the package for political devolution – instead of merely of waiting for crumbs to fall from the presidential table.

e. Behave as “Sri Lankan” political parties and not look for inspiration and support from outside the country.

Sri Lanka - India

The emerging trend seems to be to sideline India as much as possible. In the field of economic relations, India is increasingly being relegated from its traditional “first choice” role for collaboration in major projects, particularly in the field of infrastructural development. Reports speak of Sri Lanka and China having signed agreements worth USD 350 million relating to the bunkering facility at Hambanthotta and the expressway from Colombo to the Kattanayake Airport. While the Hambanthotta deal can be understood as being part of a composite project, it would be difficult to justify the exclusion of Indian companies from bidding for the expressway project. The Government of India and Indian companies have to take note of this disturbing trend and devise measures to restore India’s leading role in Sri Lanka’s economic development. Special emphasis would be necessary on projects related to the Tamil-populated areas. Preparedness on the part of Indian companies to make significant investments in Sri Lanka and tax incentives for such investment may be useful steps. Essentially, India could try to be more cooperative and helpful on the economic front.

Politically, India has little option but to continue her unobtrusive, non- interventionist, persuasive role in working towards the Tamils being treated as equal citizens the same as the Sinhalas, Muslims etc. The recent statement of the Indian High Commissioner (Alok Prasad), linking a broad-based political settlement to the resettlement of war displaced, should be welcomed. India would not be alone in such an approach. Robert Blake has bluntly stated that continued US aid to Sri Lanka would depend on how expeditiously the Rajapakse government alleviates the lot of the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamil refugees and "on the progress that is made towards political reconciliation and devolution power."
In matters relating to relief and rehabilitation, India could and should be much more pro-active, supportive and involved. It should never be forgotten that Sri Lankan Tamils are natural allies of the Indian people and the government, and that India cannot but help them to attain their legitimate aspirations.

Conclusion

In this critical crossroad of Sri Lankan history, it is for President Rajapakse to decide on his place in that history. Does he want to be known as the Sri Lankan version of Abraham Lincoln, who rendered justice to all citizens irrespective of their ethnicity and helped build a unified multi-ethnic Sri Lanka? Or would he be satisfied with being the president who perpetuated the ethnic division and fractured the country for a long time to come?

[The author, R.Swaminathan, is President & DG, International Institute of Security & Safety Management, New Delhi; and former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India. The paper was prepared to form the basis of his presentation at the National Seminar on India's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change, organized by the University of Pondicherry on 27 and 28 August 2009, at Pondicherry. He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com]