The normally taciturn defence minister has also pitched in to convey his concern in writing to the Prime Minister suggesting
that “things may take a bad turn” if timely corrective action with regard to
the anomalies in fixation of salaries and pensions of the armed forces is not
initiated.
But the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh appears to have chosen to ignore these concerns, at least for the time being. Is the Prime Minister ignoring the storm signals? As he is not well known for his public communication, one would think so. But then who cares for armed forces grievances? This is what I hear veterans saying.
Government, military, babu
Arun Prakash
The media
flutter caused by a recent missive from Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee
(COSC) Admiral Nirmal Verma to the defence minister, expressing dismay about
the omission of a military representative on the committee to examine the armed
forces’ pay and pension anomalies, is uncalled for. While a Service chief
conveying concerns to his political superiors (including the prime minister) is
perfectly in order, it is the continuous haemorrhaging of such privileged
communications to the public domain that should really be cause for serious
concern to the Union government.
And now, a
matter of even greater disquiet for the public is that the defence minister
should need to convey his concern in writing to the PM, reportedly, suggesting
that “things may take a bad turn” if timely corrective action with regard to
the anomalies in fixation of salaries and pensions of the armed forces is not
initiated.
Since 1947,
vexed issues, with a vital bearing on India’s national security, have remained
crammed into a Pandora’s Box that was daringly opened, post-Kargil, by the NDA
government. A group of ministers convened to examine these issues, rendered a
timely report, but the loss of political nerve led to a partial and cosmetic
implementation of its well-considered recommendations.
The recent
Naresh Chandra Committee ventured, once again, into the crucial arena of
national security; but it remains to be seen whether the labours of this body
will find fulfilment, or are cast, once again, into limbo by the current
coalition. The recent contretemps have an important, even if indirect,
relationship with national security reform, and two aspects merit special
attention.
First, the
defence minister’s warning comes not a day too soon; because grievances about
pay and pension issues have been simmering for many years, with bureaucrats and
politicians alike ignoring them.
As far back
as April 2006, before the Sixth Central Pay Commission (CPC) was announced,
this writer, as Chairman COSC, wrote to the defence minister, [ COMMENT: Now,
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ] seeking his personal
intervention for the “appointment of a Service Officer as a constituted member
of the Sixth CPC. since the lack of a Service representative was one of the
main reasons for the dissatisfaction amongst the armed forces post the Fifth
CPC award.”
Having
responded very positively to the initial suggestion, the defence minister at
the time subsequently conveyed to the COSC that, in spite of opposition from
his cabinet colleagues, he would still try to “embed” a Service element to
provide advice to the commission. A few weeks later, the minister moved on to
take charge of external affairs and the fate of the armed forces was left to
the mercies of the bureaucracy-dominated Pay Commission.
As expected,
the Sixth CPC report contained a number of glaring anomalies with respect to
the armed forces, and at the persistent urging of the COSC, a review committee
was constituted to examine them. Perversely, this body again excluded any armed
forces representation, and ominous signs of active discontent began to emerge,
in 2007, from the ex-Servicemen in public demonstrations. Alarmed at this, a
few retired Service chiefs wrote to the PM expressing deep concern at these
developments and urging him that it would be just and fair to have a Services
representative on the review committee. However, contrary advice seems to have
prevailed, and the results are before us to see.
A second
crucial issue worth examination relates to why India’s political establishment
is so reluctant to accord recognition to the country’s military leadership, and
insists on interposing a layer of bureaucracy between itself and the armed
forces. Why is it that the defence minister and the PM consider the defence
secretary better placed to represent the armed forces, in most forums, than the
Service chiefs — each with over 40-plus years of experience in national
security? With the greatest respect for our civil servants, the fact remains
that many of them are best described as “rolling stones”, whose careers demand
that after serving in states and assorted ministries they transit through the
ministry of defence for a year or two before moving on to greener pastures.
The
fundamental reason for this situation, and the crux of the problem, lies in the
fact that the Service chiefs have not been accorded a “locus standi” and,
therefore, remain “non-persons” in the edifice of the government. The
background to this anomaly is to be found in two volumes of business rules,
issued under the constitutional powers of the president in 1961, which are the
“bibles” for conduct of business by the government. According to these rules,
the responsibility for the “defence of India, and every part thereof, including
preparation for defence”, and for the “armed forces of the Union, namely, Army,
Navy and Air Force” has been vested in the defence secretary. The three Service
chiefs neither find mention nor are allocated any responsibilities by these
rules.
The rules of
business have been amended by the cabinet secretariat on over 300 occasions
(the last in May 2012), but no politician or civil servant has considered it
necessary to bring the chiefs, the vice-chiefs and the principal staff officers
in the three Service HQs within the ambit of these rules. All these
functionaries have a vital role to play in national security, but since they
lack a status in the government, and have no equation with secretaries of
defence, the Defence Research and Development Organisation or the Department of
Defence Production, their views and recommendations are often ignored.
The best and
oldest democracies in the world have retained firm civilian control over their
armed forces not by isolating them — but by subsuming them within the central
edifice of government and involving them in the national security
decision-making process.
It is time
to discard our antediluvian system and stop inflicting wounds on ourselves by
alienating soldiers and veterans.
Courtesy: www.indianexpress.com, August 13, 2012
Armed forces’ grievances need urgent attention
By Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar August 13, 2012
The suicide of a soldier, V.
Arun, from Kerala in Jammu and Kashmir was raised in parliament. Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh urged MPs not to have a discussion. “This is a very small
incident, which is being blown out of proportion. It is not good for the morale
of our armed forces.”
While his statement was clinical
and accurate, the choice of words may not have been politically the most
appropriate — no death of a citizen can be dismissed as “small” by the leader
of a democratic country.
One presumes the prime minister
was not keen on an open discussion on the subject since it pertains to an
in-house matter – discipline within a military unit – that falls within the
organizational purview of the Indian Army.
For a one million strong army,
this suicide, while tragic in a relatively minor empirical occurrence, an
in-house inquiry into the internal cohesion and professionalism is imperative.
From the ignominy of the ketchup
colonel, the booze briagdier and the ‘dal’ general and more recently the Sukhna
and Adarsh real estate scandals, the Indian Army has been convulsed with varied
transgressions and a lowering of its ethical and professional standards.
In 2012, there were two cases of
serious breakdown in officer-soldier relations in units tasked with
low-intensity-conflict duties. The recent suicide is indicative of the internal
stress and tension the Indian Army has to address.
These are matters the army needs
to review in an objective and candid way. There may be a case for an
independent commission to empathetically review as to what ails the Indian
Army.
The status accorded to the
military varies from country to country and is a complex derivative of the
history of the nation, its political character and the manner in which valour
is perceived.
In authoritarian regimes, the
military has a special status. In Pakistan, it has subsumed the state for
decades.
Democracies have a more complex
relationship with their military. The soldier and the patriotism and gallantry
inherent in the profession is recognized by the state and society. In India,
the military has a curious and ambivalent status apropos the state structure
and society at large.
Since 1947, the Indian military
as an institution has been kept outside of the formal structure of the state
due to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s distaste for the profession of arms.
Successive prime ministers kept the military aloof. Consequently the ‘fauj’
occupies a twilight zone, where it is neither fish nor fowl.
While the elected political
representatives are the new ruler in India, the civilian bureaucracy have
become astute mediators of the pursuit and consolidation of power and status in
the world’s largest democracy.
The progressive denigration of
the armed forces by the state and society has led to a steady erosion of
military morale – a danger the prime minister alluded to in parliament. The
apathy of the Indian state is best illustrated by the manner in which the
Manmohan Singh government has dealt with pay and allowances for the soldiers.
An objective review of the manner
in which the pay, allowances and status of the military have been lowered over
the last two decades reveals some startling facts. The military is the outcaste
in the Indian state matrix, but lacks a Gandhi or an Ambedkar to take up their
cause.
The average ‘fauji’ retires at a
much younger age than the civilian counterpart who serves up to age 60. An
empathetic state would have ensured that the inter se fixing of pay, allowances
and pension would be equitable. Alas, this is not the case. Many anomalies
abound.
Pay commissions do not have a
military representative. Review committees have the same pattern. The military
remains invisible and their grievances ignored.
Things have come to such a pass
that the three serving chiefs have expressed their dismay over how pay and
pensions for serving and retired military personnel are being addressed.
Minister A.K. Antony in turn has
cautioned the prime minister that if not redressed, this issue could take “a
bad turn”.
The UPA had a rare opportunity to
address and redress the long festering inequities regarding the military and
the larger issue of rewiring the security establishment. But Manmohan Singh and
his cabinet chose not to pick up the gauntlet – till the last lap of UPA II
when the Naresh Chandra Task Force was set up to review the post Kargil
security sector reforms.
Manmohan Singh’s Aug 15 address
will be closely monitored for the policy initiatives he will hopefully unveil
to assuage the bruised morale of the military – and avoid the ‘bad turn’ which
otherwise seems inevitable.
Courtesy: www.nvonews.com
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