[Summary of
answers to questions from media analysts on the occasion of V Prabhakaran’s birth
day on November 26 and the LTTE’s Heroes Day on November 27 are given in this
article.]
November 27
used to be celebrated as the Heroes Day by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). On this occasion what is your take on those who lost their lives in the
struggle for Tamil Eelam?
It was
instituted in commemoration of the death of the LTTE’s first battle casualty - LTTE
Sathiyanathan alias Shankar, who was killed on November
27, 1982. That was only the beginning; over the next 20 years thousands of
Tamil youth sacrificed their lives to fulfil the dream of their founder-leader
Prabhakaran. The LTTE used to observe the Day as a remembrance day with solemn
ceremonies. But three years after the elimination of the LTTE, the families of the
thousands who died can mourn them only in their hearts, without public fanfare
and ceremony. I share their agony. Death of thousands of Tamil youth changed
their lives and also killed their own shared dreams.
But it is
also an occasion to ponder whether the Tamil struggle brought to the world
stage by the LTTE could have had a different ending? Thousands of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala families
also mourn those who lost their lives at the hands of the LTTE. Here I am not
referring to the soldiers who died in war, but to others whose only fault was
either they were in the wrong place at the wrong time when the LTTE suicide
bomber struck or Thalaivar Prabhakaran did not like them or differed
with their views.
On this
occasion Sri Lankans everywhere should not only to mourn the dead but also
introspect on the living. All communities should take a pledge to do away with
violence as a means to settle political scores or struggle for their rights.
And the state and polity should facilitate this. For this to become a reality,
the government and leaders of all communities have a huge responsibility to
make credible efforts. But unfortunately the efforts made so far by all
stakeholders are too few and too little. President Rajapaksa who pledged to
fulfil his concept of one nation, one people has not shown it in his deeds so
far. Confrontation politics appears to be the flavour of the year.
On the other
hand sections of the Tamil Diaspora and Tamil Nadu politicians who glibly talk
of waging a battle for Tamil Eelam seem to show little concern for the reality
of the situation in Tamil areas in Sri Lanka. The callousness with which they
talk of war shows their warped priorities. Their number one concern should be to
help Tamils, who survived the war and are locked in survival struggle, to
resume their lives as early as possible.
On the
occasion of Prabhakaran’s birthday on November 26, as one with years of
experience in counter insurgency warfare what are your comments on the ultimate
failure Prabhakaran and LTTE to achieve his aim, despite waging war for nearly
two and a half decades?
The moral of
the LTTE’s 30-year quest for Tamil Eelam is violent means are not enough to win
wars. It requires political strategy as much as military strategy. Absence of
coherent political strategy was Prabhakaran’s biggest weakness.
The second
aspect is the need for the leader to keep in touch with the dynamics of the environment
in which he operates and adapt his tactics. Field Marshal Tito is a historical example of success in achieving
this. Prabhakaran isolated himself and depended upon a small coterie of
advisors both at home and abroad. So he failed to gauge changing global mood to
terrorism ever since the U.S. launched global war on insurgency after 9/11 Al
Qaeda attacks. As a result LTTE was banned in 33 countries and its
international support network did not effectively operate during the war.
Secondly,
opportunities for achieving the aim by peaceful means come fleetingly in the
midst of insurgency wars; these must be spotted and exploited to achieve the overall
aim. The peace process 2002 was one such opportunity when the LTTE was
physically controlling virtually most of what it called Tamil Eelam.
Prabhakaran could have turned this opportunity to achieve a peaceful end to his
struggle. But Prabhakaran lacked a world view and failed to recognise the world
had changed. Though he agreed to find a federal solution at the behest of his
friend and advisor Anton Balasingam, Prabhakaran’s heart was not it. He
literally stuck to his guns and frittered away the opportunity.
Lastly, on
operational aspects I have few points. One, use of
terrorism is counterproductive in the long run. Even suicide bombing can only be a
tactic and not a strategy. Used regularly terrorist strikes not only lose the
element of surprise so essential for the success, but also squander highly
motivated cadres and operators with special skills, who are irreplaceable. Two,
insurgency warfare cannot be carried on indefinitely. If prolonged the law of
diminishing return applies to it. Thirdly, counter insurgency forces learn from
their failures and insurgents need to constantly revalidate their methods which
may not be possible so it is better to come to terms with changed environment.
Fourthly, insurgency movements have to remember the state has enormous
resources and facilities at their disposal. With right leadership and clear
goals ultimately they can win. So insurgency forces should not be lulled into
complacency on past achievements.
What is the
future of Sri Lanka after winning the war?
Sri Lanka
achieved military victory in 30 years of warfare. But victory over insurgency
will be complete when the state achieves political victory; Sri Lanka does not
seem to be serious in achieving it.
(Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Note No.
670 December 7, 2012 Sri Lanka Update No 226)
1 comment:
Agreed with you. Sri Lanka win the war but not the battle.
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