Myanmar’s democracy, a work in progress

Col R Hariharan

Myanmar surprised everyone with its early success in ushering in democracy – despite the constraints of 2008 Constitution that legalised army’s role in parliament and executive - within two years of holding the first multiparty elections in two decades. President Thein Sein’s far sighted leadership has enabled the government to transform its image from a stodgy, insensitive military dictatorship of yesteryears to an increasingly people-friendly one.

Theoretically this should make it easy for democracies like India to deal with Myanmar. Americans have stepped in a big way in Myanmar. The successful visit of President Thein Sein to the White House in May 2013 – the first ever by a Myanmar President in 47 years – with the U.S. President Barak Obama’s assuring American support to Myanmar's political and economic reforms is a testimony to it.

The renewed U.S. presence in Myanmar brings an end to their skewed relations. The signing of a bilateral trade and investment agreement with the U.S on the occasion of Thein’s visit has triggered the flow of international businessmen to Yangon. Greater U.S. presence in Myanmar, considered for long as the pocket borough of China, is likely to create its own strategic ripples in the region. And India would also considering these strategic changes in Myanmar in shaping its overall Asia-Pacific policy.

International recognition for President Thein has come the hard way. He has brought in radical changes in the approach to politics and governance. He has freed most of the political prisoners. Restrictions on the media have been lifted.

Above all, he managed to bring into politics Mrs Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD), who had boycotted the 2010 general elections. They are now back into mainstream politics despite their objections to the continued role of army, legitimized by the 2008 Constitution. So there is an air of positive vibrations in the country about its future; and there are greater expectations among the international community about Mynamar’s future role. 

This was evident at the first ever summit of the World Economic Forum on East Asia hosted by Myanmar on June 6-7, 2013 with the participation of 10 heads of state and 550 business leaders from more than 60 global companies.

However, these welcome developments should not cloud the fact that democracy in Myanmar is still in the half-way house. It is a work in progress. The military now lurking in the backdrop still has a say in deciding the survival of the government both in the legislature and executive. There are political prisoners still in prison.  The economy lacks fiscal discipline and structures for monetary control and investment conforming to international norms are not yet in place. And Kyat, the national currency, is yet to be stabilized.  

Though President Thein has been addressing most of these issues, he has a long way go. He has the daunting task of overcoming traditional animosities and prejudices to evolve democratic solutions. Unless, the country has a period of social and political stability free from ethnic and sectarian strife it would be difficult for him to carry through the economic reforms and energise development activities. And he needs the support of all stakeholders – the army, political parties, youth, and the international community – in this task.

In a nutshell, the future of democracy is very much dependent upon rebuilding Myanmar’s national identity to galvanise the people to take them on the road to prosperity. It is not a simple narrative because the nation’s democratic experience since early years of independence in 1948 was marred by lack of strong leadership, political infighting, factionalism and rampant corruption resulting in chaos, poor governance. The country was in with itself fighting ethnic insurgents without respite. Democracy failed to deliver what it promised – improve the quality of life of the people. In fact it provided the opportunity for General Ne Win and the army to take over power in 1962.  

After four decades of army rule the country had no political assets when it went for elections in 2010, except for the idiom of controlled political activity approved by the army.  People have had no exposure to multiparty democracy except for its short but disastrous debut in the 1990 parliamentary election which was disowned by the military rulers. As a result Myanmar has now woken up to democracy without the tools to manage peoples’ power.

And in Myanmar it translates into 40 percent of the population in productive age. The youth of the country, who had historically spearheaded the struggles for independence against the British and Japanese and the military junta in 1988, suddenly find they have a small say in deciding their fate. Internet freedom has given them access to socially networked world where they find youth power on the rise. They are becoming more conscious of their democratic rights than ever before. It is logical that their aspirations for fundamental freedoms, rights to livelihood, education, health and articulation of their voice would continuously rise and they would expect the democratic government to deliver them now.

Unless the government and political parties manage to constructively channelize youth power to build a national identity, we might see it morphing into an extra constitutional pressure group. This phenomenon is already taking place in the streets of Cairo, Delhi, Athens, Paris, and Istanbul.  Can the disparate political parties, with their own private and public agendas, lacking charismatic leadership – perhaps barring Aung San Suu Kyi - manage this?

If they cannot, it would provide an opportunity for yesteryears’ military predators to stage a comeback to power to “bring back order and stability” as they did in 1962. So far, President Thein appears to have managed the situation quite well, evidently with the blessing of military leaders. Though Ms Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have extended their support to President Thein, they have not given up their opposition to the participation of army in the legislature and executive. They have only deferred it after talks between Ms Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein to enable him to go ahead with the democratic reformation process.

However, this issue could come back to haunt when the country goes to polls in 2015 to elect a new parliament with the NLD as the strongest player. It is unlikely the military would allow any threat to its favoured status to go unchallenged. And that could cramp the progress of democratic reforms. There are two other intractable issues that could threaten the onward progress of democracy – ethnic insurgency and the rising tide of Theravada Buddhist activism.

Ethnic insurgencies have been a perennial problem of Myanmar since independence. After going through a cycle of demand for independence and armed struggle, ethnic communities of Myanmar were hopeful of finding a satisfactory solution to their demands. However, their hopes were belied when their armed cadres were required to come under the Myanmar army under the 2008 constitution even before a political solution to their demands for autonomy in terms of the Panglong Agreement signed at the time of independence was found. This has led to sporadic clashes between the army and ethnic insurgent groups between spurts of ceasefire.

Though there is an uneasy ceasefire in force with major ethnic insurgencies of Kachins, Karens, and Shans, they have not been brought to a logical conclusion with a win-win solution. The reason for this is the trust deficit existing between the ethnic communities and the government that had been sustained by years of armed struggle and exploitation at the hands of the army.

Even the ceasefires effected after a number of rounds of talks are short lived. The most recent example is the ceasefire agreement the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) entered into with the government in May 2013. According to news reports, KIO spokesman had confirmed that 21 separate armed clashes between government troops and the KIO have taken place since both sides reached a 7-point agreement, under which they pledged to decrease military tensions and work towards a future agreement. The reports claim that most of the 100,000 refugees displaced by the conflict are yet to return home.

Though a lot of goodwill exists on both sides to live amicably, President Thein faces the difficult task of selling his solution to the majority Burmans (Bamar) who form 70 percent of the population – a sizeable “vote bank” in the elections. And to add to the problem is the economic exploitation of minority areas rich in natural resources. A lot of foreign investment particularly from China, is being made to develop energy and mineral resources in these regions. And they would like to have a say in resolving issues in ethnic regions. For instance the Shwe gas pipeline being developed by the Chinese runs through the KIO controlled area; so Chinese want to be present in the peace talks between the government and KIO representatives.    

Myanmar’s Citizenship Law 1982 has a xenophobic character, weighted against people of foreign origin, even third generation descendents, living in the country. Because of its discriminative clauses thousands of people of Indian origin were deprived of their citizenship. It also denied citizenship to Rohingyas – Muslims of mixed Indian and Arakanese origin – though they had been living in Myanmar for hundreds of years. Periodically, violence unleashed by Buddhist majority against them had resulted in driving over 200,000 of them to seek refuge overseas, particularly in neighbouring Bangladesh.  The 2012 anti-Rohingya riots left about 140 killed and rendered 100,000 homeless.  

Perhaps emboldened by the passive state response to anti-Rohingya riots in 2012, anti-Muslim violence is staging a comeback. In March 2013, Buddhist activists killed a total 43 people and injured 93 in Meikhtila in Central Myanmar. In all 1227 homes, 77 shops and 37 mosques were destroyed. The riots quickly spread to six other townships in Thayawady district in Bago Region in Lower Myanma and to 11 townships in Mandalay and Pegu divisions, where Muslim neighbourhoods were ransacked.And the army had to be called to restore order rather belatedly.

The anti-Muslim sentiments have some political and social support which has helped stoke Therawada Buddhist vigilantism.  These elements are heading for a showdown with the government after senior Buddhist leaders expressed their support a controversial draft Law for the Protection of Race and Religion. The draft law also requires any Buddhist woman seeking to marry a Muslim man to get the permission of her parents and local government officials. Any Muslim man who marries a Buddhist woman is required to convert to Buddhism.

As these are socio-political issues both President Thein and Mrs Suu Kyi will be finding it difficult to resolve. They would need to combine their energies to evolve a game plan to keep these issues within manageable levels to ensure the progress of democratic reforms. In the coming months, we can expect only slow progress in the reform process, facing challenges at every step from divisive political and social forces. It will be a true test of national leadership’s ability to deal with these challenges.  

India’s relations with Myanmar are likely to become more broad-based as Myanmar’s investment and business environment enlarges and becomes structured.  A closer relationship with India enables Myanmar to balance China’s overwhelming influence better, particularly as it complements India-U.S. strategic relationship. Indian leadership of all political hues is aware of the importance of Myanmar in India’s overall strategic spectrum.

Myanmar's historical cultural and religious experience and shared colonial history with India makes dealings between the two countries easier.  A number of projects to improve infrastructure connectivity among BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) and Indo-ASEAN connectivity are in the offing. India’s Sittwe multi-modal project is also making progress. However, their success would depend upon democracy firmly establishing itself in Myanmar.  It is essential that India shows a lot of understanding and paly an active role in helping Myanmar achieve success in its journey to become a vibrant democracy.  

Written on July 6, 2013

Courtesy: Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal 15 - India-Myanmar Relations 

 www.fprc.in

Serial blasts in Bodh Gaya: Comments

Col R Hariharan

Here is a summary of answers given to print and electronic media questions on the serial blasts in Bodh Gaya on Sunday July 7, 2013.

What is your take on the serial blasts in Bodh Gaya, although the police seem to have had timely alerts before they occurred?

A series of nine explosions rocked the Maha Bodhi temple complex in Bodh Gaya, the holiest of all Buddhist sites, in the early hours of Sunday (July 7, 2013). Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde has confirmed that in all 13 explosive devices were planted in and around the temple complex out of which ten had exploded and the other three were defused.  Undoubtedly, this was a terrorist attack carried out by an organized body of terrorists.

According to the police improvised explosive devices (IED) using 2-kg LPG cylinders filled with ammonium nitrate, Sulphur and Magnesium and sharpnels were used in the explosions. Analogue timers were used to set off the explosion.The number of IEDs planted would indicate more than one person was involved in the attack.

Fortunately, two of the holy sites - the main temple sanctum, and the Bodhi tree area - the seat of Buddha’s enlightenment, suffered only minor damage. The giant statue of Buddha that overlooks the worshippers was unscathed. The ineptitude in planting IEDs in close proximity to each other to explode at different timings rendered some of the timers ineffective and saved a huge disaster.  

For once neither political leaders nor the media can fault the intelligence agencies which had warned about Jihadi terrorist threats to Bodh Gaya on three occasions in October 2012, January 2013 and last month. In fact, the IB had warned of possible attack on Bodh Gaya when it named three suspected terrorists when they entered Bihar.

After receiving the latest alert, Bihar police met with the temple management last week and discussed the security arrangements in the temple complex! Despite all this effort, the terrorists have managed to carry out their task.  This showed the gross failure of Bihar police’s security management set up.

The casualness with which the IB alert was treated in Bihar is evident from the explanation given by the state that the temple authorities were managing the security inside the temple and the police were providing protection outside it. And the blasts have exposed the shoddiness of the argument. 

Whatever be the reasons for the failure to prevent the terrorist attack, it once again confirms that our counter terrorism effort continues to be a never ending 'work in progress' although five years have passed since the 26/11 Lashkar terrorists struck in Mumbai. It is a national shame.

What were the weaknesses in security management?

Bihar has been the home of some of the notorious Islamist terrorists (according to one report as many as 26 of them belonged to Bihar). Maoist extremism also had been thriving in this state, though Bihar Chief Minister Nitesh Kumar seems to have politically managed to keep it on leash at least for the time being.

In spite of such a background, the Gaya terrorist attack shows the state government had not taken terrorist threat seriously and took timely, informed decisions on preventing it. The state has to plan whatever action was required in advance and the state police has to coordinate and rehearse counter terrorism drills involving all stakeholders - the state and central police and intelligence bodies and civilian security guards. Whatever was done did not stop the terrorists from carrying out their deadly mission.

The fact that terrorists managed to carry 13 IEDs each weighing nearly four Kgs in and around the temple complex with impunity showed utter lack of professionalism and poor training of temple security personnel and the police. The temple security personnel did not know how to use the scanners or CCTV.

The Chief Minister has now asked for the deployment of Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) for the temple security. However, that is no panacea for preventing future terrorist attacks in the state because the problem is multifaceted. It is the responsibility of the state to provide overall policy guidance and make structural arrangements to facilitate security management. Apparently this is lacking.

On the positive side, there seems to be better sharing of information between state police bodies than before. Similarly the central security and intelligence agencies also appear to be sharing their inputs with state police in time. There is better  coordination with the NSG and NIA to investigate the incident after it occurred. This would help in identifying the group involved in the terror strike. Media management was better and kept the information flow to the public on a regular basis.    

Do you see this attack as retaliation for attacks on Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar? Or is it a Islamist terrorist backlash to recent escalation in anti-Muslim rhetoric in Myanmar and Sri Lanka by Buddhist activists led by monks?

Taliban extremists’ anti-Buddhist activity has a long history. Even as early as 2001 they destroyed the renowned Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan.  The persecution of Rohingiya Muslims  in Myanmar has a long history and it continues with sporadic attacks on them in Rakhine state. The 2012 anti-Rohingya riots left about 140 killed and rendered 100,000 homeless. 

This had kindled worldwide protest among Muslims particularly in Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. Even in India in Kolkata and Chennai Muslim organizations held protest marches. Last year, some mischievous elements had in fact triggered mass exodus of people from Northeast working in Chennai and Bengaluru by sending text messages threatening to attack them in retaliation for attacks on Rohingyas!

In addition to this, in Myanmar Buddhist activists have been leading sporadic attacks against local non-Rohingya Muslims also. In March 2013, Buddhist activists killed a total 43 people and injured 93 in Meikhtila in Central Myanmar. In all 1227 homes, 77 shops and 37 mosques were destroyed. The riots quickly spread to six other townships in Thayawady district in Bago Region in Lower Myanma and to 11 townships in Mandalay and Pegu divisions, where Muslim neighbourhoods were ransacked.And the army had to be called to restore order rather belatedly.

Monks had been at the forefront of such extremism. Monks like Wirathu, leader of the 969 movement, have been delivering provocative sermons against Muslims. This has caused global concerns; even the last issue of Time magazine featured Wirathu on its cover under the caption ‘Buddhist terrorism’.  

Jihadi elements have been using the popular sympathy for the oppressed Muslims among the global Muslm community to spread their influence by holding out terror threats against Buddhists. In Pakistan the god father of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jamaat ud Dawah chief Hafiz Saeed had tweeted on June 14 accusing India of collaborating with Burmese government “wipe out Muslim population of Myanmar.”

He also said it was “an obligation on the whole Muslim Ummah to defend the rights and honour of Rohingya Muslims in Burma” and asked Muslim rulers to “unite and raise their voice for the genocide of muslims in Burma at the security council."

According to a report in The Express Tribune of Pakistan,Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), popularly known as the Pakistani Taliban, threatened to "attack Burmese interests" if Pakistan did not cut off its diplomatic relations with Myanmar. It threatened to take revenge for the attacks.

Considering these reports and the capability of these terror outfits, it is reasonable to assume Gaya attacks could be part of their retaliation against Buddhists for the Rohingya persecution. However, the process of identifying the perpetrators is going on and it would be too premature to attribute it to any particular terror outfit; but its anti-Indian and anti-Buddhist character is evident.

As far as Sri Lanka is concerned Buddhist activism and vigilantism against Muslims and Christian places worship has been growing for sometime now. Mosques and churches, and even temples have been attacked. The monks have been leading  the campaign against halal slaughtering done by Muslims. They have forced closure of shops selling halal meat. This had created panic and unease among Muslims.

Though the government had been neutral, some of the ruling coalition partners like the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), right wing monks party, had been supporting these campaigns led by vigilante outfits like Ravana Balaya and the Bodu Bala Sena. At times, at the local level officials tend to ignore the violent activity of the lumpen elements of these outfits or take action belatedly.

However, Sri Lanka Muslims as well as most of the Sinhala leaders have been careful not to allow it to become a full blown Muslim-Buddhist confrontation. And the government also appears to be aware of the dangers of such a confrontation which could have its backlash in Gulf countries where Sri Lankan expatriates work in large numbers. However, in the long term, if these vigilante activities are not curbed by the government the situation could get out of control.

I do not believe Sri Lanka situation has anything to do with the IED attacks in Gaya, though LTTE had the dubious distinction of carrying out a terror attack on the Temple of the Tooth at Kandy. Despite all the speeches on Tamil Eelam, at present I do not think there is any Tamil outfit which has either the motivation or capability to carry out an attack on a holy site like Bodh Gaya.

What is your comment on the politicization of the attack on Bodh Gaya that appears to be overtaking security concerns?

In India every issue ends up as a political debate. So it is not surprising that a 

serious security breach that ended in terrorist attack in Bodh Gaya is also meeting the same fate. The reasons for this are many – inter-party and intra party politics and schism, national versus regional jealousies among political outfits, caste and religious ‘vote bank’ politics and historical prejudices etc.  We do not have national leadership strong enough to focus on our national priorities. I doubt very much whether we can outlive this.

As a result of this all our hallowed national institutions have been corrupted. The unseemly conduct of CBI in naming IB as party in the Ishrat Jahan case is the latest of such dismal episodes. So reports on terrorist activity or suspects do not get the attention they deserve at every level. For example in Kerala, the coalition politics has been leveraged to pamper the minority community and this environment has been cleverly exploited by extremist and divisive elements to increase their clout.  

So after every terrorist incident our leaders castigate the ruling party or whitewash their weaknesses. National leaders after Gaya explosions used the same clichés – ‘cowardly act,’ ‘will not tolerate,’ ‘guilty will be punished’ that have been repeated after every acts of terrorism since 26/11 terror attacks. This is symptomatic of our national weakness: inability to think beyond spouting clichés after the incident rather than getting our act together before they take place.

When P Chidambaram took over as Union Home Minister in the wake of 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai he promised to revamp the entire national counter terror effort. He tried to address weaknesses in structural and information sharing systems embedded in the culture of our intelligence agencies and police organizations, particularly at the state level.

The political class has long been accustomed to use the state police to serve their political interest. So it is not surprising Chidambaram’s efforts to professionalise policing and improve the coordination between and among police organizations and intelligence agencies are mired in petty politics and political grandstanding. As we are facing a parliamentary election soon, I do not have much hope of seeing light at the end of the tunnel as it seems unending.    

Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer, is associated with Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group.E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com; website: www.colhari.org

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 5526 dated July 9, 2013

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1315

Sri Lanka: Politics of NPC election

Col R Hariharan

 

President Mahinda Rajapaksa appears to have taken a pragmatic decision to go ahead with the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) election without tinkering with the 13^th Amendment (13A). The presidential proclamation made on the election last Friday, has been welcomed by India as it has removed a rider that could have hobbled India-Sri Lanka relations. The NPC will go to polls along with the Central and North Western Provincial councils which have been dissolved. According to media reports the PC elections are likely to be held on September 27.

Fortuitously or otherwise, Basil Rajapaksa, Minister for Economic Development, and the President’s brother, was in New Delhi to convey the good news on holding the NPC election to Indian counterpart he was meeting. According to the Sri Lankan External Affairs Ministry's statement, Rajapaksa’s visit to New Delhi was to deal with other areas of discussion, and was also “aimed at apprising the Indian leaders on Sri Lanka’s changes to the 13th amendment — the move to strip police and land powers to provinces.”

As it invariably happens when Indian and Sri Lankan counterparts meet, there are two versions on what the Sri Lanka minister discussed with Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid, National Security Advisor Shivshankara Menon and the Secretary MEA Rajan Mathai in New Delhi.

News despatches from New Delhi said India had emphasised to Rajapaksa the need “to fully implement the constitutional provision dealing with devolution of powers to provinces without dilution and go beyond it to ensure meaningful development.”The Indian External Affairs Minister who welcomed the decision to hold the election asked Basil Rajapaksa “not to dilute the provisions of a promised political settlement known as the 13th Amendment plus.”

13A plus was a term President Rajapaksa had coined during the Eelam War to keep India on his side. But he “forgot” about it when political priorities overtook after the war. By bringing 13A plus back in the discussion, India probably wanted to remind the President that India still remembered his unfulfilled promise. Of course, New Delhi’s reminder also had the advantage of convincing the increasingly restive Tamil constituency in India that New Delhi was sincere in pursuing the Tamil aspirations.  

In a BBC interview the Indian Minister of State Prime Minister’s office V Narayanaswamy on the same day, reminded Sri Lanka that if it wished to change anything related to the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA), which resulted in the 13A and in the setting up of Provincial Councils, it must renegotiate with India.“When it [international agreement]is signed between two sovereign governments, both governments are bound to implement the agreement,” he said. If one government wanted to change it, it should renegotiate with the other government. “One government cannot unilaterally cancel the agreement,” he added.

Though this was the first time a representative of the Indian government had publicly spoken about renegotiating the ISLA, at present Sri Lanka may not opt for it. Sri Lanka will have to come with a viable political option on the core issue of devolution of powers to the Tamil minority if it wants to negotiate a productive, win-win agreement.

Sri Lanka may be wary of undertaking this time consuming exercise for few other reasons reasons. Politically Sri Lanka may not be able to get its home work right before broaching the subject with India

Given Sri Lanka’s critical economic situation, it would like to broaden India’s multifaceted economic involvement and trade and commerce with Sri Lanka rather than jeopardise it by reopening a touchy 25-year old issue. Moreover, Sri Lanka needs India’s support when it confronts the issue of accountability for its actions during the Eelam War at the UNHCR once again.

Lastly, the Indian coalition government is already under siege due to fluctuating political realignments, particularly in Tamil Nadu. And as the deadline for the Indian parliamentary election nears, New Delhi is likely to be hypersensitive to any escalation of tensions between India and Sri Lanka due to tinkering with the Indian dispensation of 1987 vintage on the Tamil issue.

In this context, Namini Wijedasa write up in the Sunday Times on the reaction of Basil Rajapaksa on his return from New Delhi is interesting. Replying a pointed question whether the Government had abandoned the bill on the removal of police and land powers from the provinces he replied: “When we bring a bill like that, we don’t let go of it so easily without informing the public. There are times when we have brought that type of thing and retracted but we won’t give it up.”  

According to the news item he further said, “We hold the common position that it must be broadly discussed by the public,” he said. “The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) is a good forum for this.” This would indicate that Basil Rajapaksa had appraised India of the proposed changes it would like to carry out in 13A based on the PSC recommendations.

On the Indian Government reaction to the  establishment of the PSC, the minister is reported to have said,“They accepted it...Democracy is the best way and India is of the opinion that all parties that respect democracy must participate in it [PSC], including the Tamil National Alliance. They told us that they notified the TNA several times of this and that they will do so even in future.”

The minister explained, “It was an exchange of information between the two countries. They told us their opinions, we told them our opinions. This was a discussion between two friendly countries.” In other terms, both sides reiterated their positions on the issues of 13A and PSC.

India probably would like to accommodate Sri Lankan use of the PSC to give a veneer of acceptance to the proposed changes in 13A from all shades of political opinion. But the PSC has become a joke after the main opposition parties – the UNP, the JVP and the all important TNA have refused to participate in it. Even some of the partners of the UPFA coalition like the LSSP and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) are averse to the exercise. Now it is largely a UPFA body of ‘yes men’ to approve the changes in 13A. While technically the PSC might carry the day, politically it would be a non starter.

India would like the TNA to participate in the PSC deliberations in a bid to find a workable solution to the impasse. But its argument may not carry conviction unless the other opposition parties and the SLMC change their mind on participating in the PSC.  If we go by news reports, India had probably drawn Rajapaksa’s attention that the PSC set up must have “all shades of opinion on board.” As this is largely an internal political exercise of Sri Lanka, there is little India can do.

So the PSC recommendations are unlikely to improve the environment hostile to bring a meaningful resolution to the overall devolution issue.

While President’s decision closes one chapter of the Colombo’s political drama on the devolution contretemps and the future of 13^th Amendment, it opens up another speculative chapter on the winners and losers of the NPC election with its footnote on the fair conduct of election. Jaffna has already seen some unpleasant acts of thuggery and mischief making targeted attack on the detractors of the regime, notably the TNA which is likely to win a majority in the NPC. Will acts of violence mar the much delayed exercise of NPC election? Will the TNA be allowed to rule the NPC in case they get most of the seats in a fair election? Only President Rajapaksa can probably can answer these questions confidently.

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.688 date July 8, 2013

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1310