India & China: An Assessment of October 2013 Agreements - MoU on Road and Transport Cooperation

Col R Hariharan (Retd)

Of the multiple agreement signed between the two countries during Manmohan Singh’s visit, the MoU on roads (National Highways) and road transportation has a modest objective of promoting the sharing of knowledge, experience and cooperation in transportation technology and policy, and construction and management of highways. 

As China has emerged as the world leader in infrastructure development, the MoU provides a welcome opportunity to improve the weakest link in India’s development story. However, road communications not only promote trade, economic development and people-to-people linkages but also serve as axes for strategic forays between nations. To that extent the MoU when implemented in full will have strategic significance.  

India’s long-running unresolved border dispute with China is well known. China has been in occupation of a major portion of Aksai Chin area and has laid claims to most of Arunachal Pradesh. Communications are vital to the defence of our border region. Considering this, cooperation on road communications and transportation would inevitably involve areas in or close to India’s disputed borders with China. Border transgressions have been an enduring feature of China’s conduct regardless of the agreements it had signed with India. Border violations have been a major source of India’s concern. Dr Manmohan Singh had also drawn attention to this aspect while addressing the members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s Party School on October 24, 2013. He said: “Concerns on both sides – whether it is incidents in the border region, trans-border rivers or trade imbalances…. can become impediments to the full exploitation of the opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation between India and China.”

China has a definite advantage over India in surface communication to the border areas as it has developed a large network of roads both to the border and laterally between key communication centres of the region while India has lagged behind. When India embarked upon development of road infrastructure in border areas, China had objected to it as they fall in large swathes of Indian Territory claimed by them. During the Indian Prime Minister’s visit a Border Defence Agreement (BDA) was signed with China. This has caused some concern the BDA would put restrictions on India’s border infrastructure development.    

However, while answering a media question India’s Ambassador to China S Jaishankar has clarified that the BDA principle of “mutual and equal security” allows both countries “to take appropriate measures according to their own security needs,” puts no restrictions on developing border infrastructure. However, past experience has shown the existence of a large hiatus between China’s words and deeds. In view of this, the development of our border communications may continue to be subject to the vagaries of Chinese conduct, in spite of the BDA.  Therefore there is every possibility of cooperation with the Chinese in road and road transportation in sensitive areas increasing our strategic vulnerability. 

This MoU has a relevance to the Chinese bid to improve surface communication links with India using the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar) corridor. In the joint statement issued during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India in May 2013, India and China had agreed to consult each other to establish “a Joint Study Group on strengthening connectivity in the BCIM region for closer economic, trade, and people-to-people linkages” and for initiating the development of a BCIM Economic Corridor. The MoU on promoting cooperation in roads and road transportation signed now would seem to be a logical step to give form and content to activate the BCIM corridor. 

There is no doubt that the BCIM corridor would enable the backward regions of both India and China to join national developmental mainstream. It would tremendously increase two-way trading opportunities of both China and India, benefitting Yunnan province of China and Northeast Indian states, apart from Burma and Bangladesh. China would gain a more convenient and direct land access avoiding Himalayan passes to reach the huge Indian market and also the under exploited markets of other South Asian countries. On the other hand, India would be able to add more vigour to the Look East Policy by gaining speedier land access to the markets of ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This could result in increasing economic opportunities for Indian youth in troubled North-eastern states, providing them incentive to give up extremism.  

There are a whole lot of similar security concerns on the Western sector bordering Pakistan, where China is assisting in road construction in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. If we seriously propose to cooperate with China and implement the MoU on road and road transportation cooperation for its benefits we need to be prepared to find answers to some of these strategic concerns. 

This series is published by IPCS in collaboration with the Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS)

Courtesy: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, October 29, 2013                               URL: http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/india-china-an-assessment-of-october-2013-agreements-mou-on-4153.html

Understanding army operations in Keran Sector

A lot of noise and dust has been raised in the media regarding the recent army operations against terrorists in the Keran Sector in Jammu and Kashmir.  Some of the scribes have cast doubts about the professional competency of the army in this operation. Unfortunately, army has a problem of communicating with the media while media has neither time nor patience to get to know the details or have sufficient knowledge of military operations. In the age of real time public communication through electronic media this is understandable. The reporting on the operations in Keran sector is a very good example of how things can be botched up by both. 

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain, former General Officer Commanding of 15 Corps, was one of most successful commanders of operations in J and K. His innovative ideas and ability to think through the problem enabled the army to eliminate militancy and terrorist strikes to a large extent in J and K in recent times. He answers some of the disturbing questions raised by the media on Keran operations in his op-ed article in The Hindu of Oct 24, 2013. The article is reproduced here courtesy The Hindu.  

  

I would like to draw attention to three aspects he has touched upon: the need to understand the difference between conventional operations and counter insurgency operations (as in Keran), the tactical limitations of “sealing the border” against infiltration and the issue of recovering bodies of intruders killed in operations. And as he  says in the end “Brawn and brains apart, semantics is a part of the LoC battle. This has not been realised for far too long.” Both the army and the media have a lot of learning on how to communicate military operations. Let us hope they do it sooner than later.

To strike the right balance

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd.), former Corps Commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps

There are lessons for the media and the Army in the reporting and dispensing of information on the Keran operations

Pakistan has upped the ante along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border in the Jammu sector, and public and media interest in the operations in the Keran sector continues. Despite the Army’s statements and clarifications, there is still some unhappiness at the highest levels. The situation demands greater clarity from those who know the ground and the dynamics and can relate it to the larger issues concerning the position in that State.

Infiltration and intelligence

The first of the questions, the Army said it had intelligence on a possible attempt at infiltration and was prepared. So how did a large group manage to come in, and from multiple points? The answer is quite simple. 

Intelligence does not always mean the specifics to an area; intelligence on the likelihood of an infiltration is mostly generic, remaining as such almost through the campaigning season. An earlier article, “An ambitious ploy in the heights” (The Hindu, Op-Ed, October 9, 2013), explained that Shalabatu lies ahead of the Line of Control (LoC) fence in a treacherous forested area that has only a few Army posts, and to deploy soldiers in this area would mean having an additional unit. This has been the situation in the past too, and any attempt by terrorists to establish bases to infiltrate across the fence has been thwarted with high-trajectory and airburst ammunition. It is worth remembering that there is no such thing as “Zero Infiltration”; this is not terrain in which it can ever be guaranteed even with the presence of force multipliers such as thermal imagers and surveillance radars. Any further increase in the density of troops on the LoC fence, even in a priority area, would not result in the desired dividends.

Difference between infiltration and the spread of terrorists 

Further, there is a vast difference between infiltration and the movement of terrorists into an area between the LoC and the LoC fence. Such movement makes no tactical gains and is eventually defeated. This has been a time-tested system through the adoption of the technique of the “limit of infiltration,” which remains the LoC fence. In some places and situations, the Army permits terrorists to breach the fence and then bottles them up between the LoC fence and our own counter-infiltration positions behind the fence. All this falls in the domain of minor tactics and deserves an informed analysis.

The soft underbelly during handing/taking over between units 

The next observation is the repeated weakness during times of handing/taking over between units and how information on turnover is leaked. Security of information in the digitised world is a matter of concern. The Indian Army always has accurate information about similar activities across the LoC. And there are enough sources in our rear areas, not to forget local porters from the border areas who return to their villages every night, who report things like the movement of our convoys, change of dependency in the administrative echelons and even about bank accounts. 

This information can only be limited but not denied, and we need to be clear and realistic on the limits of counter-intelligence. There have been two instances since 2011 when terrorists backed by Pakistan Army regulars struck under such circumstances — at Shalabatu in July 2011 and in August 2013 in the Sarla complex of the Poonch sector. The recent stand-off at Shalabatu is only an infiltration attempt backed by Pakistani regulars and is an annual ritual which the Army is always prepared for. No doubt, at the time of relieving units there are supposedly weak moments especially in command and control. However, there are strict and clear orders to that effect and command and control continues with the older unit till the last day. A system of on-the-job training exists where relieving troops join the outgoing troops in all operational activities.

Regarding the non-seizure of dead bodies by our Army

Where did the bodies go? This is a question everyone seems to be asking. There probably wasn’t any at the outset and someone forgot to use that famous term which all intelligence agencies and experienced staff officers use — “uncorroborated and unconfirmed.” Had the information that was given first to the media been used with this prefix, there would not have been questioning at the culmination of the operations. More significant is the fact that someone used terminology in a general way, that is, “cordon” to explain the conduct of the operation ahead of the LoC fence in the area up to the LoC. Cordons are never laid in the vicinity of the LoC because these can at best be U-shaped, with the open-end towards the adversary across the LoC. 

This is because you don’t expose your men towards the LoC, especially when the LoC itself is not manned in that area. So, even if there were bodies it is very likely that they were carried away through the open-end of the U. Was it worth risking the lives of troops for the sake of a few dead terrorists? It was more important to keep the LoC fence strongly manned to prevent infiltration than employ these troops for search operations until reinforcements came in.

Understanding operations

Why was the Army taking so long and what was happening between October 2 and 8, the last contact at Shalabatu being on October 2? It needs a simple response, taking into consideration the basics of counter-terror operations. These operations are far from conventional operations where signals of success are given.

Here, there was actually no requirement to even mention the termination of operations; it was just a change in tack and of methodology. Counter-terror operations don’t just terminate in an area, they get transformed. Everyone here realised that there were linkages to the ongoing operations on the flanks. 

Unwarranted Media pressure

However, in this world of satellite-based maps and Google Earth, the media does need to spend time on research. Gujarthur is not 27 km from Shalabatu — that may be the distance by road. In such areas, tactical reactions are not along roads but along jungle and mountain tracks. In fact, Gujarthur where the second contact with the terrorists took place, is on the edge of the crescent-shaped ridge line which dominates the Shalabatu bowl. There are linkages between all such operations and the Army needed to spend enough time on the alert in the extended area. What the unnecessary and completely uninformed media pressure achieved was a premature announcement of a termination of operations. There is no such black-and-white announcement in such operations; they just carry on, increasing and decreasing in intensity on the basis of intelligence, operations on the flanks, the degree of fatigue to troops and the limitations of logistics.

Temporary Posts

On vacation of posts, in all probability there is much confusion on the issue of posts along the LoC fence which are at best temporary positions and manned by even buddy teams at times. 

They are vacated and reoccupied on the basis of threat perceptions and intelligence and are never held permanently. There is no chance that a well-established post such as Kulhari could ever be vacated.

Media needs training - so does PRO Army

The media does a fine job of reporting inadequacies, but this should be done after proper research; hence the need for media persons to attend local training programmes. What the Army should resort to is the correct usage of terminology and the right balance in its media releases. Brawn and brains apart, semantics is a part of the LoC battle. This has not been realised for far too long.

Courtesy: The Hindu, October 24, 2013

Sri Lanka: India’s CHOGM dilemma

Col R Hariharan

[This article includes Col Hariharan’s recent comments on the subject in various TV news channels, and web and print media.] 

Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s is facing a Shakespearean dilemma on attending the CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting) to be held in Colombo in November 2013. This is not surprising as there are strong political and strategic reasons, both for and against, attending the Colombo summit.

He is facing strong internal and external pressures that cloud objective decision making on the issue. Added to this is the erosion of the PM’s leadership image in recent times. It has taken a severe beating recently after huge scams linked to his office started surfacing one after the other. As a result, each and every decision of the PM is being questioned and the same fate probably awaits his decision on CHOGM as well.

He has to do some delicate tightrope walking to meld long term national interest with short term political priorities. The task is made more difficult because it can affect not only the poll prospects of the Congress party in the 2014-parliamentary election but even the longevity of his coalition before the election. 

Political leaders of almost all hues including the Congress party in Tamil Nadu have called for a boycott of the CHOGM. This is not surprising as they got on the Eelam bandwagon ever since Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Ms Jayalalithaa effectively used the Sri Lanka Tamil issue to sweep  the state elections. She has continued her strident stance as many Tamils consider the Centre’s response to Sri Lanka’s war crimes and human rights aberrations as inadequate and ineffective; this has put both the Congress and the DMK on the defensive. Smelling blood, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister turned even more hawkish, calling for slapping a trade embargo on Sri Lanka and international action against President Rajapaksa. The developments in Tamil Nadu seem to have  influenced India’s vote against Sri Lanka in the UNHCR last year.

The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister had been emphatic in calling for an Indian boycott of the CHOGM. All parties in the state were quick to follow suit. None of them, barring some notable exceptions, have critically debated the pros and cons of boycotting the CHOGM on the country's Sri Lanka policy or on Sri Lanka Tamils.

During the last three years, Ms Jayalalithaa has strengthened her support base with a slew of populist measures like the running subsidized food outlets that benefit the poor. Many analysts feel this would help her capture most of the 40 parliamentary seats in Tamil Nadu in the 2014 elections. Ever since the NaMo's electoral bandwagon started gathering massive public support, the Congress Party is in jitters about its poll prospects in 2014. So the Party simply cannot afford to ignore Ms Jayalalithaa and Tamil Nadu. Already a section of Congress leaders is said to favour forming an electoral alliance with the AIDMK, ditching the DMK, their long standing partner. 

But neither Dr Manmohan Singh nor the Congress party figure in the mercurial chief minister’s favoured list. Only consolation is that she is playing her coalition cards close to her chest so far, despite her better equation with Narendra Modi. Probably this has given Congress a glimmer of hope of reworking its relations with her. If the PM attends the CHOGM, such hopes are sure to be dashed.

Even without the Tamil Nadu factor, the PM’s decision had been made more difficult by Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s studied indifference to India’s repeated plea to keep up his promises on devolution and implementation of the 13^th Amendment. Even the latest effort by Indian Minister of External Affairs (MEA) Salman Khurshid during his visit Colombo failed to evoke any worthwhile response on substantive issues. The only achievement of the visit was signing of he agreement for the much delayed Indian-aided Sampur power plant. (It had been criticized on environmental count, although not a word has been spoken about the Chinese built Norocholai power plant which continues to limp.)  With the opposition readying to flay the PM for “yet another foreign policy failure” he may well decide to skip the CHOGM as a politically safe option. 

If Dr Manmohan Singh does not attend the CHOGM, he would not be alone.  Canada has already announced it would boycott the Commonwealth meet. From the beginning Canada was against Sri Lanka hosting it in Colombo as it would legitimise the Sri Lankan President’s continued indifference to international concerns on his government’s dismal human rights record.  Some see the Canadian Prime Minister’s boycott decision as a political move to woo  voters of Sri Lankan Tamil origin in the country. In most of the countries, foreign policy decisions are invariably influenced by popular perceptions and Canada cannot be faulted on this count. Even President Rajapaksa’s decision to host the CHOGM (like many other decisions) is part of his political stratagem to boost his image.

On the other hand, British Prime Minister David Cameron facing similar pressures appears to have decided to attend CHOGM. British government has reiterated the need to engage Sri Lanka on human rights issues by attending the Commonwealth summit. It proposes to come with “a clear message that Sri Lanka needs to make concrete progress on human rights, reconciliation and a political settlement."  

Indian interests in Sri Lanka are much larger than either Canada or Britain. Two inter-related aspects guide India’s relationship with its island neighbor – geo-strategy, and Tamil minority question.  Geo-strategically, India wields a huge influence over the sub-continent particularly on smaller countries like Sri Lanka. With China whittling away India’s strategic sphere of influence in the South Asian neighbourhood, India has to consider not only its national interest but also the regional interest while taking decisions that affect its neighbours.  And in Sri Lanka, China is emerging as a direct challenge to Indian presence. In fact, it effectively used the aftermath of the Eelam War to emerge as one of the two big investors and aid givers  in Sri Lanka, the other being India.

So India will have to reckon with the emerging strategic dynamics in its relationship building with Sri Lanka. As the head of state of the country hosting the CHOGM, President Rajapaksa would be its head for the next two years. So Sri Lanka reckons the successful conduct of the CHOGM would boost its international image which had been tarnished in the murky aftermath of the Eelam War.

More than that, it would be a balm to the bruised ego of President Rajapaksa who has been hurt by the continued international focus on war crimes allegations rather than his remarkable success against the LTTE. India’s vote for the U.S. resolution against Sri Lanka at the UNHCR has already created bitterness against India in Sri Lanka. 

If Indian PM boycotts the CHOGM, it is likely to add to Sri Lanka’s bitterness. This would not help India’s desire to add more depth and content to its relations with Sri Lanka but its ability to influence Sri Lanka’s decision making process on the both strategic issues and on Tamil minority issues. 

But the moot question is, beyond its symbolic solidarity with Tamils who had suffered, how would the CHOGM boycott help Sri Lanka Tamils? The much delayed Northern Provincial Council (NPC) election was held thanks to Indian sustained engagement with Sri Lanka. Subsequently in the NPC poll, people gave a massive mandate to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) hoping the Alliance would help them improve the quality of life and ensure Colombo attends to their concerns with greater sensitivity. CV Wigneswaran, the NPC prime minister, has given clear indications that he would pursue the stated objectives of TNA vigorously. This process would require India’s sustained engagement and persuasive influence with Colombo.  

Although CHOGM provides the PM an opportunity to meet other heads of state on the sidelines of the summit, it does not matter whether the PM attends it or not. In fact, CHOGM is not a vibrant and cohesive entity like ASEAN but a highly over rated old boys club of former British colonies and the Brits surviving more on empire nostalgia than on collective international influence. But the PM’s decision on CHOGM has to be part of India’s overall game plan because of its impact on India's long term interests in sustaining a win-win relationship with Sri Lanka. So it has to be more than a reaction to local political compulsions

Contentious issues relating to Sri Lanka Tamils and Sri Lanka’s human rights are not going to disappear as not even President Rajapaksa seems to be in a hurry to bring them to a closure. A decision on CHOGM would set a precedent when India-Sri Lanka relationship is tested again when the UNHCR  takes up Sri Lanka’s accountability issue at its next meeting. So Dr Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister has to take a deliberate and informed decision on attending the CHOGM. One can only hope he does so. 

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Sri Lanka Update No 238, Paper No 700 dated Oct 25, 2013 URL http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1388

 

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)  

Who cares for National Security?

I am reproducing here an open letter from Lt Gen Sardeshpande who retired after a distinghuished career. It is addressed to our elected representatives and political leaders highlighting the gross deficiencies of Indian armed forces which is sure to affect their performance. It raises the question "Who cares for national security?"

An Open Letter to Elected Representatives & Political Party Leaders

Lt Gen Sardeshpande

In my personal capacity, I am inviting the awkward distinction of adverting to you regarding the recent defence scams, deficiencies, neglect, delays, procedural tardiness and the like, which are disturbingly dangerous for the defence of the country.

The Air Force strength sanctioned for 42 squadrons has come down to 32, and, at this rate of obsolescence and ageing, will dwindle further to 29 as appears in the media. The MiG 21s have started failing and killing pilots. The Air Force and Naval aviation basic trainer HPT 32 have all been grounded; the next in line, Kiran trainers have dwindled to a handful; the next MiG 21s are already too old.

The Naval pilots are being sent to USA for their basic flying training (TNIE of 8 May 2012), and the Air Force may have to send theirs perhaps to Sweden! Navy’s Sea Harrier aircraft strength too has come down to a handful. Our Submarine fleet is not up to challenging the Chinese counterpart’s entry into the Indian Ocean, which is the maritime area so vital to our trade, economy and security.

The Army Chief has brought out a list of obsolete, ageing and deficient items in the Army’s vital weaponry, ammunition and equipment. What the Army Chief said early this year about the Army, the Air Force and Naval Chiefs had said about their Services two years ago, as reported in the press. Despite the deteriorating and unsatisfactory state of our Armed Forces as reflected by all the Chiefs, every one of them has said that they “will fight with whatever they have”. Which, when translated into reality on the battle ground, will mean only one thing: that the soldier (includes naval person and airman) will sacrifice himself and be converted into a martyr by the government, by the political parties and by the people themselves. Does this require any bright brain or complex logic to conclude?

I am making bold to ask you elected representatives, party leaders, government officials and intellectual fraternity a few questions in this regard as a common citizen, as an educated and responsible person and as an old soldier of 35 years service in the defence of our country:

• Why have all of you, each one of you, permitted this downslide?

• Why have you not raised these issues in the parliament and other relevant for a, or with the elected representatives/ party leaders?

• What has been your contribution to arrest this downslide?

• Why are you trying to glorify the soldier and his martyrdom more than ensuring healthy, well equipped, well armed, well oiled and well provided defence forces and defence preparedness?

• Why is it difficult for you to understand that the cliché of the man behind the gun being more important than the gun has its limits, beyond which that man behind becomes dead and useless?

• Why do you act so negligently as to treat the soldier as gun fodder, to be raised to glorified martyrdom deserving tears and garlands?

• What efforts have you made, or are making, to become aware of defence and military preparedness issues to ensure the country’s and its people’s security, both external and internal, even as our history shows repeatedly that we received frequent beatings precisely because we neglected these very issues? 

I know you will find these questions hard to answer. You may even vent your displeasure over my temerity to confront you on the issues. I am posing them as a common citizen, affected citizen, in our so-called democracy. Yet, I do very sincerely and seriously request you to consider the issues and attend to cleansing the muck we have created.

Dharwad                                                                             (SC Sardeshpande)