Stumbling in Xinjiang

Col R Hariharan

 

There are clear indications that the Chinese are stumbling in their effort to crush the Uighur struggle against the Han Chinese domination in Xinjiang. The scrupulous semantics used by Chinese state-controlled media describe them as terrorists though the attacks lack the sophistication of modern day terrorism. It has not helped to cover up the Chinese failure to give confidence to the restive "minority" Uighurs who form a majority in Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China's Northwest.

The way the Chinese have handled the "terror" carried out in Beijing in October 2013 is a case in point to understand all that is wrong with Chinese approach to tackling terrorism.

The “terror attack” occurred when Usman Ahmet, a Uighur driving a jeep ploughed into a crowd of people near the Tienanmen Square in Beijing on October 28, 2013 killing three people and injuring 39 others. The driver and his mother and wife who were in the jeep also died on the spot. According to initial report, some eyewitnesses said the jeep was being chased by someone; it was probably trying to get away from the pursuer.  

The three Uighurs facing death row were found guilty of “leading a terrorist group and endangering public security.” Along with the driver of the fatal vehicle, they had “looked for guns and explosives in different places, watched terrorism videos and jointly planned terrorist acts such as blasts and killings in Beijing.”

Two others were sentenced to life and 20 years in jail respectively for guilty of “participating in a terrorist group and endangering public security. Three more Uighurs were sentenced to five to 10-year imprisonment for “participating in a terrorist group.”

The Beijing attack was not as deadly as the explosive attack carried out in Urumqi market on May 22, 2014. Thirty nine civilians were killed and 94 others injured in the attack. But the Beijing attack typifies the Chinese way of handling separatist extremism that goes by the name of terrorism in China.  

It also shows the increasingly innovative ways in which Uyghur separatists had taken their “operations’ beyond the confines of Xinjiang and in this case to the national capital.

There is a problem with Chinese approach to unconventional warfare. In India where semantic niceties dominate the thought process on COIN, “extremism”, “militancy”, “insurgency” and “terrorism” often indicate how the state authority would like to handle the threat. However, to be fair to the Chinese, the fine line separating various types of anti-state violence is getting increasingly subsumed thanks to rise and spread of Jihadi terrorism worldwide.  

But, by branding all acts of violence against the state as terrorism, the state response becomes heavy handed resulting in further alienation of the population. It also increases the dependence upon military strategies rather than evolving a holistic strategy to address political, sociological and economic issues that add substance to the Cause of separatism.

This is what appears to be happening in Xinjiang. The statistics on terrorist attacks from the years 2009 to date published in the Global Times is revealing. This year so far the Chinese have attributed six incidents to the Uighur terrorists in the first six months as against seven in 2013 and two, three and one respectively in the years 2012, 2011 and 2009. This confirms the Chinese fear that after 2009 Uighur separatism is once again gathering mass to stage a comeback. 

There was no incident in 2010 presumably because of the strong military crackdown after the anti Chinese riots that rocked Urumqi in July 2009. Casualties in the riots were heavy - 197 people killed and 1700 others injured while 633 houses and 627 vehicles were damaged. 

The style of operations and weaponry used now indicate Uighur separatism is yet to articulate itself powerfully to become a terrorist movement. Some of the acts like the Beijing jeep “attack” where a whole family perished, look more like an act of desperation than a suicide attack of the Jihadi kind. It also underlines the continuing determination of some in Uighur society to assert their will against the powerful and insensitive state machinery in spite of all odds.

Uighur extremism is also gaining more national visibility and making  impact since 2013 - President Xi Jinping’s first year in office. Xi had a first-hand exposure to it when one of the three Uighur separatist outfits - the Turkestan Islamic party - carried out a knife attack and bombing in Urumqi city railway station on April 30. Three people lost their lives and 79 others were injured in the attack.

More importantly, the attack was timed to coincide with the visit of the President to Xinjiang, destablising the state for a while. So it was no wonder when Xi vowed to wipe out terrorism by making the state counter terrorism apparatus more professional and powerful at the regional and national levels. 

As though challenging the President, Uighur separatists carried out yet another explosive attack in Urumqi the very next month. It was even more deadly, killing 39 civilians and injuring 94 others. In its wake, the Chinese have launched a year-long crackdown on terrorism nationwide.

Now counter terrorism figures prominently in China’s national security schemes.  It also finds a place in joint military exercises - big or small - with a whole range of countries extending from Russia to India to Thailand and Sri Lanka to the US. Counter terrorism cooperation has become an important part of in China’s bilateral discussions with heads of governments, particularly neighbouring countries including India.

At times the over emphasis on military approach has resulted in overkill; a typical example is the arrest of a prominent Uighur intellectual Ilham Tohti, a known advocate of non violence and supporter of dialogue between the ethnic communities, in January 2014. He is now held incommunicado in Xinjiang, facing a secret trial.

Despite these efforts, the Chinese seem to be running into trouble in handling Uighur separatism. Their intelligence agencies do not seem to have their ears to the ground to forewarn them of impending separatist strike. The successful execution of a daring attack in Urumqi during the President’s visit is a case in point. This speaks of poor interface between the Han Chinese and the minority populations.

There is also a need to address the economic alienation of Uighurs from the Chinese development story.  Chinese have a long tradition of settling disbanded units of Han Chinese dominated army in border regions. This practice has boosted the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang particularly in the 70s during the period of fractious relationship with Soviet Union.

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) originally formed out of the disbanded military settlers has emerged as powerful economic and semi-military government loose cannon. It has administrative authority over several cities and settlements and farms. It operates outside the control of the government of the autonomous region making a mockery of the much touted Uighur autonomy. Its exclusive preference for Han Chinese makes it a powerful external factor furthering the alienation of Uighurs.   

Thus over the years, despite a lot of lip service to national unity, functional relations between the Han Chinese immigrants and the Uyghur regional majority have not developed on equitable basis. This feeling of alienation was further compounded by the state’s short sighted restrictions on religious practices of Uighur Muslims in the wake of 2009 trouble. This is a dangerous trend as it could push the Uighur separatists into the arms of Taliban fundamentalism which is expected to rise in the wake of American troop pullout from Afghanistan this year. So time is running out for the Chinese to rethink their strategies in Xinjiang.

Basically Chinese have to adopt a holistic approach to include ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ as a part of the COIN effort. The Global Times editorial in 2013 had some sane advice on this.  It said: “Winning the hearts of the public in sensitive areas has decisive significance. Xinjiang needs to mobilize people from all of society to launch an anti-terrorism fight…The July 5 riots in Xinjiang in 2009 left a deep scar between the Han and the Uighur. The estrangement between the two will be constantly used by extreme forces who have been trying to turn it into the deep-rooted social causes for their violent and terrorism activities there.

“The whole country should be dedicated to dissolving the estrangement, which is the key to Xinjiang's long-term stability.  We should also make Xinjiang people acknowledge the harm of such estrangement and that extreme forces are violators of the interests of the Uighur people. Meanwhile, various places in Xinjiang should appoint a certain number of police from ethnic minorities. The Uighurs should be made to believe that they are trusted members of the Chinese populace.”

We know from our own experience in Nagaland and Mizoram that no amount of military crackdown alone can uproot the feeling of alienation and separatism unless holistic efforts are made to nurture the feeling of inclusivity among the alienated so that they join the national mainstream.

This process requires a lot of patience and continuity. And Xinjiang is no exception to this. So one can only hope someone in authority take the Global Times advice to heart and put in an out of the box plan for Xinjiang. Otherwise the Chinese are going to find it more and more difficult in handling Uighur separatism.

Written on June 19 and updated on June 30, 2014
Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies C3S Paper No 2114 dated June 30, 2014

http://www.c3sindia.org/china-internal/4089

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info & http://hariharansintblog.blogspot.in ) 

Unraveling the direction of India’s China policy

Col R Hariharan

Note: 

An analysis of China’s reading of the pulse of India’s foreign policy changes under Prime Minister Narendra Modi written on June 13, 2014 titled “China’s reading of India’s foreign policy trend” is reproduced below. Since then Prime Minister Modi has returned home after his maiden foreign visit to Bhutan. Modi’s as a relationship building exercise it may be called a moderately successful visit, considering the extremely short preparatory time the foreign offices of both countries had. However, its impact would be watched with interest by both India and China during the forthcoming border talks between Bhutan and India.

A Global Times article on Modi’s visit welcomed the visit. And Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson has announced that India’s Vice President Hamid Ansari would be attending the commemoration ceremony China’s holding at Beijing to celebrate the 60the Anniversary of the Panchsheel next week.

Modi's Japanese visit will now be taking place in second half of July due to the Budget presentation in parliament on July 11.

Obviously, China seems to be taking the Indian move in Bhutan in its stride. In any case it is too early to read the Indian Prime Minister’s mind on foreign policy making. It would be reasonable to do so as its contours emerge in the coming months.

China’s reading of India’s foreign policy trend

Col R Hariharan

The two-day visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy to New Delhi within three weeks of Prime Minister Narendra Modi assuming office underlines China’s keenness, if not anxiety, in building bridges with the Indian leader who has come to power with a massive personal mandate.

In spite of all the flowery rhetoric at play during Wang Yi’s visit, he probably had a limited agenda to feel the pulse of the new Indian leadership under Narendra Modi. This is not going to be an easy exercise because Modi has shown he leads from the front with an assertive style and ruthlessly pursues his objectives. His campaign style and later his utterances in office have shown his uncanny ability to spring surprises upon the opposition and the regional satraps. 

Prime Minister Modi spending 45 minutes at his meeting with the Chinese visitor despite his heavy schedule in the early days of office is significant. It showed the importance Modi attached to India’s relationship with China and the wide range of issues that probably figured in the meeting. Chinese leadership is likely to be pleased with this as the new Indian government  has sent a number of confusing signals on some of China’s key concerns regarding India.

On the foreign policy front also the “Modi touch” had its effect; two cases in point were his invitation to the SAARC heads of government to attend his swearing-in function and the announcement that Bhutan would be the destination of his first overseas visit. Bhutan has close strategic relations with India and like India has an ongoing dispute over China’s claims over Bhutanese territory. 

Concerns on core interests

Some of the actions of the Modi government, even before it completed a month in office, touch upon some of China’s “core interests” as well as strategic security concerns. And they have come close on the heels of the visit of the Special Envoy. These actions give some inkling into the emerging Indian security perspective on China.

Territorial integrity: China could not ignore the presence of Lobsang Sangay, the political head of the so-called Tibetan government-in-exile, at the prime minister’s oath taking function. It promptly sent off a demarche to India protesting against the invitation to Sangay, as it considers any public recognition of the Tibetan exile set up as an affront to its territorial integrity. Added to this is Modi’s Facebook entry which said Sangay was “an honourable guest of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)” indicating the possibility of the Tibetan issue gathering mass at a later date.

Inviolability of national borders: There were indications that India would be speeding up infrastructure development work along its border with China. These were probably deferred as the Manmohan Singh regime did not want to ruffle China’s sensitivities on this count. 

a.  The Indian Home Ministry has agreed on principle to the setting up of 54 new Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) border posts along in Arunachal Pradesh with the likely increase in ITBP strength by 50,000 troops. The increase in border posts would help improve India’s security posture in this disputed region. Already raising of an additional mountain strike corps for this region is underway and a number of advanced landing grounds for air support are also being added.  In the past, the Chinese  have been reacting to any Indian effort to improve the infrastructure in their “claim” territory on the Northern borders of India.

b.     Close on the heels of the report on ITBP came Indian environment minister Prakash Javadekar’s  indication that faster environmental clearances would be given to border roads and strategic defence infrastructure projects in border areas pending with his ministry for long. This would mean the speedier completion of 80 road projects within 100 km from the Line of Actual Control on the Northern border with China. This region has been the scene of a number of violations by Chinese troops who had been objecting to improvement of road communication on the Indian side.  

Indian Ocean security: The Environment Ministry has also cleared a proposal to install a radar station at Narcondam Island in the Andaman Nicobar Command.  This six-year old proposal would help the armed forces to monitor the reported Chinese activity in the Coco Island off Myanmar coast, very close to the Northern Andaman. The Indian Prime Minister plans to visit on July 14 the newly acquired aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya to see its capabilities at sea. These do indicate India’s determination to assert its naval superiority in the Indian Ocean region, where Chinese navy had been progressively increasing its presence. 

Strategic relations with Japan: At a time when China’s relations with Japan are turning increasingly confrontational, China would be watching the Indian Prime Minister’s planned meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on July 3-4 at Tokyo with concern. Modi would be meeting his Japanese counterpart even before he meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Brazil later in the month. The significance of Modi’s parley with Abe at a Summit meet unlike the one with the Chinese leader would not be missed by the Chinese. More so as Modi enjoys a personal rapport with his Japanese counterpart which could turn the Summit meet to trigger a few strategic security initiatives. 

Building on the positives for a win-win relationship

Though the Chinese find these reports difficult to digest as they had been accustomed to browbeat India in the past, Prime Minister Modi has some positives that could help them build a win-win relationship.

First is Narendra Modi’s familiarity with China and, probably admiration for, its development model. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, he had visited China three times. All the visits had productive development agendas. He visited China twice in his first tenure as chief minister. The first visit in November 2006 was to study the Special Economic Zones while in September 2007, he led a delegation of Gujarati entrepreneurs to the port city of Dailan, the second largest container transshipment hub in China. Northeast China.  The Gujarat development model including the huge infrastructure and special economic zones have benefitted from Chinese experience and expertise can help China in improving its equation with the Indian Prime Minister. 

His visit to China in 2011 probably secured the unconditional release of 13 diamond merchants of Gujarat who were jailed in Shenzhen for alleged violation of customs norms.

Xi Jinping’s message (conveyed by the Special Envoy) to Prime Minister Modi praising his leadership and inviting him to “work together to achieve peaceful cooperation and inclusive development for the benefit of our two people and in the interest of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and in the world" tries to build upon the existing positives of Modi’s personal equation with China.

Its reaffirmation of China's positive perception of India's role in the world and expectation and desire for pursuing bilaterally their development dreams is probably an indication how Xi would like China-India relations to develop.

Modi’s warm reciprocation of the Chinese sentiments in his talks with the Special Envoy emphasizing the potential for greater cooperation and to work for mutually beneficial trade and investment as economic partners probably reflects his expectations. The inclusion of plans to energetically engage with China to further develop strategic and cooperative partnership in the Modi government’s agenda presented by President Pranabl Mukherjee’s address to the parliament underlines the importance attached to India’s relationship with China. 

Modi’s economic development plans presented in the agenda and his top ten priorities to shore up the nation’s economy provide a number of investment and business opportunities for the Chinese. So till the relationship with the Indian government is established on a firm footing, China is likely to focus on these opportunities rather than allowing the negatives to dissipate them.

Given the elephantine memory of the Chinese and their penchant for focusing on choosing their initiatives at the tactically advantageous moments, in the near term we may not see dramatic change on their conduct on the border.

This is confirmed by Wang Yi’s facile justification of border intrusions in the North as well as the issue of stapled visas at his press conference in New Delhi. However, probably the improvement in personal equation of Prime Minister Modi with Prime Minister Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping in the coming months would determine the speed and destination of India’s relationship with China.

To summarise Modi seems to have given sufficient indications to China that while he is holding out the hand in friendship, he also has a mailed fist on the other.  Chinese leaders would be factoring it in tailoring their India policy to suit the changed assertive leadership style of the new Indian government.

Written on June 13, 2013

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, is a strategic analyst associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: http://col.hariharan.info

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 5727 dated  23-Jun-2014   http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/

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Tale of Twin Troubles

Col R Hariharan

There is trouble brewing on the Tamil shores, with shock waves being felt across Palk Strait too. At the core of the problem are the twin terror trails that are becoming more discernable. Analysis of recent terror activities in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka lend credence to their presence. One relates to the Indian jehadi network and the other to the LTTE’s overseas offshoot’s efforts to gain a toehold in the island nation.

Both have common features: obsession with a cause, motivation to carry out attacks against all odds, and the existence of local and overseas networks. Both found a fertile ground due to the short sighted policies of the respective governments. However, the comparison ends there. The jehadi network in Tamil Nadu seems to have fared better due to regional vote bank politics. However, the LTTE is finding it difficult to push through its revival efforts, thanks to Sri Lanka’s counter measures and the immediate suppression of any activity smacking of separatism.

Jehad in Garden of Peace

Chennai was stunned on May Day by two low-intensity explosions on the Bangalore-Guwahati superfast express at the city’s central station. The blasts shattered the myth of Tamil Nadu being “a garden of peace and security”, as the state’s chief minister had claimed. A young woman was killed and 14 others were injured in the explosions. Analysis of the explosives, including fragments of the timers, showed that the composition of the explosives was similar to those used by the Indian Mujahideen.

Suspicion of an ISI hand was aroused after Mohammed Sahir Hussain, a Sri Lankan national, arrested two days before the blasts, confessed that he worked for Pakistan Intelligence based in its high commission in Colombo. He said he was tasked by Amir Zubair Siddiqui, counsellor (visa) at the high commission, to gather information on installations in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Hussain added he had sent photographs and maps of US Consulate in Chennai and Israel Consulate in Bangalore to his handler.

Siddiqui’s name had cropped up earlier in 2012 when Thamim Ansari, a terror suspect, was apprehended on the way to Tiruchi airport to catch a flight to Colombo. Police recovered DVDs containing visuals of the army paragliding training and a parade of the army signal corps. He told the police that he was instructed by Siddiqui to take the videos, which also included Nagapattinam port and Madras Regimental Centre in Wellington.

Further investigations into the Chennai blasts pointed out that Abu Backer Siddiqui, a member of the banned Tamil Nadu outfit, Al-Umma, had carried out the blasts. Al- Umma’s operative Panna Ismail, who was in custody, also confirmed Abu Siddiqui’s involvement.

The investigators suspect that Abu Siddiqui was trying to reactivate Al-Umma, which had gone into oblivion after the arrest of its leadership in 1998. Al-Umma, along with other fundamentalist Muslim groups, sprouted in Tamil Nadu following the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the rise of Hindutva groups like Hindu Munnani and VHP in the state.

The terrorist organization gained notoriety when it carried out 13 bomb blasts at 11 locations in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, minutes before BJP leader LK Advani was to address his election rally on February 14, 1998. Forty six people were killed and over 200 were injured in the blasts.

Outfits Lean on Politics

The DMK government’s follow-up showed the determination to crush the terrorists in the state. It banned not only the Al Umma but also Jehad Committee, another fundamentalist body.

Key leaders of the Jehad Committee and the Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra Kazagham (TMMK), a Muslim NGO believed to be founded by former members of the banned terrorist outfit Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), were arrested.

In the Coimbatore blast trials, 158 terrorists were convicted, of which 43 received life sentences in 2007. But the alleged mastermind, Abdul Nasar Madani, walked free. Given a hero’s welcome in Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala), he assured his support to the state’s Left Democratic Front (LDF) regime and said he would work for the welfare of Dalits and Muslims.

In Tamil Nadu, the TMMK sobered down; it broadened its agenda to include human rights, reservation for the Muslims, administration of Waqf properties and social security measures for the minorities. This helped the TMMK to leverage support during elections using the perennial confrontation between the DMK and the AIADMK.

The TMMK cloned into several parties. The Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath was formed as a breakaway group, which further broke up into two factions—Indian Thowheed Jamath and Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath. Another competitive party that took birth was Manitha Neya Makkal Katchi (MNMK), which is allied with the AIADMK. It grew because of the weakening influence of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), the oldest Muslim party in the state.

Yet another fringe group that gained notoriety was Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP), whose cadres were arrested in Coimbatore in 2006 for plotting serial bomb blasts similar to the 1998 blasts. All five cadres were acquitted in 2008. The MNP has connections with Kerala’s National Democratic Front (NDF), which formed the Popular Front of India (PFI) with MNP and the Karnataka for Dignity (KFD), another such organization, to coordinate its efforts. At present, the fundamentalist parties in Tamil Nadu seem to have more influence with the DMK than the AIADMK. This was evident when the DMK government released nine Al Umma extremists, sentenced to 13 years of jail, before they completed their sentences in September 2009.

There is a need to understand the morphing of the fundamentalist groups into political parties. Though they have denounced terrorism, they tend to focus on the politics of confrontation. Their targets include the US and those responsible for attacks on Muslims, globally. This makes it important for terrorism watchdogs to keep their activities under watch. The other aspect is to curb the foreign connections of these mainstream parties.

Tamil Issue Resurfaces

The plight of Sri Lankan Tamils recently became an issue in Tamil Nadu. This was compounded by the competitive politics among the Dravidian parties, as well as Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s poor post-war handling of issues related to the empowerment and rehabilitation of Tamil population. Rajapaksa’s development model focused on development of infrastructure and public services, without adequate efforts to resolve the core issue of political autonomy for the Tamils. He conducted the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections four years after the war on LTTE ended. And the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) government that came to power was not given a free hand even in exercising its limited powers. The retention of a retired general as the governor of the province has not helped in restoring amity.

So, it is not surprising the LTTE’s offshoot abroad is trying to take advantage to revive its activity in Sri Lanka. There are scores of distressed families of LTTE cadres and sympathisers of Tamil Eelam separatism in the Northern Province. Most of the 13,000 “rehabilitated” LTTE cadres in Sri Lanka are without employment. Army still occupies chunks of private agricultural land despite promises to return them to the rightful owners.

Terror Strikes by LTTE

According to Sri Lankan analyst DBS Jeyaraj, there were three attempts by overseas LTTE elements to trigger activity in Sri Lanka. Significantly, there was a Tamil Nadu connection in all the three attempts.

The first attempt was discovered in March 2102 after investigating the murder of a member of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP, led by Cabinet Minister Douglas Devananda) in Trincomalee district. A handwritten note “death to traitors” with the Tiger emblem was found near his body. Intensive interrogation of suspects uncovered an attempt at the revival of LTTE assisted by the Vinayagam faction of the overseas LTTE.

Thorough interrogations also brought to the fore other revival attempts assisted by the Vinayagam faction of the overseas LTTE. Kumaran of the Vinayagam faction in Paris recruited 15 former LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu and organized them into three cells of five members each. One of these cells was sent to Trincomalee in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka in order to carry out the killing of the EPDP cadre in March 2012.

The second attempt at LTTE’s revival was uncovered in December 2012 when a former LTTE cadre was arrested in Colombo. It led to the startling discovery of “a clandestine campaign” underway in Tamil Nadu to recruit Sri Lankan Tamil youths sympathetic to the Tamil Eelam cause and indoctrinate them with the LTTE ideology.

This was being financed by the overseas LTTE elements. Based on the information provided by Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu police raided a house in Pammal on the outskirts of Chennai and arrested four occupants—S Suresh Kumar, D Udaya Doss, T Maheswaran and K Krishnamurthy— in December 2012. Suresh Kumar headed an LTTE team that made explosives. Police recovered documents, electronic circuit boards and panels from the house.

In March 2014, the Ministry of Defense in Sri Lanka ordered the freezing of all funds, assets and economic resources belonging to 16 Tamil diaspora organizations and 424 select individuals, “believed…. to be committing, attempting to commit, facilitating or participating, in the commission of acts of terrorism.” A Gazette Extraordinary notification, signed by the defense secretary on March 20, 2014, listed them in accordance with the UN Regulations No 1 of 2012.

The latest attempt by LTTE was in March 2014. A former LTTE cadre Ponniah Selvanayagam Kajeepan, aka Gobi, opened fire on a policeman in the Kilinochchi area of Sri Lanka. The security forces carried out a search to hunt him out. In the end, they killed not only Gobi, but two other former LTTE cadres, Suntharalingam Gajatheeban, aka Theiveegan, and Navaratnam Navaneethan, aka Appan.

Further investigations and interrogation of suspects revealed Theiveegan, a former bodyguard of V Prabhakaran, was a black tiger as well as a pilot, who had flown sortiesfor the LTTE. He was in touch with leaders of two LTTE’s rival factions abroad—Nediyavan in Norway and Vinayagam in France. Theiveegan made many trips to India to keep in touch with contacts. Sri Lankan intelligence discovered that Theiveegan had the support of another senior LTTE leader Dayamohan, who had sought refuge in Switzerland.

Fraught with Peril

Sri Lanka is finding it difficult to grapple with Tamil Nadu becoming a base for the LTTE and the support for Tamil separatists among political parties in the state. The DMK and the ruling AIADMK have adopted a strong stand against the Rajapaksa government. Can these parties be weaned from their negative focus if Rajapaksa walks the extra mile to make it happen? With the change in leadership in New Delhi, the Modi regime has its work cut out.

Written on May 27, 2014

Courtesy: India Legal, Vol VII Issue 20,   June 30, 2014                                                                  http://indialegalonline.com/tale-twin-troubles/