To Bangla or not: Let Bengalis have their last word on their fate

To Bangla or not: Let Bengalis have their last word on their fate

It would be prudent for national parties to see its smooth passage, rather than creating a ruckus over a non-issue.

POLITICS | 5-minute read | 31-8-2016

COLONEL R HARIHARAN @colhari2

West Bengal state assembly has passed a resolution to change the name of the state to Bangla, the word locals use to refer to it. It fulfils the ruling Trinamool Congress' promise made in 2011. Drawing a bit of political mileage after both the Congress and the CPI (M) had opposed the change, Ms Mamta Banerjee, the chief minister, said she was inspired by Rabindra Nath Tagore's music.

Well, to be more accurate it was not Rabindra Sangeet -his music - but the poem "Amar sonar Bangla" lauds the land and became the national anthem of the other Bangla - Bangladesh.

Normally, the change of name of a state should be a non-issue to national parties after the state had opted for it. This is not the first time an Indian state has decided to rename itself. Uttaranchal, which was created out of Uttar Pradesh on November 9, 2000, was renamed Uttarakhand on January 1, 2007 to reinforce its identity as a state and not a region. After Telengana was carved out of Andhra Pradesh, the parent state brushed aside suggestions to change its name as "Seema Andhra" and retained its name.

But the change of name can also be a tricky exercise. The Congress party which was ruling the Madras State opposed the popular demand for renaming the state as Tamil Nadu as everyone called it and the party's state unit was known Tamil Nadu Congress. It paid a heavy price and lost the state election after the DMK party used the issue as one more foil to flaunt its Dravidian credentials and love of Tamil; the Congress party has not been able to return to power in the state since then.

If we go by the Tamil Nadu experience, Ms Banerjee may well be correct in saying "the CPI (M) and Congress have made a historic blunder by opposing the change in name". In fact, the CPI (M)'s opposition is rather curious as it had proposed it when it was in power! Is the volte face because the TMC stole the thunder from the party in the name game?

Not only the Congress and the CPI (M) but the state BJP also opposes the change, though cadres and leaders of all political parties use only as Bangla (or Bango in yet another variation). Their rationale for opposing is different. In fact, the state BJP president Dilip Ghosh is said to have asked the Centre not to table the resolution for change of name "as it would erase the memories of Partition."

He has a point because no Bengali can forget the trauma Bengal had suffered twice due to partition of the state – first in 1905, during the British colonial rule and later in 1947, at the time of independence.

Despite sharing the rich cultural heritage of Bengali language and social and cultural history, the western and eastern halves suffered from class, caste and religious differences. The Hindus majority dominated the industrialized western half while the poor, landless Muslim majority lived in the agrarian East. While the Western half supplied the English speaking babus to the British, the riverine culture of east produced seafarers, rice farmers and Hilsa fish that sustains the life of Bengalis everywhere.

The Partition of Bengal in 1947 resulted in the creation of East Pakistan was preceded by the great Calcutta killings of  August 16, 1946 after the Muslim League gave a call for direct action resulting in the loss of about 5000 lives. The violent birth of East Pakistan a year later left a bloody trail of riots and further killings both in the West and East. The demography of both halves changed dramatically due to the tectonic effects of Partition.  Over 25 lakh Hindus fled from the newly created East Pakistan over a period of four years from 1947, reducing Hindus there from a powerful community to a helpless minority, smarting in the aftershocks of Partition to this day.

There was a bit of a political drama before Bengalis were reconciled to partition in 1947. Three months before partition came into effect, Bengal provincial Muslim League leader Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy came up with the idea of not accepting partition of the province but creating an independent Bengal that would join neither India nor Pakistan, as he felt the comparatively less developed Muslim dominated agrarian eastern half would not be economically viable on its own. He managed to muster the support of Sarat Chandra Bose, Netaji Subash Chandra Bose’s brother and a Congress leader in his own right, for his proposal. After detailed discussions to give form to the proposal for unified Bengal, the two leaders signed an agreement and published the plan on May 27, 1947.

Though Suhrawardy could convince Mohammed Ali Jinnah about the validity of his proposal for a unified Bengal and gain his tacit approval, the Muslim League did not fall in line. It negated the League’s the two-nation theory that formed basis for the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. Even within the Bengal provincial Muslim League, the opinion was divided.

The Congress party out rightly rejected the proposal as it suspected Suhrawardy’s intentions. This was not surprising because Suhrawardy’s credibility among the population was eroded as many felt he had planned the August 1946 Calcutta killings. The idea of a unified Bengal did not find much support and died a natural death after Bose developed differences over Suhrawardy’s insistence that there be separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Though the idea of independent Bengal was short-lived, it showed the strength of Bengali nationalism which could overcome Hindu-Muslim antipathy.

The bloody aftermath of Partition subsumed the strength of Bengali identity for nearly two-and-a-half decades. However, East Pakistanis, treated as the poor cousins of the Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan, reasserted their Bengali identity to create Bangladesh in 1971, with India providing the military muscle.

The change of name for West Bengal would come into force only after the parliament approves the resolution for change with two thirds majority. It would be prudent for national parties including the BJP and the Congress party to see its smooth passage in parliament rather than creating a ruckus over non issue.

After all what is in a name? Whether the rest of India accepts it or not, for every Bengali, their state would only be Bangla or Bango. And they would continue to relish the illich machcher jhol (Hilsa fish curry) cooked in distinct East Bengali style with Hilsa smuggled from Bangladesh.

#Mamata Banerjee, #West Bengal, #Bangla

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal DailyO.in

http://www.dailyo.in/politics/bangla-west-bengal-assembly-partition-1947-hilsha-bangladesh/story/1/12669.html

When I heard LTTE forces order Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination

When I heard LTTE forces order Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination

I checked with my Sri Lankan sources who said the then PM would be killed in keeping with Prabhakaran’s style.

POLITICS | Long form | 23-8-2016

COLONEL R HARIHARAN @colhari2

Saturday, August 20th was the late Rajiv Gandhi's birthday. Rajiv Gandhi’s political career was barely seven years; it started with the assassination of his mother Ms Indira Gandhi in 1984 and ended with his own assassination. But within those years, he made a mark by doing things differently from the traditional political class. Had the charismatic leader not become the victim of a LTTE suicide bomber on 21 May 1991, the Congress party's fortunes might have been scripted differently.

Neena Gopal's latest book “The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi” has once again brought the focus on the sordid episode of the nation's failure to protect its former prime minister. I have always found Sri Lanka fascinating particularly after serving as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990.

The author, during the course of writing the book, had long conversations with me on the situation leading up to Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. I have not read the book yet; but I find from the published extracts the book contains some of my recollections.

Rajiv Gandhi served as prime minister from 1984 to 1989; he had no political experience but his exuberance to get things done and impulsiveness and impatience to get results endeared him to the masses. He attempted to end longstanding conflicts facing the country during his term. While some of them like river water sharing in Punjab and ending Bodo insurgency in Assam were partly successful, many other such attempts did not live up to the expectations.

When Rajiv came to power India- Sri Lanka relations were in a mess. Mrs Gandhi had given sanctuary to a motley collection of Tamil separatist insurgent groups who had fled the island nation along with thousands of Tamils in the wake of Sri Lanka's infamous July 1983 pogrom against Tamils. The Tamil insurgent groups became a potential threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. So Sri Lanka had little option but to accept Indian counsel, particularly after talks with Tamil groups failed to yield results. 

Rajiv Gandhi signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 1987 with President JR Jayawardane to ensure Sri Lankan Tamils got a degree of autonomy within a united Sri Lanka, while India underwrote the disarming of Tamil militants. The Accord was hastily conceived and hurriedly executed in typical Rajiv Gandhi style of trying to resolve problems in double time, often defying political wisdom. Though the implementation of the Accord cost Rajiv Gandhi his life, it is an anachronism that both the countries never allowed it to reach its logical conclusion.

Rajiv Gandhi's leadership had done quite well till opposition parties managed to rally together and focus on his alleged involvement in  the Bofors gun purchase scandal; the misconceived Indian army intervention in Sri Lanka only added masala to the allegations of Rajiv's ineptness. Young Gandhi scion's popularity drastically came down, resulting in the Congress party’s defeat in the national elections held in 1989. 

It was a depressing time for men in uniform like me in Sri Lanka from 1988 onwards when opposition parties at home ridiculed the Indian forces while the Congress was put on the defensive. The DMK government had come to power in Tamil Nadu was openly hostile to the IPKF.

It extended hospitality to wounded LTTE cadres in the state, while our soldiers fighting them died un-mourned in foreign soil.

The VP Singh government in New Delhi and President Premadasa were on the same page on the recall of IPKF. It was on 24 March 1990 the last landing craft carrying Indian Peace Keeping Force commander and his operations group left Trincomalee harbour to Chennai.

Thus both the governments saved the LTTE from annihilation as IPKF had already cut it down to size, reducing the overblown self image of Prabhakaran to the realistic proportion of an insurgent leader in hiding in the jungle. He knew he was fighting with his back to the wall; eight batches of LTTE leadership were dead.

Even as IPKF observed a ceasefire, Prabhakaran had secretly made common cause with his sworn enemy Sri Lanka President Ranasinghe Premadasa to do what he couldn't - to evict the IPKF from Sri Lanka. It must have been a humiliating experience for Prabhakaran to break bread with Premadasa. Prabhakaran’s plot to assassinate Rajv Gandhi was probably conceived at that time. Premadasa readily obliged the LTTE leader; he not only issued an ultimatum to India to withdraw the forces from the island but also supplied arms to the LTTE.

During the next couple of months, the IPKF was being disbanded in Chennai and our headquarters was being wound up. The component units and formations moved out. Last of our radio interception units that had regularly shared its output of LTTE transmissions brought me one such intercept.

It was a recording of one of the LTTE networks operating from somewhere in Nilgiris in Tamil Nadu. The contents of the conversation in the peculiar Jaffna Tamil dialect were startling. It ordered the “dumping” of Rajiv Gandhi. While I don’t remember the exact wording, the scene is still embedded in my mind.

Dumping is the term LTTE used for killing. I was familiar with the LTTE dialect used in their communication. In 1987, I had collected the documentation of LTTE kangaroo courts done with Nazi precision ordering “dumping” of 102 people who were shot and dumped in garbage pit for committing crimes like selling drugs, soliciting etc. I called the radio operator who knew Jaffna Tamil very well to confirm the content of the intercept; he was emphatic it was an order to kill Rajiv Gandhi.  I was shocked and immediately informed the IPKF force commander.

He asked me not to “touch it.” He had good reasons because we have no functional headquarters for follow up action. He asked me to hand over the audio cassette to the Intelligence Bureau in Chennai for taking further action. Immediately, I went over to the IB headquarters and met the joint director.  

He was a good friend known to me for over a decade. He listened to the audio and laughed at me. “Colonel, it is all bravado. They are not specifically saying when and where Rajiv should be killed. In any case, I don’t believe they would kill Rajiv. Why would they?” I still remember the conversation because it left me uneasy though I had no answer to his logical reasoning. With a troubled mind, I returned to my office.

I checked with my Sri Lankan Tamil sources who said Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination would be in keeping with Prabhakaran’s style.

Later, when I was in New Delhi in early 1991, I dropped into the North Block office of the same IB officer I had met in Chennai. He was holding a top security appointment. He asked me about my future plans after retirement in March 1991 and offered to assist me in case I needed any help. I again asked him about the Rajiv Gandhi assassination cassette; he simply laughed it off. 

The rest is history; Rajiv Gandhi’s killing came as a shock to me. I was left with a lingering feeling of guilt for not vigorously pursuing the information I had in hand which could have prevented the assassination. When the Special Investigation Team was formed to investigate Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, its chief DR Karthikeyan called me to help out in the investigations. As I had retired, I suggested the names of officers and NCOs who could help him to progress the investigation.

I also informed him about the audio cassette containing assassination threat to Rajiv Gandhi I had handed over to the IB. He told me the Navy also had a similar intercept.

This is one instance where Indian intelligence community as a whole had failed. Now I understand why Americans had failed to read the 9/11 attack although they had bits and pieces of information about it well in advance. Collecting information is one thing; but assessing what it implied is a different ball game.

Napoleon said if you expect the enemy to attack from four directions, he may well do it from the fifth one!

So true!

#Sri Lanka,  #LTTE,  #Rajv Gandhi,

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal DailyO.in

http://www.dailyo.in/politics/rajiv-gandhi-ltte-v-prabhakaran-nalini-sri-lanka-tamils-neena-gopal/story/1/12543.html

Modi’s POK-Balochistan ploy: gambit or game plan?

360^o  Balochistan – Pakistan’s untold story

Modi’s POK-Balochistan ploy: gambit or game plan?

DECCAN CHRONICLE | COL R HARIHARAN 21 August 2016

Though Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech on Independence Day covered a wide range of issues, it was his reference to Pakistan’s human rights aberrations in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (including Gilgit Baltistan) and Balochistan that triggered a lot of speculation about a new Indian narrative on Kashmir.  

No PM before Modi had ever raised the issue of Pakistan’s poor human rights record in POK and Balochistan in their Pakistan discourse. Prime Minister Modi is not given to impulsive pronouncements on foreign policy issues. So why did he surprise everyone by raising Pakistan human rights issues in his Independence Day address?  The easiest answer is that he was using it as a gambit to halt Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from further whipping up anti-Indian sentiments going on ever since Hizbul Mujahideen leader Burhan Wani’s killing triggered widespread protests in the Kashmir Valley.

However, a gambit without a game plane is of little use as its impact would only be transitory. This was evident when Pakistan declared that the Indian Prime Minister had crossed the “Red Line” in his Independence Day address by referring to Pakistan’s internal problem in Balochistan.  

Does that mean Modi is evolving a new game plan on Kashmir? It may well be a work in progress because a few days before the Independence Day, Modi had convened an all party meeting to evolve a consensus on Jammu and Kashmir.  So the PM might simply be sending signal to Nawaz Sharif that India could ‘redouble’ Pakistan’s over-hype on the unrest in the Kashmir valley by drawing attention to Pakistan’s poor human rights record in its own backyard.

How far Modi’s empathy to the people of POK and Balochistan can be taken forward to shape India-Pakistan relationship equation?   The answer to this question is as complex as the three distinct regions – POK (part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control since 1947), Gilgit Baltistan which were part of Maharaja Hari Singh’s kingdom at the time of partition and now known as Northern Areas forming part of Pakistan and Balochistan province bordering Iran with its own cultural and ethnic history spilling over into Iran.

For five decades now, India had virtually written off POK and the Line of Control dividing it with the rest of Jammu and Kashmir has practically the status of an international border. Both POK and Gilgit Baltistan can probably hype-up in the India-Pakistan discourse as a trade off for specific advantage; on the flip side it could prolong any negotiations.

As far as Balochistan is concerned, the sparsely populated province’s struggle for preserving its identity in the national discourse has seen many ups and downs. Pakistan army has ruthlessly used force to suppress the freedom movement and many Baloch leaders in exile have been thrilled by Indian PM’s words of support.

  

The region rich in mineral resources is vital for the Pakistan-China strategic framework as Gwadar port developed with Chinese investment is core element in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor providing land locked Xinjiang province in China access to the Arabian Sea.  Already, Pakistan had been accusing India of supporting Baloch separatists through Afghanistan. Indian prime minister’s vocal support to Baloch freedom movement would further exacerbate Pakistan's concern.  

India has demonstrated in the past its capability to militarily intervene in erstwhile East Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and in Sri Lanka in 1987. So PM Nawaz Sharif simply cannot afford to ignore Modi’s statements on POK and Balochistan. This could impose caution in his actions regarding India in the near term when the public ardour to support Kashmir agitation cools down.  However, the moot question is how much control Nawaz Sharif has over the country’s relations with India?

Initially, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif welcomed Modi’s overtures to build better relations with Pakistan from the day Modi became Prime Minister. In fact, Nawaz Sharif had called his victory in the national elections in April 2014 a mandate for peace with India. He wore the pink Rajasthani turban gifted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at his granddaughter Mehrunnisa Safdar’s wedding. In December 2015, Pakistan media quoted his instructions to ministers and senior officials not to issue any statement that could damage the peace process with India. The same report quoted the outgoing Indian High Commissioner TCA Raghavan saying the relations between the two countries were heading towards betterment.

Six months later, the same leader was asking the people "not to forget those in Kashmir who are sacrificing their lives for their movement for freedom….Their movement for freedom cannot be stopped and it will be successful. You are aware of how they are being beaten and killed. All our prayers are with them and we are waiting for the day Kashmir becomes (part of) Pakistan."

What has changed in between for Nawaz Sharif, a pigeon cooing peace to morph into a predatory hawk spouting anti-Indian slogans?  There are probably both internal and external reasons that have persuaded the Pak prime minister to shelve his ‘peace with India’ agenda and revert to ‘Kashmir first’ formula. First is the army gaining complete control over Pakistan’s India policy. It came after a brief confrontation with the prime minister when it saw its control slipping away after Prime Minister Sharif and Modi started developing personal rapport.  

Second, the Army chief’s strident call for cracking down on corruption after Panama papers showing details of offshore accounts of Sharif’s kin surfaced unnerving the prime minister.  India’s rather confused handling of the Pathankot attack and its aftermath probably strengthened Pak army’s case for continued use of “good terrorists” against India and Afghanistan while hunting “bad terrorists” at home in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Balochistan.  

It would seem the Pak army chief and Sharif are on the same page on India now to build their strategies around Kashmir civil unrest. Otherwise it is difficult to explain ministers and leaders participating in anti-India rallies organized by the 26/11 Mumbai Lashkar attack mastermind and Jamaat ud Dawa leader Hafiz Saeed. He has been given a free hand to organize “Kashmir Caravan” comprising of buses and trucks stretched for several kilometers to move from Lahore to Islamabad to drum up support for Kashmir unrest.

Hafiz Saeed’s “warning” to India to either accept separatist Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s 4-point formula on Kashmir and “withdraw security forces from the Valley, or face the decision in battlefield” has an ominous ring. It raises the uncomfortable question is Pakistan preparing for Operation Badr-2 (Operation Badr being infiltration of jihadi terrorists –who were actually troops- into Kashmir prior to Kargil War)?  Hafiz Saeed’s statement should not be ignored as a rant for gaining cheap publicity. Probably, security and intelligence agencies in New Delhi and Srinagar are already on the lookout for tell-tale signs of Operation Badr-2; Pak intentions would probably become clear in the coming months.

Notwithstanding his recent comments on Pakistan, Prime Minister Modi probably still considers building friendly relations with India’s neighbours including Pakistan as his foreign policy priority. But he has to bring back normalcy in Kashmir Valley if we are to avoid a more complex re-enactment of  Kargil experience. That is the first step before we contemplate further moves on Pakistan. 

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/opinion/op-ed/210816/360-degree-balochistan-paks-untold-story.html

What Bodos’ latest attack in Kokrajhar means

What Bodos’ latest attack in Kokrajhar means

It is easy to attribute the shooting to intelligence failure. But that would be ignoring the complex environment prevailing in Assam

POLITICS | 5-minute read | 06-08-2016

COLONEL R HARIHARAN @colhari2

Two to four Bodo militants travelling in an auto rickshaw opened fire and killed 13 people and left 14 others wounded in the busy Friday market of Kokrajhar in Assam on August 5. Indian Army, paramilitary forces and police are jointly carrying out search operations to apprehend the other militants, who threw a grenade and set fire to shops before fleeing  the scene.

Army jawans present on the spot shot dead one of the militants armed with an AK-47 rifle. Mobile phone recovered from the dead militant showed probably he belonged to the hard line faction - the National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit (NDFB-S), though the organization quickly disowned the attack.  

Songbijit Ingti Kathar, the military chief of the NDFB, broke away to form the NDFB-S in 2012, as he was against holding peace talks with the government mooted by the NDFB leadership. He has expressed his determination to carry on the armed struggle for the creation of independent Bodoland in an interview in 2013.

In all likelihood, Songbijit is sending a strong message with the latest attack in Kokrajhar that he might be down but not out, as the group had been on a low profile since 2015. However, NDFB-S should not be ignored as it is known to have connections across the border with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) faction and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) holed up in Myanmar.  The other two factions – NDFB (Ranjan Daimary) and NDFB (Pro-talks) are observing ceasefire pending peace talks with the government.

The NDFB is one of the three proscribed insurgent groups in Assam; it had carried out sporadic attacks in the region along the north bank of Brahmaputra for the creation of an independent Bodoland. During its peak period of militancy between 1992 and 2001, the NDFB violence had resulted in the death of over 172 security forces and over 1200 civilians, while NDFB lost 370 cadres.

The Songbijit faction is the only carrying out insurgency now.

Doubts have been expressed about the involvement of NDFB-S because the attack was carried out brazenly in the style of jihadi militants.  Moreover, NDFB-S in the past had targeted only Muslims and Adivasis whereas those killed in Kokrajhar attack included six Bodos. But that would under estimating the possibility of Songbijit changing his tactics.

The NDFB-S is capable of vicious killings; it responsible for killing about 100 people in a series of attacks carried out in the same region in May and December 2014. In the May 2014 attacks alone it had killed 32 Muslims who had been its main target. 

It is easy to attribute the latest attack to intelligence failure. But that would be ignoring the complex environment prevailing in Assam as a result of over five decades of insurgency. The state has seen the rise of nearly 60 militant groups in this period; out of this seven are active at present. Thirteen groups are either observing ceasefire or involved in peace talks, while 36 other outfits have become inactive.

Kokrajhar is in the heartland of Bodo tribals who number around a million.  The headquarters of the Bodo Territorial Area Districts (BTAD), an autonomous administrative unit of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), created under the sixth schedule of the constitution, is located there. It was created in December 2003 after the state and central governments signed the Bodoland Accord with the biggest Bodo insurgent group –the Bodoland Liberation Tigers (BLT) in February 2003.  

The BTAD covers the districts of Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri with a population of over three million people. It was created to fulfill the aspirations of Bodo tribals inhabiting the neglected region to preserve their land rights and linguistic, socio-cultural and ethnic identity as well as to economically develop the region. 

However, the creation of BTC did not satisfy the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and Bodo Peoples Action Council (BPAC) which had led a violent struggle for the creation of an independent Bodoland from March 1987 onwards. However, the creation of the BTC politically divided the Bodo community. The NDFB was a product of these divisions within the community.

The problems of the region are far from over although the BTAD’s chief administrator Hagrama Mohilary was the head of the BLT militant group in the past. It had not been able to bring about the expected development in the region. The infrastructure development has not kept pace with the requirement of the difficult terrain crisscrossed by tributaries flowing into Brahmaputra.

The region has also seen the backlash against Bodo domination from other minority communities, particularly Muslims and Adivasis inhabiting the region. Muslims and Adivasis had raised their own militant groups to fight the Bodo militants; now they are observing ceasefire. This has enabled militant groups like the NDFB-S to survive and carryout sporadic violent activities.

It will be facetious to ignore the lingering insurgency problem in Assam. Unfortunately, despite all the lip service, the Northeast continues to be neglected and languishes on the periphery of the national mainstream. But things are changing now as many leaders with  militancy background  have joined mainstream politics in Assam. For instance, Naba Kumar Sarania, the independent MP elected from Kokrajhar, was a dreaded leader of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).

Unfortunately, we seem to forget that insurgency in the Northeast is a challenge not only to the state and central governments but also the people of India as it is a vanguard to strategic security and remains our tenuous land link to Southeast Asia.

#Bodos,  #Assam,  #Kokrajhar attack

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal DailyO                                               http://www.dailyo.in/politics/kokrajhar-terror-ndfb-bodos-ulfa-assam-bjp-insurgency/story/1/12215.html

A Bird’s eye view of Modi’s foreign policy (Tamil)

சொன்னதும் செய்ததும் – வெற்றிக்கான வாய்ப்பு

கர்னல் ஆர் ஹரிஹரன்

மேற்கத்தியப் பார்வையில் நமது நாட்டின் வெளியுறவுக்  கொள்கையைப் பார்க்கும் பெரும்பாலான அறிவு ஜீவிகளுக்கு நரேந்திர மோடியின் அணுகுமுறை கசக்கிறது.. இதற்கு மோடியின் இந்துத்துவ மற்றும் ஆர்.. எஸ். எஸ் பின்னணி, ஒரு முக்கிய காரணமாகும். அவர்கள் பார்வையில் ஆங்கிலக் கல்வியோ, குடும்ப-அரசியல் பலமோ அல்லது டெல்லியில் மத்திய அரசின் நெளிவு சுளிவுகளில் அனுபவமோ இல்லாத மோடிக்கு இந்தியாவின் பிரதமராகும்  தகுதி கிடையாது.

ஆனால் நடுநிலையான, இந்துத்துவ பின்னணி இல்லாத, என்னைப் போன்றவன் கணிப்பில் பிரதமர் மோடியின் வெளியுறவு சாதனைகள் மிகவும் பாராட்டத் தக்கவை. கடந்த 24 மாதங்களில் அவர் வெளியுறவில் நிகழ்த்திய சாதனைகள் எல்லாம் முழுமையாக வெற்றி அடையவில்லை; ஆனால் அவற்றுக்குக்கூட வெற்றிக்கான வாய்ப்புக்கள் அதிகமாகி உள்ளன.  

இந்தியா சுதந்திரம் அடைந்திருந்ததிலிருந்து பின்பற்றி வந்த வெளியுறவுக் கொள்கையின் அடிப்படையிலேயே மோடி செயல் பட்டாலும், அவர் அதற்கு அளித்த உருவகமும், உந்ததுலும், செயலாக்க முனைப்புக்களும், உலகில் பல  நாடுகளைக் கவர்ந்திருக்கின்றன. அவற்றில் இந்தியாவில் இதுவரை அதிக அளவில் அக்கறை காட்டாத சில நாடுகளும் அடங்கும்.

அத்தகைய நாடுகள் மோடியின் இந்துத்துவ மற்றும் ஆர். எஸ். எஸ் பின்னணியைக் கண்டு கொள்ளாமல் இந்தியாவுடனான உறவை ஏன் வலுப்படுத்த முயல்கிறார்கள்? அதற்கு, மோடியின் “சப்கே சாத், சப்கா விகாஸ்’ (எல்லோருடனும் சேர்ந்து எல்லோருக்கும் வளர்ச்சி) என்ற அடிப்படை வெளியுறவுக் கொள்கையே காரணம்.

இதற்கு இஸ்லாமிய நாடான சௌதி அரேபியா ஒரு முன்னுதாரணமாகும். பாகிஸ்தானுடன் நெருங்கிய பாதுகாப்பு மற்றும் பொருளாதார உறவைக் கொண்ட சவுதி அரேபியாவுக்கு முதல் முறையாக பிரதமர் மோடி பயணம் மேற் கொண்ட போதே அந்த நாட்டின் அரசர் மோடிக்கு “கிங் அப்துல் அஜீஸ் சாஷ்” என்ற நாட்டின் மிக உயர்ந்த பட்டயத்தை அளித்து கௌரவித்தார்.

அடிப்படையில், மோடி இந்தியாவின் வெளியுறவுக் கொள்கை இரண்டு கோணங்களில்  இயங்குகிறது. முதலாவது தெற்காசியாவில் அண்டை நாடுகளுடனான உறவை வலிமைப் படுத்தி, தென்கிழக்கு ஆசிய நாடுகளுடன் உள்ள உறவை வலிமைப் படுத்துவது. ஆனால் பாகிஸ்தானுடனான உறவில், மோடியின் ‘உறவுக் கர’ முயற்சிகள் இதுவரை பலிக்கவில்லை. அது போல நோபாளத்துடனான உறவில் தேக்க நிலை ஏற்பட்டிருக்கிறது.

இரண்டாவது கோணம் உலகின் வலிமை வாய்ந்த சீனா உள்ளடங்கிய பி-5 நாடுகளுடன் நல்லுறவை வலுப்படுத்தி, தொழில் வளர்ச்சி, மற்றும் பாதுகாப்பை அதிகப்படுத்துவது. முக்கியமாக அமெரிக்க அதிபர் பராக் ஒபாமாவுடன் மோடியின் நட்பு தனிப்பட்ட முறையில் வளரவே, இரு நாடுகளுக்கிடையே பல ஆண்டுகளாகத் தேக்கத்தில் கிடந்த அணு சக்தி உபயோக மற்றும் பாதுகாப்பு ஒத்துழைப்பு உறவுகள் பெருமளவில் முன்னேற்றம் கண்டிருக்கின்றன.. சீனாவுடன் பல ஆண்டுகளான எல்லைப் பிரச்சினைகளில் மாற்றம் இல்லை என்றாலும், பொருளாதார உறவுகள் மேலும் பலமடைய வாயப்புகள் அதிகரித்திருக்கின்றன.   

பதிவு; அந்திமழை மாத இதழ், ஆகஸ்டு 2016 www.andhimazhai.com

Sri Lanka Perspectives: July 2016

Col R Hariharan

Rajapaksa’s “Long March”

In a bid to deprive the support base of President Maithripala Siriisena within the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and to rally his supporters former President Mahinda Rajapaksa was leading a Pada Yatra from Kandi to Colombo from July 28 scheduled to end on August 1.  The 117 km walk vended its way despite various efforts to obstruct its progress.

The United National Party (UNP) partner of SLFP in the ruling coalition caused some anxious moments to the organizers of the Pada Yatroa in their passage through the strongholds of two UNP ministers. The Colombo Hyde Park venue for a meeting at the end of the march has also raised some questions.​

Though President Sirisena did not directly criticise the Pada Yatra, in a veiled attack on Rajapaksa, he said “If the former leaders had performed their duties and governed properly, there would not be a need for them to undertake long marches for political purposes, hurting their feet.” However, the President made his mind clear at a meeting of SLFP members. H warned that those found working against the party would be removed from the SLFP; despite this 40 members of the joint opposition are reported to have joined Rajapaksa’s long march indicating the divisions within the SLFP.

Banners carried in the long march sported slogans such as "Stop the political witch hunt", "Don’t arrest soldiers", "Hold the postponed LG elections", "No foreign war crimes courts", "Stop removal of subsidies for people" and "Ninety two ministers; What’s is the difference." These reflect Rajapaksa’s points of criticism of Sirisena government aimed at whipping up nationalist sentiments and take a dig at the lack of progress in Sirisena’s electoral promises.

Jaffna University students clash

A clash between a group of Tamil and Sinhalese undergraduate students studying at the University of Jaffna’s Science Faculty on July 16 resulting in injuries to four Sinhalese studentsm, including one seriously injured, has highlighted the continuing ethnic divide between the two communities though the Eelam War ended seven years ago.

The Jaffna University had been admitting Sinhalese students since 2011. Well known columnist DBS Jeyaraj to say a quarter of the Jaffna Univesity’s undergraduate population of 6590 were Sinalese predominantly in the science faculty. Generally, their relationship with the faculty and Tamil students had been cordial though lack of knowledge of each others’ language and limited proficiency in English restricted their mingling.  However, Sinhalese students had minor grievances like non availability of campus accommodation and understanding circulars which were only in Tamil.

Though there had been mixed cultural events in the past, where Sinhala and Tamil students had participated together, this year the Freshers welcome event organized had been the source of friction. Unlike the previous years when the Kandyan dancers were allowed to perform indoor, this year Sinhalese students requested that they be allowed to join the welcome procession along with Tamil drummers. This was not acceptable to Tamil students and the faculty decided to continue with the old format. This resulted in clashes between factions of Sinhalese and Tamil students. The Dean quickly intervened and sent the Sinhalese students to their homes.

The government has sensibly tried to play down the incident.  However, it is to the credit of President Sirisena not to shy away from discussing the issue. While inaugurating a training institute in Kilinochchi, he referred to the student clash at Jaffna University and said “reconciliation should be included in the school curriculum as a subject. All our educational institutions should be reformed to prevent recurrence of an incident such as that which occurred in Jaffna.”

He also told the Sinhala Buddhist community that they would be able to “live happily only after solving the issue pertaining to the issues pertaining to other communities in the country and first step in this regard is to acknowledge that the people in the North have a problem to solve.”

Political parties, particularly the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) have generally not allowed political polemics to overtake the need for maintaining harmonious relations between the two communities. The University authorities have already appointed a committee to inquire into the incident and the Higher Education Minister Lakshman Kiriella has promised to punish those guilty.  Northern Province chief minister CV Wigneswaran has suggested appointing a commission to inquire into the incident lest it creates further disharmony.

However, inevitably the event has drawn attention to bitter feelings still simmering in the two communities due their factitious relationship in the past. Tamil grievances over continued military occupation of their land, signs of Sinhala Buddhist cultural “invasion” and Tamils own sordid experience of ethnic abuse and discrimination at the hands of Sinhalas. Mischief mongers already seem to be at work as provocative posters in Sinhala have appeared social media though Sinhalese students have disowned them. In the past, Jaffna University students have shown strong pro-LTTE sentiments and parties toeing the Eelam line still enjoy strong following.

It is high time shows both communities and the government redouble their efforts at the social and political level to rebuild bridges between the two communities lest chauvinists on both sides exploit the event to further damage the situation. The incident sows, the Sirisena government efforts at ethnic reconciliation is still a work in progress despite claims of success.

Written on July 31, 2016

 [Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force from 1987 to 90. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com   Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ] 

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, August 2016 issue   www.security-risks.com

http://col.hariharan.info/2016/08/sri-lanka-perspectives-july-2016.html