Caste, an Unsavoury Reality

This is an issue, which often hit the headlines as we saw in the Justice Karnan episode. Is there a better way to handle caste matters, other than aggravating them?

Col R Hariharan  

The unsavoury episode of Justice CS Karnan has left a many red faces, not only in the Supreme Court, but among all of us, including the “enlightened” citizens. From the popular perspective, repeatedly reinforced by the media, there is absolutely no justification for his unconscionable behaviour.  Of course, it was an aberration waiting to happen, because of the systemic flaws in the Collegium system to the higher judiciary. It has been done without applying the limited systemic checks before his appointment.

Thanks to Justice Karnan, the selection system’s soft underbelly has been exposed. But as a nation that loves to endlessly debate every issue, without quickly acting, we can expect no radical change in the system after the Karnan episode.  As the Supreme Court is inclined to defend its turf, probably some cosmetic changes would be made in the system. It may sound cynical, but that is way we handle problems, following the Middle Path (with no offense to Gautama Buddha), rather than bite the bullet to take hard decisions.

But, this article is not a legal critique of Justice Karnan’s judicial misconduct. This is also not an apology for the theatrics that accompanied the misconduct. It is to take a closer look at the national issues it signals. 

COURSE CORRECTION

For too long, we have ignored such misconduct from those occupying high offices, both in bureaucracy and politics. They usually belonged to powerful non-dalit segments that call the shots and we invaribaly chose to ignore them for that reason. But Justice Karnan suffers the double whammy of  being a Dalit, holding a high office. That is one reason for the high decibel outrage.

Karnan's caste muddies the waters in making a dispassionate analysis of his misdemeanour, because the nation is dominated by the upper and middle castes. Our founding fathers, driven by social consciousness, introduced reservations for Dalits and tribals, who were traditionally marginalised from the national mainstream. When lawmakers made the transient arrangement a permanent feature of the constitution, they perpetuated the caste differences further.  'Mandalisation' was a part of it and strengthened caste stratification. Now, more castes are vying to be classified as more backward than others, in a nation that is trying to move forward.  We have been living with the anachronism of caste identity, rather than competency, becoming the lifeline.

It is immaterial whether we consider caste reservation right or wrong. Already for two generations caste identity has become a huge source of power. It is here to stay, be it politics, governance, education or employment.  

Caste plays a key role in shaping not only political perceptions, but also our social discourse. It is obvious in matrimonial columns, where caste takes priority over racism, seen in our preference for fair skin. Less obviously, it permeates our private conduct as well, thanks to the social conditioning we receive from childhood.

We would be living in cuckoo land, if we believe we can amend the constitution to abolish caste reservations. The constitution did not invent castes; it only gave it a statutory recognition. Caste panchayats had been there from times immemorial. Castes were based on hereditary occupations, somewhat like the trade guilds that flourished in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. These panchayats became the dispensers of both social justice and social security. They provided the muscle in caste confrontations as also led the palaver to resolve such confrontations. The reservation policy has queered this system, because caste based occupations have given way to knowledge-based ones. 

Dalits and marginalised communities have taken advantage of it to climb up the social ladder. Though occupations have changed, the system based on caste identity has not vanished. In fact, they have been reinforced by political parties that pander to divisive identities of caste. Almost all political parties have separate cells for dealing with various castes. In urban areas, political parties or their factions are operating the morphed version of caste panchayats.

TN CASE

In my state of Tamil Nadu, caste reservations were institutionalised two decades before Independence. The government of  Madras presidency (which included the whole of Tamil Nadu state)  led by chief minister Dr P Subbarayan (father of Communist leader-turned  Congress minister Mohan Kumaramangalam) implemented caste based reservations in 1927. Actually, it was implementing an earlier Government Order (G.O.No. 613) of 1921 that introduced caste based reservations. The government's implementation order G.O. Ms. No.102 of 1927 introduced reservations for Dalits, Christians and Muslims; it also reduced reservations for Brahmins from 22 percent to 18 percent and for other castes from 48 percent to 42 percent.

I remember when the order was abolished in my state after independence, my non-Brahmin classmates observed a day of protest, boycotting classes and shouting slogans against the Congress party and Brahmins, a minuscule minority hogging government jobs till then. Since then, for three generations, Tamil Nadu has practised institutionalised caste reservations with mixed results. Educated Dalits have clawed their way into politics and find a place in occupations that were the preserve of other castes.

That is how many Dalits from the state are now in state and central government jobs in high echelons. This is has been resented by backward classes, who have also benefitted from the system. Political turf wars based on caste equations have become essential part of coalition forming. However, it translates into virulent caste conflicts when politics fails to provide answers to social confrontations.

However, much of the change is more symbolic than substance. In the 60s, my small town in Tamil Nadu, the streets were named after the caste of the people who lived there.  And nobody made a big noise about it. Now, I find the same streets are named after national or state political leaders. Their traditional caste tags have been dropped, often resulting in ridiculous distortion of names; for instance, TT Krishnamachari Salai (road) in Chennai has become TT Krishnama Salai. The state’s avowed desire to help Dalits (called Adi Dravidas in the state) has given rise to Adi Dravida hostels, which are really ghettos built exclusively for Dalit students. It presents a cameo of the state's skewed approach to transform well meaning ideas into actions, skewed by ingrained caste prejudices.

Perhaps, a study of the impact of 80-years of caste based reservations in Tamil Nadu could provide useful pointers to handle unsavoury fall out of perpetuating reservations. It is possible such a study has already been carried out. If so, it is time to dust it up and take some remedial actions.

But the moot point is, are there any takers for improving the way we handle caste issues, apart from shouting slogans and expecting politicians to use their jugaad to handle critical issues? I have my doubts.

Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, has rich experience in terrorism and insurgency operations. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute.

Courtesy: India Legal | May 29, 2017 |  
http://www.indialegallive.com/opinion/caste-unsavoury-reality-25964

Did India make a mistake by skipping OBOR summit? 3 key questions answered

The Pakistani army will benefit immensely from the strategic alliance with the Chinese.

POLITICS | 5-minute read | 18-5-2017

COLONEL  R HARIHARAN @colhari2

1. Was Belt and Road Forum (BRF) summit an overall success?

Yes; from the Chinese point of view, BRF summit was a success because most of the key nations through which the Belt and Road projects pass through, barring India, attended the summit at the highest level. Thus the summit added substance to China’s bid to create a new world order across Asia.

But the EUrepresentatives (including those from Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain) struck a jarring note by rejecting a Chinese text related to trade prepared at the summit.

According to media reports, EU representatives explained that for Europe the BR initiative would only succeed, if it was based on transparency and co-ownership.

The EU representative had also raised the issue of profitability of the project which remains a big question mark. This, in a way, vindicated India’s perceptions on the BR initiative.

Internally, the successful conclusion of BRF has given Xi's image a big boost making him “the master of all he surveys” as the cliche goes. This would further strengthen his control over the three echelons of power: the CPC, the government and PLA. But his acid test will be to successfully carry forward the project and deliver on his promises on OBOR to the people. This may not be an easy task, given the complexities of the BR initiative and the imponderables on its gruelling course.

2. Was India's decision to boycott correct?

Understandably, opinions are divided in the country on the Modi government’s decision to boycott. This is evident from editorials in national dailies, which are equally divided on the issue. There are merits and demerits in the decision taken by India.

The boycott is in keeping with the government’s policy decision, which was crystallised after China chose to ignore India's repeated expressions of concern about the CPEC's violation of Indian sovereignty in illegally occupied Indian territory in Kashmir.

Our foreign secretary has explained India’s deep concerns explicitly  to the Chinese counterparts on a number of occasions.

On the negative side, by boycotting the BRF, Prime Minister Modi lost a very good opportunity to put across the Indian perspectives and reservations on the OBOR and the CPEC at the forum attended by heads of state and high dignitaries from 29 countries.

I presume, the government took an informed decision to boycott the summit, considering the pros and cons in entirety. I also expect the government to have worked out a post-boycott action strategy. We will have to wait and see the developments in this regard in the coming weeks.

3. Has the BRF given a boost to Pakistan?

Yes. The Chinese gave place of prominence to Pakistan in the summit and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was basking in its glory. It has come at the right time for him, when his political fortunes at home have gone south rapidly.

He had been plagued by uncertainties about his future on two counts: uneasy relations with the army, which is a power centre outside the constitution in Pakistan.

The other is the judicial probe into the off shore accounts of his sons, details of which were leaked out in the Panama papers. It continues to haunt him.

Considering this, the BRF probably acted as a shot in the arm for him as his body language and broad smile in the visuals of the forum indicate.  

But on his triumphal return home, Nawaz Sharif  will be facing flak from opposition and the media, which have been critical of the lack of transparency in the CPEC project. This has gathered more mass, particularly after the Karachi newspaper Dawn published two CPEC project documents for the first time.

These indicate the great game the Chinese are playing in Pakistan. I am not sure how Pakistan intelligentsia and politicians will react to China planning to call the shots in all walks of life in Pakistan in the next decade plus, as visualised in the project papers.

Overall, we can expect the Pak PM to be fully occupied with damage control measures to salvage his reputation already in tatters.

Pakistan Army will be very happy with the BRF outcome, as it has been unflinching supporter of the CPEC.

As China’s powerful ally in Pakistan, army will immensely  benefit from the strategic alliance with the  Chinese, not only on the military front, but also in internal power play as well. It is likely to increase as the CPEC  matures further in the coming days.

Beefing up of infrastructure visualised under the project would add to rapid maneuverability of Pakistan’s armed forces in the coming years particularly along its western borders along Iran and Afghanistan .

Of course, along our western borders, improved communication networks to be executed under the project could add form and content to Pak army’s muscle-flexing in tandem with its Chinese allies.

So we can expect increased belligerence from the army hiking up its provocative activities through jihadi proxies in the valley to tie up our forces in fighting rearguard actions. This would add depth to safely execute the CPEC project in POK in areas close to the border.

It should also be matter of concern for our national security planners as the days may not be far off when Pakistan army carries out joint exercise with PLA close to our western borders.

So the moot question is: are the Indian armed forces ready to face  an increasingly belligerent Pakistan army, particularly, egged on by China’s elbow strength? This question is likely to increasingly figure in the nation’s security ouija board in the coming months and years.  

#India-Pakistan ties,  #China,   #CPEC,  #OBOR

The writer is a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia with rich experience in terrorism and insurgency operations.

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal www.dailyo.in http://www.dailyo.in/politics/obor-cpec-china-india-pakistan-ties/story/1/17261.html

Sri Lanka Perspectives -April 2017

Colonel R Hariharan   | 30-04-2017 |                                                                               

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, May 2017 issue | www.security-risks.com 

Reading  the Sri Lanka-India  MoU

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s visit to New Delhi from April 25 to 29, 2017 and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) the two countries signed hogged the limelight of events during the month. Though foreign affairs analyst and unabashed Rajapakshaphile Dr Dayan Jayatilleka, given to hyperbole, called it “Ranil’s worst betrayal: Giving Trincomalee to India” even before the visit, there is a broader context both for the visit and the MoU. 

As India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson described, it was a “working visit” to strengthen close relations existing between the two countries. For Sri Lanka, it meant not only India showing its readiness to under write development projects, but also its affirmation of the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe’s course corrections to the relations. For India, it was a show of solidarity with Sri Lanka, particularly when it was negotiating with the Chinese for better concessional terms on Hambantota port and Colombo reclamation projects.

Of course, there is an even larger international context of Indian Ocean Region (IOR) security. Both India and the US have been increasingly concerned about the security of  IOR after China started asserting its increasing naval muscle in the region. With China gaining a firm foothold in Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure in Colombo port and Hambantota port under its control, it has become essential for India to periodically to share its mutual security concerns with Sri Lanka, which has close bonds with India.  This has become imperative as the IOR is likely to be the scene of increasingly muscular assertion among naval powers, particularly China.

The MoU is open ended except for deadlines preparatory to the finalization of projects.  As the Indian MEA spokesman said it provides a vision that would need further discussion, when more inputs became available. He saw it as part of India’s desire to promote its “external environment and naturally to neighbourhood first.”

According to the copy of the MoU carried in the Sunday Times, Colombo, its focus is mainly on promoting projects in energy, infrastructure connectivity and port development sectors with Indian assistance and investment in Colombo and Trincomalee areas as well as road segments mostly in Northern Province.  Thus India would be substantially contributing to the development of industries and infrastructure links in the North and East , which could help the regions integration with the rest of Sri Lanka. 

The projects include a re-gasified liquid natural gas (LNG) fired 500 MW power plant;  an LNG terminal/floating storage re-gasification unit in Kerawalapitiya near Colombo;  50 MW solar power plant at Sampur;  joint development of upper tank farm in Trincomalee, port, petroleum refinery and other industries in Trincomalee; industrial and special economic zones at locations to be identified; development of Mannar-Jaffna, Mannar-Trincomalee and Dambulla-Trincomalee expressways with Indian investment; up gradation and purchase of railway rolling stock; container terminal at Colombo port as a joint venture and agricultural sector and livestock development.

The MoU shows a number of features efforts of  both India and Sri Lanka to improve their project planning on a few counts. Time-bound schedule for projects is an interesting feature to avoid time-delay that had been the bane Indian-aided projects in Sri Lanka. The power generation projects are environment friendly, based on LNG and solar power; perhaps the cancelling of 500MW coal fired power plant to be built by India at Sampur, after advanced project planning, on environmental grounds induced the decision.

Another significant feature is India and Japan joining hands to build a floating LNG terminal, a 500MW power plant based on LNG and a gas distribution pipeline at Kerwalpitiya.  This would indicate the close bonds developing between India and Japan, furthering their strategic convergence in the IOR. It also has the potential for further cooperation and coordination between India and Japan in projects in Sri Lanka.

The MoU is yet another step in building bonds between the two countries beyond India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) , which came in force in 2000. Both the countries have been discussing a comprehensive Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) for some time now. Sri Lanka chambers of commerce have welcomed the idea.  However, the subject has become politically sensitive as Sri Lankan professionals fear ETCA would ultimately enable India to export services personnel to Sri Lanka, though its objective is not to open up Sri Lanka to Indian services personnel.  In view of this, India has shown no hurry in pushing it. Perhaps India would like to wait and watch the final shape of the China-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA), which has been on the anvil for some time.  The MoU has shown the contours of areas in which India can build economic bonds as and when the ETCA is finalized.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to visit Colombo and Kandy to attend United Nations Day of Vesak in Sri Lanka. The three-day celebration will begin on May 12 at Colombo and closing ceremony will be held in Kandy. However, as of now the Indian prime minister’s visit will be strictly to attend the religious function. Other foreign dignitaries attending the celebration include Nepali President Ms Bidya Devi Bhandari.

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com