India-China strategic equation along eastern approaches
Col R Hariharan VSM
[This is the text of a presentation made at an international conference on "India, China and the Silk Road Initiatives: Challenges and Opportunities" organised jointly by the Institute for Contemporary Chinese Studies (ICCS) and the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam on 11-12 November 2016.]
“Connectivity itself has emerged as a
theatre of present day geopolitics. When diplomats get agitated about lines on
the map today, they are more likely to be discussing proposed road connections,
rail lines, oil pipelines or maritime routes than contesting national
boundaries. Who draws these lines; who agrees with them; what are the financial
institutions to convert them into reality; what would be the modes of managing and
implementing them once built – all these questions carry geopolitical
significance. Naturally, every country tends to look at these questions from
the view point of its own best interests. Connecting Asia successfully requires
the judiciousness and wisdom to reconcile these differing points of view and
agree on something that all stakeholders can live with.” - S Jaishankar, Foreign
Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, New
Delhi. 2 March 2016
In order to realise China’s soaring
ambition to be a global power in keeping with its worldwide political and
strategic influence, President Xi Jinping embarked
upon the transcontinental One Belt One Road economic
initiative (OBOR) in 2013.[i]
In fact, the OBOR is a revival of China’s
ancient Silk Route network of trade routes from China to Europe and it forms
part of President Xi’s realisation of the ‘Chinese dream’.[ii]
The OBOR includes six
initiatives: China–Russia–Mongolia Economic Corridor, New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic Corridor (BCIM)
and China–Indo China Peninsula Economic Corridor. In tandem with the land based
connectivity, China is also promoting the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road (MSR) to improve China’s Indian Ocean connectivity through by creating
maritime infrastructure and facilities along the littorals of the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR). Collectively,
all the six OBOR strategic initiatives and the MSR are referred to as the
‘Belt and Road’ initiative. The Belt and Road initiative visualises the construction of
multimodal infrastructure links and energy and industrial complexes to promote
economic interconnectivity between China and Asia, Europe and IOR.[iii]
There are strategic
concerns about the OBOR as its vision statement speaks of ‘promoting orderly
and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources,
deep integration of markets’ and encouraging economic policy coordination among
countries ‘to jointly create a balanced regional economic cooperation
architecture and to seek new models of international cooperation and global
governance.’ [iv] This reinforces
the perception of India, shared by the U.S. and its Western and Asian allies, that
the OBOR is part of President Xi Jinping’s strategic plan to create a new world
order. This has caused concern about China’s strategic intentions as the OBOR’s
six economic corridors would become the vehicles for China’s global dominance.[v]
As China’s global
footprint expands with the development of the OBOR, the PLA is being modernised to
improve its capability to take care of increasing China’s strategic interests.
The PLA has recruited better
educated soldiers and officers to manage technology systems to suit the modern
informatised battlefields.[vi]
The U.S. Department of Defense 2016 Annual Report to the
Congress has noted that China’s military modernization program has
become ‘more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of
missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane
security, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief (HA/DR).’ [vii] The
Report further states that efforts were on to improve PLA’s key capabilities
including cruise missiles; short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles; high performance aircraft; integrated air defense networks;
information operations capabilities; and amphibious and airborne assault units.
China is also improving its maritime
reach and capability through the MSR initiative. It has constructed a chain of modern port
complexes in Kyaukpyu (in Myanmar), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Gwadar (Pakistan)
in the Indian Ocean. PLA navy’s warships including nuclear submarines are now familiar
with the IOR as they have been regularly patrolling the Indian Ocean waters for
some years as part of anti-piracy duties.
China’s maritime ambition is
extending well beyond Asia as evident from plans to establish a naval base in
Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, announced in November 2012.[viii]
Similarly, China has also been negotiating with Portugal for taking over a US
air base in the Azores archipelago in Portugal, a year after the US decided to vacate it.[ix]
As US Republican chairman of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence
Devin Nunes commenting on China spreading its infrastructure investments around
the globe said, ‘It is now using the same tactics to establish a foothold in
the Azores which, if successful, will be used for a logistics and intelligence
hub that could ultimately be expanded for other military purposes, adjacent to
critical US military facilities.’ [x]
These facilities would be able to sustain the PLA operations far from home
shores. Thus OBOR network has the potential to be a game changer in tilting global
strategic equations in China’s favour in the coming decade.
Part II: Strategic implications of the OBOR initiatives in South Asia
South Asia occupies an
important place in China’s global power projection for both strategic and
economic reasons because five South Asian countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Nepal and Bhutan – border China’s restive Xinjiang and Tibet autonomous
regions. South Asia also dominates the Indian Ocean through which China’s
maritime traffic passes. This makes the
CPEC, the BCIM and the MSR initiatives, forming part of the OBOR in South Asia,
vital to the success of the OBOR as a whole. The South Asian region also provides
China’s landlocked western regions direct access to the warm water ports of
Indian Ocean. South Asia, with its growing middle class population and under
developed infrastructure and manufacturing sectors, offers excellent prospects
for Chinese investment and trade. The World Bank in an April 2016 report has rated
South Asia as “the fastest growing region in the world, with economic growth
expected to gradually accelerate from 7.1 percent in 2016 to 7.3 percent in
2017” showing resilience in the face of turbulent international markets.[xi] India
with of a population of 1.27 billion (of the total regional population of 1.7
billion) wields enormous strategic, economic, cultural and religious influence
in South Asia. More than all this, China probably sees India as a challenger to
its ‘vision to write the next era of globalization and help its export
and investment engines run for years to come.’[xii] The
CPEC, BCIM and the MSR initiatives with their networks in South Asian countries
would help China in strategically and commercially handle India’s overwhelming
presence in the region.
Like most
of the countries in Central and West Asia, which are starved of investments,
South Asian countries also see the OBOR projects as an attractive proposition to
facilitate the flow of Chinese investments. They expect Chinese investments to
speed up development projects in backward regions and improve employment
opportunities, while better international connectivity would increase their
international trade prospects. Pakistan as a participant and Afghanistan as a beneficiary have already
joined of the CPEC. Nepal has also indicated its willingness to join the OBOR
as the Chinese have undertaken projects to improve Nepal’s road connectivity
with Tibet. China wants India to join the OBOR, because as the biggest regional power and a rising global economic power
India’s participation would improve China’s credibility in the region. It would
also contribute to the economic viability of not only the CPEC and BCIM but the
OBOR as a whole. More than all this, it
would help China build multifaceted relations with India and reduce the chances
of India “ganging up” with the U.S. and Japan against China.
India had been rather
lukewarm to the idea of participating in the OBOR initiative. India sees the OBOR as having serious
implications for its national security, which had been hostage to China’s territorial claims
along India’s northern borders since 1960s. China does
not recognise the validity of the Mc Mahon line as the international boundary
between India and China (Tibet region). China has continued to illegally occupy
of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin in Ladakh region. China also claims other pockets of Indian
territory along the Himalayan border as also the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as
Southern Tibet. In spite of this, from
1996 onwards both the countries have made efforts to rebuild their relations
fractured after 1962 war. Although the two countries had held 19 rounds of
talks to resolve the border dispute, only limited progress has been made. So
far, only agreements on border management to avoid accidental escalation of
conflict and maintenance of status quo in respect of areas of existing settlements
in the disputed areas have been arrived at.[xiii]
Another factor
clouding India’s relations is China’s suspicion about the continued hospitality
extended to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader and about 100,000
Tibetan refugees, living in exile in India for nearly six decades. China has
branded the Nobel Laureate for Peace as a ‘dangerous separatist’ because he remains
the visible icon of the Tibetan struggle for autonomy to preserve their
distinct identity, culture and language. China’s contempt for the Dalai Lama is
evident from the intemperate ‘warnings’ it issues to India, whenever the
Tibetan leader meets an Indian official or minister or participates even in a
religious conclave. Recently, China has issued yet another ‘warning’ to India
for clearing the Dalai Lama’s his visit to Arunanchal Pradesh to participate in
a religious function at the Tawang monastery. [xiv]
In spite
these disputes, India-China relations qualitatively improved after Prime
Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. India launched proactive measures
to build cordial and mutually beneficial relations with China and other
neighbours. Since he came to power, Prime Minister Modi has had four bilateral
meetings with President Xi Jinping focusing on building win-win relations
between the two countries. President Xi has reciprocated the Indian Prime
Minister’s efforts. Prime Minister Modi’s use of the catch phrase “Inch towards
Miles” (abbreviation of the sentence ‘India and China towards a millennium of
exceptional energy’) expresses his optimism about the emerging India-China
relations.[xv] Both the countries have taken a number of
initiatives to foster trade, investment, strategic cooperation on global issues
and on building people to people relations between the two countries. China is
increasingly investing in and executing a number of projects in India’s
industrial, infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.
President
Xi and Prime Minister Modi seem to enjoy great personal rapport after their
meetings and interactions. Despite this, India-China relations have entered a
period of uncertainty. This is mainly due to China’s efforts to deepen its
multifaceted strategic cooperation with India’s bête noire Pakistan,
even as it talked of building win-win relations with India. The bitter relations
between India and Pakistan dates back to1948, when Pakistan invaded and
forcibly occupied part of the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, which
had opted to join India. Not reconciled to the merger of Pakistan had waged
three wars against India in which the Kashmir issue was the centre piece. After
losing all the three wars, Pakistan embarked upon using Islamist terror groups
based in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) to create public unrest in the state, while
Pakistan based terrorists carried out attacks on Indian security forces.
India’s parleys to normalise relations with Pakistan have been frustrated by
Pakistan’s failure to rein in state-sponsored Jihadi terrorists based in
Pakistan operating against India. Despite assurances from Pakistan Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to take action, they continue to infiltrate into the
Jammu and Kashmir state to carry out attacks and trigger unrest.
India
has also objected to the CPEC project as its passes through POK violating
India’s sovereignty. India is concerned about the $46 billion project as it
would not only to help the development of Pakistan, but build also enable China
to increase its presence to build very close strategic, economic, political and
military relations. This would mutually enhance their political and military
capabilities which could be to the detriment of India. China plans to station 100,000 marine troops
to protect its overseas assets in Djibouti base and Gwadar port.[xvi]
Thus CPEC would legitimise China’s military presence in Pakistan in areas close
to India’s western borders with Pakistan. These moves have raised serious
questions in India about China’s strategic intentions, as its close strategic
bonds with Pakistan could affect India’s delicately balanced relations with
both the countries. This could also make it difficult for India to prevent
external considerations influencing the resolution of bilateral problems with
both China and Pakistan.
In bid
to safeguard India’s interests in this worsening strategic scene, Prime
Minister Modi has strengthened India’s strategic partnerships with the U.S.,
Japan and Vietnam. The strategic partnership is expected to protect India’s
traditional areas of influence in South and Southeast Asia as well as the IOR
which have been eroded by China. The Indian navy conducting the 2016 Malabar
trilateral joint naval exercises with the U.S and Japan, off Japanese coast in
the vicinity of SCS, have added to China’s suspicions. China had not taken
kindly to India taking a public stand in support of the freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea (SCS) akin to the U.S, in the face of China’s claim to
sovereignty over the whole of the SCS.
Opaque
process adopted for the OBOR
India has also expressed
concerns about the opaque process adopted for the OBOR project. China-centric trade and investment strategies in
projects executed in Myanmar and Sri Lanka had been found to lack transparency
and promote environmental degradation and corrupt practices. This had caused
huge political backlash in both the countries. China’s singular focus on its
own interests at the cost of the host nation’s interests had caused public
outcry against Chinese aided projects.[xvii]
India’s foreign secretary
S. Jaishankar while addressing the Raisina Dialogue, in New Delhi in May 2014,
made a pointed reference to these concerns. Though he did not specifically
mention the OBOR or its South Asian projects, he said India viewed it
differently from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), also a
Chinese initiative. He emphasised that India had detailed consultations with
China before it took a decision to join the AIIB. However, the OBOR was
presented as a ‘more unilateral decision.’ He said the key issue was ‘whether
we will build our connectivity through consultative processes or more
unilateral decisions’ and India preferred the former.[xviii]
In view of India’s reservations, China is said to be trying to get Russia to
calm India and save the CPEC.[xix]
India and the BCIM
The BCIM project on completion will be
connect India and China - the two Asian economic giants – through India’s
strategically most vulnerable eastern region bordering four countries
-Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. The
BCIM initiative aims at harnessing the comparative advantage of each country
for the mutual benefit of all members through crucial infrastructure connectivity
and economic co-operation. With the intra – BCIM trade galloping from $6
billion in 2001 to $90 billion in 2011 and expected to touch $130 billion,
building seamless connectivity between the members would help in rapid economic
growth and human development of the backward regions. This would benefit
approximately 1.1 billion young people under the age of 25 living in the BCIM
region (estimated at Bangladesh 51.1 percent, China 31.8 percent, India 46.6
percent and Myanmar 44.7 percent) and upgrade the quality of life for the
people as a whole.[xx]
The 2800–km long
economic corridor starts from Kolkata (West Bengal, India) and connects Kunming
(Yunnan province, China). From Kolkata, it runs through the Bangladesh cities
of Jessore, Dhaka and Sylhet to cross into India near Silchar (Assam). From
there it goes through Imphal and Moreh in Manipur state to join the Tamu - Kalewa friendship road in Myanmar and onward to Mandalay and Lashio. It
enters China at Muse to reach Kunming via Riuli and Dali. A stretch of less
than 200–km of the road in Myanmar
from Kalewa to Monywa is required to be upgraded to all weather road. [xxi]
Similarly, another 50 km stretch between Jiribam and Imphal in Manipur state is
also in poor condition.
The concept of BCIM
interconnectivity is not new. It was thrashed out in detail by scholars,
business leaders and economists from the four countries for nearly three
decades through track-2 initiative, with little progress. However,
it got official recognition when the four nations started looking at
connectivity strategies in the late 1990s to take advantage of the global
economic liberalisation. Though the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation was
formed in 1999 and government officials, scholars, business leaders and
technical experts from the four countries periodically met and discussed BCIM
related issues, progress on the ground was not much.[xxii]
Even
before the OBOR was conceived, China had taken up infrastructure construction,
industrial and technology development projects in the three landlocked
Southwestern provinces including Yunnan province as part of the Western
Development Strategy adopted in 1998. Yunnan province which borders Mynanmar,
Laos and Vietnam became the focal point of BCIM project when China started
promoting the BCIM in 2012.[xxiii] Chinese
visualises the BCIM to provide not only seamless road infrastructure but also
provide railway, water, air and digital connectivity for free movement of
goods, services and people across the whole region. They expect it to lower
barriers to provide for free flow of investments and resources to develop
modern cities, create industrial complexes and increase employment
opportunities.
Even
before the BCIM was conceived, India adopted the Look East Policy in 1992 to
improve infrastructure links with Southeast Asian nations, particularly the
ASEAN. The Policy aimed at opening up the landlocked Northeast states for
development and external trade. India hopes to reduce social unrest in the
backward region that had led to decades of separatist and ethnic insurgencies,
despite having rich natural resources, tea, fossil fuel and timber. India also
hopes that improved communication links with Southeast Asia would fast track
the quality of life of the people in this region. As a part of the policy,
India had embarked upon two infrastructure projects in partnership with Myanmar
to improve the country’s external connectivity through the Northeast. These are
the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (Project) and the Kaladan Multi
Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP). The KMMTTP would connect Haldia port
on India’s eastern seaboard with Sittwe port in Myanmar where a carrier
terminal is being built. From there through the Kaladan River the road reaches
Mizoram state (India) reducing the transit time. These projects have progressed
well; on completion they are expected to mutually add value to BCIM
connectivity.[xxiv]
In
addition to these initiatives, the Chinese have also reopened the Stillwell
Road of World War II vintage in 2016 from Kunming to Assam. The road was in
disuse for long. It runs from Kunming to Assam through Northern Myanmar via
Myitkyina to cross the Indian border at Pangsau Pass (Arunachal Pradesh) to
reach Ledo in Assam. In a first, two Chinese trucks carrying exhibits for the
Assam International Agri Horticultural Show 2016 reached Guwahati in Assam from
Baoshan in Yunnan to mark the opening of the Stillwell Road. The Stillwell road
enters India through the Pangsau Pass in Arunachal Pradesh. As Aruanchal
Pradesh is claimed by the Chinese, the use of the Stillwell road would be
susceptible to the vagaries of India–China relations.
Moreover, the poor condition of the road is also likely to restrict its use.[xxv]
Bangladesh officially
started taking interest in the BCIM project with the adoption of the Look East
Policy in 2001 to improve links with Southeast Asia and China. As the BCIM is in consonant
with this policy, Bangladesh hopes the BCIM would help it to gain greater
market access to both India and China, the two most powerful Asian economies.
It also expects the project to eliminate non-tariff barriers and bring in more
investment for infrastructural development.
After
Myanmar’s ruling military junta ended its isolationist policy in the 1990s, it
started developing better infrastructure links with China and India with their
assistance. After democracy was restored, Myanmar readily joined the BCIM
project. Myanmar’s state counsellor Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated Myanmar’s
support to Belt and Road initiative and the BCIM when she visited Beijing and
met with President Xi Jinping in August 2016.[xxvi]
Extremist and insurgency
threats
Extremism and insurgency is
a major problem in Bangladesh, Manipur (India) and Myanmar particularly in the
region through which the BCIM corridor runs. The region is a melting pot of
diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities, which had made
it difficult to eliminate the spread of extremism and insurgency.
Manipur state’s accession
to India in 1949 is a highly emotive issue for the majority Meiteis, who had
been ruling the state before accession. This continues to influence Meiteis
social and political perceptions. The Meiteis, who form 53 percent of the
state’s 2.86 million population, have a delicately balanced socio-political
relationship with the minority indigenous tribal groups who form 20 percent of
the population. They have their own distinct ethnic identity, languages and
dialects. This has resulted in complex
political and ethnic problems that hamper governance and development activities
in the state since it acceded to India on 21 September 1949.
The Meitei insurgency
relates to the demand for independence from sections of ultra nationalist Meitei
population from 1992 onwards. Most of the insurgent groups are in suspended
animation, though some of the splinter groups still carry out criminal
activities. Sections of Kukis fearing the domination of Meiteis and Nagas,
organised themselves into armed groups to demand the creation of Kukiland, a separate
state for Kukis to protect their identity and culture. However, Kuki extremist
groups are also observing ceasefire after the government assured it would resolve
their grievances.
The Government of India
signed in August 2015 the Naga Peace Accord with the most influential Naga
insurgent group – the Issac Swu-Muivah faction of the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) to end the insurgency.[xxvii]
However, their insistence on the creation of ‘Nagalim,’ a greater Nagaland
state made up of Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and
Nagaland and some parts of Myanmar, has become a stumbling block to permanent
peace. The demand for ‘Nagalim’ enjoys widespread support among Naga tribal
groups in Manipur, particularly among the Tangkhuls who are an influential Naga
group. Unless all sides are prepared to make some compromises to evolve a
permanent solution, the Nagalim issue could remain a potential rallying point
for the resurgence of Naga extremism.
Another troubling aspect in
Manipur is the sporadic raids carried out by the Myanmar based Kaplang faction
of the NSCN trans-border raids against Indian security forces in Manipur. [xxviii]
Though both India and Myanmar have carried out joint operations a number of
times against trans-border insurgents, they still remain a security threat.
Since independence,
Bangladesh had been facing both Islamist extremist groups affiliated to the Al
Qaeda and Left Wing extremists (LWE). In sustained operations against LWE
between 2005 and 2016, security forces had killed as many as 665 extremists.[xxix]
This has practically eliminated the LWE threat. A number of Islamic terrorist
groups sympathetic to the Al Qaeda came up after the U.S. launched its war on
terror in the wake of 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the U.S These include the Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami
Bangladesh (HUJI-B), the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and the
Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). They were very active till 2006, when the
military-led caretaker government came to power curbed their freedom of action.
After Mrs Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League came to
power in 2009 with a mandate to eliminate Islamic extremism and cut its links
with ultra right wing Islamist political parties, large number of militants have
been arrested and arms cache have been recovered. In spite of this, small groups of Islamist
extremists continue to target liberal elements, which raise their voice against
Jihadi terrorism. On 1 July 2016, a
group of five armed terrorists raided a well known cafe in Dhaka and held a
dozen customers including foreigners as hostages. In the police action that followed, in all 29
people including 20 hostages (including 18 foreigners), five terrorists and two
police officers were killed.
Though, Bangladesh police
have discounted the claim of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the
international jihadi terrorist group for carrying out the attack, the
possibility is very much there, as local terrorist elements probably inspired
by the ISIL propaganda are believed to have carried out the attacks.[xxx]
Security forces have killed 74 JMB extremists so far in 2017, in operations
carried out against them. To escape the security crackdown, many JMB cadres are
said to have infiltrated into West Bengal, Assam and Tripura states. The
Bangladesh government has warned the government of India about their
infiltration in the three states. Thus
Islamic extremism in Bangladesh continues to be a potential threat to
destabilise the smooth operation of the BCIM.
Myanmar has been facing ethnic
insurgency since 1948. Ethnic minorities make up about 30 percent of the
population. They are mainly concentrated in the Shan, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Chin,
Kachin and Rakhine states. They took to insurgency demanding independence after
they found promises made to treat them equitably at the time of independence
were not kept by successive governments in Myanmar. The threat of ethnic insurgency had been one
of the reasons for the army to rule the country either directly or indirectly
since 1961. Though the army had managed to work out a ceasefire agreement with
about 14 of the 16 insurgent groups, it floundered when major ethnic groups of
Kachins, Kokang, and Shans refused to merge their armed cadres with the army
till a durable settlement for a federal union was worked out. However, from
2013 the Myanmar government had held nine rounds of peace talks and reached a
national ceasefire agreement. Eight insurgent groups had signed the agreement
by November 2016.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, senior counsellor
of the National League for Democracy government, convened the 21st
Century Panglong Conference on 31 August 2016, kindling hopes of achieving
complete peace in the country by 2019-20. The nine ethnic armed groups which
form the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) attended the conference to
push their demand for a federal union.[xxxi]
However, armed conflicts which broke out
in northern part of the country in November 2016 have stalled the peace making
process. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army
(TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA - formed of tribes of
Chinese ethnicity) and the Arakan Army (AA) launched coordinated attacks on
military outposts, police stations and a trade centre in Muse and Kutkai
township in northern Shan State. It is through this region the BCIM corridor
enters China. The 105-mile trade zone southeast of Muse in Kutkai township area
has come under a standstill due to the clashes. The situation along the Yunnan
border has worsened with as many as 20,000 Kokang tribals, who are of Chinese
ethnicity living on the Myanmar side of the border, seeking refuge with their
kinsmen living on the Chinese side of the border. China has repeatedly
expressed its concern about the situation in the Kokang region to Myanmar.
Myanmar’s fledgling democracy has
been facing a major challenge after anti-Muslim violence broke out in Central
Myanmar town of Meiktila in March 2013. Egged on by fringe elements among
Buddhist clergy, it is now focused mainly on Rohingiya Muslim minority living
in Rakhine sate as Myanmar has not granted them citizenship though they had
been living in the country for generations. Rohinigiyas had to been trying to
flee the country after army crackdown which destroyed their villages. It has
snowballed into a major international human rights issue after the army was
accused of wanton destruction of property, rape and murder of Rohingiyas.
Myanmar government has set up an
advisory commission on Rakhine state headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan to find lasting solutions to the conflict in the state.[xxxii]
The Commission is scheduled to submit its report this year. In the meanwhile,
Myanmar army had been involved in operations against suspected Rohingiya
militants, said to be affiliated to the ISIL, who attacked an army camp in the
region. The whole situation is nebulous and uncertain along the Bangladesh
border with potential to adversely affect Myanmar’s relations with Bangladesh
which is already hosting thousands of Rohingiya refugees. The enormity of the problems facing the BCIM
corridor through this troubled region has the potential to frequently dislocate
its smooth and uninterrupted operations unless security forces are earmarked
for ensuring secure movement.
CONCLUSION
Despite
serious reservations over China’s strategic intentions in promoting the Belt
and Road initiative (OBOR), as it is linked to the giant CPEC infrastructure
initiative in Pakistan, India has agreed to join the BCIM corridor initiative
which also forms part of the OBOR. The BCIM traversing from Kolkata through
Bangladesh and Manipur state in India and Myanmar will end in Kunming in
Yunnan, China. It is expected to open up the backward region by initiating
development activities to improve employment and trading opportunities.
The BCIM region is a complex one composed of
people of diverse ethnicity who belong to different religions. They speak many
languages and tribal dialects. Their interaction is conditioned by their
historical experiences including conflicts.
The difficult terrain and poor communication in the region has
discouraged close interaction. Lack of development and desire to preserve the
distinct identity of various ethnic groups had given rise to a number of
separatist and ideological insurgencies, notably in India and Myanmar with
their fall out in Bangladesh bordering both India and Myanmar. Though both the countries have initiated a
dialogue process to end separatist insurgencies, normal life has not been fully
restored yet. Bangladesh, which had been troubled by Islamic radicalism in
politics, had been trying to eradicate Islamic extremists who had become active
in the country since 1992. Though the security forces have succeeded the threat
is far from over. International jihadi terrorist organisations like the ISIL
have been interested in using local extremist elements to their advantage to
carry out terrorist strikes. So the potential threat from resurgent Islamic
extremism is very much there.
In addition to the threat of insurgency and
Islamic extremism, the region had been facing other unconventional threats from
trans-border movement of extremists, unrest due to illegal immigrants,
trafficking in drugs, arms and people and operation of criminal gangs across
the borders.
These have the potential to
hinder the smooth operation of the BCIM. The mismatch in political perceptions
and bilateral problems among the four countries serviced by the BCIM could also
delay resolution of problems arising in the day to day operation of the BCIM. In
order to address these issues, a regulatory framework to handle issues of
governance i.e., transparency, accountability, sovereignty, security and
monitoring environmental impact will be required.
This
is going to be a major challenge for all the member countries, particularly in
Myanmar. Dr. Rej Jia, President of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, had
suggested institutionalising a four-nation security partnership as part of the
recommendations of the JSG. She said the BCIM countries could draw lessons from
the six-nation Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Programme to
enforce security along the route for transportation, trade and trade. While
addressing the problems relating to physical connectivity might be easier,
establishing an appropriate legal and regulatory framework could prove harder,
she added.[xxxiii] Dr
Ria’s suggestion is worthy of consideration for evolving a fool proof mechanism
to ensure greater transparency, security and accountability is in place for the
BCIM project.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
[i] ‘Full Text: Vision and Actions on
Jointly Building Belt and Road.’ 2015. Xinhua
CRI English News. March 29.
http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/29/2941s872030.htm (accessed 12 January 2017).
[ii]
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