Col R Hariharan | 5 June 2018
[This is an edited compilation of answers to questions raised by
an Indian research scholar on India’s relations with its smaller neighbours.]
Q: What are the misconceptions about India in South Asia, when
it comes to security related issues as a threat to State Sovereignty? Why do
these perceptions exist? And how can India move past these misperceptions?
India’s cultural, religious, ethnic
and linguistic soft power dominates the entire South Asian region from
Afghanistan on the West to Myanmar on the East and from Nepal in the North to
Sri Lanka in the South. Its shared historical, political and commercial links
spread over two thousand years overwhelms India’s smaller neighbours.
With India clocking over 7 percent
growth and emerging as the fastest developing economy in the world, next only
to China, its increasing military power and advances in science and technology
makes it a dominant power not only in South Asia, but also in the Indian Ocean
Region. At times India’s overbearing conduct in dealing with smaller
neighbours, due to its domestic political compulsions or in its own strategic
interest, has created the image of acting like a “Big brother” among smaller
countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. So smaller neighbours of India
are wary of Indian domination subsuming their own identity.
India’s military
interventions that led to the creation of Bangladesh (1971) and to ensure ethnic peace in
Sri Lanka (1987-90) have shown that India was capable of using its military
power to achieve its strategic objectives. This has created latent feeling of
insecurity among sections of society, who are wary of their own distinct
identity, religion, culture and economy from being overwhelmed by India.
Political parties in these countries have exploited the anti-India sections
among the population to their own advantage; governments in these countries
have also leveraged it to gain maximum advantage while dealing with India.
With China making inroads in South
Asia, latent anti-India feelings are exploited by China to further its
interests. So India has to factor neighbours sensitivities, not only on aspects
of security, but in all dealings more than ever before, retain its influence in
the region.
Q: Rajen Harshe (South Asia
analyst) similarly points out that while the strategic community in India tends
to construe India’s military interventions in neighbouring countries in
defensive terms, this is not the perception of its neighbours. He argues that
India’s neighbours, particularly the smaller neighbours, “have viewed such
interventions in terms of the outward projection and demonstration of India’s
military might.”(Harshe, 1999) He further adds, “To put it more sharply,
India’s military interventions in Bangladesh (1971), Sri Lanka (1987-9) and
Maldives (1988) have only added to the insecurity as well as fear of Indian
hegemony among India’s neighbours. Do you agree? Is this fair? And how do we
move past this?
While from India’s perspective, its
military interventions were justified on the basis of its own security
interests and concerns, this wa not how others saw it.
I don’t agree with Mr Rajen Harshe’s contention or
understand how he gauged the neighbourhood perceptions. Unless there is
empirical evidence, I will question such conclusions. It is absured to call
Indian military intervention in Maldives in 1988, at the request of the
President to prevent a coup by mercenaries, as Indian show of force. Similarly,
in Sri Lanka, troops were sent at the invitation of President Jayawardane (in
terms of the Ind0-Sri Lanka Agreement) as he feared the Tamil militants
(particularly the LTTE) might refuse to lay down arms, after Sri Lanka army was
sent back to the barracks.
I don’t know which “others” you
refer to, I presume it is some academic. Nations always intervene in another
country, directly or indirectly, to
safeguard their own national security interests or to achieve a strategic
security objective like protecting their areas of strategic influence. In
India’s case areas of strategic influence include Afghanistan, Nepal,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar and Indian Ocean Region including
Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius.
Generally, nations intervene in
what is called in strategic terms as “spheres of influence.” So the so-called
“justification” is invariably to satisfy international community, lest it draws
flak from superpower manoevures in the UN Security Council. This is how
conflicts take place when big powers intervene in countries, even in far off
places.
Q: In Sri Lanka, India had concerns
over the influx of Tamil Refugees, as it did in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. India was also apprehensive about external powers in Sri
Lanka, such as China, Pakistan, Israel and even the US. However, on
hindsight, some feel “India's peace keeping action proved
counter-productive,
alienating the Tamil community, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.” (Mukherjee &
Malone, 2011).
India and Sri Lanka are
geo-strategically linked together, like Nepal and Bangladesh. India
and Sri Lanka relations have always related to three major issues: the status
of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, geo-strategic security of the region
including the Indian Ocean, and the Tamil populations’ quest for democratic
rights. Issue relating to
Tamils of Indian origin occupied a large space in India’s policy horizon
till were signed.
The geo-strategic issue dominated
Indian thinking in the Cold War era. It was overtaken by the Tamil issue when
the 'Black July’ pogrom
against Tamils carried out in July 1983. This triggered a large flow of Tamil
refugees to Tamil Nadu. This coincided with the end of single party rule in New
Delhi. The new era of coalition rule at the Centre increased the influence of
rival Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu as useful allies of national parties.
This suited the Congress party that had developed cracks in its monolithic
framework.
India’s strategic concerns laced with
desire to help Sri Lanka amicably resolve the Tamil issue culminated in the
signing of the India –Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. It reflected the holistic
Indian approach to building strong bonds between the two countries because it
halted the Tamil separatist insurgency, while underwriting Sri Lanka unity. At the
same it ensured the Sri Lanka constitution is amended to create provincial
councils in traditional areas of Tamil habitation with partial powers in
recognition of their distinct identity, culture and language. To call ISLA a
failure is debatable, even after India’s unhappy experience during its military
intervention from 1987 to 90 that ended in fighting with the LTTE.
After the LTTE assassinated Rajiv
Gandhi in 1992, India’s focus shifted to a more benign and less active approach
on the Tamil question. There is no question of alienation of India among
Tamils; even now Tamil politicians always seek India’s support just as the
government seeks to resolve ethnic crisis.
Q: In the creation of
Bangladesh, India's role “was widely viewed internationally and in the region as primarily
an attempt to dismember an arch rival.” (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011) Moreover, contrary to India's expectations, “the assistance it rendered to Bangladesh did not win it an ally
but rather produced a neighbour that has often proved prickly and resentful.” (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011)
I totally disagree with this view
point. The Indian intervention in 1971 should be viewed in the backdrop of
Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. India did not render
“assistance” to win an ally in Bangladesh, nor is it a “prickly ally”. To
describe the umbilical relations of the two neighburs in such terms would be
trivialising them. India waged war in East Pakistan with multiple objectives:
a. To strategically reduce
the potential threat posed by a united Pakistan on India’s vulnerable Eastern
flank.
b. To support assertion of
Bengali identity and independence against Pakistan’s military authoritarianism,
after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman found Bengalis democratic claim for sharing power
in Pakistan was not recognised, despite their
parliamentary majority.
c. The massive military
crackdown by Pakistan army in Eastern wing resulted in a human tragedy with ten
million refugees seeking safe sanctuary in India. Mrs Indira Gandhi sought
international assistance to tackle the situation politically. The US, then an
ally of Pakistan, under President Richard Nixon’s dispensation saw it in terms
of Cold War and forced the military option upon India.(See the notorious
Anderson Papers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Anderson_(columnist) for details.)
Q: How would you explain the threat
perceptions against India in Sri Lanka? Or in relation to Sri Lanka? How should
we deal with it? Have these interventions had an impact on India's
neighbourhood policy in the long run?
Already answered.
Q: Why do India's neighbours see it as more threatening than China? Or is this not
so? Why do they lean towards China, is it just balance of power, which happens
all the time international relations?
I don’t know whom you are quoting
to say neighbours see India as more threatening. If you mean the neighbours
feel threatened by India’s huge army next door and fast growing economy
dominating them, then I would agree. Yes, they are unnerved by India’s sheer
size. China’s size does not intimidate them the same way, because China is a few
thousand kilometres miles away. While I understand their concerns,
neighbourhood is not by choice but by geography. They also understand it, so
they try to manage with India’s presence.
Of course, it is only natural that
India’s neighbours try to balance their relations with two big powers, but at
times they play India and China against each other to garner maximum advantage.
This is what all nations, including India and China, do all the time.
Q: How do we resolve
this?
Foreign policy
formulations of India should be viewed holistically, one cannot have special
foreign policy only for neighbours because it has to fit in India’s national
vision. So we need to understand how PM Modi strategizing India’s neighbourhood
policy.
Stephanie M L Heng,
a visiting fellow at New Delhi based Observer Research Foundation, writing on
India’s foreign policy formulation last year said: “Today, most countries use a
combination of soft power and hard power, together called ‘smart power.’ Since
Modi became prime minister in May 2014, India has employed such a blend, but
with a strong focus on soft power.
PM Modi,
though seen as a strongman at home, has sought to position his efforts abroad
as diplomacy by consensus – not bullying – which India’s smaller neighbours
have complained of in the past. Modi explaining his strategy in July 2014 said:
“Look foreign policy is not about changing mindsets….foreign policy is about
finding the common meeting points. Where do our interests converge and how much?
We have to sit and talk with every country.”
According to Dhruva Jaishankar of Brookings, Modi’s public
articulations, combined with nature, outcomes, and timings of Modi’s diplomatic
activities, offer a clear picture of India’s priorities and strategic
objectives. They are essentially five-fold:
·
Prioritizing an integrated
neighbourhood; “Neighbourhood First.”
· Leveraging international partnerships
to promote India’s domestic development.
· Ensuring a stable and multipolar balance of power in
the Indo-Pacific; “Act East”
· Dissuading Pakistan from supporting
terrorism.
· Advancing Indian representation and
leadership on matter of global governance.
I agree with him.
Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia, served as
the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from
1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South
Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute,
Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com
Blog: http://col.hariharan.info
Courtesy:
Chennai
Centre for China Studies No Article
No. 037/2018