India-Sri Lanka Relations: New Challenges

Debate : India-Sri Lanka Relations: New Issues and Perspectives

India-Sri Lanka Relations: New Challenges

R Hariharan* | Courtesy: Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 14, No. 1, January- March 2019, 1-57

Foreign relations have occupied an important place in Narendra Modi’s vision for India during his just concluded first term as Prime Minister. In fact, ‘Neighbourhood First’ was the central theme when he started off as Prime Minister, inviting the Heads of State of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries for his inaugural function in 2014. However, Pakistan’s continued refusal to give up the use of extremist jihadi outfits operating from its soil to bleed India has prevented SAARC from evolving into a full-fledged effective regional grouping. So, India’s relations with its  neighbours have, perforce, been bilateral rather than multilateral.

However, after his resounding victory in the May 2019 general elections, Prime Minister Modi invited the heads of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiativefor Multi-Sectoral Technical Economic Cooperation) countries - Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal and Bhutan - for his swearing in ceremony on 30 May 2019. This probably indicates Prime Minister Modi’s shift of focus from ‘Neighbourhood First’ to ‘Act East’ involving the BIMSTEC nations. In fact, Prime Minister Modi is slated to visit the Maldives to address the Majlis (parliament), followed by a visit to Sri Lanka within the first ten days of assuming office for the second term. This seems to indicate that India’s foreign policy priority will now be to build strong relations with its IOR neighbours, particularly Sri Lanka and Maldives.

This will also be in keeping with Prime Minister Modi’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All), launched in 2015, for developing the blue economy of Indian Ocean Rim Countries. The maritime initiative seeks to create a climate of trust and transparency, respect for international maritime rules and increase in maritime cooperation with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Bangladesh. Though SAGAR has had moderate success, its importance is increasing more than ever before. The growing strategic power play between China and the USA and its allies in the Indo-Pacific is affecting the strategic interests of India and the BIMSTEC countries.

India-Sri Lanka relations are moving away from traditional concerns and collaborations due to the dynamic changes in the strategic environment in South Asia and the IOR. Sri Lanka has emerged as an important partner of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) -its strategic economic infrastructure project. The BRI includes the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which aims at strengthening maritime infrastructure between China and Asia, Africa and Europe.

China took the risk of making huge investments in economically unviable projects in Sri Lanka at the end of two and half decade long war between Sri Lankan government and Tamil separatists represented by LTTE. Sri Lanka now owes China US$ 8 billion and finds it difficult to service the debt. After the US$ 1.6 billion Hambantota port proved a burden, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with the state-owned China  Merchants Ports Holdings Company (CMPort) which agreed to pay US$ 1.12 billion for 85 percentshare of Hambantota port for 99 years. India has been watching with concern China gaining control of Hambantota port as it legitimises its strategic presence within India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. The Colombo Port City project (originally conceived as part of Western Region Megapolis) was started in 2014. However, the project - to be built by Chinese contractors at a cost of US$ 1.5 billion on 112 hectares of reclaimed land in Colombo’s Galle Face promenade - courted a lot of controversy. It went through a series of conceptual changes, and has now been rechristened as Colombo International Financial Centre, a self contained smart city project. It is expected to be completed in October 2019. However, to be profitable, all these projects would need Indian participation. 

The Chinese are aware of this requirement, and will always factor in this aspect while negotiating with Indian counterparts. Using Sri Lanka as a takeoff point, China is now gaining not only a military advantage but also a commercial edge in South Asia. When the China- Sri Lanka free trade agreement (FTA) comes through, Chinese business is capable of using India’s FTA with Sri Lanka to gain backdoor entry into Indian markets. 

In this complex environment, two main issues emerge: managing China’s strategic power play in Sri Lanka, and managing the Jihadi terrorist threat in Sri Lanka.

The first issue is Sri Lanka emerging as a pivot in the IOR as a result of China’s growing strategic assertion in the IOR, and the flexing of its naval power in the Indo-Pacific. China’s show of force to assert its sovereignty over the whole of South China Sea has become a source of international concern not only for India but also for the USA and its East Asian and European allies. India has maintained its strategic autonomy in dealing with this issue, while trying to strengthen its maritime and naval cooperation with the USA, Japan, and France to protect its national interests in the Indo-Pacific. In this environment, how should India build a win-win relationship with Sri Lanka?

China’s maritime assets created in the IOR, including Hambantota, extend now from Djibouti in the west to the South China Sea in the east. This is a challenge to not only to India’s strategic construct but also that of the USA, Japan, and its Pacific allies. They are coming together to build their collective strength to face the challenge posed by an increasingly assertive China. With these moves, the centre of gravity of global strategic power is shifting slowly to the IOR.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abeenjoy a close rapport in shaping India-Japan strategic relationship. “Towards a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” - the title of the joint statement issued during PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to India on 14 September 2017 – eloquently underlines the strategic focus of the relationship between the two countries. The recent example of Sri Lanka, Japan, and India signing an agreement to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port is a very good example of Indo-Japan collaboration taking on China’s economic challenge in Sri Lanka. The project is estimated to cost US$ 500 to 700 million. Unlike Hambantota, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) retains 100 percent ownership of the ECT.

From the Indian point of view, the more sinister issue will be China trying to influence elections in Sri Lanka as it is said to have done in support of Mahinda Rajapaksa during the 2015 presidential election through Chinese companies. An investigative article on the controversial Hambantota port project in the New York Times (25 June 2018) gave details on such Chinese assistance. The article “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough up a Port” by Maria Habi-Abib explained how China dictated terms on utilising  Sri Lanka’s need for financing the Hambantota port,  not only to benefit Chinese state owned companies, but also to further China’s strategic interests. Mahinda Rajapaksa played an important role in furthering Chinese strategy in Sri Lanka. 

The report gives details of how China corrupted the electoral process to ensure President Rajapaksa’s election in the 2015 election (of course, it failed). Internal investigation reports give the details of China Harbor’s bank account, which “dispensed” at least US$ 7.6 million t o the affiliates of Rajapaksa. The report says that, ten days before the polls, US$ 3.7 million was distributed in cheques to buy gifts (including saris) for supporters, print campaign promotional material, and the paying of US$ 38000 to a “popular Buddhist monk” and to volunteers. The report said that most of the payments were made from China Harbor’s sub account named “HPDP Phase 2” - an acronym for the Hambantota Port Development Project.

The second issue pertains to the terrorist jehadi threat. Nine members of a local Muslim radical outfit - the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ) – carried out in all nine blasts in three churches and three luxury hotels in Sri Lanka on Easter Day (21 April 2019), killing 253 people and injuring over 500. A week later, the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack. Although India had passed on information 12 days in advance to Sri Lanka regarding the planned attack (including the names of persons involved) both President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe said they had no knowledge of the information. Evidently, the schism between the two leaders, which started in October 2018 after the President made a vain bid to sack Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, seems to be affecting government functioning in matters of national security. A further probe has revealed that Zaharan Hashim, the leader of the NTJ, probably had links with IS suspects in Kerala and Karnataka. Buddhist fringe elements took the opportunity to carry out massive anti-Muslim riots in North-western province, even as the police watched.

 Intelligence and security personnel from India, the USA, and the UK have reached Sri Lanka to help the investigation into the IS inspired terrorist strike. According to a Daily Mirror columnist, China - perhaps unnerved by the US and UK security agents landing in Sri Lanka in the wake of the blasts - sent “a message” for President Sirisena from Chinese President Xi Jinping. He has said that President Sirisena should come to Beijing, and President Sirisena has confirmed he would. In what is a very significant development, when he arrived in Beijing, President Xi chaired a joint Sri Lanka-China bilateral meeting on security co-operation with Colombo. One of the key decisions taken was on “strengthening co-operation in the defence sector and sharing intelligence between Sri Lanka and China” - an aspect that has been incorporated into the new defence agreement. President Sirisena briefed the meeting on the Easter Sunday massacres carried out by pro-IS Muslim extremist groups.

According to the article, before he left Colombo, President Sirisena explained that Sri Lanka did not have the technological expertise and equipment “to trace persons who were promoting terrorism and spreading false information. President Xi agreed to provide both expertise and equipment. He will also send a technical team to Sri Lanka to train personnel.” President Sirisena also agreed to a government-to-government deal for the hi-tech surveillance of Colombo City on the lines of “smart cities.” The article said this would also cover the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City, both constructed with heavy Chinese funding.

Under these circumstances, India will have to work hard to improve cooperation and coordination of counter terrorism strategies at the operational level. This would include networked real time exchange of information, exchange of data and details, and the tracing of the movement of people and money using electronic surveillance. Some of the specific areas to be addressed include the following:

·         Developing a counter narrative against Jihadi terrorists using social media. It has been noticed that the IS uses social media to carry out decentralized control of various affiliates in countries across the continents from Syria to Central Africa to South Asia to the Philippines. Blocking social media is a near impossible method except for short periods. So India and Sri Lanka, along with other like-minded countries, can develop a technology hub to study and train personnel to establish and operate such hubs for real time intelligence collection, identify grey and black propaganda, block fake news.

·          Prevent money laundering, the smuggling of arms, drugs and people.

·          Exchange identity details to identify suspects transiting between countries on a real time basis using digital technology.

·          Specific training for handling terrorist situations, and standardized drillsfor fast response.

·          Form joint teams where necessary to carry out follow up action seamlessly across the borders. Carry out periodic reviews and assess developing situations to provide better understanding.

Indo-Sri Lanka relations are heading for an eventful period because Sri Lanka is undergoing a period of political instability due to rival power centres headed by Mahinda Rajapaksa, President Sirisena, and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe who are all eyeing the next presidential poll, to be announced towards the end of the year. The draft Constitution - which was to usher in yahapalana (good governance), is still in incubation - like many other ideas. The vexed issues of ethnic reconciliation and the free and fair investigation into the allegations of war crimes against the Sri Lankan army towards the end of the Eelam War 2009 (as required by the UN Human Rights Council) are still hanging fire. The economy is in shambles, with mounting debt restricting the government’s freedom of action. Under these circumstances, Sri Lanka will require a lot of understanding and hand-holding from India, which is “family,” while China is a “friend” - as former President Rajapaksa once remarked. *

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* The Author, Col. R. Hariharan, a retired MI officer, contributed this article  on June 1, 2019. He served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group, and the International Law and Strategic  Studies Institute.

China, like US, is not dependable and trustworthy'

Courtesy: Rediff.com/News/October 18, 2019

'Only when China treats India as an equal can we consider them real friends.'

Was the second informal meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping successful?

"The 'unequalness' in the India-China relationship is partly due to our conduct. We are not vision-driven like China," Colonel R Hariharan, an associate with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, tells Rediff.com's Shobha Warrier.

What impact will the informal meeting have on the India-China relationship?

If I were to rate the meeting, I will give it 3/5. The meeting was cordial. Both leaders met in a friendly atmosphere and discussed long term strategic issues of global and regional importance.

The informal meet was able to repair the slightly fractured relationship after China's conduct at the UN security council in support of Pakistan after India abolished Article 370.

After Imran Khan met Xi in China on October 9, Xi said China would continue to firmly support Pakistan on issues concerning its core interests and of major concern to it.

Normally, China uses the words 'core interests' when it refers to territory. For example, China uses 'core interests' in case of reference to Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong.

This is the first time Xi has used the term 'core interests' in relation to Pakistan.

China has made contrarian statements on the Kashmir issue, not only now but in the past also. It has said it should be settled bilaterally as also settling through the UN etc.

But this time, before the informal summit, India took pains to explain to China that abolishing of Article 370 was an internal matter, related to amending the Constitution.

After this explanation, China went to the UN security council to help Pakistan out, though no resolution on Kashmir was brought as it could not muster adequate support.

That itself showed China was favouring Pakistan on Kashmir. After that the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan made a very serious statement in support of Pakistan.

Xi's use of the term 'core interest' shows China has taken a position to support Pakistan.

India, unhappy with the development, had sent another strong signal by participating in the ministerial level meeting of the US, Australia, Japan and India to formalise the Quadrilateral alliance, which had been a loose network to formulate collective strategies in the Indo-Pacific.

These developments sent negative vibes before the meeting, just like what happened after the Doklam standoff before the Wuhan meeting. The external affairs ministry in a statement said Kashmir was an internal matter and India would not like any external interference.

So Xi probably thought Modi might bring it up Kashmir issue at the informal summit.

Do you feel Modi deciding not to raise the Kashmir issue is to India's credit?

Modi did the right thing by not raising the Kashmir issue after maintaining it was an internal issue. And the comfort level for Xi increased when Modi did not raise the issue.

India had also kept quiet about Hong Kong.

So, you can say India while being firm, took a number of measures to improve the comfort level between the two leaders.

China noticed the signals. The mood of the leaders at the meeting was quite good, enabling them to cordially discuss larger issues.

It seems trade and trade deficit dominated the summit. Does that mean Modi and Xi considered trade as the most important issue to discuss?

I will view it slightly differently. The same subject came up at Wuhan also. After the Wuhan meeting China agreed to India's export of sugar and non-Basmati rice.

In the current year, our exports to China have slightly gone up though still (it is) low. Imports have also come down.

Perhaps encouraged by this, the two sides discussed trade issues and agreed to setting up a high level mechanism headed by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Chinese Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to look in detail at trade, investment and services. So, there is hope that there would be positive gains.

Against the background of the US-China trade war, would China be looking at India as a huge market? Would India also want to have a share in the huge Chinese market?

Exactly. The problem is China restricts imports from India. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, though India imports organic chemicals for manufacture of drugs from China, China does not allow the import of Indian drugs.

China wants India to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement between the 10 member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its six FTA partners (China, Japan, India, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia).

India has been negotiating hard on the terms as it could result in Chinese imports going up. This issue also came up at the summit.

There was a lot of emphasis on trade. There was an effort on India's part to create a congenial atmosphere to take these issues forward. Issuing long term visas for the Chinese is one such effort.

Chinese tourists are not coming in large numbers to India unlike Sri Lanka where they top the number of foreign tourists. There is a great opportunity for India in promoting tourism.

Many experts say China cannot be trusted.

Personally, I am of the opinion that no nation should trust any other nation 100%.

In the case of China, it has more meaning. India has very close defence relations with both France and Russia and both have proved they are dependable. Though Russia has sold weapons and France sold submarines to Pakistan, we can trust them.

But China, like the US, is not dependable and trustworthy.

China is brazenly self-centred. China is probably the only country which has gone to war with almost all of its neighbours over border disputes.

China has been investing heavily in all of India's neighbours. Is it to isolate India?

The basic difference between India and China is India's dream is regional and China's dream is global.

Chinese investment in our neighbouring countries serves China in two ways: It furthers China's quest to become a global power. At the same time, it can strategically contain India, which is a potential challenger to China in Asia because of its size and growing economic power.

It is not easy to isolate India which dominates the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean. China has developed a blue water navy to protect its maritime trade as China is a very big importer of petroleum and other mineral resources.

How much will such informal summits help build a better relationship between India and China?

The advantage of an informal meeting is you do not have to come out with a joint statement.

Though they say there was no fixed agenda, the ministers accompanied them shows they have an agenda. It is not a formalised agenda, but a free-flowing one. So this creates a friendly atmosphere, to further the understanding of each other.

The body language of both leaders showed that they were quite comfortable with each other...

Xi came to power a year earlier than Modi. After Modi came to power, they have met 18 times which means in five years, they have met on an average more than three times a year.

These meetings were both formal and informal, summits as well as on the sidelines of international conferences. So, they seem to have built a rapport and appear to be quite comfortable with each other.

Can India and China ever be true friends?

Only when China treats India as an equal can we consider them real friends.

Unfortunately, the Chinese try to equate themselves with the Americans. The 'unequalness' in the India-China relationship is partly due to our conduct too. We are not vision-driven like China.

Also, China is a highly materialistic, Confucius-driven, society where the ruler is accepted as all powerful. So they are able to realise their vision better.

Yes, we are two different systems, but we have to co-exist. Like Vajpayee said, you can choose your friends, not your neighbours.

SHOBHA WARRIER / Rediff.com

https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/china-like-us-is-not-dependable-and-trustworthy-/20191018.htm