Friday, 4 July 2025

Role of US and China in India-Pakistan Confrontation Q & A

Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd)

[Here are my answers to a few questions from the media on the subject on June 15, 2025.]

 

1. Why could tension between India and Pakistan strengthen America's strategy to contain China in Asia?  Does India-Pakistan conflicts like the recent Op Sindoor open a strategic window for the US against the communist regime?

I don't think tension between India and Pakistan strengthens US strategy to contain China in Asia. It will involve the US wholeheartedly politically, militarily and internationally supporting India against Pakistan which is a close political, economic and military ally of China. On the contrary, American conduct during Op Sindoor has been to call for peace on both the warring nations - without calling on Pakistan to disband Jihadi terrorist camps which triggered Op Sindoor which triggered the war. 

China has also been careful in commenting on Op Sindoor though it had expressed its support to Pakistan. Its call to India and Pakistan to seek peaceful means to solve issues is a case in point. 

We should not attach too much importance to the US role in bringing peace after Op Sindoor as India had planned to neutralise terrorist hideouts and PAF support bases which retaliated. The US probably advised Pakistan to sue for peace after the PAF air bases were hit because they are handy for USAF to use if needed as its ally Israel's war against Iran was looming in the horizon.

 

2. Why and how does the US aim to contain China in Asia and how does it plan to use its ties with India to achieve the mission?

In my perception the order of US priority in its relations with China will be: 

a. To bring US-China trade to equitable levels. Already talks are on and intermediate solutions have been found. 

b. To control and find alternative sources for essential imports like computer chips, rare earths, solar panels etc from China to reduce over dependence on China. India could become an alternate source just like Ukraine with which US has signed a pact for rare earths mining.

c. To ensure US and allies in SE Asia & ANZUS continue to enjoy freedom of navigation in South China Sea and overt Chinese threat against Taiwan, Japan and South Korea are minimised. 

d. Build closer relations with India and smaller South Asian allies to keep Indian Ocean waters free from build up of PLA-N threat. 

e. India is the only US ally with the longest land border with China. So we can expect the US to provide intelligence and space based support in India's military confrontation with China. However, this will depend upon India continuing to buy essential military equipment/ technology in becoming increasingly dependent upon China from the US. The delay in GE engines for Tejas aircraft and Apache helicopter deliveries are cases in point. The US will continue to pressurise India for purchase of military hardware. 

 

3. Was Trump's abrupt announcement of ceasefire between India and Pakistan meant to ensure that China did not get credit for defusing the situation at some point of time? 

No. I don't think so. I view it in the overall context of Trump's failure to persuade two major conflicts he had promised both Putin and Zelensky to end the war in Ukraine as well as making no headway in the Palestine conflict going on between Israel (supported by US) and Hamas, actively supported by Iran and sentimentally supported by the Muslim world. 

Over the years, US Deep State has created assets in Pakistan Army and among political parties despite Pakistan's  aberrations like giving refuge to Afghan Taliban e leaders while the US troops were  fighting in Afghanistan,  the Osama affair and Pak involvement exporting jihadi terrorism in India. In the last two decades, the US had been building better relations with India to check China's increasing strategic influence using Belt & Road Initiative. This has become relevant to US as India is emerging as a global economic and military power with potential conflict with China on the border issue. India has welcomed the move to build closer relations with the US and its South East Asian allies. Despite its limitations, the QUAD framework is an example of this. 

So, Trump has used his assets in Pakistan and good relations he enjoys with PM Narendra Modi to end the three-day war between them. Coincidentally for Trump, India seems to have planned a quick end to Op Sindoor  mainly to teach a lesson to Pakistan not to give support to Jihadi terrorists for their operations in India.  

 

4. Given the way the recent India-Pakistan air conflict became an arms race event between the West and China, does the US seriously consider extending arms (F-35s), intelligence and technological support to India in its conflicts with Pakistan to indirectly teach China a lesson? Or would the US keep things covert?

I have answered this question partially on US priorities in earlier questions. I think F35 is too costly for India, lessening its appeal as against the F16 which the US had been already trying to push in India. On intelligence and other tech support, particularly on maritime warfare, some sort of cooperation exists between India and US. During ops it can be expected to go up.,

 

5. The US still is an arms provider to Pakistan (read F-16s). There are also talks of  US eyeing Pakistan's mineral resources. Is it realistic for the US to side with India in a conflict with Pakistan to corner China? The recent developments suggest that the US was not really favouring India at least openly. 

Already this has been answered in earlier questions. POTUS Trump is a transactional strategist. So, his decision making will be dictated by (what in his perception) is good for America. India should not be surprised by his actions in critical times. 

 

6. Is the US's China containment policy more focused on restricting Beijing's access to the Indian Ocean Region, which is key in terms of strategic location and a major trade route? Does India play a significant part in controlling PLA-N activity in Indian Ocean?

This is a major subject. China’s visible presence has made India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy more relevant not only to India’s national security, but also its trade and commerce. Conscious of this, PM Modi revamped maritime cooperation doctrine with the launch of the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative March 12, 2015, to build better relations with island nations of IOR - Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles.  India has recently revamped the SAGAR initiative. 

The Indian Navy maintains vigilant watch over key Indian Ocean choke points through a combination of persistent deployments, advanced surveillance platforms, and strategic partnerships. Indian warships are deployed to watch round the clock choke points in Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Malacca and Sunda Strait for potential threats. In addition to this, surveillance assets using P-81 Poseidon aircraft conduct daily long range maritime patrols, offering high resolution radar and electro-optical surveillance. The GSAT-7 Rukmini satellite provides secure naval communication and enhances maritime awareness across Indian Ocean Region.

India conducts joint patrols and naval exercises with regional and extra regional partners like the US, France, Australia, and Japan. These collaborations improve interoperability and extend India's surveillance reach. India has created the Andaman Nicobar Command and INS Baaz to monitor choke points, the Malacca Strait. These serve as intelligence outposts for rapid deployment.

 

7. Does the US also gain, if China remains focused on India-Pakistan tension towards its western front, drawing Xi’s attention from the strategic South China Sea and Strait of Malacca trade route to the east and south?

The answer to the question lies in the four dimensions of China - Pakistan relationship. These are:

a. Internally, China's weakest borders are Xinjiang and Tibet, because Hans are in minority. Historically they had been independent or enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Since 1958, CCP has tried to curb them through Hanisation. China considers Jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan as existential threats to its frontier regions. So, it considers cultivating relations with Pakistan & Afghanistan essential for China's war against terrorism. Pakistan has suppressed Uyghur independence activists from using Pak territory for their operations in Xinjiang.

b. Pakistan provides an alternate sea access to China's east by-passing choke points of Indian Ocean dominated by India and its Western allies. So, China has used BRI to build multimodal connectivity to Xinjiang through Pakistan so that China's shipping resources reduce their risk.

c. Strategically it suits China to cultivate Pakistan which is hostile to India since its creation and China has long pending territorial and boundary disputes with India since they went to war in 1962. This was evident during Op Sindoor, during which India had to keep a watch on China as Pakistan military is largely armed by China and China was providing satellite communication support during Pakistan's military operations. 

d. Globally, China's emerging as a strategic challenger to the US' global influence. At the same time, India is also growing as a global economic and military power, though not in the same league as China and the US. This has led to the US and its Western and Eastern allies wooing India for building better relations to protect their supply chains and strengthen their strategic posture in South and East Asia. China would like to cut down India to size so that it does not become a potential challenger to China in Asia, with or without the help of US and its western allies.  


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