Saturday, 9 January 2010

Indian Intervention in Afghanistan: A Reality Check

Recently the question of India stepping into the American shoes in Afghanistan when the U.S. and allies withdraw their troops is being debated by many strategic analysts. In particular Nitin Pai and Rohit Pradhan writing in the Pragati January 2010 issue have made a strong case for Indian military intervention in Afghanistan; Dr. Subhash Kapila writing in www.southasiaanalysis.org has focused on the need for India to evolve contingency plans for what he calls “the day after” when Americans pull out.

My take on this issue is a loud no to sending troops although one can understand the strategic imperatives of such a decision. After a pragmatic look at our current capabilities, Indo-Afghan relations, and likely strategic developments in the region, my findings are as follows:

a. Our armed forces are hardly in a position to implement the recently revised 'cold start' military doctrine which envisages the possibility of a two front war with China and Pakistan. It also includes pre-emptive neutralisation of terrorist bases across the border without holding ground to prevent it from escalating into a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan. These are tall requirements and our force levels are just adequate to meet our current needs. They are not enough to fully implement the cold start concept on two fronts.

b. Our armed forces have huge deficiencies in basic equipment i.e. artillery guns, tanks etc. Even the small arms are obsolete. Such large scale deficiencies could affect the fighting efficiency. Added to this we have 25% shortage in officer strength in the army. These are cumulative effects of years of our bureaucratic military procurement methods and lack of accountability of defence research. These have managed to keep our armed forces with the bare minimum capability to fight a 20th century war, let alone the 21st century one. Even with immediate remedial measures this situation is unlikely to improve before 2013.

c. For meaningful military intervention in Afghanistan we have to plan for containing a belligerent Pakistan while fighting Pak-supported Taliban. Even if Pakistan is contained, for a COIN operation against Taliban in Afghanistan we would require at least 100,000 additional troops. That means raising a field army of at least five divisions.

d. It will be a logistic nightmare to support five divisions in Afghanistan as both air lift and shipping would require strategic support of Iran and CIS countries and probably Russia. It would be an enormously costly affair.

e. To weaken our effort Pakistan has the option to heat up proxy war in J and K front or trigger a shooting war on our western front. So whether we like it or not it would be prudent for India to be militarily prepared to face Pakistan as a proxy in Afghanistan and J &K and for a direct confrontation on our western front, if we embark on war in Afghanistan.

f. Given our nebulous internal security situation, it would be strategically prudent for Pakistan to aggravate it through sponsored terrorism. This could add to our internal woes and distract our attention.

Apart from the security aspects discussed above, there are other considerations. Our political parties are well known to play the minority card at the drop of a hat; so how will New Delhi politically sell the idea of sending an expeditionary force to Afghanistan? And Marxist parties would dub any move to send troops to Afghanistan as reactionary response to satisfy the Americans. New Delhi's political style in contentious situations is to strike a compromise. If our experience in Sri Lanka, the only overseas operation of Indian forces,is any guide the coalition in power would try to soften the impact by delaying decision making, and then evolve compromises on force levels and avoid providing clear cut strategic goals to the expeditionary force. This would affect the effectiveness of our forces in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan.

Indo-Afghan relations are age old and if we have to make a strategic move it should be at a time of our choosing based on our specific requirement and not because the U.S. quits or brings pressure on India to face the flak there. Historic milestones of Indo-Afghan relations are as follows:

a. India had always had strong relations with successive governments in Afghanistan except for the short period when Taliban was controlling the nation. Thanks to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's leadership, during freedom struggle Congress had the support of Pashtuns who populate both sides of Pak-Af border. In fact Pashtuns led by Khan Sahib had boycotted the referendum on partition. So Pakistan got NWFP by default. However, subsequently when we became independent we failed to maintain the rapport with Pashtuns alive perhaps because it was no more politically relevant.

b. American Cold War response to Soviet occupation provided enough incentives for Pakistan to expand its strategic hold in Afghanistan. Pakistan used Pashtuns and other frontier people who were influenced by Wahabi obscurantism to strengthen Afghan insurgents fighting the Soviets forces supporting the pro-Communist regime in Kabul. It is noteworthy that the Afghan regime in this period had enjoyed India's full support; so in a way Pakistan was indirectly whittling down Indian influence in what it considered as its strategic backyard. When Soviets vacated Pakistan helped the Taliban to occupy this strategic space in the emerging power struggle in Afghanistan after the collapse of the pro-Communist regime there.

c. Indian supported the Northern Alliance (predominantly Uzbek and Tajik militias) which fought the Taliban (composed of mostly of Pakistanis and Pashtuns).But India did not provide any troops though it probably provided arms.

Given this historic backdrop, India’s present non-military involvement in Afghanistan is only a continuation of its policy to keep Afghanistan as a strategic ally. India has constructed some of the strategic border links and rebuilt schools and hospitals in Kabul. Our BRTF men are undertaking the road construction with the limited protection provided by Indian paramilitary. India probably have close intelligence links and liaison with Karzai regime. Although Indian presence is affected by the US sponsored COIN operations it is not part of it. Of course, as India is providing strategic support to Afghanistan in improving vital infrastructure, the U.S and NATO forces are also benefited.

When the US and its allies withdraw and leave Afghanistan to fend for itself Taliban is likely to politically try to gain power. A compromise solution where Taliban share power with Afghan regime is within the realms of possibility. If its cosmetics are right, it could have international support.

But even if there is a compromise arrangement, it is likely to be unstable as there are strong ideological and tribal differences between Taliban and others. So any move by Taliban to militarily usurp power is a strong possibility; it will have the support of Pakistan military and the ISI, though the Pakistan government may play down its direct involvement.

If such hostilities breakout it would be natural for Afghanistan to look for international support. In such a contingency Afghanistan would probably enjoy tacit cooperation and support of Iran (which has its own ideological score to settle with Taliban) and material assistance from the U.S. The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, has already given notice of have Russian intentions: “we cannot stand aloof and impartial on what’s going on in the friendly neighbouring countries too.” So Russia could also chip in. But none of them would provide troops.

Of course, there is the China factor. Chinese are making huge investments in Afghanistan and they would probably like a peaceful Afghanistan to consolidate their position. Steve Hynd in his article “China eyes its Afghanistan moves” in Pragati has quotes the deputy general of the China Council for National Policy Studies, Li Qinggong’s view that China would help facilitate “deployment of international peace keeping missions in its land and accelerating its reconstruction process” when the U.S. withdraw military forces. Does this mean Chinese troops could become a part of an international peace keeping force?

If an international force is not constituted, China’s options become limited. China is a strategic ally of Pakistan. So obviously Pakistan could influence the Chinese response. If the Pakistan supported Taliban and India supported Afghan government are in conflict Chinese would be comfortable if Pak-Taliban alliance wins. So China is a factor to contend with in the region, although we may try to wish it away.

India is the regional power that could provide sizable military assistance including troops. While it could easily provide material, political and diplomatic support and probably military equipment to beef up Afghan army to fight Taliban, intervention with Indian troops would not be such an easy task for reasons already discussed.

Beyond providing material assistance and military resources, it is extremely doubtful whether New Delhi would send troops to Afghanistan. If it decides to do so it has to get its act ready in double time. Our "democratic decision making style" is usually to take a plunge and then work out a way to get out of the maze. Such a strategy could be suicidal in Afghanistan if India intervenes without adequate political, military and diplomatic homework.

The moral of the story is simple: anyone getting into the Afghanistan morass will be sucked in as Pakistan, Soviet Union, and the U.S. had experienced. At present India is neither politically nor militarily ready to take the plunge. In spite of it, if India plans to do so it should go with its eyes wide open to bear tremendous human and material cost over at least five years of campaigning. Can we afford this luxury? Any takers?
Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies www/c3sindia.org

10 comments:

Sugar man said...

With all respects Sir,I don't understand how a war torn country like Afghanistan could be a strategic ally in the present scenario.Even in the long run I don't see any reason why we have to support Afghanistan, at the cost of national security and human lives.Let the Americans and the UN take care of it.
Surely as a citizen ,I don't want to see another IPKF scene in Afghanistan.Like wild bull running in an endless terrain confused and not knowing what to do.
This is no time for another foreign affairs or diplomatic experiment.
In the scenario all our efforts should be focused on strengthening our armed forces and eradicating any deficiencies.Eradicating the Red tapeism from the system and speeding defense production and procurement process .
I don't understanding why New Delhi is focusing on Afghanistan when our enemy resides in the very next door.

R. Hariharan said...

Kumar has sent me these comments:

With reference to your paper "Indian Intervention in Afghanistan- A Reality Check" in SAAG.

Before embarking on a detailed analysis of military intervention, the fundamental question which needs to be answered is what is India's objective in sending troops to Afghanistan? We need to remember that the US and the ISAF came into Afghanistan after 9/11 pursuant to the mandate of UN Security Council (Resolution 1386). Is it to prevent the Taliban/Al Qaeda from gaining control of Afghanistan or strengthening the Karzai government or to counter Pak influence? Surely we cannot get militarily involved in that country to protect our mission in Kabul and other places or to give cover to the various infra-structure projects undertaken.

M/s Pai & Pradhan need to read history of Afghanistan and in particular the Anglo-Afghan wars.

Firstly, India simply does not have the capabilities to undertake a mission of the magnitude described by the authors in Pragati. (The analysis by M/s Pai & Pradhan was too simplistic, according to me). Our armed forces' combat capabilities have been dented over the years both by politicians and the lack of good talent (We somehow continue to have a big shortage of officers)

Secondly, the big problem of logistics - Afghanistan is a landlocked country which borders states like Pakistan and Iran which in all likelihood would not be in favour of Indian troops in Afghanistan. Thus, India's access to Afghanistan for any military venture is severely hampered.

Thus, in the unlikely event of committing troops, India may need to take assistance of the former Soviet republics like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc and Russia as well. Then of course having put soldiers on the ground, do we have the airlift capabilities of servicing these troops?

Then is the issue of public opinion which would turn against the government in case of mounting casualties.

Without going into the details of the Indian Army's new military doctrine, we simply do not have the kind of manpower and equipment to launch an Afghan adventure. At times, I am not too sure whether the quality of the equipment will see us through even a conventional war with Pakistan. (Please read the recent TOI report about the IAF's ageing fleet)

In the circumstances, covert operations aimed against Pak-taliban is a better and more realistic option than full-fledged military intervention.

R. Hariharan said...

Reference Blogger Sugar man ...

You have raised an important aspect of strategy. That is in hostilities you should use the enemy's enemy to your advantage.

Pakistan sees Afghanistan as its area of strategic influence. This is more so because it provides strategic depth to Pakistan. However, Afghanistan is vary of Pakistan's intentions for two reasons.

One is the Pak Pashtun demand for autonomy (they have geographic continuity with their tribesmen on Afghanside who sympathise with them). The other is Afghanistan has been traditionally more friendly relations with India than with Pakistan, which has functional relations. So Afghans see India as a power that could safeguard Afghan interests.

Even otherwise Afghanistan is located in geo-strategically sensitive area as it borders, apart from Pakistan, Afghanistan, oil-rich Central Asian states and even parts of China. So it is a strategic window for India.

However, I agree with your views on Indian troop intervention in Afghanistan because we are not just ready.

Anand said...

Hariharan, why do you think the Iranian would not be pleased if India decided to train and equip the ANA and ANP?

Iran is publicly very pro Karzai, GIRoA and ANSF. Karzai's strongest support base is among Afghan Shiites.

Sugar man, a capable ANA that fights the Taliban, Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed, Lashkar e Jhanvi, Jundullah, Sipah e Sahaba, Haqqani, TTP; and all the rest would greatly benefit India.

In 2009, during the first 11 months alone, 2120 ANP died in combat. This isn't even accounting for the ANA; or the wounded.

Afghans are dying in very large numbers fighting India's enemies. Don't the Afghans deserve some support?

Note in the most recent Afghan public opinion poll, 90% of Afghans had a negative view of the Taliban. The Afghans want to fight the extremists. What is the harm in helping them?

Abhishek Sharma said...

Only a foolish Government of India can think so. This will spoil many future options of India.

Anand said...

Abhishek, why did Kashmiri violence drop 90% after 9/11? India owes a great debt to the Afghans for fighting India's enemies. Naturally, the Afghans are not fighting them for India; they are fighting them because India's enemies also happen to be Afghanistan's enemies.

What is the harm in training and equipping the ANA and ANP? Especially if India can do so as part of a vast unanimously UN authorized coalition and at the request of the Afghan people and their elected leaders?

If the Afghans lose, the consequences for India and the world would be devastating. Fortunately for the world, the GIRoA (Gov Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), ANA and ANP are far from being defeated.

Abhishek Sharma said...

Anand you must understand that it is not just one reason why violence dropped by 90% in Kashmir. I would say that this violence begun to drop post 31.12.1999. Tell me how many terrorists were arrested after 31.12.1999. 9/11 opened one more front for Islamist terrorists. However it is not events post 9/11 that caused decline in terrorist incidents. Afghanistan is a delicate thing. One wrong finger press can spoil all your efforts. You cannot say for sure that who in Afghanistan is on which side. The same man you may train today may overnight listen to some Hakimullah, change his mind and get ready to infiltrate. Hence let this job be done by U.S and its allies. Our resources are quite limited, any expenditure should be done only for our security. We do not have any surplus.

R. Hariharan said...

Comments received from Sardul Minhas:

Here is a counterpoint to Nitin Pai’s recent argument for sending Indian troops into Afghanistan. I agree with Col. Hariharan. India doesn’t quite have the capability today for force projection of this sort. It needs to peacefully develop at least for the next 10 to 15 years; at 9% annual growth rate its economy will have quadrupled in 15 years provided there are no sharp jolts to it.

India can mobilize the diplomatic forces, however. It can take the lead role in arranging an international peace conference on Afghanistan – call it the Kabul Conference – for all the great powers to guarantee Afghanistan’s democracy and neutrality. Some may quibble, of course, that the time for that isn’t ripe.

Abhishek Sharma said...

See organising conferences is no help. We can do something more. Let the Afghan Commanders be permitted to receive training in India. Ultimately the nation of Afghanistan is to be protected by Afghans only. If our intention is only help, then this is best we can do. For India to take up the security of Afghanistan is like a clerk dreaming to own a Corporate Jet.

Abhishek Sharma said...

Further if we are directly involved in the security set up there, our enemies will spread the word that India is killing Muslims in Afghanistan and many such bla bla and bla. Please believe that this rumour will find many subscribers in Afghanistan. Hence for us Afghanistan is like a T.B patient which has to be helped carefully, else chances of our getting infected are not remote.