Media reports from New Delhi say that a group of ministers headed by the home minister P. Chidambaram has approved a civil aviation ministry proposal to incorporate the death penalty to hijackers in the Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982. It will have to be brought before the Parliament for enactment. The Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 provides for life imprisonment for hijacking and acts of violence connected with hijacking against any passenger or crew of the aircraft.
According to the news paper report, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had cleared the policy five years ago in a bid to make the anti-hijacking law more stringent . While no one doubts the intention of the government, it is not clear why it took ten years to decide to give teeth to the anti hijack law after the infamous December 1999 Kandahar hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC 814? The Kandahar hijack was an event of national shame. That hijack exposed the soft underbelly of the Indian government which buckled under the demand of a handful of Pak hijackers and released Masood Azhar, founder of the notorious Islamist terror group of Jaish-e-Mohammed, and three others in exchange for the hostages.
The abortive attempt by Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, a Nigerian Islamist terrorist, who tried to blow an the Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit last Christmas-eve probably made the Indian government to sit up and take stock of the existing aviation security situation including anti hijacking measures in our own country.
The new proposal also provides for no negotiations whatsoever with the hijackers on their demands. Is it realistic? Can we enforce such a policy with iron-clad rigidity as Israel does? What happens if the terrorists start killing hostages one by one? Will the government in power be able to resist political and public pressures to negotiate with the hijackers? These are some of the questions that arise on the ‘no negotiation’ policy. Such policy strictly enforced would discourage hijacking. But our government’s decision making process in murky situations is quite suspect. So unless there is clear and unambiguous decision making based on firm self belief, mere enactments will not deter hijacking. It is actions more than enactments that speak loudly of government intention.
The Indian express also reported that in 2005 the government had "unveiled a tough anti-hijack policy under which any hijacked plane, being used as a missile to target vital installations as in the 9/11 terror attack, would be shot down." Enforcement of this policy is not going to be easy; it calls for great sagacity in decision making. Questions raised earlier about ‘no negotiations’ policy also need to be answered on this issue also.
At times the situation in the aircraft is confused and tricky; it is not always clear whether a plane is hijacked because pilots are under duress. In this context, two hijack scares - both IndiGo flights - reported in 2009 are of special interest. On July 23, 2009 Sanjay Malik a passenger on board flight GE-181 from Delhi to Mumbai triggered a mid-air scare claiming there was a bomb on board. He wanted the plane to be diverted to Karachi. However, the crew managed to control the situation and the plane was landed safely. Malik was reported to be mentally deranged. In another incident on February 1, 2009 "threatening behaviour" of a passenger reported by the pilot on a flight from Goa to Delh brought on the NSG commandos to the tarmac and air force fighters were scrambled. On safe landing the unruly passenger was found to be drunk; he and two other passengers were arrested. So decision to shoot down an aircraft full of passengers is not going to be easy. This dilemma has bugged the U.S. also. In any case a determined terrorist could still hijack and crash the aircraft on the target while vital moments are lost in taking the difficult decision to shooting down he aircraft.
Basically, our weakness is not in enactments. It is in evolving systems and in enforcing the existing acts and procedures. Proclaiming a death sentence to a hijacker is not enough. After all over a dozen criminals and terrorists sentenced to death are languishing in death row for over a decade because the government has not been unable to make its mind to carry out the sentence. Amazingly the list includes Afzal Guru who masterminded the attack on Indian Parliament! So how many terrorist hijackers, already brainwashed to die smilingly, would be deterred by the death sentence provided in the Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 is a moot point. Presumably, the amendment is to show the public the determination of the government's determination in fight hijacking than anything else.
Probably the best deterrent to hijacking would to nab the potential hijackers before they board the aircraft. It would require extra effort on the part of intelligence agencies to collect real time information. The back end coordination at the airports wit national security and intelligence agencies aided by adequate and updated technology would make it more difficult for hijacker to seep through the airport security net.
Foolproof preventive security measures in airports would make hijacking a tough and risky proposition. But I am not very confident whether the security measures in minor airports like Trichy, Bhuj or Jorhat are as good or as strict as in major airports like New Delhi, Mumbai or Kolkatta. Moreover, is the state police apparatus well integrated in the whole chain to forewarn and forestall hijack attempts? One can only hope these aspects are getting the attention they deserve.
[Some of the points contained in this article were included in an interview given by the author to the NDTV-Hindu on January 13, 2009.]
4 comments:
Comments received from Kumar:
For death penalty to be incorporated in the statute books is no big deal. Most important is whether India can lay its hands on the hijackers. We messed it up in Kandahar big time. None of the Sikh hijackers who hijacked aircrafts from India in the 70s were caught by the Indian authorities. They were treated with honour by Pakistan. So it hardly matters whether we amend the law or not. It may attract media attention and some publicity to show India wishes to act firmly. Another question, why are we waking up today, nearly a decade after Kandahar?
Own remarks:
I agree with you 100%. Our key issue is in our action and not merely in acts.
Comments received from RAGHU:
Just read your article on SAAG about Hijacking. I had some comments and was wondering if these are realistic?
For India, the threat of Hijacking mainly comes from
1. Pak/B'desh sponsored terrorists
2. NE insurgents
3. home grown Jihadis
4. D-company/Mafia
5. and to a minor extent, from a disgruntled citizen.
Of these, my opinion is that the threats from Pak/B'desh costs us more - not just in time and money but also our image and perception. Tackling a hijacking by home grown jihadis would be tricky. Those by 2, 5 would be embarrassing but not as much as if it were to be from 1 or 3 or 4.
Regarding dealing with Pak/B'desh sponsored terrorists, would it be practical (assuming we have a determined political leadership) to have a policy of paying back in kind immediately after the incident?
This is what I mean by paying back in kind immediately after the incident - As soon as it is known that a plane has been hijacked and is beyond Indian authorities' control they should start talking to the terrorists and ask their demands and negotiate some time.
Once it is known that Pak is the mischief maker, RAW should get ready to create chaos in Pakistan. If the hijackers don't relent then chaos should begin in Pakistan. RAW assets should explode 1 or 2 bombs (without absolutely killing any innocent civilian) there and then send a message to the concerned (ISI, Army, political leadership) that if their assets (jihadis/hijackers) don't surrender to Indian authorities then many more bigger ones will explode. Simultaneously it should place some bombs in a building inform Pak media that a certain building (any multi-storied building in a major city) will explode in an hr or 2 and that authorities should evacuate the building - so as to make the warning look serious.
Once the hijackers/jihadis surrender then all the locations (and bombs) RAW targeted should be let known to Pak authorities. Informing Pak media and creating chaos is necessary to bring pressure on the ISI/Army and political leadership if any and so a big mess and confusion should be created there.
Since RAW wouldn't be advertising that GoI is involved, it will give some plausible deniability to India.
India shouldn't hesitate and be unduly concerned about others knowing that it is us, since it is a tit-for-tat. The question is not what the world feels but what it will do knowing that it is us; it is our national security issue and we are taking only defensive action.
There will be a lot of high pitched blame games, denials etc between India and Pak but I feel it might be worth because it will send an unambigious message to Pak that messing with us comes with a heavy price tag.
Part 2 of comments received from Raghu:
One disadvantage could be that Balcohis can't be instigated by us to hijack or take hostages but then I doubt if RAW wants to do that because right now they are categorized as insurgents and if they indulge in such actions then they will be labelled as terrorists.
Regarding B'desh, if it is AL's govt then I don't think it might be difficult to deal. But if it is BNP then Khaleeda Zia and her sons should be targeted and the issue resolved.
Hijacking incidents from home grown jihadis - SIMI or IM is more tricky and so is the case with D-company.
Another issue is about giving training to some authorities to the airports to stop a hijacked plane like the IC 814 Kandahar episode.
In that episode if the airport authorities had decided to shoot the tires of the plane or park vehicles on the runway and stop it from taking off, then the situation could have been at least less embarrassing. So, shouldn't the GoI give sufficient powers, and training to the airport security personnel to shoot the plane tires or block the runway, by parking vehicles or do anything that prevent the plane from taking off?
On the issue of giving training and powers to the airport security personnel many questions will pop up, like,
1. what if the plane has reached the takeoff speed, will its tires be shot at? Because if the plane hasn't reached the takeoff speed then it might be safe to shoot the tires but if it has reached the takeoff speed which will be very high, then shooting the tires might make the plane crash on its nose/fuselage or even wings and it might catch fire and explode killing hostages even before there is a chance to negotiate their safe release. Will the airport authorities take decision to shoot the tires or will it be national security management team?
2. Is it possible to come up with techniques/technology to install arresting wires on the runways like on aircraft carriers?
Other options like parking vehicles on the runway to stop it from taking off also brings up further questions -
1. In how many minutes will the airport authorities issue orders to block the runways?
3. Knowing that the authorities will try to stop the plane, the hijackers might threaten to explode the plane if they aren't allowed to fly. In such scenarios who will take responsibility and where will the buck stop?
These and many more questions are sure to arise and I hope will be debated thoroughly.
My observations on Raghu's comments in two parts:
Own comments:
1. Experience of countries like the U.S. in carrying out special operations in another country in revenge or retribution had not been very happy. Although Israel had done this with impunity it is far from routine. World will not show India the condescension it shows to Israel in such cases. This is the reality.
Moreover such acts will require special authority and competencies which very few democratic govts approve or sanction. Particularly in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy like India it would be ill advised. It would only escalate the suspicions and play into the hands of terrorists who want publicity.
Moreover, our governance and administration are not good enough for covert operations in third countries. There is no political will or conviction.
As regards the training points you have mentioned, anti-hijacking methodology is a specialised operation.
The training points you had mentioned are included in their curriculum. The weakness is not so much as training as will of the decision-makers. Kandahar episode had dramatically shown this.
As a nation we are notorious in not empowering others and 'buck-passing' is the standard operative procedure of political and bureaucratic bosses. Unless we sort this out I fear we will dither more often than succeed.
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