Sri Lanka: 13A, CHOGM, China and India

Col R Hariharan

[This is an extract of an E-mail interview given to Confluence, a London based magazine.]

Q1. India has blown hot and cold over the Sri Lankan national question over the past several decades.  Now there is 13A and the elections for a Northern Provincial government looming. Do you see the Manmohan government acting positive and decisively in this context?

There are two narratives on India’s stand on the Sri Lankan national question. One is India as a regional power which would like to maintain a strategically useful and friendly relationship with Sri Lanka and the other, a national narrative based upon the traditional linkages between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka Tamils. The “hot and cold” relationship as you call it is due to the priorities of which narrative overtakes policy making at a specific time of criticality.

India had been trying to strike a balance between the two narratives. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 1987 was a product of this recipe. And it had all the makings of satisfying neither the regional strategic needs nor the local Tamil aspirations. It was in a way built into fail because it had so many loopholes for politicians on both sides to wriggle out of their commitment. The 13A as a product of this Accord is there with a lot of short comings. But it is at least recognition of the need for equitable justice to minorities. (I am not a great votary of the 13A; it needs to be reworked in the present climate when LTTE guns have been silenced. See my latest SAAG update on 13A uploaded yesterday.)

When Rajapaksa came to power and promised devolution and then waged Eelam war and sought Indian acquiescence, it was the regional narrative that dictated the policy. But when he failed to save the face of New Delhi by going back on his promises, New Delhi’s inability to meet the political demands in Tamil Nadu on the issue brought on the national narrative to the fore. With the elections looming for Indian parliament end 2013-14, the ruling Congress coalition facing multiple hazards to win the next election, national narrative is likely to get shriller unless Rajapaksa (in the most unlikely event ) of doing a sleight of hand and gets Tamils back in political mainstream.    

In international relations acting positively and decisively as you term it comes perhaps on the last stage before slapping sanctions or going to war. Indian foreign policy moves like the proverbial Indian elephant – at its own phase – and its large political body takes a long time to get decisive action going. Keeping this as well as the existing antagonistic relationship between the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and New Delhi in view, I do not expect a dramatic breakthrough in the near future. Ms Jayalalithaa’s partisan approach to Sri Lanka national question limits her capability to rally India to act positively and equitably to bring about a useful solution.

After all, the days of Operation Poomalai that sent IAF aircraft to drop food supplies to beleaguered Jaffna are over. No country – not even the so called super power the U.S. - can get away with it unless it has a level of acceptance internationally. Indian usually does not make such multilateral moves in its neighbourhood unless it is under the UN aegis.

Q2. How do you see CHOGM playing a role in the present predicament at its September meeting in Sri Lanka?  Canada has dropped out while David Cameron has said he will attend and yet give a terse message. South Africa is also likely to follow in the same vein. Others including Australia may toe a different line. How do you see a man accused as a war criminal functioning as the Head of the Commonwealth in the next two years?

The CHOGM undoubtedly puts India in a dilemma of Shakespearean proportions. Here also we see the national and regional narratives making their play to pull Indian decision making in opposite directions.

Tamil Nadu political parties, including the Congress, have asked for boycotting the CHOGM in protest against Sri Lanka’s conduct and lack of accountability. India does not take such drastic decisions. I don’t think present leadership in New Delhi would take such a step which could damage the strained India-Sri Lanka relationship irreparably (already soured by Indian vote at UNHCR) as Mahinda Rajapaksa who would be ascending to CHOGM chair could take it as a personal affront.

But New Delhi is definitely not happy with his broken promises and prevarication which have politically embarrassed Indian national leadership. And it will be paying a price for it in coalition politics. New Delhi will be factoring these aspects while considering Tamil Nadu’s political pressures.   

If political compulsions and pressures from Chennai are insurmountable then New Delhi might downgrade the level of participation to Minister of External Affairs.

On the other hand, India at the strategic level would like to leverage its attendance to get what it wants from Sri Lanka. In the present context it might be limited only to ensure the Northern Province elections go through without amending 13A. Already Sri Lanka has indicated that it would be the game plan. It would be logical to deduce this did not come from a change of heart in Sri Lanka but as a sop to India. While it might satisfy North Block in New Delhi it is unlikely to be accepted in Tamil Nadu. So presumably India could apply more pressure on Mahinda – form and content of this remains in the realms of speculation – in the coming weeks.

Personally, I feel India should participate in CHOGM – at whatever level it wants – so that Rajapaksa’s double speak is laid bared to all the leaders on the sidelines of the conference or interspersed amidst generalities that pass for CHOGM declaration. Perhaps David Cameron is already working on such a thing and India can ginger it up a bit to send a strong medicine to Rajapaksa.

Boycott is a one shot affair suited to Canadian vote banks but not India as it has umbilical relations with Sri Lanka. India has to take the narrative further, not chop it.

Q3. Rajapakse has cultivated China assiduously and there is even a defence agreement for the supply of arms and training.   How do you view China's role in this context?

Yes Chinese are in a big way, digging their heels in Sri Lanka in many sectors. This is what they are doing in Nepal, where they are funding Chinese language teaching. And Bangladesh is in line for it. Pakistan is a strong strategic ally just as Myanmar is. The entire Indian neighbourhood is coming under high profile Chinese presence in infrastructure, telecom, tourism, power generation, and consumer goods sectors.

But it should not be forgotten that in India also Chinese influence in the same business sectors, barring Chinese tourism, is going up. Already Indian companies are availing RMB loans. India-China trade is poised to hit $ 100 billion in 2015. Would Chinese want to endanger this by stepping on India’s corns with a confrontational profile in Sri Lanka? I don’t think so. They will be more nuanced and subtle.

This does not minimise the strategic risk India will be facing with incremental Chinese influence. It does not matter whether it is defence training or arms supply. India surpasses all countries put together in training Sri Lankan troops. India does not supply arms to Sri Lanka in any case. China cannot match India except in select areas. And there is a military culture that has to have compatibility which India and Sri Lanka enjoy much more than China could aspire. But they could use Sri Lanka as a springboard for snooping on Indian communication, manage intelligence network, embed agents and practise all the arts and crafts of intelligence because India and Sri Lanka are so close.  India has no option but to counter them using their own assets in Sri Lanka.

But the real danger is in China influencing Sri Lankan policy decisions that could adversely affect India in trade, transit, furthering India-Sri Lanka economic links. Already there are some indications that some attempts are being made. With Sri Lanka so close by land and sea in times of war which I do not visualise, China’s ever-growing profile would be a real threat. The merchant marine assets could be used for R and R and supply; telecom satellites could eavesdrop on India. India should factor it in its big picture of regional strategy and in shaping its China policy and Sri Lanka policy because this is what Big Game is all about. 

This will be more so when Chinese naval profile increases its potential as a threat in Indian Ocean in next ten years. I am sure someone is already doing it or planning to do it [in their reckoning] in North and South Blocks, political leaders willing. 

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)  

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Note No 687 dated 28 June 2013

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1304

Selling Yunnan to South Asia

A report on the China-South Asian Countries Think Tank Forum meet held in Kunming – June 6 and 7, 2013

Col R Hariharan

China’s keen desire to broaden its relationship with South Asian countries, with special focus on building linkages with Yunnan Province, was manifest at the first-ever China-South Asian Countries Think Tank Forum (CSA Forum) hosted jointly by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Yunnan Provincial Government at Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province on June 6 and 7, 2013.

Institute for Chinese Studies, New Delhi and Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad were South Asian co-hosts of the conference.

Three premier Chinese think tanks - the National Institute of Asia Pacific and Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences - and the Yunnan Provincial Foreign Culture Exchange Association provided support in conducting the Forum meet.

About 40 resource representatives from South Asian countries (including Afghanistan) and Myanmar and about 80 representatives of Chinese think tanks from various provinces and academic institutions participated in the two-day deliberations. 

On the evening of June 5, participants of the Forum were invited to attend a huge open air cultural event showcasing a mix of Chinese opera, ethnic and pop dances and music, organised on the eve of the first ever China-South Asia Expo starting on June 6. Significantly, a Bollywood dance with song crooned by a Chinese pop star was uproariously received by the audience.

The next morning, the Forum delegates were  invited to attend the inaugural function of the  China-South Asia Expo (a morphed form of South Asian Countries Trade Fair held in earlier years). At the inaugural function, among the representatives from South Asia, India was a conspicuous absentee.

One of our hosts proudly pointed out the Expo venue was completed in record five months; he added two metro net works under construction in Kunming would be completed by 2015 linking the existing metro.

CSA Forum was inaugurated in the afternoon of June 6 at the International Conference Hall in picturesque lakeside resort of Dianchi Garden Hotel and Spa. Veteran diplomats Mr Eric Gonsalves and Mr Kishan Rana, Major General Dipankar Banerjee (retd), and Mrs Alka Acharya were some of the prominent Indian representatives.

Pakistan was represented by Mr Fazal-ur-Rahman, Director, Strategic Studies Institute Ltd Islamabad (not to be confused with the more reputed Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) and Mr Khalid Rahman, Director General, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. Major General Sajjadul Haque, Director General, Bangladesh Institute of International & Strategic Studies, Mr Nihal Rodrigo, former foreign secretary of Sri Lanka, and Dr Kelegama, Executive Director, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, were some of the other prominent South Asian participants. Nepal had representatives from the international relations cell of United Communist Party (Maoist) and the Nepal Congress.    

After a brief inaugural function addressed by Chinese government and academic dignitaries, the Forum deliberations were carried out in three simultaneous meetings to discuss Regional Economic Cooperation, Regional Connectivity and People to People Contact.

In the evening Shanti Niketan and Vishwa Bharati University made a audio-visual presentation for the delegates on Ravindranath Tagore's universal message of love and peace, interspersed with melodious Ravindra Sangeet. Professor Tan Chung gave a moving introduction to the programme on Tagore and his contribution  for amity and peace.

At the session on Regional Connectivity, senior representatives from India spoke. Mr Gonsalves stressed the need to work on common interests as relationship building was a work in progress. Major General Dipankar Banerjee touched upon problems of visa issue which was affecting connectivity.  Col Hariharan (Retd) made a presentation on strengthening China-India convergences which was well received.  Commodore RS Vasan (Retd) from Center for Asia Studies, speaking at the same session highlighted the power play in the Indian Ocean and identified areas in which India and China can actively cooperate. 

The Chinese representatives made multifaceted and well researched presentations. They focused on positive aspects on which relationship could be built. They stressed the need for China-South Asia networking to minimise the impact of the global economic downturn as well as for sharing technological advancements in China and India.  

There was an open house to draw up a China-South Asia Forum Charter. After a lot of debate, a declaration rather than a memorandum was drawn up to take the Forum forward.  The Chinese hosts wanted the Forum to meet next year to add form and content to the ideas discussed at the forum. Delegates agreed to the suggestion.

Overall, the Forum meet was very well organised with excellent time management and logistics. The credit goes to Professor Ren Jia, chairman of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences who was ably assisted by Professor Guo Suiyan. A surfeit of enthusiastic student volunteers from the university, who tried out their English skills with the delegates, went out of their way to help the delegates.The delegates will remember the warm hospitality and courtesy of all the staff looking after them.

The Forum meet coincided the China-South Asia Expo (a morphed form of South Asian Countries Trade Fair held in earlier years) at Kunming from June 6 to 10, 2013. Simultaneously, the 21st China Kunming Import and Export Fair was also held. According to a Xinhua report, business volume transacted at the two five-day fairs “proposed to strengthen cooperation and maintain economic growth amid the lack lustre economic rebound” totalled $17.47 billion, “up 116.5 percent over last year.”

With the Yunnan - Burma road to the Indian Ocean coast and pipeline links poised to be completed this year, clearly the objective of the whole exercise was not only to show case Kunming which has become a modern city but also to market Yunnan as the gateway for business with China for South Asians. It is a timely move that can also take advantage of the BCIM infrastructure link which is taking shape.

Obviously, the Chinese objective in organizing the CSA Forum was to understand the perceptions of South Asian countries to provide for smoother interaction with them and strengthen the growing links with China. 

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies, C3S Paper No 1167 dated 27 June 2013
http://www.c3sindia.org/india/3635

Sri Lanka: 13A and its nine lives

Col R Hariharan

Indian Ministry of External Affairs took the unusual step of issuing a strong press statement cautioning Sri Lanka not to dilute the 13^th Amendment (13A) at the end of a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) delegation’s meetings with Indian leadership including the Prime Minister on June 19, 2013. It was in response in to Colombo’s hectic moves to dismantle the constitutional provision of 13A that confers a level of autonomy to Tamil minority.  If 13A is abolished it would not only be negation of the promises President Rajapaksa made to the nation and India but  it would set the clock back on the national reconciliation process that is stalled at the start line since 2009.

The much maligned 13A reached its episodic climax during May-June as the September 2013 Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections neared. There was a flurry of activities in Colombo as the President was averse to allow the Tamil National Alliance(TNA) – erstwhile political ally of the LTTE- to capture power in the NPC. There was a bit of confusion as the President was making up his mind on how to go about doing this. This resulted in the administration and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the all powerful Defence Secretary sending confusing signals on future course of action. Lalith Weeratunge, President’s Secretary, added his penny’s worth in twitter justifying the dilution of powers of the “while elephant” provincial councils as they had not served any purpose, a discovery that came 23 years too late.

In this context TNA MP Sumanthiran’s twitter was interesting: “If PCs have not worked so far, then why has this discovery not taken place all these years? Only when the Tamil people were going to vote did they decided that provincial councils are not required... This shows their malfeasance,” he added.

In a political tear jerker that would vie with mid-day television soap, the last two episodes saw the dramatic change in the ruling UPFA coalition’s political strategy. It hopped from bringing an “urgent bill” to replacing 13A with the 19th amendment (a morphed 13A with its non-flyer wings clipped) to refer it to yet another parliamentary select committee (PSC). Obviously, the quick change of mind came after India hinted dark forebodings and some of the coalition partners loudly protested, while Tamil parties watched.

The President has used the PSC as time-tested weapon to bring to heel recalcitrant Tamil political nit-pickers as much as chief justice. The PSC has two advantages –it buys time and rarely it produces acceptable results because key parties usually do not participate in it. In the present instance also, only the ruling UPFA coalition was quick to nominate 19 members while the main opposition UNP and yesterday’s opposition JVP remained non-starters. TNA’s participation is anybody’s guess, as the troika that pulls it ensures it runs in the same place without moving forward.

As the government appears to be reconciled to hold the NPC elections as scheduled in September 2013 without any change in the 13A, the PSC’s purpose is probably to delay a decision on the issue till the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) is seen through in October 2013. As the President has appointed a PSC to “to speed up the process,” Colombo hopes to smoothen India’s ruffled feathers lest it decides not to participate (India never boycotts) in the CHOGM. We can expect the PSC to stretch itself to see through the CHOGM where the President would be anointed lead the CHOGM for two years.

Sri Lanka needs to seriously introspect why the 13A still survives when all politicians, including President Rajapaksa and his brother Gotabaya speak periodically about changing it or getting rid of it.

The 13A fathered by the wily of Sri Lanka neta JR Jayawardane as political expedience to weather a brewing confrontation with India in 1987. It was a deformed child at birth, with low life expectation. It was never allowed to articulate fully and remained a cradle baby after Prabhakaran massacred hapless policemen and other Tamil activists of EPRLF in hundreds in 1990 and killed the hopes of the Northeastern Provincial Council ever functioning. Prabhakaran’s stand against 13A to give substance to his quest for a free Tamil Eelam suited Southern Sinhalas who were in any case averse to “Tamil terrorists” - regardless of their stripes - coming to power.   

However, political parties in the rest of Sri Lanka took to provincial council system with surprising agility because it created one more layer of dispensation of power and favours. It also gave local politicians and their underlings the trappings of non-existent power.   So the 13A continues its ambulatory existence as Sri Lanka polity has not been willing to find a suitable substitute that would provide decentralized powers to the provinces.

As the 13A owes it to the India-Sri Lanka Accord 1987 (ISLA), it has another “useful” political purpose – to make India the whipping boy. India is an essential “evil denominator” in Sri Lanka politics; political and military memoirs written by Sri Lankans are replete with instances to describe this phenomenon. Tamil and Sinhala leaders of all hues ranging from Rajapaksa to Prabhakaran to Weerawansa have emphasized 13A’s as an Indian machination thrust upon an unwilling Sri Lanka.

The 13A’s ISLA linkage has been bringing India into the Sri Lanka political scene now and again, though less frequently after India’s unpleasant experience of direct intervention from 1987 to 90. Even the present Indian interest in 13A came about only after President Rajapaksa thawed it out of cold storage when he came to power in 2005 to use it as a political ploy to ward off sermonising Western powers and retain India’s support.

To sustain Indian support during the Eelam War, Rajapaksa went through various committee manoeuvres and promises to “improve” the 13A, which was never fully implemented. Fortunately, for him, New Delhi with its own other internal and external preoccupations had accepted his arguments during the Eelam War. However, after AIADMK dethroned DMK from power in Tamil Nadu using Eelam War issue, New Delhi was pushed into action.

The pay off time for Sri Lanka’s double speak on the subject came at the UNHCR, after the Rajapaksa chose to ignore mounting allegations of war crimes at home and abroad. And New Delhi had little option but (to do the “right thing” as Hardeep S. Puri puts it in his op-ed piece in The Hindu “Why India is right on Sri Lanka”) to vote for the UNHRC resolution calling for Sri Lanka’s accountability for its conduct during the war.

The political scene in India is undergoing change and Sri Lanka will increasingly find its manoeuvring space getting more and more constricted even if the Congress-led alliance comes back to power in 2014.  As Hardeep Puri wrote, “To dismiss popular sentiment in Tamil Nadu as the machinations of politicians is both a misreading of the situation and a recipe for disaster. Why should Sri Lanka not be held to account for not respecting understandings given bilaterally to India, such as those of April-May 2009?”

Unless Rajapaksa finds an answer to this vexing question, any government in India will find it difficult to wish away the issue because Sri Lanka’s “accountability” is as much applicable to its promises on implementing 13A and devolution of powers to Tamil minority, as investigating allegations of war crimes.

The simple truth is devolution and 13A issues have come to haunt President Rajapaksa because he squandered four years of peace in strengthening his political base rather than bringing back Tamils to political mainstream. This has compounded his accountability problem with the international community. Even now many are not convinced that he would go through the NPC election as planned because he has given sufficient indications that he would like to do what he and the Sinhala right want, rather than accept the inevitability of the TNA gaining control of the NPC.  

Surprisingly, the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa while rightly recognizing the rise of Eelam protagonists abroad as a threat to Sri Lanka’s national security, has failed to recognize the hot house conditions Sri Lanka is providing for them to propagate their cause. Acts of Sri Lanka Buddhist extremism increasing everyday against Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities, allowed with studied indifference of the state reinforces the growing belief that the Rajapaksa regime is becoming an inward looking, and intolerant. Political speeches on tolerance and brotherhood sound no more credible.These add to the climate of suspicion.

The present mess has given hope for revival of the Eelam Cause among Tamil Diaspora, though there is little enthusiasm among Sri Lankan Tamils. Thanks to Sri Lanka’s indifference to war crimes allegations and implementation of LLRC recommendations, anti-Sri Lanka sentiment is lodged in Tamil Nadu’s local politics. This poses a serious threat to not only India-Sri Lanka relations but also the interest of Tamil Nadu as has living links with Sri Lanka Tamils.    

Like all half cooked and warmed up food, 13A seems to have finished its shelf life. It has neither met the aspirations of yesterday’s Eelam secessionists nor satisfied Sinhala triumphalists. However, in the absence of a suitable substitute it stands as a sop, if not a symbol of hope, for Tamils. It also apparently satisfies President Rajapaksa’s “liberal sentiments” to leave it for the time being while his coalition members are pandering to Sinhala right wing elements. And it keeps India at bay. Given this curious setting I expect the 13A, truncated or otherwise, to survive its nine lives.

I am one of those who had believed that Sri Lanka at the end of the Eelam War had a wonderful opportunity to open a new chapter in equitable ethnic relations. But what is happening in Sri Lanka mocks at my simplistic belief. I realise Sumanthiran’s words “The Sri Lankan government from the word go was never interested (in devolution of power). The victory in the war meant, take it all….” are probably more than political rhetoric. And that is sad.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org