Col R Hariharan
Indian Ministry of External Affairs took the unusual
step of issuing a strong press statement cautioning Sri Lanka not to dilute the
13th Amendment (13A) at the end of a Tamil National Alliance (TNA)
delegation’s meetings with Indian leadership including the Prime Minister on
June 19, 2013. It was in response in to Colombo’s hectic moves to dismantle the
constitutional provision of 13A that confers a level of autonomy to Tamil
minority. If 13A is abolished it would not only be negation of the
promises President Rajapaksa made to the nation and India but it would
set the clock back on the national reconciliation process that is stalled at the
start line since 2009.
The much maligned 13A reached its episodic climax
during May-June as the September 2013 Northern Provincial Council (NPC)
elections neared. There was a flurry of activities in Colombo as the President
was averse to allow the Tamil National Alliance(TNA) – erstwhile political ally
of the LTTE- to capture power in the NPC. There was a bit of confusion as the
President was making up his mind on how to go about doing this. This resulted
in the administration and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the all powerful Defence
Secretary sending confusing signals on future course of action. Lalith
Weeratunge, President’s Secretary, added his penny’s worth in twitter justifying the dilution of
powers of the “while elephant” provincial councils as they had not served any purpose,
a discovery that came 23 years too late.
In
this context TNA MP Sumanthiran’s twitter was interesting: “If PCs have not
worked so far, then why has this discovery not taken place all these years?
Only when the Tamil people were going to vote did they decided that provincial
councils are not required... This shows their malfeasance,” he added.
In a political tear jerker that would vie with mid-day
television soap, the last two episodes saw the dramatic change in the ruling
UPFA coalition’s political strategy. It hopped from bringing an “urgent bill”
to replacing 13A with the 19th amendment (a morphed 13A with its non-flyer
wings clipped) to refer it to yet another parliamentary select committee (PSC).
Obviously, the quick change of mind came after India hinted dark forebodings
and some of the coalition partners loudly protested, while Tamil parties
watched.
The President has used the PSC as time-tested weapon
to bring to heel recalcitrant Tamil political nit-pickers as much as chief
justice. The PSC has two advantages –it buys time and rarely it produces
acceptable results because key parties usually do not participate in it. In the
present instance also, only the ruling UPFA coalition was quick to nominate 19
members while the main opposition UNP and yesterday’s opposition JVP remained
non-starters. TNA’s participation is anybody’s guess, as the troika that pulls
it ensures it runs in the same place without moving forward.
As the government appears to be reconciled to hold the
NPC elections as scheduled in September 2013 without any change in the 13A, the
PSC’s purpose is probably to delay a decision on the issue till the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) is seen through in October
2013. As the President has appointed a PSC to “to speed up the process,”
Colombo hopes to smoothen India’s ruffled feathers lest it decides not to
participate (India never boycotts) in the CHOGM. We can expect the PSC to
stretch itself to see through the CHOGM where the President would be anointed
lead the CHOGM for two years.
Sri Lanka needs to seriously introspect why the 13A
still survives when all politicians, including President Rajapaksa and his
brother Gotabaya speak periodically about changing it or getting rid of it.
The 13A fathered by the wily of Sri Lanka neta
JR Jayawardane as political expedience to weather a brewing confrontation with
India in 1987. It was a deformed child at birth, with low life expectation. It
was never allowed to articulate fully and remained a cradle baby after Prabhakaran
massacred hapless policemen and other Tamil activists of EPRLF in hundreds in
1990 and killed the hopes of the Northeastern Provincial Council ever
functioning. Prabhakaran’s stand against 13A to give substance to his quest for
a free Tamil Eelam suited Southern Sinhalas who were in any case averse to
“Tamil terrorists” - regardless of their stripes - coming to power.
However, political parties in the rest of Sri Lanka
took to provincial council system with surprising agility because it created
one more layer of dispensation of power and favours. It also gave local
politicians and their underlings the trappings of non-existent
power. So the 13A continues its ambulatory existence as Sri Lanka
polity has not been willing to find a suitable substitute that would provide
decentralized powers to the provinces.
As the 13A owes it to the India-Sri Lanka Accord 1987
(ISLA), it has another “useful” political purpose – to make India the whipping
boy. India is an essential “evil denominator” in Sri Lanka politics; political
and military memoirs written by Sri Lankans are replete with instances to
describe this phenomenon. Tamil and Sinhala leaders of all hues ranging from
Rajapaksa to Prabhakaran to Weerawansa have emphasized 13A’s as an Indian
machination thrust upon an unwilling Sri Lanka.
The 13A’s ISLA linkage has been bringing India into
the Sri Lanka political scene now and again, though less frequently after
India’s unpleasant experience of direct intervention from 1987 to 90. Even the
present Indian interest in 13A came about only after President Rajapaksa thawed
it out of cold storage when he came to power in 2005 to use it as a political
ploy to ward off sermonising Western powers and retain India’s support.
To
sustain Indian support during the Eelam War, Rajapaksa went through various
committee manoeuvres and promises to “improve” the 13A, which was never fully
implemented. Fortunately, for him, New Delhi with its own other internal and
external preoccupations had accepted his arguments during the Eelam War.
However, after AIADMK dethroned DMK from power in Tamil Nadu using Eelam War
issue, New Delhi was pushed into action.
The pay off time for Sri Lanka’s double speak on the
subject came at the UNHCR, after the Rajapaksa chose to ignore mounting allegations
of war crimes at home and abroad. And New Delhi had little option but (to do
the “right thing” as Hardeep S. Puri puts it in his op-ed piece in The Hindu
“Why India is right on Sri Lanka”) to vote for the UNHRC resolution calling for
Sri Lanka’s accountability for its conduct during the war.
The political scene in India is undergoing change and
Sri Lanka will increasingly find its manoeuvring space getting more and more constricted
even if the Congress-led alliance comes back to power in 2014. As Hardeep
Puri wrote, “To dismiss popular sentiment in Tamil Nadu as the machinations of
politicians is both a misreading of the situation and a recipe for disaster.
Why should Sri Lanka not be held to account for not respecting understandings
given bilaterally to India, such as those of April-May 2009?”
Unless
Rajapaksa finds an answer to this vexing question, any government in India will
find it difficult to wish away the issue because Sri Lanka’s “accountability”
is as much applicable to its promises on implementing 13A and devolution of
powers to Tamil minority, as investigating allegations of war crimes.
The
simple truth is devolution and 13A issues have come to haunt
President Rajapaksa because he squandered four years of peace in strengthening
his political base rather than bringing back Tamils to political mainstream.
This has compounded his accountability problem with the international
community. Even now many are not convinced that he would go through the NPC
election as planned because he has given sufficient indications that he would
like to do what he and the Sinhala right want, rather than accept the
inevitability of the TNA gaining control of the NPC.
Surprisingly, the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa
while rightly recognizing the rise of Eelam protagonists abroad as a threat to
Sri Lanka’s national security, has failed to recognize the hot house conditions
Sri Lanka is providing for them to propagate their cause. Acts of Sri Lanka
Buddhist extremism increasing everyday against Hindu, Muslim, and Christian
minorities, allowed with studied indifference of the state reinforces the
growing belief that the Rajapaksa regime is becoming an inward looking, and
intolerant. Political speeches on tolerance and brotherhood sound no more
credible.These add to the climate of suspicion.
The present mess has given hope for revival of the
Eelam Cause among Tamil Diaspora, though there is little enthusiasm among Sri
Lankan Tamils. Thanks to Sri Lanka’s indifference to war crimes allegations and
implementation of LLRC recommendations, anti-Sri Lanka sentiment is lodged in
Tamil Nadu’s local politics. This poses a serious threat to not only India-Sri
Lanka relations but also the interest of Tamil Nadu as has living links with
Sri Lanka Tamils.
Like
all half cooked and warmed up food, 13A seems to have finished its shelf life.
It has neither met the aspirations of yesterday’s Eelam secessionists nor
satisfied Sinhala triumphalists. However, in the absence of a suitable
substitute it stands as a sop, if not a symbol of hope, for Tamils. It also
apparently satisfies President Rajapaksa’s “liberal sentiments” to leave it for
the time being while his coalition members are pandering to Sinhala right wing
elements. And it keeps India at bay. Given this curious setting I expect the
13A, truncated or otherwise, to survive its nine lives.
I
am one of those who had believed that Sri Lanka at the end of the Eelam War had
a wonderful opportunity to open a new chapter in equitable ethnic relations.
But what is happening in Sri Lanka mocks at my simplistic belief. I realise
Sumanthiran’s words “The Sri Lankan government from the word go was never
interested (in devolution of power). The victory in the war meant, take it
all….” are probably more than political rhetoric. And that is sad.
(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South
Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of
Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and
the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org
2 comments:
As a Sri Lankan and a Sinhalese I don’t think many in SL want 13 A dead. Many here accept 13 A would be a good solution for SL’s problem or even a starting point. I also like to know ur idea about SL government’s concerns. For example the idea of preventing any possibility of a merger between North and East is crucial to SL. Don’t u understand that it is a genuine concern.
When Dravidian separatism arose in South India, didn’t Nehru separate Dravidian province by forming kerala and kannada provinces? So why doesn’t SL have the same right to do the same thing in order to protect its nation. I find it hypocritical.
I agree India and Tamil Nadu should understand genuine concerns of Sri Lanka. And as you rightly said 13A was a starting point. But now after the Eelam War, I feel there is a fresh perspective needed from both sides - I mean Sinhala and Tamil, India and Sri Lanka - on how to achieve a win win situation given the current situation.
I see nothing wrong in having North and East as separate provinces, if that is what people want. This can be ascertained.
The creation of Andhra, Kerala and Karnataka states had nothing to do with Dravidian movement. Congress party in early 40s before independence decided on creation of linguistic states as a demand and organised its party apparatus on the same basis. When Indian princely states were merged a states reorganisation commission was appointed and present states were created.
Dravidian separatism died a natural death as it had no takers outside Tamil Nadu reducing the relevance of the whole concept. In Tamil Nadu this demand was faded once DMK party contested the elections and came to power. Even now though the anti-Sri Lanka rhetoric by fringe parties with separatist ideas in Tamil Nadu make big headlines in Sri Lanka they have little following.
I think a hardline on Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu or India will hurt Sri Lanka Tamils more than anyone else. It is politically not a clever move either.
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