Col R Hariharan
[This article includes points made by the
author in a discussion on a TV news channel on Maoist violence beamed on June
14, 2013.]
The Maoist attack on Dhanbad-Patna Intercity
Express at Jamui - one of Bihar's seven Maoists-hit
districts on May 13
killing three persons, is a rude reminder that the state is yet to win its war against
Maoist extremism, despite winning many battles on other fronts.
The attack comes even as the nation is
recovering from the gruesome killing of Chattisgarh Congress President Nand
Kumar Patel and his son, as well as the well-known Adivasi
leader Mahendra Karma, and 20 others by Maoists near Suguma in Southern Bastar
District earlier.
The two
incidents underline the need to shed the romantic notions many of us nurture
about Maoist extremism. Ironically the Congress leaders were on a “Parivartan
yatra” as a part of their electioneering campaign; but when will the country
make a parivartan (change) in the way it combats Maoists?
The Maoists’
–whatever be the latest alphabetical acronyms of their faction – fundamental
credo is to destroy the democratic state and its machinery through armed
violence. Maoists have shown repeatedly that all those who are in the way of
achieving this objective – be it the Adivasi they claim to protect, politicians,
petty government officials or even the hapless cop on traffic duty – will be
ruthlessly eliminated. So, successful
cohabitation of democratic governance and Maoists is an oxymoron
proposition.
Though national
leaders periodically repeat the cliché of Maoist extremism being a national
threat, they generally soft pedal the anti-democratic nature of Maoist conflict
and adopt reactive strategies. As a result for long the nation had adopted a
soft approach in dealing with Left Wing extremism in contrast to its attitude
to separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and northeast.
There are a few
reasons for this. Maoist strongholds are generally in backward tribal areas which
have low population density, and send fewer elected representatives. As long as
Maoist conflicts do not affect urban constituencies where political idiom is
commanded by money power and caste equations, politicians choose to ignore them
because poor Adivasis are outside the Hindu caste pantheon.
Tribals have
long faced social and political exploitation, and economic deprivation. Over a
period of time, society has chosen to ignore their plight. Their traditional
areas of habitation have been exploited by feudal elements that left the
Adivasi population eking out a marginal living. However, economic
liberalisation has drawn powerful national and foreign business entities with
rapacious appetite for raw material, particularly mineral deposits and green
resources into traditional areas of tribals. While mega business corporations in
collusion with political-bureaucracy nexus prospered with this development, the
Adivasis have been left out of the growth story. Moreover, corrupt political
and administrative system well entrenched in society has marginalised Adivasis
from gaining access to social security outreach of available to the rural poor.
Claiming to be
defenders of the oppressed people, particularly the tribals, Maoists have been
able to sell their struggle to gain broad based support among human rights and
environmental activists and left wing sympathisers. Usually they are more
articulate and committed to their beliefs than politicians whose words fail to
carry conviction.
Political
parties have also been treating Maoist extremism to score brownie points
against the ruling party. Of course, the ineptness of execution of operations
and knee jerk response of political leadership to Maoist extremism provide
opportunities galore for the opposition.
Elected
governments at the state and Centre are aware of this situation. However, due
to lack of accountability in governance, the state has unwittingly become
unofficial patrons of exploiters. As a result their repeated promises to make
the system vibrant are suspect. As structural changes continue to be elusive, Maoists
have thrived.
During the last
decade or so, Maoists have also become part of this network of exploitation by extorting
mining entities and their contractors. So Maoists are no more gooey eyed
idealists the intellectual class would like to believe.
When P
Chidambaram donned the mantle of Union Home Minister in the wake of 26/11
Lashkar terrorist attack in Mumbai, he adopted a systematic approach to
strengthen the police and paramilitary forces. The fight against Maoist
extremism also benefitted from this approach. According to the Home Ministry
reports total number of districts affected by Maoist extremism fell from 208 in
2009 to 173 in 2012. Some major counter extremists operations were launched in
2009-10 and as many 5,705 extremists were killed, surrendered or arrested.
Does this mean government
has succeeded in eradicating Maoist extremism? The figures of casualties and "liberated areas" are deceptive, as in low
intensity warfare body count may weaken the extremist but does not end their
activity. After suffering heavy losses in 2009-10, Maoists have changed their
tactics to avoid contact with paramilitary forces. Maoists, despite their
depleted strength, retain the ability to carry out sensational strikes. Exploiting
the operational incompetency and leadership weaknesses of state apparatus, they
now carry out attacks like the ones on the Intercity express in Jamui and
Congress leaders and functionaries in Chattisgarh.
There is an
underlying national consensus among political parties, and even among most of
the civil society organs, that Maoist extremism vitiates the gains of
democratic governance. However, deep differences exist on how to go about
eliminating them or render them ineffective. There appears to be an element of
desperation in the government’s approach. In September 2011 Union Home Minister
P Chidambaram expressed Centre’s readiness for holding unconditional talks with
Maoists even if they do not surrender arms or renounce their extremist
ideology. It is not clear what will the state and the extremists talk about, if
the extremists continue to retain the arms and adhere to their ideological
commitment to destroy the state through armed struggle!
In short our
national approach to combating Maoist extremism appears confused and
vacillating. The country’s war against
Left Wing extremism appears to be heading for a long haul, unless it can
overcome some fundamental weaknesses that have become part of our system:
·
- The overall objective should be to remove the Maoists as interlocutors for the oppressed people and sensitise the state administrative machinery to meet the needs of the people. The state has to own up its responsibility to protect the constitution and provide a secure environment for the people to live in. This involves the removal of Maoists as an extra constitutional entity interfering with governance. To achieve this, the state requires goal clarity, which does not seem to exist now.
- The state should be able to sustain its presence in the “liberated” area and defend it against recurrence of Maoist extremism. This can come about only when the people see the state as a better option than Maoists and extend their support. Attempts to carry out such programmes have not made much headway due to lack of political will and commitment. Political rivalry, cronyism and corruption coupled with aberrations in the administrative and police machinery usually vitiate the gains.
- A well integrated approach between the state and the Centre in combating Maoists continues to remain elusive although their paramilitary and police forces have been working together for nearly a decade now. Law and order is largely the state’s responsibility and states are wary of Centre poaching on their pasture under cover of counter extremist operations. This has been aggravated by schism between states ruled by the opposition and the Centre. At functional level this affects real time information sharing and coordination of operations.
- Police forces continue to be colonial stereotypes lacking a people-friendly approach. This has affected modernisation of police forces affecting their counter extremist operations. As most of the states have chosen to ignore implementation of police reforms, recommended by successive police commissions, organs of law enforcement continue to wallow in corruption and pandering to political influence. Palliative measures like employing retired army brigadiers for planning of operations against extremists are unlikely to yield lasting results professional standards of police and paramilitary forces are upgraded without delay.
In short,
success in operations against extremists cannot be gauged merely by body counts
or size of sanitized areas, though they do indicate success of operations at
the field level. The more difficult part of operations is weaning away the
people from Maoists’ pernicious ideology that undermines the very existence of
the state. To create a congenial environment for this, it becomes imperative to
render Maoists ineffective so that they cease to be an instrument of terror.
But such security operations should be a means to an end for good governance. To
achieve this counter-terror operations have to be planned and executed with
greater sensitivity to human rights and environmental protection lest the
organs of state merely replace Maoists as the exploiter of peoples’
grievances.
Col Hariharan
is a retired Military Intelligence officer associated with the Chennai Centre
for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com
Blog: www.colhariharan.org)
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Paper No 5511 dated June 17, 2013 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1294
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