Col. R. Hariharan
This paper was presented
by Col Hariharan at the Third Annual Conference on “Inside China 2013: New
Leadership, Social Changes and Economic Challenges,” jointly organised at New
Delhi by the C3S, India International Centre, New Delhi, Institute of Policy
and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, Department of East Asia Studies, Delhi
University, and Centre for East Asia Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi, on September 6, 2013 at New Delhi.
INTRODUCTION
The long process of
China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) modernisation going on since 1978 is
conditioned by three things: Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s mandate, national
leadership’s guidance, and the dynamics of strategic environment in which the
PLA is expected to operate.
The 18th National
Congress of the CCP held in November 2012 brought in fifth generation leaders
in a thorough makeover of the national leadership. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang
brought in to the politburo standing committee replaced Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao as President and Premier respectively in March 2013. Thus in the next
decade or so the PLA modernization process will be guided by the 18th Congress
deliberations, under the new leadership according to the strategic environment
visualized by them. [1]
After deliberating on issues, the 18th CCP Congress
Work Report identified the broad contours of PLA’s strategic modernization as:
“Building strong national defense and powerful
armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet
the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of
China’s modernization drive.
“We should attach great importance to maritime,
space and cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of
military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and
enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most
important of which is to win local war in an information age.”[2]
Translated in military
terms, the Congress visualized PLA modernization as a continuous process in
keeping with the strategic needs of China to enhance its global power
projection. Its stress on maritime, space and cyberspace security are closely
linked to informatization process already underway to bring PLA on par with
modern armies of the West, particularly the U.S. The digitization process of
PLA will go hand in hand as part of the “four modernizations” – the strategic
direction provided by Deng Xiaoping for his holistic development vision in the
fields of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology.
This enables the PLA modernization process to take advantage of the gains of
national development.
PLA’s peace time
employment envisaged by the Congress would be to further improve its competence
in military operations other than warfare (MOOTW) that will include disaster
relief as well assistance to the Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) to handle internal
unrest and counter terrorism tasks whenever required. Continued participation
of PLA in UN peace keeping operations and anti-piracy missions would be in keeping
with China’s growing international influence and desire to increase its
international profile as a responsible global power.
PLA and the new
leadership
President Xi Jinping in
his first address made to the nation on March 17, 2013 as head of state spoke
of the Chinese dream. He said “We must make persistent efforts, press ahead
with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism
with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. “To realise the Chinese road, we must
spread the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with
patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as
the core,” he added.
Since becoming
President, Xi had been travelling far and wide throughout the country from
Shenzhen “Special Economic Zone” of in the south where China’s economic
revolution started to arid Gansu in the North one of the poorest provinces. He
has been visiting military training institutions, PLA establishments and naval
ships to spread his Chinese dream. Evidently Xi’s Chinese dream will have
reform and innovation as ingredients in both economic and strategic security
content.
The idea is reflected in
retired PLA Colonel Liu Mingfu’s book The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and
Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era in 2010. He says “Since the 19th
Century, China has been lagging on the world stage….President Xi’s dream is of
a stronger nation with a strong military.”[3]
Even before Xi became
President in March 2013, as general secretary of the Central Committee of the
CCP he had “vowed to unswervingly fight against corruption and keep power
reined within the cage of regulations” while addressing a plenary meeting of
the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on January 22,
2013. He “ordered enhanced restraint and supervision on the use of power.” He
stressed, “Power should be restricted by the cage of regulations.”
According to a Global
Times report, he asked “efforts to strengthen national anti-corruption
legislation and relevant intra-Party regulations to ensure national organs
exercise their power within the boundary of laws”.[4] According to the report
Xi said “the CPC’s resolve and distinct attitude on handling serious
rule-breaking among some of its cadres, including high-ranking officials,
showed it is “absolutely no empty talk” that one will be severely punished for
law or Party discipline violations no matter how high a person’s official
ranking is.”
On June 18, 2013 Xi
called for a ‘mass line’ for co-jointing the interests of the Party with the
people in a year-long campaign for a “thorough cleanup” of undesirable work
styles such as formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance. (Top
leaders of the CCP launched the ‘mass line’ from the second half of the year to
cement Party-people ties.).Xi also stressed the CCP members should be critical
and self-critical in the spirit of rectifying improper work styles and the
campaign should focus on self-purification, self-renewal and self-progression.
This jargon reminiscent of Maoist days clearly indicates the Party’s and Xi’s
desire to improve the Party members’ ideological commitment, discipline,
eradicate corruption and improve their contact with the people.
As a creature of the
Party it is impacting the PLA also. This evident from a circular issued by the
PLA General Political Department said Xi’s speech showed that the CCP was
“consciously adaptable to changing times and can maintain its advanced nature
and purity.” Xi’s speech should be studied and combined with the spirit of the
CCP’s 18th National Congress, adding that “the minds and actions of the armed
forces” should be unified with decisions made by the central leadership”, it
added. [5]
According to a Xinhua
report of July 22, 2013 President Xi called for unswerving efforts to
strengthen relations between military officers and common soldiers through a
campaign inside the military. The campaign, which was initiated in April,
requires senior PLA officers and the armed police to live and train as common
soldiers for at least 15 days in grassroots units every one to five years,
depending on their rank. Xi said the campaign will help promote military
traditions, improve its work style, strengthen ties between officers and
soldiers and reinforce the “construction” of grassroots military units. It also
said the PLA General Political Department had issued orders for military
officers to solve problems of soldiers and grassroots military units during the
campaign. Officers must reflect on their responsibilities and problems through
the campaign and make their work more scientific and efficient. The campaign
will be part of the implementation of the “mass line,” the Party guideline
under which officials and members of the Party are required to “prioritize the
interests of the people and continue to represent them and work on their
behalf,” it added.
Clearly President Xi’s
aim is to prevent development of elitism among Party leaders and military
officers lest they lose touch with ordinary people. In this context Xi
Jinping’s observations on PLA-Party relationship and PLA soldiers’
professionalism during a visit to the Beijing Military Region headquarters on
July 29, 2013 are of interest. According to Xinhua he said, “We must make sure
that troops obey the command of the Party and are absolutely loyal and
reliable”….Officials and soldiers “especially those medium-level and senior
officials” should be educated on consciously sticking to political belief,
stance and discipline. He further stated, “They should maintain high-level
unity with CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission any time
and under any circumstances, and resolutely obey their command.” Currently and
in the near future an important task in the regard is to strengthen efforts of
promoting the goal of building a strong military, Xi said. Combat capability
was the only and fundamental measure of the troops, urging accelerated steps to
enhance the military’s strength based on information technology. [6]
To summarize, President
Xi Jinping’s aim appears to be to ensure the PLA modernization process, which
is bringing a lot of graduates and technical people with specialized roles into
armed forces, does not encourage Bonapartist tendencies but sustain PLA’s total
commitment to the Party.
Visualization of PLA’s
role
China’s Defence White
Paper 2013 visualizes the nature of China’s national defence policy and PLA’s
strategic role as: “China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of
peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature…. China will
never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in
military expansion… China’s armed forces provide a security guarantee and
strategic support for national development, and make due contributions to the
maintenance of world peace and regional stability” [7].
Its stress on the
defensive nature of China’s national defence policy and avowal “never to seek
hegemony” are only a reiteration of its views of the past. However, it has
become necessary now on two counts. China’s loud power assertion of territorial
claims in South China Sea and its never-ending territorial pin pricks along its
unsettled border with India have increased international perception of China as
a bully out to destabilize Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. This has led to
the U.S. increasing its strategic readiness in China’s neighbourhood with more
powerful neighbours like Japan, India and Vietnam realigning their strategic
equations with each other.
DS Rajan in his paper on
PLA modernization sees this as China’s military strategy undergoing “a fresh
elaboration of operational tasks for the PLA.” [8] According to him the four
demands being made now on the military are:
- To
conduct ‘Historical Missions in the New Period of the New Century’ involving
non-combat operations such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as President Hu
Jintao, said in 2004. This is in keeping with China’s growing global interests
and desire to be seen as a global power.
- To
protect the country’s ‘core interests.’ These include maintaining fundamental
and state security, safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and ensuring continued stable development of economy and society.
- To
build new type of combat capability to win local wars in conditions of
informatization and strengthen the composite development of mechanization and
informatization, with the latter as leading force.’ This implies integrating
C4ISR systems in mechanized forces command, control, deployment and operations
and integrating air and naval support.
- To
‘build strong army that is capable of winning wars and strengthening combat
readiness.’
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF MODERNISATION
The ongoing process of
evolution of PLA as a modern fighting force started in 1977 after ten traumatic
years of Cultural Revolution played havoc with PLA’s cohesiveness. PLA’s
strategic modernization falls in four convenient time zones: [9]
- Period
of implosion (1966-76): During this period of Cultural
Revolution played havoc with the cohesiveness and operational capabilities of
PLA. Military training came to a grinding halt and most of the training
establishments were closed down. As a result of political preoccupation, PLA’s
command and control structure broke down with specialists and officers
denounced as ‘bourgeois.
- Period
of introspection and recovery (1977-85): The failure
of the PLA in 1979 Vietnam War shook up the leadership leading to introspection
on revamping PLA. Military influence on Party was brought down. PLA
representation on the politburo and military membership in the Central
Committee were progressively brought down to lay stress on professionalism. PLA
training institutions were reorganized and the value of defence education was
recognized. National Defence University was formed by merging the PLA Military
Academy, the PLA Political Academy and the PLA Logistics Academy to promote
‘jointness’ in the PLA. The first simulated combat exercise was held in 1985.
- Period
of strategic rethinking (1985-95): After PLA formations were restructured
creating group armies. Training system was further revamped to complement
simulated combat exercises. Recruit training was improved. The Gulf and Kosovo
wars introduced to PLA the emerging informatized battlefields of the future. In
1995 President Jiang Zemin conceptualized the focus on “two transformations” –
fighting and winning local wars under “informatized” conditions, and becoming a
force based on quality instead of quantity. To achieve this both the government
and the PLA began “to cultivate a new generation of officers capable and
competent.”
- Period
of strategic change (1995 onwards): Chinese leadership realized the
imperatives of hi-tech environment in warfare after U.S. invasion of Iraq and
war on terror in Afghanistan. It realized embracing informatized and digitized
environment would enable PLA take a leap forward in modernization without
waiting for full mechanization. To improve the quality of officers, recruitment
of college graduates became the norm. Training of PLA personnel in civilian
institutions was also introduced to speed up informatization and digitization
to suit 21st century warfare needs.
PLA’s strategic
challenges and response
China considers the U.S.
as key contender in its power projection. Considering this, the PLA would be
keenly analyzing some of the tasks visualized by the U.S. from time to time.
The U.S.’s strategic realignments and developments in tactical doctrines and
integrated warfare systems would be of special interest to the PLA.
Of course, China has
publicized its rapid advances in science and technology which have speeded up
PLA’s modernization process. Of strategic interest are the following
developments: [10]
- Rapid progress has been made in reconnaissance and
surveillance capability using unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite
resources with the positioning of China’s16 Beidou satellites. They now cover
the entire area across China and the Asia-Pacific and we can expect South Asia
also to come under its coverage as more countries are opting for Beidou
communication satellites. Trefor Moss writing in the Diplomat has reported that
the China’s maritime agency – the State Oceanic Administration(SOA) – was
setting up 11 UAV bases (one in each coastal province) to be ready by 2015.[11]
- Up gradation of PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet strength with
more submarine and surface platforms and better anti-aircraft and anti-ship
systems in place is progressing well. The Navy’s fleet operation outside the
South China Sea is taking its baby steps. While the newly inducted Liaoning
aircraft carrier is trying out landing of fighter jets, we can expect a carrier
based PLAN fleet streaming in Indian Ocean in the coming years.
- PLAN had been operating anti-piracy operational
task forces since 2008 in Gulf of Aden. Though China had been projecting it as
part of the international effort to fight piracy, these operations have refined
PLAN’s fleet operational capability in international waters. PLAN ships have
also been exposed to an entirely new experience of operating in coordination
with ships of Indian Navy and Japanese Self Defence Force on anti-piracy duties
in the area.
- According to the U.S. Department of Defense “The
road-mobile, solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A)
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service. The CSS-10 Mod
2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the
continental United States. China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM,
possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry
vehicle (MIRV).”[12]
- Although PLAAF flight tested J-20, its first
stealth aircraft in 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses “China’s
first fifth generation fighter is not expected to enter service prior to 2018,
and China faces numerous challenges to achieving full operational capability,
including developing high-performance jet engines.”[13]
- Similarly PLAAF which is refining its joint warfare
capability, is said to be facing problems in providing accurate ground support
using C4I systems as precision guided munitions (PGM) for accurate air strike
is yet to be developed.
PLA training exercises
2012-13
PLA training exercises
during 2012-13 provide an indication of how it is preparing to meet the strategic
challenges. These exercises have been growing in complexity and size over the
years. Of special interest are the trans-military region (MR) exercises by PLA
along with PLAAF that have been undertaken since 2008. Jinan MR has emerged as
central to these exercises indicating its role as strategic reserve. These
exercises have shown China’s ability to move large forces using rail and
civilian infrastructure and logistics over long distances.
According to a U.S. War
College report of 2012, “These exercises have allowed the PLA to experiment
with operational techniques in areas such as command and control for joint
operations, operations in a complex electromagnetic environment, the formation
of combined arms battalion task forces, and logistics support. Thus, trans-MR
exercises contribute not only to PLA capabilities but also to China’s overall
deterrence posture and are important signifiers of overall PLA development and
modernization exercises”[14]
China-Russia joint
military exercises 2013
China in response to the
changes in the international security environment in its neighbourhood has been
carrying out war games with Russia. It carried out two joint military exercises
with Russia in 2013, namely the “China-Russia Maritime Joint Exercise 2013” and
the “Peace Mission 2013.”
Peace Mission 2013 was
held in Chelyabinsk in Urals in Russia from July 27 to August 15, 2013 with
battalion sized combat groups from Shenyan Military Area Command and Russia’s
Central Military Area Command participated in the exercise. JH-A fighter
bombers of PLAAF and Su-24 fighters of Russian air force participated in the
exercise. The objective of the exercise was ostensibly to jointly train and
exercise in planning and carrying out counter terrorism operations. But considering
the battalion combat group training supported by armour and air force, probably
the objective was to refine BCT operations jointly with air force in a C4I
environment. It is significant as the PLA took part in training in another
country and transported its troops over large distances.
The Sino-Russian
maritime joint exercise termed as China’s “largest ever joint naval exercise”
was carried out in the Sea of Japan in the second week of July 2013. with the
participation of 18 surface ships including four guided missile destroyers, two
missile frigates, a supply ship and three-ship born helicopters, and a
submarine. According to Xinhua, Major General Yang Junfei, the Chinese fleet’s
commander, said: “This is our strongest line-up ever in a joint naval drill.”
China was sending “seven ships, three helicopters and one special warfare
unit”, he added. The exercise was to simulate “recapturing ships seized by
pirates, as well as search-and-rescue operations and a number of air defence,
anti-submarine and anti-ship exercises,” Xinhua reported. Two commando units
also took part in the exercise.
Apart from its relevance
of this joint exercise to the growing Chinese confrontation with Japan and
Philippines in South China Sea, these exercises are sure to enhance the fleet
operation, assault landing and joint operation techniques of PLAN.
Peoples’ Armed Police
(PAP) exercises
Considering the growing
counter terrorism requirements in its western borders, the PAP has increased
its training on counterterrorism, riot control, border control, and natural
disaster response operations. They are now better trained and equipped than
before. The PAP training appears to be focusing on operating in integration
with other ground forces in informatization setting. This will enhance PAP’s
capacity during wartime as they provide light infantry support to the PLA and
be ready to respond to civil unrest that may accompany an external threat in
Xinjiang and Tibet.
CONCLUSION
The CCP under the new
leadership of Xi Jinping is striving to tighten the Party discipline, fight
corruption and improve the linkages between the Party and the people. PLA as
the sword arm of the Party will also being impacted by these measures. His
approach to the PLA appears to be to ensure the modernization process which is
bringing a lot of graduates and technical people with specialized roles
conforms to its total commitment to the Party.
As a continuous process,
PLA modernization is progressing well to take on expanding roles and missions
in keeping with China’s increasing global influence and power. Having completed
the restructuring of forces and increased their fire power and mobility, PLA’s
stress on informatization and digitization will be to improve its BCT
capabilities with air support, increase its strategic mobility, and firepower
using missiles on land air and sea. This will be in keeping with China’s
increasing power assertion in its neighbourhood and enlarging ambitions to be
recognized as a global power.
Some of the areas of
development to watch would be PGM, fifth generation fighters, conventional
missiles anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military
cyberspace capabilities. These would enhance PLA’s to take on
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions.
The PLA’s sophisticated
training and exercises involving land forces, navy, and air force have enhanced
its capability to carryout long-range conventional strike and regional power
projection. The rapid modernisation of PLAN with greater operational exposure
is enhancing China’s ability to project its power beyond the Near Seas. In the
coming years the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning with
integrated air defence and submarine capabilities would further extend its
power projection capabilities.
[Col R Hariharan is a
retired MI officer specialising in South Asia and its neighbourhood. He is
associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and South Asia Analysis
Group. Email:colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org]
Notes
[1] Xinhua report, November 15, 2012 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special
[2] www.news.xinhuanet.com 17 November 2012
[3] BBC June 5, 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/world-asia-china-22726375
[4] Global Times, ‘Xi Jinping vows power within the cage of regulations.’
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/757583.shtml
[5] Quoted from South Asia Security Trends, July 2013 issue,
www.security-risks.com
[6] South Asia Security Trends, July 2013 issue, www.security-risks.com
[7] China’s Defence White Paper, April 2013 quoted by DS Rajan from “The
Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State
Council, People’s Republic of China, 16 April 2013 in “China: Enigmatic
military modernization programme” C3S Paper No. 1148, May 9, 2013
www.c3scindia.org
[8] As above
[9] Adapted from DS Rajan’s C3S paper quoted above and Kemphausen and others
ed., The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s
Military, a study of the PLA human infrastructure by Strategic Studies
Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2008.
[10] Extracted from Forecast of U.S. Army Tasks 2013, U.S. Department of
Defense.
[11] Trefor Moss, Here come…China’s Drones, The Diplomat, March 2, 2013
http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/02/here-comes-chinas-drones
[12] The 2013 China Report submitted by the U.S. Department of Defense to the
U.S. Congress.
[13] As above
[14] Kemphausen and others ed., Learning by Training: The PLA training at home
abroad, by Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2012.
