Col R Hariharan
Introduction
The growing presence of the Chinese in Sri Lanka, when India-Sri Lanka
relations are under stress, has disturbing strategic connotations for national
security. Chinese actions are closely related to the domestic and
external policy dispensations of the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jingping
as well as China’s desire to takeover South Asia’s under-exploited markets
dominated by India so far.
The 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress
held in November 2012 had envisaged the policy parameters of the new
leadership. It said: “Peaceful development is China’s basic state policy, and
win-win cooperation is a banner for China’s friendly relations with other
countries. To realise ‘China dream’, we must have a peaceful international
environment. At the same time, the country will resolutely safeguard its
national sovereignty, security, and core interests. The two policies are two
pillars of Chinese diplomacy, and do not conflict with each other.”
Echoing the Party guidance, President Xi
Jinping speaking at CCP politburo session in January 2013 said that China would
remain on a path of peaceful development, yet it would “never give up”
legitimate rights or sacrifice ‘core interests’. He cautioned that “no country
should presume that we will engage in trade involving our ‘core interests’ or
that we will swallow the ‘bitter fruit’ of harming our sovereignty, security or
development interests.” China’s loud assertion of its claims in South China Sea
bears this out.
In the South Asian context,
China’s policy prescription would translate as: vigorously defending the
integrity of its borders, pursuing its territorial claims, developing strategic
communication lines to the border areas and not losing sight of its economic
interests. The PLA’s repeated intrusions along
India’s border in Ladakh and enlarging presence in Sri Lanka validate this.
India’s emergence as a
rapidly growing economic and military power dominating the Indian Ocean adding
to China’s strategic concerns. China has unresolved border dispute and
unfulfilled territorial claims with India have continued to simmer. China
nurtures deep suspicions about India’s role in sustaining the activities of
exiled Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama as well as India’s growing strategic
relationship with the US and Japan.
Nonetheless, China appears to have realized the need to avoid head-on
confrontation with India and build a win-win relationship taking advantage of
each other’s economic strengths. Thanks to India’s reciprocation of these
sentiments their bilateral relations are recovering slowly from the huge
setback suffered after China’s war with India in 1962.
However, the relationship building process continues to be hostage to a
number of unresolved issues of 1962 vintage. New areas of Indian concern like
the construction of dams in the upper reaches of Brahmaputra River in Tibet and
the presence of PLA construction troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have
emerged.
Considering this environment,
building a strong relationship with Sri Lanka was a logical step for China as
it confers a strategic advantage in protecting its interests in the Indian
Ocean region while providing a strategic pivot in the underbelly of India.
China’s strategic forays in Sri Lanka
are likely impact the US and the Western powers also as it gives China a
strategic foothold midway on Indian Ocean’s international sea lanes of
communication. President Rajapaksa has been aggrieved about the way Sri Lanka
was treated by the US and the West over allegations of human rights violations
during the Eelam War IV and its aftermath. In the last stages of the War in
April 2009, the US offer to send marines to evacuate the LTTE leadership
trapped in a narrow strip of land caused a lot of suspicion about the US
intentions in Sri Lanka. This was further aggravated after the U.S. sponsored a
successful resolution seeking Sri Lanka’s accountability for its human rights
aberrations in the UN Human Rights Council meeting in March 2012 has.
China’s forays in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has the potential to make a huge impact in India’s strategic
security thanks to its geographic proximity to India. However, its smaller size
makes it more vulnerable to India’s strategic moves. Both nations have recognised the
relevance of each other to their national well being and security architecture. This
is vouched by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) signed
by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka President JR Jayewardene on July
29, 1987. In the letters exchanged between the two leaders at the time of signing of the
ISLA (and attached to the Agreement) JR Jayewardene had assured that Sri Lanka
would not make available Trincomalee and other ports for military use by any
country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interest. This is relevant in the
context of the emerging role of China in Sri Lanka.
India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka after the signing of the ISLA
and its pull out due to political changes in both the countries had soured the
relations for a decade. But later, the two nations came together to build a
converging, multifaceted relationship. This relationship developed frictions
after Sri Lanka army routed the LTTE and ended it two-decade old separatist
insurgency in the Eeelam War IV (2006-2009). Some of the reasons for this are:
- Sri Lanka’s unhappiness with India’s failure to meet its wish list for arms in full during the Eeelam War. This was due to domestic political pressure in India. However, India extended invaluable diplomatic, intelligence and other non-military support to Sri Lanka.
- Sri Lanka’s failure to dispassionately investigate allegations of war crimes committed against Tamils during the War triggered the sympathies for Tamils in Tamil Nadu helping revival of support for Sri Lankan Tamil separatism spearheaded by LTTE’s overseas elements. This has increased Sri Lanka’s suspicion about India’s agenda in Sri Lanka.
- India’s vote for the U.S. sponsored resolution seeking Sri Lanka’s accountability for its human rights aberrations passed in the UN Human Rights Council meeting in March 2012 had created a lot of bitterness in Sri Lanka.
- President Rajapaksa failure to keep up his repeated promises to implement the 13th Amendment created as a result of the ISLA to fully empower provincial councils. This has caused a furore in India’s domestic politics and embarrassed India’s ruling coalition. This could affect their political fortune in the next parliamentary election.
China has used these fissures in the bilateral relationship to
systematically to undermine India’s overwhelming political, strategic and
commercial influence in Sri Lanka. Despite the two South Asian neighbours very
close relations, China has made considerable headway by exploiting President
Rajapaksa’s domineering leadership style and sense of triumphalism after the
war. Sri Lanka’s economic vulnerability in the post-war reconstruction period
has made Sri Lanka to return Chinese overtures.
China established itself as a friend of
Sri Lanka by meeting Sri Lanka’s wartime requirements after it was “let down by
friends.” So far China is reported to have provided over $1.8 billion worth of
arms to Sri Lanka. China's Poly Technologies is estimated to have supplied $37.6
million worth ammunition and ordnance for the army and navy in 2007. China
National Electronics Import Export Corp provided Sri Lanka a JY 11 3D radar at
a cost of $5 million. China also provided diplomatic support for Sri Lanka at
the UN.
Chinese assistance has been widely
appreciated by President Rajapaksa and most of the Sri Lankans, who were
disappointed with India. This has provided take off point for China in Sri
Lanka’s internal and external spheres.
Since the end of Eelam war in 2009 there
had been a steady increase in exchanges at governmental, military, and
political levels between the two countries. President Rajapaksa has visited
China six times since came to power in 2005. During President Rajapaksa’s
August 2011 visit to Beijing, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed the
country’s readiness to help with Sri Lanka’s economic development, promote
communication between the two countries with regard to infrastructure
construction, enlarge two-way trade and investment, and strengthen cultural and
personnel exchanges.
In his last visit in May 2013, President Rajapaksa met with President Xi
Jinping during which China and Sri Lanka
agreed to upgrade their relations to a strategic cooperative partnership. A Xinhua report on the visit said “According
to the new consensus, the two countries will maintain high-level exchanges, enhance
political communication, and support each other's efforts in safeguarding
national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” indicating
Beijing’s strong desire to build its strategic relations with Sri Lanka.
China’s Defence Minister General Liang
Guanglie visit’s – the first ever for a Chinese defence minister to Sri Lanka -
in August 2012 was kept at a low profile. However, the Chinese press release on
the visit was a little more explicit. It quoted General Liang as saying that
political trust between the two countries had deepened with the rapid expansion
of exchanges and cooperation in various fields. He expressed the hope that the
two sides would continue to work hard to maintain the close and friendly
relations and strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the field of non-
traditional security and improve the ability to respond to crisis together, so
as contribute to regional peace, stability and development.
The Minister’s references to
‘non-traditional security’ and ‘responding to crisis together’ were related to
international counter-terrorism cooperation that China had been promoting for
some time. This was mooted in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and joint
exercises have been carried out. Probably China would like to promote similar
joint efforts with South Asian nations.This was evidenced by the Chinese
military participation in the Sri Lanka joint services exercise “Cormorant III”
from September 10 to 25, 2012 in Eastern Province aimed at honing joint
operational skills with the air force and navy in counter terrorism operations.
Besides the Chinese troops, military
personnel from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Maldives participated in the exercise.
As revival of Tamil separatist insurgency in Sri Lanka appears remote, Sri
Lankan armed forces training for such security situations would give them the
option of working with Chinese military assistance in such an eventuality.
China’s active military cooperation in Sri Lanka, literally in India’s
‘backyard’, would complicate India’s security situation.
During the Chinese defence minister’s
visit a grant of $100 million for construction of army camps in North and East
was a slew of such assistance announced. This illustrates Chinese attitude to
the aftermath of the Eelam War in sharp contrast to India’s $ 105 million relief
and rehabilitation package offered to war affected people.
A month after
his visit to Colombo, the chairman of China's
National People's Congress Standing Committee Wu Bangguo, known as the Top Legislator, the second
highest ranking member China’s party hierarchy, made a five-day visit to Sri
Lanka during the month. During his meeting with President Rajapaksa, Wu proposed
expanded cooperation between the two countries in infrastructure construction
and as well as collaboration in new sectors such as marine scientific research,
climate change, disaster prevention and relief, tourism etc. Many of the
projects offered have been quickly progressed by the Chinese showing the
priority they attach to Sri Lanka.
Major General Qian Lihua, Chief of
Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, visited Sri Lanka in
August 2012. He has a distinguished record as Member of the Central Military
Commission of PRC and Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army in
November 2002. During his exchange of views with Sri Lanka army commander he
assured PLA’s fullest cooperation to Sri Lanka army in several areas of its
professional training, exercises and further promotion of military assistance
on request. He also promised Sri Lanka more openings in the future for training
of Sri Lankan officers at PLA’s training facilities.
China has emerged as the largest
development aid giver to Sri Lanka in 2012 with a commitment of $1.05 billion
while India providing over $700 million was in the second place
according to the Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance and Planning's External Resources Department's 2012 report. The total assistance extended by China during the period between 1971 and 2012 was $5.05 billion of which $4.76 billion, representing around 94 per cent, was extended during the last 8-year period from 2005 to 2012, the report said. India extended a total assistance of $1.45 billion between 2007 and 2012. Out of this amount $1.12 billion was loan assistance and 326 million was grant assistance.
according to the Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance and Planning's External Resources Department's 2012 report. The total assistance extended by China during the period between 1971 and 2012 was $5.05 billion of which $4.76 billion, representing around 94 per cent, was extended during the last 8-year period from 2005 to 2012, the report said. India extended a total assistance of $1.45 billion between 2007 and 2012. Out of this amount $1.12 billion was loan assistance and 326 million was grant assistance.
Chinese companies are involved in a
number of infrastructure, communication and port development projects of
strategic importance funded by Chinese loans. These include the Hambantota port
project Phase-I completed at a cost of $360 million (85% financed by the
Chinese) and Phase II construction underway; the Mattala Rajapaksa International
Airport near Hambantota built at an estimated cost of $ 210 million completed
in March 2013; the just completed Colombo South Container terminal with
2.4 million TEU capacity built by a joint venture company in which China
Merchant Holdings Co holds 85% share. This makes Colombo Port complex one of
the biggest in the world.
At present over 25,000 Chinese workers
are in various projects in Sri Lanka and there is a fear that many of them may
stay on. Of greater sensitivity are Chinese
deals to build telecommunication and information technology networks in
Sri Lanka. These would increase China’s options to eavesdrop on Indian and
Indian Ocean communication and to carry out electronic warfare.
The projects include an agreement worth
$50 million between telecom provider China ZTE Corporation with Mobitel of Sri
Lanka to establish 700 LTE base stations and transmission equipment for stage
VII mobile network expansion project. Launch of the country’s first
communications satellite with the help of China Great Wall Industry Corp, which
has signed $320 million worth satellite deals with a Sri Lankan private
company. Besides this the two companies have struck deal for the use of China's
Beidou (GPS) navigation system by Sri Lanka. According to the Chinese company
spokesman a telecommunications centre in Kandy will become operational within
this year and provide Beidou service.
Conclusion
China’s strategic clout in Sri Lanka is increasing
every day. Many of Chinese assisted projects like Colombo container terminal,
Hambantota port and Mattala airport, satellite and telecom endeavours provide
legitimate access to Chinese specialist personnel. Under President Xi Jinping
efforts are on to build closer strategic linkages with Sri Lanka. These will
have serious connotations for India’s national security and maritime security.
China’s soft power is increasingly visible in all aspects of Sri Lanka society
–political, diplomatic, eand development fronts as well. Chinese entry into
real estate and some manufacturing projects are also coming through. Chinese
language teaching and cultural spread are also on the cards as Confucius Centre
is scheduled to open in Colombo.
Though Chinese soft power expansion is
also happening in India (except for Confucius Centre), political perceptions of
President Rajapaksa are likely to favour China as a counterpoise to reduce his
dependence upon India. The strategic dimension Chinese have added
now could make rapid headway unless the drift in India-Sri Lanka relations is
halted. The strong anti-Sri Lankan flavour of Tamil Nadu politics has caused
serious damage to India’s carefully nurtured relationship with Sri Lanka.
Unless this is managed better, political developments in India may well assist
rather than hinder China in establishing themselves firmly in Sri Lanka.
Written on August 11, 2013
Courtesy: Centre for Land Warfare Studies Journal "Scholar Warrior", August 2013 issue
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