Friday, 31 July 2015

How Mulla Omar’s death strengthens ISIS to target India?

His exit as a nominal head would further weaken Taliban’s dwindling support. We can expect more of their cadres defect to the Islamic State in the coming months.

COL R HARIHARAN @colhari2 | POLITICS | 4-minute read | 30-07-2015
Mulla Omar, the elusive Taliban leader who virtually led the Afghanistan government from 1996-2001, is dead. Abdul Hassib Seddiqi, the spokesman of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security confirmed that the Taliban leader died in a Karachi hospital in April 2013.
Omar’s refusal to hand over his close associate Osama bin Laden to the U.S. after the al Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in theU.S-led war on terror to end the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Since then the 53-year old one-eyed leader was never seen in public, particularly after a U.S. bounty of $ 10 million on his head was announced.  He was reported to have fled to Pakistan to form the Quetta Shura – Taliban’s leadership council in exile – and later to Karachi.
Though reports of his death had appeared in Afghanistan a few times in the past, they were never confirmed. Even recently, Afghan sources close to the Afghan government CEO Dr Abdulla Abdulla had reported his death in Pakistan in 2013.  The Afghan government seems to have decided to confirm Omar’s death now perhaps to thwart the Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (Afghan Taliban)’s effort to boost its image by publishing Mulla Omar’s biography in April 2015.  The biography spoke of battlefield achievements of Omar “the leader of the Islamic Emirate” in detail; it said he was continuing the jihadi activities in the face of “regular tracking by the enemy.”
Taliban watchers considered the publication of the biography as an  attempt to prevent defections from the organization to the Islamic State (ISIS) which has made rapid inroads into Taliban’s home ground. Once hailed as a charismatic leader, it is doubtful whether Omar still retained his charisma after years of absence from the public view. Even if he was alive, there is no certainty he would be able to face the sophisticated onslaught of ISIS, which is rewriting the idiom of jihadi warfare.
Mulla Omar’s exit even as a nominal head would further weaken Taliban’s dwindling popular support, though it had tried to assert its strength with a series of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan.  We can expect more Taliban cadres to defect to the ISIS in the coming months. This could increase its capability to strike not only in Pak-Af region but in India as well. So India cannot afford to ignore even minor acts of symbolism like waving of ISIS flags seen recently in Kashmir valley. 
We will have to look at them in the context of Pakistan army showing increasing belligerence towards India keeping alive confrontations along the Line of control in Jammu and Kashmir and the recent Gurdaspur terrorist attack in Punjab.
An ISIS recruitment document recovered in Pakistan tribal region and brought to public attention by American Media Institute on July 28, 2015 is of great relevance to India’s national security. The 32-page Urdu-language document titled “A Brief History of the Islamic State Caliphate (ISC), The Caliphate According to the Prophet,” seeks to unite all factions of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban into a single army of terror.  It urges all the jihadi groups to recognize the ISIS leader as the sole ruler of the world’s Muslims under a “caliphate.” The document chillingly enjoins all to “accept the fact that this caliphate will survive and prosper until it takes over the entire world and beheads every last person that rebels against Allah." It proclaims, "This is the bitter truth, swallow it.” This clearly indicates ISIS’ strategic goal to emerge as the sole arbiter of Muslim Ummah.
India would be the logical target for the ISIS as “striking in India would magnify the Islamic State’s stature and threaten the stability of the region” as stated by Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution in his comments on the document.

The ISIS threat to India is now exacerbated with a new strategic equation emerging in this region after the recent Afghanistan-China-Pakistan trilateral strategic talks. The first ever formal talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban representatives, hosted by Pakistan at Murree on July 7, 2015 with the blessings of the Pakistan army, is its visible manifestation. A second round of formal talks originally scheduled to be held in Urumqi in Xinjiang will now be held in Murree. Though the talks are held without a ceasefire in place in Afghanistan, as both Afghan President Ghani and the Taliban seem to be keen to sue for peace we can expect some progress to be made in the near future.
The presence of representatives from China and the U.S. at the talks indicates U.S. acquiescence to the trilateral strategic realignment which excludes India. While India would welcome any effort to bring peace in Afghanistan, it cannot be at the cost of India's regional interests. Though the U.S. intention might be to build a solid front against the ISIS’ entry in the region, in real terms it means India cannot count upon even nominal U.S. support in Af-Pak region when it confronts strategic challenges to its security. This could be the reality when India confronts the ISIS threat emanating from Af-Pak region. It is time political pundits bury their hatchets to come to term with the strategic realities of South Asia.

Courtesy: India Today Opinion portal DailyO.in    http://www.dailyo.in/politics/mullah-omar-terrorism-taliban-isis-afghanistan-pakistan-tehreek-e-taliban-kashmir/story/1/5349.html


Monday, 27 July 2015

Why we are in a dilemma over Yakub Memon’s hanging

The Mumbai blasts showed the damage done to our unique syncretic identity, perhaps irreversibly, after the destruction of the Babri Masjid.

COL R HARIHARAN |POLITICS| 5-minute read| 27-07-2015

The Supreme Court bench that reviewed the death sentence of Yakub Memon had no doubt about his role as one of the conspirators who carried out the 1993 Mumbai blasts that cost 257 lives. Having waited for eight years after he was sentenced to death, the Maharashtra government perhaps wants to get the job done quickly and set July 30 as the day for his hanging.

An article written by the late B. Raman, one of India’s foremost terrorism experts, was published posthumously by Rediff.com after the Supreme Court confirmed Yakub's death sentence. It seems to have thrown a spanner in the works as the Maharashtra government got ready for his execution.

Raman, as the head of the RAW's international counter terrorism division, was involved in the process of getting Yakub back to India. And he retired soon afterwards. He had written the article immediately after the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (TADA) court sentenced Yakub to death in 2007, but withheld its publication. Raman's  article raises three points to support the argument that death sentence awarded to Yakub was not justified.

Yakub “definitely had an assurance from us which is why he voluntarily came to Kathmandu, handed over so much data and details to us. We have betrayed him.”  

Raman says he was “disturbed to notice some mitigating circumstances in the case of Yakub Memon and some other members of the family were probably not brought to the notice of the court by the prosecution” before sentence was passed.

Raman also says that Yakub cooperated with the investigating agencies and “assisted them by persuading some other members of the Memon family to flee from the protection of ISI in Karachi to Dubai and surrender to the Indian authorities.”

On the other hand, Raman had no doubt about Yakub’s guilt. He says there was not “an iota of doubt about the involvement of Yakub and other members of the family in the conspiracy and their cooperation with ISI till July 1994. In normal circumstances Yakub would have deserved the death penalty if one only took into consideration his conduct and role before July 1994.”

Though Raman’s heart probably persuaded him to have the article published immediately after the death sentence was handed out, his head seemed to have asked him to write to the editor Rediff.com to withhold its publication. This represents the typical conflict of the head and heart many intelligence operatives face when  they get entangled in conflict betweenprofessional compulsions and value systems. Most of the time, they take cynical view of the whole issue but they find they cannot do so all the time. Yakub's case was probably Raman's moment of truth. It is not surprising because such conflicts affect even the most hard boiled operators. In one such instance in my own career after the 1971 war a moral dilemma regarding the life of one of our East Pakistan agents turned into a physical ailment till I was counseled for a cure.  

Not unexpectedly, fringe elements in the garb of speaking for the minority community and anti-death sentence lobbies have churned up the Yakub issue and made it murky. And some of the retired judges have come out with strong statements against the death sentence. But there are two points about such statements. They have all done so only after Raman’s article was published posthumously. None of them have the responsibility of either the legal system that examined the case or the government elected by the people which have to ensure justice is done for 257 innocent people who were killed in the blasts.

But more important are the views of members of the intelligence community who were involved in the case. They also seem to be divided on the question of hanging Yakub. Those who support Raman’s argument have focused on the credibility of the assurance given by intelligence agencies to Yakub Memon. If such assurances are not maintained it not only affects the credibility of the operative and the agency, but alsomake intelligence field operations a little more difficult.

I am sure they all realise intelligence agencies the world over are notorious for not keeping up promises. The amoral and secretive nature of their work  makes it easy for them to do so; so it would not be surprising if an assurance given to Yakub was not kept by them.

The 1993 Mumbai serial blast case was unique not only for the huge loss of life, nexus between criminal world and jihadi terrorism or meticulous planning and execution.  It also established the involvement of the ISI, and as a corollary Pakistan establishment, in Jihadi terrorist attacks in the country. This makes it difficult for the courts to be lenient in this case. 

The Mumbai blasts also showed the damage done to our unique syncretic national identity perhaps irreversibly after the destruction of the Babri Masjid.To this day Jihadi terrorists use it to justify their gruesome acts to the faithful. 

In the Yakub Memon’s case the judiciary had to think with the head and draw their judgement based on facts supported by evidence. Presumably, the defence would have put up the mitigating circumstances after the court found Yakub guilty and before it passed the sentence. The justice system provides for clemency petitions to the executive authorities to consider issues of heart. This process is not yet complete; and our justice system, despite its delays, can be expected to take an informed decision in this case.

So clearly there is no room for religious jingoism of the Owaisi kind. Actually, it confuses the issue by bringing the polemics of majority versus minority politics and can harm Yakub Memon’s case. Let us hope better sense prevails because there is no doubt Yakub Memon is guilty; the issue is only whether to hang him or reduce it to a life sentence. Nothing more or nothing less. 



Monday, 13 July 2015

Mahinda’s return as PM: Not yet a done deal

In Lanka, talk of cash flow fueling political jockeying, graft charges and memories of rights violations during former president’s rule loom over parliamentary polls

Col R Hariharan |Times of India| South Pole| 13 July 2015

Unfazed by his surprise defeat in the last presidential polls, Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa appears to be back with a bang on the nation’s political centre stage with the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition nominating him to contest the August 17 parliamentary election. as a candidate. Six months ago, when Rajapaksa went into a sulk after his  defeat, nobody would have imagined that he would bounce back so soon and so strongly with the support of UPFA.

His nomination ended weeks of suspense, as his bête noire President Maithripala Sirisena, chief of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), tried to persuade the party, the UPFA coalition and even Mahinda to prevent the latter’s comeback. But Rajapaksa seems to have made up his mind, well before political manoevures began, to contest the election with or without SLFP support as the anti-corruption bodies were making life miserable for him and his siblings. But no one, probably not even Mahinda, was certain of the UPFA nominating him.

Sirisena is reported to have confessed to his loyalists that he could not carry the UPFA coalition with him to prevent Rajapaksa’s nomination. Civil society  leaders and political leaders who put their faith in him to clean up the administration and ensure Mahinda does not reincarnate called Maithripala’s decision a betrayal of the 8 January mandate.

Meanwhile, caretaker Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe-led UNP has announced the formation of the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) to contest on the same plank of corruption free governance it had used successfully in the presidential election.. The UNFGG brings together disparate political parties and elements like the rightwing Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), which never saw eye to eye with the UNP all along, dissidents from the UPFA front, some important leaders and close confidants of Sirisena like Ranjitha Senaratne from the SLFP and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka and his Democratic party and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) are likely to extend support to the UNFGG even if they do not join it.

It is not going to be a cakewalk for Mahinda. Though the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe combine’s investigation of all mega projects finalized during the Rajapaksa regime has not found evidence to prosecute Rajapaksas, the allegations remain fresh in public memory. Ditto is the fate of allegations that Rajaaksa family had stashed their illegal wealth abroad in secret accounts.
President Rajapaksa ruthlessly used his executive powers to put down opposition from  all quarters using political goons and even the military while rule of law remained only in statute books. Such callous exercise of power, more than anything else rallied the masses to vote against him in the presidential poll.
  
A massive turnout of minorities against Rajapaksa helped Sirisena gain the vital lead in January. Though Sirisena-Wickremesinghe combine has not fully met with the long standing demands of the minorities, particularly Tamils, it had taken halting steps to improve the situation. A few thousand acres of land in the north occupied by the Army have been returned to the rightful owners. Colombo has removed minor pinpricks under which the TNA-led Northern Province government functioned. Even on the vexing issues of missing persons and war crimes there had been positive movements. The government had met Tamil Diaspora representatives including the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) to muster their support for evolving a solution to the Tamil minority issue. So the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has little option but to support the UNP-led front.

The Muslim vote is likely to go more for UNFGG as memories of anti-Muslim campaign during Rajapaksa regime is fresh in their memory.

Of course, it is difficult to predict who will gain a majority in the parliament as the political line ups are not yet final. However, one thing iscertain;Rajapaksa’s image as modern day Duttegemunu, the legendary Sinhala King who defeated the Tamil King Elara, for eliminating the Tamil Tigers may not be enough for a comeback. He will have to be seen as an inclusive and more democratic leader. And that may not be easy.

[Col R Hariharan, a retired Intelligence Corps officer, served as the head of intelligence with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90). E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com]



Wednesday, 8 July 2015

Sparing India’s strategic space for China’s entry in the East

Chinas latest strategy paper provides insights to Xi’s thinking on power projection. India should keep its options open while sparing its strategic space to China by participating in the BCIM corridor project.

Col R Hariharan

At last India also seems to have made up its mind on joining the China-promoted Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor project to open up a land access route between South Asia to China’s South Western region.[i] General VK Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, recent statement that the recent stand of with Burmese Naga insurgents in Manipur would not affect the Project amply clarifies New Delhi is clear in its decision.[ii]

Perhaps, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took the decision to join  the Project after clarifying his mind on some of India’s strategic concerns about China after his May 2015 visit to Kunming capital of Yunnan Province where  he inaugurated a Yoga Institute supported by India. Chinese also “acknowledge that unlike in the past, when it was perceived to be dragging its feet, India is now showing enthusiasm over the project” according a news report in The Hindu from Kunming.[iii]  With its changed stance Chinese have high expectations of India speedily completing the last bit of 200 km of road on Indian side of the border to provide four-lane highway connectivity between Kunming to Kolkata.

Ever since President Xi Jinping came to power two years back China has been vigorously promoting the BCIM corridor as part of its strategic outreach to South Asia, mainly India.[iv] 

Yunnan has become the focal point of this effort. For the last three years China had been convening the China South Asia Think Tank Forum at Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, to improve its people to people links with South Asia in a bid to overcome apprehensions about China’s strategic intentions and objectives in the region. 

The project is expected to trigger start greater investment inflow because it links India and China which are topping the global economic growth charts first time in two and a half centuries and have the money and inclination to invest in green field areas in the region serviced by the BCIM.

Tenuous land links from the landlocked regions of Southwestern China with Northeastern Indian states. The whole region is rich in natural resources including minerals, forestry, petroleum, forestry and energy. Lack of development in the BCIM region is one of the causes for age old tribal and territorial animosities coming up frequently to result in insurgency movements. However, there are signs of most of the insurgency movements in India’s Northeastern states are talking peace for some time to end decades of conflict. Development and economic growth expected in the wake of BCIM project can speed up this process to improve the quality of life denied to the people of the region. It could also contribute to peace and prosperity to the whole region contributing to the economic viability of the BCIM project.[v]

Perhaps this is what made Prime Minister Modi to decide upon joining hands with China to complete the BCIM project, keeping aside the historical baggage of unresolved territorial disputes between the two countries relevant to the security of the Northeast. Ideally, on completion the BCIM could provide a win-win situation for all the four member states and promote greater understanding and harmony among them, lessening the chances of confrontation.

But India has to recognize a few home truths. The bottom line is India will be sparing its strategic space for China’s entry into India’s East through the BCIM project which fits in with President Xi’s belt and road strategy and supplements the 20th Century Maritime Road initiatives. These pave way for greater assertion of China’s economic, strategic and political clout. And this could be at the cost of India, which had been the cock of the walk in the region for hundreds of years till it failed to build upon its strengths due to its own national and regional preoccupations and pulls and pressures and seemingly endless ethnic conflicts sometime stoked by China. This had resulted in a cycle of conflict, poor governance and lack of development. In the 90s India embarked upon the Look East policy to the Northeast by improving the connectivity of landlocked region to ASEAN and Southeast Asia. But it made tardy till Prime Minister Modi preferred to Act East rather than merely Look East. 

In this context, the China’s military strategy paper released by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing on May 26, 2015, provides interesting insights into the dynamics of Xi’s strategy. [vi]

The strategy paper is different in both form and content from the last White Paper “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Force” published on April 16, 2013.[vii]  Unlike the earlier one, this is more focused on concepts of strategy and doctrine than details. So it is less obtuse than the earlier document and provides a clear correlation between President Xi Jinping’s world view on key strategic issues affecting national development and security as well as employment of Chinese armed forces. However, core concepts of the doctrine appear to remain the same as enjoined by the Communist Party of China (CPC).

A few things stand out in the whole paper. These include getting the armed forces ready for a global role, to protect strategic interests outside China (including protection of maritime rights), and ensuring the CPC’s continued doctrinaire control over the armed forces. On the modernization of armed forces which has been progressing for nearly two decades the focus is now on modernizing the logistics in tandem with the development of road, rail and air communication networks. This was perhaps the weakest link in China’s strategic Westward move. Similarly the emphasis on nuclear deterrence and second strike capability, cyber warfare and space warfare provide Chinese leadership’s employment of forces on emerging threats to the realisation of the Chinese Dream.

President Xi would like the world to see his Chinese Dream as the Chinese peoples’ aspiration  “to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue development and share prosperity.” In essence this is what the earlier military white paper also said.

President Xi and other leaders have been repeatedly proclaiming China’s peaceful intentions even as China is making strategic inroads into South and Central Asia and the world beyond. Chinese war ships are increasingly asserting China’s claim to the South China Sea; Chinese navy has become a regular part of the Indian Ocean landscape to protect its national interests. 

The Paper probably hopes to set at ease the doubts about China’s strategic intentions in the minds of its neighbours like India and ASEAN over the “Belt and Road” strategy and the 20th Century Maritime Silk Road projects. There is also latent fear among them about China’s promotion of the communication links in tandem with the Asian Infra-structure Investment Bank and broad banding the BRICS network to build a strong Chinese-led economic and strategic counterpoise to the West. When successful it could make China’s economic and strategic domination of Asia complete and holistic making the RMB the transactional currency among the networked countries.   

Even if China’s proclaimed intentions are peaceful, can India be lulled by these words? The answer to this question is closely related to India joining hands with China on opening the BCIM corridor. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval delivering the annual KF Rustamji Lecture on May 22, 2015 on “Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response” cautioned that while India’s relations with China ‘were looking up’, India’s border issue remained critical for bilateral relations with China.[viii]  And India needed to remain on a ‘very very high alert.’ In particular, he spoke of India’s concerns about the Eastern Sector where the Chinese have claimed Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. He was only articulating what Narendra Modi asked China “to reconsider its approach on some issues that hold us back” during his recent visit to Beijing.

It is a moot question whether the publication of the White Paper was timed to coincide with the worsening situation in the South China Sea? The U.S. and its allies notably Philippines are locked on near-confrontation over China’s development of an air strip on the disputed Spratly islands after artificially expanding the reef. The issue has caused concern to all stakeholders using the sea links including India because it strikes at the root of China’s much professed recurrent theme of “peace and harmony” with all the neighbours. But Beijing seems to be confident of India understanding the Chinese point of view.[ix]

Prime Minister Modi has the difficult task of deciding how far and how much India can trust China and cooperate with it. He seems to have taken a calculated risk in promoting the BCIM project perhaps in the interest of bringing peace, harmony and good governance in the region and to wean away people from insurgencies. It would also reinforce his Act East policy, and provide for greater Indian investment and trade to flow eastwards.  It also augments his overall strategy of building bridges with India’s neighbourhood to reinforce our soft power to achieve strategic objectives for the common good of the people living in the entire region.

However, participation in multilateral economic and development initiatives comes with some cost to the country’s freedom in decision making and sovereignty. India has joined major Chinese strategic initiatives i.e. BRICS grouping and its economic initiatives, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). India also appears to be interested in signing a Free Trade pact with the  Eurasian Economic Union.[x] So India will be coming under greater pressure than ever before in the coming years from diverse countries and multi lateral associations while taking strategic decisions in its national interest.  

So India will have to closely monitor the progress and operation of the BCIM project lest the outstanding sovereignty issues with China affect the Northeast region in the course of the laudable development initiative.


[Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. Their websites carry many of his analytical articles. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Website:www.col.hariharan.info]


Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies C3S Paper No. 0139/2015 dated 8 July 2015

South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 5966 dated 8 July 2015


END NOTES




[iii] China, India fast-track BCIM economic corridor project, June 26, 2015 The Hindu    http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-india-fasttrack-bcim-economic-corridor-project/article7355496.ece 
[iv] Fully text of Li Keqiang’s speech at opening ceremony of Boao Forum (1), April 11, 2014http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/853912.shtml
 [v] Liu Zongyi, Beijing and New Delhi can open an Indo-Asia Pacific era http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/881546.shtml
[viii] Settling border issue key for india-china relations says NSA, May 23, 2015 http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/settling-border-issue-key-for-india-china-relations-says-nsa/84174.html
 [ix] Sino Indian ties can conquer West’s doubts  http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/921831.shtml  
[x] India to sign free trade pact with Eurasian Economic Union, Moscow, June 19, 2015. India Brand Equity Foundation    http://www.ibef.org/news/india-to-sign-free-trade-pact-with-eurasian-economic-union