கேள்வி-பதில்; இந்திய-சீனா இழுபறியில் தவிக்கும் இலங்கை & இந்தியாவும் கோத்தபாயவும்

கர்னல் ஹரிஹரன்

கேள்வி; தற்போது அம்பாந்தோட்டை மாவட்டத்தில் துறைமுகம் சீனாவுக்கு வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ள நிலையில் அங்கு தீவொன்றின் உரிமையை சீனா கொண்டுள்ளது தொடர்பில் சர்ச்சைகள் நிகழ்கின்றது. அத்துடன் பிரதமர் ரணில் விக்கிரமசிங்க நீர்மூழ்கி கப்பல்களை கண்காணிப்பதற்கு விசேட நடவடிக்கைகள் எடுக்கப்பட உள்ளதாக கூறியுள்ளார். அதேநேரம் மத்தள விமான நிலையத்தினை இந்தியாவுக்கு வழங்குவதற்குரிய நடவடிக்கைகள் இறுதிக் கட்டத்தினை அடைந்துள்ளன. மேலும் இந்த மாவட்டத்தில் ஹைவே ஒன்றை அமைப்பதற்காக யப்பானுடன் ஒப்பந்தம் செய்யப்படுகின்றது. இதனால் மூன்று நாடுகளுக்கிடையில் இராஜதந்திர போட்டி ஏற்படும் என விமர்ச்சிக்கப்படுகின்றது. இது சம்பந்தமாக தங்களின் பார்வையை பகிர்ந்து கொள்ள முடியுமா? 

பதில்; தங்கள் கேள்வியில் மூன்று நிகழ்வுகளின் தாக்கங்கள் தென்படுகின்றன. ஆகவே அவற்றை முதலில் தனித்தனியாக நோக்கிய பிறகுதான் அவற்றின் ஒன்று சேர்ந்த தாக்கத்தை நாம் புரிந்து கொள்ள முடியும்.

முதலாவது சீனாவுக்கு அம்பந்தோட்டை மாவட்டத்தில் துறைமுகத்தின் தீவொன்றில் சீனாவுக்கு வழங்கப்பட்ட உரிமை. இது ஏற்கனவே சீனாவுக்கு துறைமுகத்திலும் அதைச்சார்ந்த பகுதிகளிலும் அளிக்கப் பட்டுள்ள 99 ஆண்டு ஆளுமை உரிமையின் விளைவே ஆகும். போகப்போக அங்கே இலங்கை அரசின் ஆளுமை பெயரளவில் இருந்தாலும் கொஞ்சம் கொஞ்சமாக சீனாவின் ஆதிக்கம் ஓங்கும் என்பதின் சந்தேகம் இல்லை. பிரதமர் விக்ரமசிங்க சீன நீர்மூழ்கிக் கப்பல்களைப் பற்றி குறிப்பிட்டிருப்பது இந்தியப் பெருங்கடலில் சீன ஊடுருவலுக்கு அம்பந்தோட்டை துறைமுகம் எவ்வாறு உதவக்கூடும் என்ற அமெரிக்காவின் கவலைக்கான பதிலாகும். ஆனால் இலங்கை கடற்படை கடலோரத்தை ஒட்டிய பாதுகாப்புக்கே தகுதி வாய்ந்ததாகும். ஆகவே அது எந்த அளவில் நீர்மூழ்கிகளின் கண்காணிப்பை செயாலாக்க முடியும் என்பது கேள்விக் குறியே.

மத்தள விமான நிலையத்தை இந்திய நிர்வாகத்திற்கு ஒப்படைப்பது அதை லாபகரமாக நடத்துவதற்கான வியாபர விரிவாக்கம் என்று கூறலாம். இருந்தாலும் இது இலங்கை அரசு தனது இந்திய உறவில் சீனாவுடன் வளர்ந்து வரும் நெருங்கிய உறவின் தாக்கத்தை ஓரளவு சமநிலைப் படுத்த உதவும் முயற்சி என்று கருதுகிறேன். இந்தியா அம்பந்தோட்டவின் அண்மையில் மத்தளவில் பிரவேசிப்பது அதற்கு கால்பதிக்க உதவும் என்று சீனா கருதும். ஆனால் அது இந்தியா எவ்வாறு மத்தள விமான நிலையை உபயோகிக்கும் என்பதைப் பொருத்தது. அதுபோல ஐப்பானுடனான ஹைவே கட்டுமான ஒப்பந்தமும் பிரதமர் ரனில் இலங்கை முழுமையாக சீனாவின் பொருளாதாரப் பிடிப்பில் இல்ல என்று உலகுக்குக் எடுத்துக் காட்டும் ஒரு முயற்சி என்றே தோன்றுகிறது.

ஆக இந்த நிகழ்வுகளை ஒட்டு மொத்தமாகப் பார்த்தால் இலங்கையில் வலுத்துவரும் சீனப் பிரவேசத்தின் விளைவாக  இலங்கையின் நட்பு நாடுகளான இந்தியா, ஜப்பான், அமெரிக்கா ஏனைய மேற்கு நாடுகளிடையே இந்தியப் பெருங்கடலின் பாதுகாப்பைப் பற்றிய கரிசனத்தின் அதிகரிப்பைக் காட்டுகின்றது. அவற்றை அந்நாடுகளின் ராஜதந்திர வெளியீடு என்று கருதலாம் ஆகவே இலங்கையில் சீனாவின் ஆளுமை தொடர்ந்து வளர்ந்து வரும் சூழ்நிலையில், இலங்கை அரசு தனது சீன உறவை மற்ற நேச நாடுகளுடன் சமநிலைப்படுத்தக் கடினமாக செயல்படும் என எதிர்பார்க்கலாம்.

கேள்வி; அத்துடன் கோத்தபாய ராஜபக்ஸ ஜனாதிபதி வேட்பாளராக களமிறங்குவது தொடர்பாக மீண்டும் இராணுவ அல்லது சர்வாதிகார ஆட்சி ஏற்படும் என்றும் விமர்ச்சிக்கப்படுகின்றமை தொடர்பாக தங்களின் நிலைப்பாடு என்ன? இந்தியா இதில் எத்தகைய நிலைப்பாட்டினை எடுக்கும் எனக் கருதுகின்றீர்கள்?

இந்தக் கேள்வியை நான் நடுநிலையுடன் பதலளிக்க முனைகிறேன். ஏனெனில், இலங்கையை ஜனநாயகப் பாதையிலிருந்து மாற்றி எளிதாக ராணுவ ஆட்சி கைப்பற்ற முடியும் என்ற கூற்றில் எனக்கு நம்பிக்கை இல்லை. கோத்தபாய கடந்த காலத்தில் அவ்வாறு செய்யவில்லை. ஆகவே நீங்கள் ‘மீண்டும்’ ராணுவ ஆட்சி என்று கேள்வியில்  குறிப்பிட்டிருப்பது உண்மைக்கு புறம்பானதாகும்.

அதே நேரத்தில் விடுதலைப் புலிகளை எதிர்த்து நடந்த நாலாவது ஈழப்போரின் போது, எமெர்ஜென்சி அறிவிக்கப்பட்ட காலத்தில் ராணுவத்தின் கை ஓங்கியிருந்ததும், பயங்கர வாதச்சட்டத்தை ஆட்சியினர் துஷ்பிரயோகம் செய்து மனித உரிமையை மதிக்காமல் செயல்பட்டதும் உண்மையே. அந்த காலத்தில் நிகழ்ந்த மனித உரிமை மீறல்களின் விளைவே ராஜபக்ச மீண்டும் பதவியில் வரதாபடி பெரும்பான்மை மக்கள் தேர்தலில் அவருக்கு எதிராக வாக்குரிமையை பிரயோகித்தார்கள். மைத்ரிபால அரசு பதவிக்கு வந்து மூன்றாண்டுகளுக்கு மேல் ஆனாலும் குற்றம் செய்தவர்களை தண்டிக்காமல் செயல்படுவது அதன் செயல்பாட்டின் குறையே ஆகும்.

அவ்வாறு அரசு தொடர்ந்து மெத்தனம் காட்டுவது ஏன்? போர்க்குற்றங்களுக்காக ராணுவத் தலைவர்கள் மீது வழக்குப் போட்டால் அதன் எதிர்மறை விளைவுகள் ராணுவத்தினுள்ளேயும், பொது மக்களிடையேயும் தோன்றக்கூடும் என்ற அச்சம் ஒரு காரணமாக இருக்கலாம். மைத்ரி-ரனில் அரசுக்கு அதன் அரசியல் ரீதியான் பக்க விளைவுகளைப் பற்றிய அச்சமும் இருக்கலாம்.

கோத்தபாய ராஜபக்ச அல்லது எந்த மாற்றுத் தலைவரோ அடுத்த பொதுத்தேர்தலில் ஜனநாயக முறையில் மக்களால் தேர்ந்தெடுக்கப்பட்டு அரசமைத்தால் அதை இந்தியா கட்டாயம் வரவேற்கும். மீண்டும் ராஜபக்ச குடும்பத்தினர் பதவிக்கு வந்தால், அவர்கள் செயல்பாடும் இந்தியா-இலங்கை உறவின் அரசியல் முக்கியத்துவத்தை மனதில் கொண்டே செயல்படுவார்கள் என்று நினைக்கிறேன். அவ்வாறுதான் கடந்தகாலத்தில் ராஜபக்சே ஓரளவு செயல்பட முயற்சிப்பதாக சொல்லிக் கொண்டார்.

ராஜபக்ச தலைமை தேர்தலில் பெரும்பான்மை இடங்களில் வெற்றி பெற்றால் சர்வாதிகார அரசை அமைக்க கட்டாயம் இருப்பதாகத் தோன்றவில்லை. கடந்த காலத்தில் நடந்த விடுதலைப் புலிகளுடனான போர், ராஜபக்ச ராணுவத்தைப் பெருமளவில் உபயோகிக்க முக்கிய காரணியாக இருந்தது. தற்போது அத்தகைய சூழ்நிலை இல்லை. அது உருவாக வாய்ப்பு இருப்பதாகத் தோன்றவில்லை. மேலும் சர்வாதிகார ஆட்சி அமைத்தால், அதை மக்கள் மவுனம் காத்து அனுமதிப்பார்களா? கட்டாயம் எதிர்ப்பார்கள்.

இலங்கையில் சர்வாதிகார ஆட்சி அமைக்கப்பட்டால் இந்தியா கட்டாயம் அதை வரவேற்காது. மாலத்தீவில் நடந்து வரும் எதேச்சாதிகார விடயத்தில் இந்தியா எடுத்துள்ள எதிர் நிலையே இதற்கு ஒரு உதாரணமாகும். இந்தியா மாலத்தீவில் எடுத்த இந்த நிலைப்பாடு இலங்கையில் சர்வாதிகார அரசு அமைக்க ஒரு பெரும் தடையாய் இருக்கக் கூடும்.

Gandhian dilemma in military leadership

by Col R HARIHARAN | GFiles | July 2018 | Governance |  Leadership

http://www.gfilesindia.com/gandhian-dilemma-in-military-leadership/ 

Can the Gandhian way of handling crisis situations help in running an army unit?

I may be laughed out even before I answer the question. However, I grew up in a family conditioned by Gandhian thoughts, when my father-a small town doctor-actively took part in the freedom struggle and was even imprisoned. I carried some of the Gandhian ideas and values when I served for nearly three decades in the army. I found some of his ideas useful in handling tricky situations that confronts a military leader. Before I recount my experience in applying Gandhian ideas, a bit about the man revered as Mahatma.

Though many consider Gandhi a pacifist, he did not think so. Addressing a gathering at Geneva in 1931 Gandhiji said “I regard myself as a soldier, though a soldier of peace.” Gandhi applied quite a few principles of war in executing his political campaigns. These included selection and maintenance of aim, flexibility, economy of effort and coordination and cooperation.

He planned centrally and decentralised execution. His leadership style was similar to what is taught in military training schools. Gandhi led from the front, the way a military commander should, even in the face of adversity. His leadership, akin to the military leader’s, was built on adherence to goals, clear communication of objectives, flexibility of approach and constantly monitoring progress.

Though his approach was based on doctrines, he was not doctrinaire in execution. He inspired his followers by example rather than by use of force. And his coercive persuasion skills were as effective as a military man’s strategic encirclement.

Many people think military officers run their units with the summary powers available to them under the Army Act. Team play is the core strength of army, which makes it impossible for a commanding officer to run the unit with the help of only the Army Act. He requires situational management skills to run a military unit. Every soldier is taught to fight to survive, has access to the gun and he knows how to use it. This makes it risky if a CO chooses to be ruthless or autocratic, going by the book alone.

Commanding a military intelligence unit is a little trickier, because some of the men consider themselves ‘over smart’, better educated than the average soldier and are exposed to unsavoury elements of society in the course of their work. During my over two-and-a-half decades of service in MI, I discovered some of them can quote army orders and army rules line and verse to serve their ends.

A study of Gandhi’s life reveals how he introspected everyday on his actions and tried to correct himself to overcome his weaknesses. This is one trait I had tried to imbibe; it stood me in good stead in handling situations where I faced moral and ethical dilemmas. There were many such challenges in my experience. But as intelligence work is shrouded in secrecy, I have chosen two ordinary situations in an intelligence unit. These explain how Gandhian intervention in the thought process helped to resolve internal and external leadership dilemmas.

Gandhi led from the front, the way a military commander should, even in the face of adversity. His leadership, akin to military leaders was built on adherence to goals, clear communication of objectives, flexibility of approach and constantly monitoring progress

While commanding an intelligence unit in the North-East, we had a quarter master havildar (QMH), a storekeeper in civilian terms. The QMH is a recognition of an NCO’s seniority and performance; I found CQMH Natha Singh (name changed) very poor in his job. I gave him an adverse annual confidential report (ACR) and did not recommend him for promotion. I explained to him why I have done so. Natha Singh took it stoically.

THEN probably, my ego as the commanding officer went on an overdrive; I transferred him to a difficult post on Burma border, which had never produced any worthwhile results. But I was pleasantly shocked when Natha Singh produced excellent results. I felt guilty for giving an adverse report though he was excellent in his primary job as an intelligence gatherer. I wanted to retract my earlier ACR but the Intelligence Corps records said that there was no provision for it.

I took up the case with command headquarters, which came up with the same reply. I wrote to the Adjutant General’s Branch in Army Headquarters, which insisted the rules were inflexible on NCOs ACR. I called the Major, who dealt with the subject at Army Headquarters. When I appealed to him to do something, he said there was a provision for initiating a special confidential report for NCOs serving in operational areas.If I really wanted to help the NCO I could initiate such a report, which carried more weightage. I immediately did so and mentioned in the report how the NCO was wrongly assessed earlier. The whole process took eight months.

After that, for the next seven years, I never came across Natha Singh. While serving in MI directorate in Army Headquarters, Natha Singh walked into my office. He was now a junior commissioned officer and his beard had turned grey. He beamed at me and said “Sabji, I have retired. Before retirement I went to our records to go through my dossier. There I found the copies of your letters, eight of them to ensure that the damage done by the adverse ACR you gave me was neutralised. In fact, I had no clue of storekeeping and I thought you were right in reporting it. But thanks to your persistence and glowing special operational report, I got a foreign posting and I am going home, a little rich, but with a lot of satisfaction. I wanted to thank you on my way home to Jammu.”

I was overjoyed. I shook hands and offered him a cup of tea. “Sabji, can I ask you something? Why did you bother about my career, even I felt I did not deserve any better?” I though it over a while. In the end I realised it was the Gandhian value at work inside me. I replied him, “It was Gandhiji at work inside me.” He looked at me a little puzzled; he probably thought the Sabji was going a little bonkers at fifty.

Even in day-to-day unit management, Gandhi came in handy. Intelligence units are full of NCOs, who are not to be employed in manual labour. But for unit maintenance, we had no option but to use them in odd jobs requiring manual skills. Two NCOs—both of them good soldiers—were marched up before me by the senior JCO for disobeying orders to clean up an abandoned soakage pit in the unit area. After the chargesheet was read, I asked the NCOs what they had to say in defence. They said as per army rules, NCOs should not be employed on manual labour, so they refused to do it. And they were right. I was little puzzled on how to handle the tricky defence. I put myself in Gandhi’s shoes and then asked the two NCOs to go and get three shovels. They brought them, as the JCO looked on with no clue on what was happening.

I explained to the NCOs the unit had only two sepoys and so NCOs had to do some of the manual work. As they would not do so as per rule, I said I was going to do the shoveling of the soakage pit, “because somebody had to do it.” They were shocked. “Sir, you should not do it. You are the CO,” they picked up the shovels to do the job.

I stopped them for a moment. “I am glad you have decided not to go by the book. By the same book, I am punishing you for disobeying a senior’s order with three extra duties,” I said. It defuseda potential crisis situation. I got into a bit of trouble for the unorthodox way of handling the episode during my annual inspection. Even that ended happily when I explained to the divisional commander the peculiar problem of manual labour faced by intelligence units.

Gandhi successfully practiced participatory management, driven by ethical and moral considerations without sacrificing goal orientation. That is why he is still remembered. 

Col. R Hariharan is a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group, the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info

India-China Yin Yang in Tibet

The latest military drill conducted by China in Tibet was probably a reminder to India that the subtext of the military situation in Doklam remains a potent point of confrontation

By Col R Hariharan | Opinion on news | Courtesy: India Legal, July 8, 2018    http://www.indialegallive.com/viewpoint/india-china-yin-yang-tibet-51396

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a military drill in Southwest Tibet on June 25 to test civilian-military integration and logistic support in high altitudes. Beyond the military dimensions of the exercise, it has connotations on India-China relations and on Presi­dent Xi Jinping’s process of consolidating his power through civil-military integration. In terms of India-China binary, the exercise comes in the wake of Wuhan summit in April when PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping  had agreed to build a future relationship based “upon mutual respect for each other’s developmental aspirations and prudent management of differences with mutual sensitivity”.

But the tabloid Global Times’ report on the military drill did not reflect the Wuhan spirit. It referred to China’s victory in the 1962 war against India. It quoted Song Zhongping, a military expert, to say that in the 1962 conflict, “China failed to protect its fruits of victory due to poor logistics support” because the biggest challenge of battle at the high altitude was to provide sustainable logistics and armament support. The twin problems of long logistic lines and operating in high altitude continue to play in their minds of PLA as they affected the Chinese troops in their 72-day long confrontation with Indian army last year at Doklam on the India-Bhutan-China trijunction.

In the midst of the Doklam confrontation in August 2017, PLA conducted live fire exercises at an altitude of 5,000 metres in Tibet which was given wide publicity in Chinese media. The aim of the exercise was “to test its strike capability on plateaus” and improve combat capability.

A combat brigade of PLA Tibet Regional Command conducted exercises in rapid deployment, multi-unit joint strike and anti-aircraft defence, according to a PLA press release. The CCTV also broadcasted the military drill to reassure the public about the combat readiness of its troops. The South China Morning Post, quoting a Beijing based military commander Zhou Chenming, said, “The PLA wanted to demonstrate it could easily overpower its Indian counterparts.” The newspaper said the Chinese force that took part in the drill was stationed in the Lizhi region of eastern Tibet, close to Doklam. The Chinese troops also featured a new light tank with “strong firepower, advanced armour and good mobility” suited for deployment on Tibetan plateau.

The latest exercise in Tibet is probably to remind India that the subtext of the military situation in Doklam remains as a potent point of confrontation. On the other hand, a Twitter clip showing Chinese and Indian troops celebrating the International Yoga Day together on June 21, 2018, is symbolic of the efforts of the leaders of both countries to get out of the frostiness that crept in their relations post Doklam.

The yin and yang of India-China relations post Doklam standoff was evident at a recent seminar titled “Beyond Wuhan: How far and fast can China-India relations go” organised jointly by the Chinese embassy at New Delhi. Chi­nese ambassador to New Delhi Luo Zhao­hui in the keynote address said (cautioned?), “We cannot stand another Doklam; we need to control, manage, narrow differences through expanding cooperation. The boundary question was left over by history. We need to find a mutually acceptable solution through special representatives.”

The ambassador said in a loaded statement “security cooperation is one of the pillars of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). Some Indian friends suggested that China, India and Pakistan may have some kind of trilateral cooperation under the SCO. So, if China, Russia and Mongolia can have a trilateral summit, then why not India, China and Pakistan?” Though the am­bas­sador did not mention Kashmir issue or Chinese mediation, it triggered speculation about China trying to find a me­diatory role in India-Pakistan disputes.

The latest military drill in Tibet also has an internal dimension. It is in keeping with the decision of the President Xi-led Communist Party of China Central Committee in January 2017 to establish a new agency to integrate the country’s military and civilian setups.

Zhang Wenlong, the head of command logistics, commenting on the latest military drill, said it was aimed to explore a new mode of military-civil integration in the plateau following the reshuffle of the military system. During the drill, a local petroleum company supplied fuel immediately to an armored unit while the city government of Lhasa delivered food to soldiers after a day of mock battle. The exercise is only a part of the PLA conducting drills at home and abroad in keeping with the injunctions of President Xi. These drills involve PLA’s ground forces, navy, air force, rocket force and armed police.

However, the Doklam experience seems to have left an indelible imprint on the Chinese military mind. According to PLA Daily, China’s most advanced aircraft including J-20 stealth fighters, Y-20 transport aircraft, J-10C fighters are practising beyond-visual range air combat at unspecified airports on a “plateau region”—an obvious reference to the Tibetan plateau bordering India. Obviously, China is getting ready to ensure no more “Doklam” takes place.

Territorial disputes continue to be a major, recurring irritant in India-China relations, though both of them have their own baggage of other allergic issues. China’s allergies include the status of Taiwan, the Dalai Lama and Tibet’s autonomy and its human rights standards. Issues such as the Kashmir imbroglio, India-Pakistan relations and Pakistan sponsored terrorist threat are a few issues that touch India’s raw nerve.

At the Wuhan summit, leaders of the “two major countries” in Asia spelled out their common perspective—domestically, regionally and globally. They said “both sides have the maturity and wisdom to handle the differences through peaceful discussion and by respecting each other’s concerns and aspirations”.  To go beyond the lofty aspirational level, both countries have lot of ground to cover. One thing is clear: both nations are cautiously moving forward, hoping to overcome their differences through small steps. As Lao Tzu said, “A journey of a thousand miles starts with one small step.”                                                                                                                              The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia

Sri Lanka Perspectives: June 2018

Col R Hariharan | 30-6-2018 |

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, July 2018 | www.security-risks.com

Gotabaya for presidential poll

Former president Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) appears to be getting ready for an early presidential poll in 2019, amidst reports that President Maithripala Sirisena might call for an early election though they are due in 2020. There had been a few reports of the SLPP fielding Gotabaya Rajapaksa, former defence secretary and brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, as its presidential candidate. Some political leaders have already voiced their support to him for the post. 

The issue came up again in the media when the outgoing US Ambassador Atul Keshap made a courtesy call on Mahinda Rajapaksa at his residence in Colombo.  The Jaffna Tamil daily Kalaikkathir quoted sources close to the former president that the ambassador told Rajapaksa that neither the US government nor Western powers would welcome Gotabaya as a presidential candidate. While the US embassy’s was non-committal saying the meeting was a private one, Mahinda Rajapaksa vehemently denied the report.

In a telephone interview to Ceylon Today, Rajapaksa said that in his personal conversation the US ambassador had not made any mention of his brother Gotabaya or his suitability as a presidential candidate. When he was asked about “an intra-family tussle between his brothers Gotabaya and Basil over the possible presidential candidate, he said it was not true. ‘What Basil had effectively said was that he would support any candidate the SLPP nominates as the Presidential candidate.’”

Gotabaya is the preferred choice of Sinhala nationalist segment and sections of Buddhist clergy for next president. This was evident when Endaruwe Upali Thero, the deputy chief prelate of the Asgiriya chapter, in his sermon (anusasana) on Gotabaya’s the 69^th birthday at his house, said that he should opt for military rule if that was necessary to build the country. According to a report in Colombo Telegraph the Thero noted that Gotabaya was referred as a Hitler and suggested that if that was the case he should be one and build the nation. “What we need is a leadership that has the blessings of Mahinda Rajapaksa and is linked with Buddhism, the Buddhist Order and the Sinhalese. We can see that the law has completely broken down. We need a leader who shows fidelity to the doctrine,” he added.

All the Rajapaksa brothers and the 16 SLFP MPs who voted for the no confidence motion against PM Wickremesinghe, were present on the occasion. This would indicate the shape of SLPP presidential campaign strongly supported by the Buddhist clergy and the muscle of Sinhala nationalist segment, when Gotabaya is fielded as the SLPP candidate. 

However, Gotabaya, a US citizen holding dual citizenship, will have to renounce his US citizenship to be eligible to contest the presidential election. The 19^th amendment to the constitution, expressly forbids dual citizenship holders from contesting elections. On this basis, the Supreme Court had forced Geetha Kumarasinghe, a Swiss citizen holding dual citizenship, had to relinquish her parliamentary seat. 

However, Gotabaya speaking in another context as early as June 5, 2015 had said that he had already taken measures to cancel his dual nationality. “I have already handed over the relevant documents to the US embassy in this regard,” he added. It is not known whether the process is through.

Chinese financial support in presidential election

Chinese support to Gotabaya’s ascent as president can be expected, if we go by China’s  financial support to Mahinda Rajapaksa’s campaign during 2015 presidential election through Chinese companies. Details of these transactions are contained in an investigative article on the controversial Hambantota port project in the New York Times June 25, 2018 issue. The article “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port” by Maria Habi-Abib lays bare how China not only dictated terms utilizing Sri Lanka’s need for financing the Hambantota port and other development projects not only to benefit Chinese state owned companies, but also  to further China’s strategic interests to gain a strategic foothold in Sri Lanka. Mahinda Rajapaksa played an important role in furthering Chinese strategy.

The report gives details of how China corrupted the electoral process to ensure President Rajapaksa was elected in 2015 election. The internal investigation reports give details of China Harbor’s bank account which “dispensed” at least $7.6 million to affiliates of Rajapaksa.  It said ten days before the polls, $3.7 million was distributed in cheques to buy gifts including saris for supporters, print campaign promotional material, paying $38000 to a “popular Buddhist monk” and volunteers. The report said most of the payments were made from China Harbor’s sub account named “HPDP Phase 2” acronym for Hambantota Port Development Project. 

The NY Times report only confirms what had been appearing in bits and pieces in Sri Lanka media during the last four years. However, much to the embarrassment of the Maithripala-Ranil government, which had promised to bring the corrupt to book, investigations have dragged on while members of Rajapaksa clan continue to be politically powerful entities. This was evident in the reply of Minister Lakshman Kiriella to a media query on the NY Times report. He said the foreign minister had officially “inquired” United Arab Emirates (UAE) whether funds received by Mahinda Rajapaksa from China had been deposited there.

After Rajapaksa’s defeat, when the Maithripala Sirisna government was saddled with the burden of making payments for the debt that kept accumulating as Hambantota port proved unviable. It was left with no option but to negotiate with the Chinese. After months of negotiations, in December 2017, the government handed over the port and 15000 acres of land around it for 99 years to the Chinese set off nearly $1 billion dollars of the loan. However, the debt servicing burden continues to be a drag on the country’s economy. This has provided further opportunities for the Chinese to become favoured lenders.

The transfer of the port has given China a strategic foothold on Sri Lankan coast dominating the critical merchant marine and military sea lanes of Indian Ocean. There is little space for the present Sri Lanka government to get out of the Chinese debt trap, however much it may like to. This has enabled China to further firm in Sri Lanka by gaining lucrative contracts to Chinese companies on its own terms, through opaque process. 

For instance, the Resettlement ministry has awarded a contract to China Railway Beijing Engineering Group Co Ltd and its representative Yapka Construction Pvt Ltd to build 40,000 prefabricated houses in the North East without going through the tender process. According to Sunday Times report India has expressed its concern at the whole process of awarding the contract to a company with no record of construction in in the North and East increasing India’s concerns.

The Sirisena government has repeatedly tried to reassure India on its national security concerns. The latest is Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe office clarifying that Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) would be in charge of Hambantota  port security. SLN was moving its Southern Command to Hmabantota. It added that Sri Lanka had also informed the Chinese that Hambantota cannot be used for military purposes. But in times of strategic necessity, Chinese are unlikely to read such fine print.

India has to recast its foreign relations and security calculus factoring China’s increasing overt and covert influence in Sri Lanka’s politics, economy and security space. With China increasing its hold on Maldives, at the cost of India, Indian dominance of the Indian Ocean region is likely to face bigger challenges in the near future.  

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog: http://col.hariharan.info