Even 10
years on, the country is not fully prepared for another terrorist attack and is
bogged down by petty politics and lack of co-ordination between various agencies
at the grassroots level
By Colonel R Hariharan
| December 1, 2018| India Legal |
Are we better prepared for another attack like 26/11?
Unfortunately, the answer is not simple as it is interwoven with the
international environment, and internal political and structural dynamics.
On the 10th anniversary of the Mumbai attacks of November 26,
2008, in which 166 people lost their lives, relatives of the victims came
together at the Gateway of India, facing the iconic Taj Mahal Hotel which bore
the brunt of them. The media went on a high, bashing Pakistan and its “deep
state” while recounting details of the attack.
INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION
Internationally, Israel and the US came out with strong
statements of solidarity with the victims of the attack and India. US Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo in his message said that the fact that the perpetrators of
the attack had not been prosecuted so far was “an affront to the families of
the victims”. He called upon all countries, “particularly Pakistan, to uphold
their UN Security Council obligations to impose sanctions against the
terrorists responsible for this atrocity, including LeT and its affiliates”.
International solidarity, particularly from the US and Israel,
is expected as their citizens were victims of the attack; moreover, they had
been in the forefront of the international war on jihadi terrorism. Despite
this, in the world of realpolitik, national interest is invariably the sole
consideration for nations aiding other countries in fighting their wars,
particularly terrorism. So India has to fight its own war on terrorism.
There is unlikely to be any change in Pakistan’s attitude in prosecuting Hafiz Saeed and
six others involved in the Mumbai attack. This was evident from the
presence of Punjab minister Fayyaz ul-Hasan at a function organised by the
Jamat-ut-Dawa, founded by Saeed, on November 26, 2018. The backdrop on the
stage was a huge blow-up of Elias Davidsson, author of the book, The
Betrayal of India: Revisiting the 26/11 Evidence. Hasan’s presence
at the function lends credibility to Pakistan’s right-wing narrative of how
India orchestrated the whole Mumbai “drama” in November 2008.
This was not unexpected. The Pakistan Army calls the shots
regarding defence and India policies and uses trans-border terrorists as a
strategy to bleed its neighbour.
In fact, there are clear indications of Pakistan trying to
revive Khalistani terrorism in Punjab, leveraging this movement’s connections
in Canada, Italy and the UK. On November 4, 2017, the Punjab police arrested
five men said to be part of a Khalistani module that killed RSS members in
Ludhiana, Dera Sacha Sauda followers and a Christian pastor in
October-November, 2017. The suspects, on interrogation, confirmed that
the Khalistan Liberation Force carried out the killings at the bidding of
Pakistan spy agency, the Inter Services Intelligence. Since then, Punjab police
and intelligence agencies have scaled up their vigilance on Khalistani
activities.
According to the Punjab police chief, tech-savvy young men are influenced by
Khalistan separatist propaganda on social media. The grenade attack by two
Khalistani terrorists on a Nirankari satsang in a village near Amritsar on
November 18 is a strong reminder that Punjab could emerge as an option for
Pakistan-supported terrorist operations in the near future. So the question
really is not our readiness to face yet another Mumbai-type attack, but to face
a massive attack launched by educated, tech-savvy and indoctrinated terrorists
and aided by inimical powers. And the way to face them is to overcome our core
weaknesses in the war against terror and structurally improve our systems.
IMPROVE SYSTEMS
The abysmal response of the counter-terrorism apparatus to the
26/11 attacks showed that the national leadership had failed to establish a
fool-proof system to handle terrorist threat. In fact, these attacks showed the
same systemic weaknesses seen in the earlier Mumbai blasts case of 1993 and the
parliament attack in 2001.
The 26/11 episode revealed that there were glaring systemic
weaknesses, both at the state and central levels. There was lack of
co-ordination in intelligence gathering and dissemination which could forewarn
and help agencies respond before a terrorist strike. After an attack takes
place, the security response is often uncoordinated, tardy and delayed.
CO-ORDINATION OF
INTEL
After the 26/11 attacks, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram
mooted a radical overhaul of India’s security and intelligence apparatus. The
National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), a network to collate data from the
databases of various agencies and ministries, came up in 2016. NATGRID’s data
is now available to 11 central agencies, including the Research and Analysis
Wing and the Intelligence Bureau. Two phases of NATGRID have been implemented
and two more, related to banking transactions and internet usage, are in the
offing. The National Investigation Agency was created on December 31, 2008, to
combat terror. Its director-general, YC Modi, has claimed it is a success story
with a conviction rate of 95 percent in 165 of the 185 cases registered since
its inception.
However, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), modelled
on the lines of the National Counter-terrorism Center of the US and meant to be
receiving actionable intelligence inputs, has run into rough weather due to
political wrangling. Many chief ministers see it as an instrument of the centre
to poach on the preserve of states where public order and policing are
concerned. This stalling is a major failure in intelligence sharing on a real
time basis between states and the centre.
State policing continues to be the weakest link in national security. Many
states have not implemented the recommendations of successive police
commissions to improve the quality of policing. So, after 2008, though the
centre allocated more funds to improve and strengthen state police forces,
their capability varies widely from state to state.
MARITIME SECURITY
The fact that 10 LeT terrorists could travel by sea unchecked
for four days and infiltrate Mumbai to carry out the 26/11 strikes exposed the
vulnerability of our maritime security. To rectify this, the Coastal Security
System was refurbished with more fund allocations for coastal infrastructure,
including police stations and radar installations.According to the Indian Navy website, at the apex level, the
National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS)
co-ordinates all matters related to maritime and coastal security. Joint
Operations Centres have been set up by the Navy in Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi
and Port Blair, manned by the Navy, Coast Guard and marine police. They act as
command and control hubs for coastal security. As a result, inter-agency
co-ordination between nearly 15 national and state agencies has improved. Also,
a chain of 74 automatic identification system receivers, complemented by 46
coastal radar installations, cover the entire coast.
After Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power, a proposal to
create a National Maritime Authority to ensure cohesive policymaking and
effective co-ordination for coastal security figured in the president’s address
to Parliament in June 2014. However, this has not materialised so far; so
NCSMCS continues to be an ad hoc solution. Overall, our coastal security is
better than it was in 2008 but it is still a work in progress. Its weakness is
the continued neglect by states, reflected in the indifferent performance of
coastal police personnel who lack marine capabilities.
LEGAL ASPECTS
The world over, governments have been grappling with enacting
laws to handle terrorist threats. India is no exception. Our judicial process,
never known for speedy disposal of cases, adds to the agony of enforcement
agencies. There is lack of a viable counter-terrorism act. There is confusion
in jurisdiction between multiple central and state security agencies. Cross-border
issues, with political ramifications, also affect the apprehension and
prosecution of terrorists in sanctuaries abroad.
The Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
already contain provisions related to terrorist activity, including the offence
of waging war against the government, sedition to bring hatred or contempt or
inciting disaffection towards the government. These have been used in
prosecuting terrorists involved in almost all cases of terrorist attacks,
including the 1993 Mumbai blasts case and 26/11 terrorist Ajmal Kasab’s trial.
After the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, the parliament enacted in
1985 the terrorism-specific Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act (TADA). It was used extensively to combat insurgency in Punjab. The
Act defined “terrorist act” and “disruptive activities”, put restrictions on
the grant of bail and gave enhanced power to detain suspects and attach
properties. After widespread allegations of misuse, TADA was allowed to lapse
in 1995.
In 2001, after the terrorist attack on Parliament, the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002, was enacted. POTA covers political
dissent, allowed prolonged pre-trial detention and reversed the presumption of
innocence of an accused. Misuse of some of its draconian provisions led to
widespread protest and it was repealed in 2004. However, courts allowed
investigation and prosecution of cases booked under TADA even after repeal of
the Act. As a result, a number of cases are still pending and many
accused are languishing in jails without trial.
At present, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA),
originally enacted in 1967, is used as the primary anti-terrorism law. It
enables the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the rights to freedom of
speech and expression, peaceful assembly without arms and formation of
associations or unions that threaten national sovereignty and integrity.
However, it has been amended by Parliament five times. It was under the UAPA
that five activists were recently arrested in the Bhima-Koregaon case for
alleged support to CPI (Maoist-Leninist) activities (it is a proscribed
organisation).
Since Independence, India’s integrity and unity have been
threatened from time to time by separatists, left-wing extremists and terrorist
organisations supported by Pakistan. However, its enactments to combat these
disruptive forces lack clarity. Law-enforcing agencies, too, have to respect
the constitution and be accountable for their actions to prevent misuse of Acts
like the UAPA. Unfortunately, with party polemics vitiating the political
climate, we may continue to meander in combating the forces threatening our
national sovereignty.
—The writer is a retired officer of the Intelligence Corps and
associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia
Analysis Group
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