Sunday, 31 May 2020

Simmering standoff

By Col R Hariharan |Special | India Legal | May 30, 2020 |

Even as nations are in the midst of fighting Covid-19, Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation in eastern Ladakh for nearly three weeks. This seems to be the biggest standoff after the 73-day Doklam standoff on the Sikkim border in August E2017.
Since April 2020, Chinese troop concentrations close to the border had been noticed. However, the confrontation was triggered when they physically tried to prevent Indian troops patrolling the Pangong Tso Lake on May 5. In the fisticuffs that followed, troops used iron rods and sticks, in which 100 were reported injured.
Though local commanders from both sides met and agreed to disengage the next day, the standoff has now spread to Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). Both sides have massed troops, with the potential to explode into an armed conflict.
Indian troops clashed in these places during the 1962 war with China. This underlines their strategic importance to our national security, particularly after China and Pakistan stepped up their strategic cooperation during the last decade.
Estimates of troops on both sides vary, from 2,000-5,000. But the difficult terrain and high altitude makes the deployment of even 500 troops at a time tough, according to some generals with hands-on experience in the region. Another clash took place between Chinese and Indian troops on May 9 at Naku La in north Sikkim; ten soldiers were reported injured. The clash occurred even though there was no major dispute between the two about the international border in Sikkim. This would indicate that the Chinese are reminding India about its vulnerability.
On May 18, China accused India of “trespassing and illegally building defence facilities” in Galwan Valley. Chinese Communist Party tabloid Global Times mentioned that China had enhanced control measures throughout the border in Ladakh. It quoted Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, as saying that Galwan Valley was not like Doklam because it was in the Aksai Chin region of southern Xinjiang. So, if India escalates friction, its military could pay a heavy price.
So far, parleys between the military commanders in Ladakh have not yielded results. However, diplomatic efforts are on to defuse the situation. After making standard comments to buttress their territorial claims, the Chinese have given tentative signals of a thaw. This was evident from Chinese ambassador Sun Weidong’s conciliatory statement on May 26.
From past experience of such confrontation, followed by conciliation, it is going to be a long haul before the troops stand down in Ladakh and return to normal activity. However, given the complexity of India-China relations at all levels, our country is unlikely to lower its guard any time soon.
After the 1962 conflict, it took nearly three decades for India-China relations to move from confrontation to cordiality. An agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas was signed on September 7, 1993. During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in November 1996, India and China signed an agreement on confidence-building measures along the LAC. It provided for border security and confidence measures between the two countries. It called for military disclosure when they undertake border exercises and for the reduction of troop levels in the border areas. It also allowed them to observe and inspect troop movements in each other’s territory upon invitation. This agreement built mutual trust, though border incidents continued. However, both sides handled them away from media glare.
During Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005, the two sides signed an agreement on political settlement of the boundary issue, setting guidelines and principles to the boundary issue through equal and friendly negotiations. An important milestone in these relations was the signing of the border defence cooperation pact on October 24, 2013 during PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to China. It put no restrictions on India developing border infrastructure or enhancing military capabilities there.
Against this background, 2019 may be considered a very constructive one. It saw interaction between the two countries at various levels starting with the Mamallapuram informal summit in October 2019 where PM Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping. Evidently, the two leaders were trying to build upon their constructive engagement at the Wuhan informal summit a year earlier. The positive vibes created at Wuhan managed to patch up, if not mend, the frayed relations after the standoff at Doklam at the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction.
But a month before Xi’s participation in the Mamallapuram Connect, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in a scuffle on the banks of Pangong Tso. Though it was defused after talks between the commanders from the two sides, it was a stronger reminder that no amount of bonhomie can wish away the border disputes acting as a drag on bilateral relations.
However, Xi did not raise or discuss the Kashmir issue, though Pakistan PM Imran Khan had made a number of visits to Beijing seeking China’s support to internationalise it after India abolished the special status of J&K. After the Mamallapuram meeting, Xi said: “We will seek a fair and reasonable solution to the border issue that is acceptable to both sides in to both sides in accordance with the agreement on political guiding principles.” He also suggested that both countries needed to improve levels of military and security exchanges and cooperation, which was followed up. Even Covid-19 did not halt interaction between the two countries. They went ahead with the “Hand-in-Hand-2019”, the eighth edition of the India-China joint military exercise on counterterrorism and disaster relief. The objective of it was to build and promote positive relations between the two armies. The PLA contingent of 130 troops from the Tibet Military Command participated in the exercise.
In the same month, the 22nd round of talks between the special representatives, National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval and China’s State Councillor Wang Yi, was held in Delhi. They involved the most complex part of the negotiations—agreeing on a framework to resolve the dispute in all sectors. After that, the final step will be delineating and demarcating the boundary in maps and on the ground.
In spite of all the bonhomie, why does China create a military crisis in Ladakh when India is on the back foot fighting Covid-19? The answer lies in the importance of Ladakh for the strategic security of Xinjiang and Tibet, which form China’s longest land border with India. This is not the first time that Indian troops manning the border here have confronted Chinese troops transgressing the LAC because they do not accept its alignment. However, on the ground, Indian and Chinese troops have been maintaining patrolling limits that generally pass for the LAC. This makes the present standoff in Ladakh strategically more important for both China and India than Doklam was.
India had deferred improvement of border road connectivity, particularly in unpopulated regions of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, till 2011. The Chinese took full advantage of this to occupy more and more territory to buttress their claim. Shyam Saran, then NSA, was reported to have submitted a report to the PMO on Ladakh in which he said the PLA had “incrementally” occupied nearly 640 sq-km area at DBO, Chumar and Pangong Tso Lake. Media reports alleged that he had stated that the entire Depsang Bulge was now inaccessible to India.
Chinese intrusions across the LAC came at critical moments. China’s muscular assertions in the Ladakh region have increased in frequency, particularly after India started 61 infrastructure projects to improve connectivity to the western, central and eastern sectors from 2011 onwards.
In April 2013, when the Manmohan Singh government was getting ready for a general election a year later, Chinese troops intruded into the Depsang Bulge, a table-top plateau, threatening to cut off 750 sq km of northern Ladakh. After a 23-day standoff, they withdrew after Indian diplomatic efforts at the highest level.
This intrusion was strategically significant as it was just 35 km from the Karakoram Pass at the tri-junction of the India-Pakistan-China border and overlooks the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge to the west and the Indian observation post at Chumar in the east. Equally significant was that the Chinese intrusion took place before China’s Premier Li Keqiang’s scheduled visit on May 20, 2013.
Even as PM Modi extended a red carpet welcome to Xi during his maiden visit to India in September 2014, the atmosphere was marred by confrontation with Chinese troops intruding across the LAC in Ladakh. Apparently irked by such conduct, Modi did not mince words when he drew Xi’s attention to the incident in his statement at the end of the talks. And Xi took note of it.
Former foreign secretary and ambassador to China Nirupama Rao summed up the present situation in her tweet on May 25: “Given absence of line of separation and mutual distancing between sides, no jointly highlighted areas of difference of perception of LAC, we are bound to see more such incidents which now, additionally, have potential to turn into armed confrontation and conflict.”
India will have to take a serious look at China under Xi, which is more aggressive and ambitious. It is in a hurry to become a global power and create a new world order on its own terms. At the same time, Xi is under tremendous international pressure on many fronts after Covid played havoc with global trade and the economy. The US is spearheading a global campaign to hold China responsible for the spread of the virus due to its opaque public health practices.
China’s diplomats have become raucous in their response to them, earning the sobriquet of wolf warriors. China’s “one country-two systems” is under severe strain after Hong Kong’s quest for autonomy started getting out of hand. Taiwan has elected for a second time President Tsai whose party stands for independence and the US has announced it would resume arms sales to Taiwan. Tensions are at a new high in the South China Sea as China is trying to consolidate its control over the sea, brow-beating smaller neighbours like Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam from exploring offshore gas and oil resources.
These vulnerabilities of China could be turned into opportunities for India, with a mix of deft diplomacy, show of strength and imaginative trade and economic policy. That is the only option for India because it works better than empty rhetoric or muscle-flexing when the country is already under tremendous pressure from the pandemic.
The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Cehnnai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute.






Monday, 25 May 2020

Arms & The Man


In an effort at cost-cutting, the Army is considering a Tour of Duty concept to induct young people for three years on a “trial basis”. Critics say this could erode its professional capabilities.

By Col R Hariharan |India Legal | May 23, 2020 |

The Indian Army is facing an unprecedented shortage of manpower. In June 2019, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh informed the Rajya Sabha in a written reply that there were 45,634 vacancies in the Army as on January 1, 2019. This included 7,399 vacancies in the officer cadre. Would they be made up in the near future? Unlikely, if we go by past experience.
Of course, there has been no dearth of volunteers eager to join the Army at recruiting rallies because joining it is a way of life for many. In rural India, it is still considered an honourable profession. But invariably, most of the youths fail to clear the minimum physical fitness and literacy standards set for various branches of the Army.
There are many reasons for this. The Army has uncompromisingly tough physical fitness and medical standards for recruitment. In the case of officers, there are psychological and leadership aptitude tests in which many fail.  Continuous deployment of troops in difficult terrain away from their families for prolonged periods makes it less attractive than a civilian job in an increasingly urbanised setting. Better opportunities for promotion and perks in private undertakings siphon off well-qualified youth from job markets. High achievers are attracted by civilian government jobs which offer better opportunities for quick promotion and perks than offered by the Army.
Manpower deficiencies in the Army are nothing new. It is a hardy, perennial experience in the entire career of many commanding officers. Manpower deficiency is only the tip of the iceberg of problems that the armed forces are trapped in, along with the tangle of political indifference, revamping the national security apparatus and military and civil red tape. Over the years, a number of committees have examined various iss­ues affecting the armed forces. However, implementation of their recommendations had been tardy, subject to lack of the political leadership’s commitment, financial crunch, bureaucratic indifference and the military’s own internal rivalries.
In 2016, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar constituted an 11-member committee of experts under Lt Gen DB Shekatkar (Retd.) to recommend measures to enhance combat capability while re­balancing defence expenditure of the armed forces. The Shekatkar Committee made 99 recommendations in its report submitted in December 2016. These ranged from optimising the defence budget to the need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). These recommendations, if implemented, could result in saving up to Rs 25,000 crore in defence expenditure over the next five years. 
A recent news report that the Army was considering a proposal titled “Tour of Duty” (ToD) to induct young men and women as officers and soldiers for three years on a “trial basis” has to be viewed in the overall context of the Army’s structural reforms undertaken to implement the Shekatkar Committee recommendations. The ToD concept was to tap “resurgence of nationalism and pat­riotism” among youth who wish to experience military life for a temporary duration rather than taking it up as a profession. The report added the “game changer” proposal was being examined by top commanders and its main aim was to bring people closer to the force by giving them an opportunity to experience military life. “If approved it will be a voluntary engagement and there will be no dilution in selection criteria. Initially, 100 officers and 1,000 men are being considered for recruitment as part of test bedding of the project,” said Col Aman Anand, PRO, Army.
Not unexpectedly, the ToD news report received both brickbats and bouquets from senior veterans. Lt General Raj Kadyan, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, has been sharply critical of ToD. He said the ToD officer aspirant’s likely pre-commission training period was three to six months as against three and a half years of an NDA cadet or one and a half years’ training given to cadets through the Indian Military Academy (IMA). So ToD officers are “likely to end up at best as semi-trained leaders”. This is not wholly correct.
After the Army’s 1962 debacle, to meet the manpower needs of sudden expansion of the forces, the Army introduced emergency commission (EC). EC officers were given basic training for six months and inducted into the units. I, as an EC officer, was a witness to their stellar performance on the front lines as young officers in both the 1965 and 1971 wars. Many of them sacrificed their lives in these wars.  It was no less than that of permanent commissioners.
General Kadyan also said that because of the difference in training period, jawans are unlikely to respect a ToD officer the way they do a normal officer. Their faith and confidence in him and his judgement in times of crisis will be a lot less. It is difficult to accept this argument because ToDs will be exposed to a tough training regimen in their units, which is a unit commander’s responsibility. A modern jawan is smart enough not to be impressed by just labels or pedigree. Thirdly, he said that the attitude and commitment of the ToD officer, a “transient”, will not be the same as that of the normal officer. Of course, it will not be the same, but the ToD has a greater urge “to prove himself” as EC commissioned officers would vouch. This can motivate him to perform better.
Lastly, the General said that the im­pact of the ToD concept on the Army will be adverse, eroding its professional capabilities. Fortunately, the Army’s professional capabilities are not dependent upon the performance of a handful of ToD officers but on the units and formations as a whole. The Army has a culture of taking things in its stride and turning them into what it needs.
As against these arguments, exposure to the Army’s training, discipline and management skills under difficult conditions would help the ToDs who would later join civilian occupations. This would be a welcome addition to corporate culture and civil society. But yes, the Army has its own internal elitist crony system based on pedigree—military schools, NDA entries, IMA graduates and short service officers. ToD cadres are likely to end at the base of this pecking order. However, performance usually outweighs this system unlike the caste system we are accustomed to which forms an unenviable part of our socio-political culture.
Shorn of such lofty concept, the ToD seems to be yet another aspect of the current cost-cutting exercise that the armed forces has undertaken, while making up manpower deficiencies. According to an analysis in The Print, the cumulative cost for a three-year ToD service officer, including pre-commission training, pay and allowances, is expected to be Rs 80-85 lakh as against Rs 5.12 crore and Rs 6.83 crore, respectively, for an SSC officer after 10 and 14 years of service, respectively.
Already, General Bipin Rawat, CDS, has taken up a number of cost-cutting initiatives like extending the retiring age of armed forces personnel below the rank of officers to 58 and asking the forces to get rid of their overwhelming dependence on exorbitant foreign weapon systems and support “Make in India”. Commenting on the ToD concept, the CDS said it was at a nascent stage and under the Army chief’s consideration. According to the media report, he said, if it works out, it is good, but added that its viability needs to be studied. He reportedly said: “It will require a year of training. The ToD will be in Kashmir and the Northeast…. One year of training cost… equipping him and doing everything for him and then losing him after four years. Is it going to balance out? It will require a study.” This reflects the CDS’s reservations about this concept.
But the core issue in military manpower is only one: will the soldier be able to meet the emerging battlefield expectations of performance? President Abdul Kalam, during his maiden visit to J&K in June 2004, visualised the “future soldier” when he spoke to the troops: “When I see you, I visualise in a few decades that the configuration of the soldier in the planet will undergo a change, with the focus on him carrying a payload with lighter and high performance weapons, high calorie food and intelligent clothing to meet temperature variance and self-contained networked communication system. These features will assist mobility and survivability in the battlefield. Mobility, lethality and survivability will be provided through the integrated helmet, body protection and weapon instrumentation.” 
Kalam saw the integrated helmet with a computer system, sensor display, night vision instruments, communication systems, video cameras and image intensifier. Body protection was achieved through smart clothing with ballistic protection, reduced weight, smart shoes and NBC suits with mine sensors. He told the soldiers: “I can imagine that a few years from now, you will have intelligence-gathering apparatus and computer and communication systems being made part of your apparel.”
Kalam’s futuristic vision is no fiction. The Indian Army conceptualised the F-INSAS (Future Infantry Soldier As a System), a futuristic modernisation plan, between 2007 and 2012. In 2015, due to high costs, it decided to implement it in two components: one to arm the future infantry soldier with the best available assault rifle, carbines and personal equipment such as helmets and bulletproof vests and the second, battlefield management systems. The Indian soldier’s helmet will be made of a lighter-weight composite material so that it balances out the additions of visor, camera and internal communication system, but still protects him from 9mm carbine rounds and shrapnel. It is possible that armoured clothing could include a shear-thickening capability that not only disperses the impact of a gunshot or blast, but potentially harnesses and transfers that energy for its own internal energy system.
There is no end to modernisation as many countries have realised. It is an expensive process as technology and tactics keep it dynamic. Can the Indian Army upgrade the entry level of its soldier to absorb and deliver the requirements of fighting in the modern battlefield? Only the country, not merely the Army, can answer this question.
—The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute



Monday, 4 May 2020

Sri Lanka opts for parliamentary polls during Corona times


Col R Hariharan |30-4-2020| Sri Lanka Perspectives April 2020 | South Asia Security Trends, May 2020   www.security-risks.com

Sri Lanka Election Commission (EC) has announced on April 20 that the parliamentary election delayed due to Corona pandemic threat, will be held on Saturday, June 20. However, there appears to be a lot of uncertainty about holding it on June 20.  EC Chairman Mahinda Deshapriya is reported to have told the representatives of political parties, who met him a day later, that June 20 set for the election was “by no means final” and the situation would be reviewed on May 4. The opposition leaders were protesting strongly against holding the election when the Corona pandemic had not been brought under control.  They pointed out election campaigning under such circumstances would affect the safety of the people, who would be exposed to the virus on a large scale.

In a subsequent interview on April 28, the EC Chairman clarified that “a minimum period of five weeks is required for candidates to campaign for the election, which would mean that the country should be free of COVID-19 by at least May 15, so that a free, fair, transparent and credible election can be held.” The EC proposes to take stock of the situation every ten days. He also said the election can only be held after health authorities give the green light. In other words, EC’s decision to hold the election on June 20 will be subject to prior clearance from the government and health authorities (finally by May 15 in EC Chairman’s reckoning).  This rider is likely to be played up by opposition parties, during the constricted campaigning likely due to the Corona virus threat.  

The main opposition the United National Party (UNP) and its allies do not seem to have recovered from the damaging effect of  UNP’s internal schism which enabled President Gotabaya Rajapaksa victory with a clear majority.  So, as of now the Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) is probably the favourite to win more seats in the parliamentary election as and when it is held. Though the Rajapaksas winning two thirds majority appears slim.

However, President Rajapaksa, unlike his brother Mahinda who had political compulsions in choosing his aides, has worked to create a favourable government environment unmindful of the political environment. President Gotabaya, like US President Ronald Reagan, appears to be a votary of the Russian proverb “Trust and Verify” (Doveryáy, no proveryáy). He has hand-picked trusted senior military officers and veterans to fill key appointments that matter.  He has reorganised the intelligence structure and police investigative apparatus “pruning” officers of “suspect” credentials.

Apparently, he had chosen to ignore reported misgiving among some senior political leaders who were side-lined in this process. Civil society leaders have expressed their concern at the militarisation of administrative processes. Nothing illustrates this better than task force created to fight the Covid-19 packed with veteran army and naval officers. Military personnel have been employed on a large scale in duties connected with enforcing virus restrictions; military intelligence has been used to identify and trace Cornona affected persons and their associates, who might be infected.   

In keeping with his style, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa with an eye to have an early parliamentary election, ordered the dissolution of the parliament on March 4, ignoring early signs of Corona virus epidemic threatening to spread further. Now the increasing Covid-19 pandemic has queered the President’s plans and introduced uncertainty over holding it even in June. A number of questions are being raised over Constitutional impropriety of government decisions being taken when the parliament stands dissolved. On the other hand, opposition parties also seem to have understood the extraordinary situation created by pandemic, while questioning the wisdom of holding the election. Seven opposition parties have offered “responsible cooperation” to the President in return for restoration of [dissolved] parliament. The precondition makes it an exercise in futility.

The President has now made reducing the Covid threat to manageable proportions as his No. 1 priority. According to President Rajapaksa “at the moment we have minimised this virus from spreading in the country….Sri Lanka had a proper mechanism to collect the information needed to stop the infection from spreading from each patient,” the Presidential Media Division statement said. 

Sri Lanka’s Covid count as on April 30 stands at: confirmed cases 660, active cases 514 and deaths only 7.  A disturbing aspect has been the spread of virus among Navy personnel; 226 sailors have been infected with Covid so far according to Acting Chief of Defence Staff Lt Gen Shavendra Silva. Naval personnel infected include 147 within the Welisara navy camp and 79 persons on leave.

Epidemiologist reckon that both confirmed and active cases have probably peaked and expect it to start plateauing by May first week. So hopefully, if the wishes come true the election could be held on June 20. But the question, at what cost will continue to haunt the EC when it conducts the election, even with the blessing of the government.

However, even before the election campaigning start disturbing trends continue to vitiate the socio-political environment churned up by the spread of the virus.  

The first is prominent role played by the Maha Sangha in what are considered as political issues. The President Gotabaya Rajapaksa met with the prelates of the Maha Sangha and brief them on the need for a strong parliament “to fulfil the aspirations bestowed on him with the landslide victory. He is reported to have told them that there were no constitutional powers to reconvene the dissolved parliament. He also expected to meet the Maha Sangha regularly on the third Friday of every month. The prelates have also said there was no need for reconvening the dissolved parliament. Their statement comes in the face of opposition parties’ demand for reconvening; moreover, the Supreme Court is already examining its constitutional validity. 

Buddhist clergy have continued to voice against Muslim political leaders for suspected involvement with the Easter Sunday Jihadi terrorist bombings, though the police have cleared them after preliminary enquiry. In the anti Muslim back lash that followed Muslim Covid patients have been refused treatment and victims of virus death have not been allowed to be buried till the government orders followed. These pin pricks have further unnerved the Muslim community.

It has increased the suspicion of Buddhist clergy influencing government actions. Such apprehension is probably behind UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, Agnes Callamard’s statement that any measures taken to deal with the COVID-19 emergency should be guided by the principles of legality, proportion, precaution and non-discrimination.

Second is the absence of follow up action of the Rajapaksa government upon the findings of inquiry commissions including a parliamentary select committee (PSC) on the Easter Sunday Jihadi terrorist attacks last year killing 259 people. The PSC had accused the then President Sirisena of ‘actively undermining’ national security and of failing to prevent the Easter Sunday bombings. It also alleged that had not given proper guidance or support to the security establishment and police. The report also noted PM Ranil Wickremesinghe and Deputy Defence Minister Ruwan Wijewardene at that time had failed in their duties.

Cardinal Malcom Ranjith, the chief of Roman Catholic Church, met with President Rajapaksa and expressed the concern of survivors and victims’ families at lack of action against those behind the attack. Many Catholic church leaders have said that a strong public protest campaign would be launched against the failure on the part of the government to punish those responsible for the Easter Sunday carnage, after the Covid epidemic was brought under control.

Lastly, human rights violations by law enforcing agencies have continued to be a cause of concern for civil society. But this is nothing new, considering the tardy action taken or failure by successive governments in the past to improve their accountability over such allegations.


Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and South Asia Analysis Group Email: haridirect@gmail.com Blog:: https://col.hariharan.info