Even as nations are in the midst of
fighting Covid-19, Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in an eyeball to
eyeball confrontation in eastern Ladakh for nearly three weeks. This seems to
be the biggest standoff after the 73-day Doklam standoff on the Sikkim border
in August E2017.
Since April 2020, Chinese troop
concentrations close to the border had been noticed. However, the confrontation
was triggered when they physically tried to prevent Indian troops patrolling
the Pangong Tso Lake on May 5. In the fisticuffs that followed, troops used
iron rods and sticks, in which 100 were reported injured.
Though local commanders from both
sides met and agreed to disengage the next day, the standoff has now spread to
Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). Both sides have
massed troops, with the potential to explode into an armed conflict.
Indian troops clashed in these places
during the 1962 war with China. This underlines their strategic importance to
our national security, particularly after China and Pakistan stepped up their
strategic cooperation during the last decade.
Estimates of troops on both sides
vary, from 2,000-5,000. But the difficult terrain and high altitude makes the
deployment of even 500 troops at a time tough, according to some generals with
hands-on experience in the region. Another clash took place between Chinese and
Indian troops on May 9 at Naku La in north Sikkim; ten soldiers were reported
injured. The clash occurred even though there was no major dispute between the
two about the international border in Sikkim. This would indicate that the
Chinese are reminding India about its vulnerability.
On May 18, China accused India of
“trespassing and illegally building defence facilities” in Galwan Valley.
Chinese Communist Party tabloid Global Times mentioned that China had enhanced
control measures throughout the border in Ladakh. It quoted Hu Zhiyong, a
research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences, as saying that Galwan Valley was not like Doklam
because it was in the Aksai Chin region of southern Xinjiang. So, if India
escalates friction, its military could pay a heavy price.
So far, parleys between the military
commanders in Ladakh have not yielded results. However, diplomatic efforts are
on to defuse the situation. After making standard comments to buttress their
territorial claims, the Chinese have given tentative signals of a thaw. This
was evident from Chinese ambassador Sun Weidong’s conciliatory statement on May
26.
From past experience of such
confrontation, followed by conciliation, it is going to be a long haul before
the troops stand down in Ladakh and return to normal activity. However, given
the complexity of India-China relations at all levels, our country is unlikely
to lower its guard any time soon.
After the 1962 conflict, it took
nearly three decades for India-China relations to move from confrontation to
cordiality. An agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas was signed on September 7, 1993.
During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in November 1996, India and China
signed an agreement on confidence-building measures along the LAC. It provided
for border security and confidence measures between the two countries. It
called for military disclosure when they undertake border exercises and for the
reduction of troop levels in the border areas. It also allowed them to observe
and inspect troop movements in each other’s territory upon invitation. This
agreement built mutual trust, though border incidents continued. However, both
sides handled them away from media glare.
During Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to
India in April 2005, the two sides signed an agreement on political settlement
of the boundary issue, setting guidelines and principles to the boundary issue
through equal and friendly negotiations. An important milestone in these
relations was the signing of the border defence cooperation pact on October 24,
2013 during PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to China. It put no restrictions on India
developing border infrastructure or enhancing military capabilities there.
Against this background, 2019 may be
considered a very constructive one. It saw interaction between the two
countries at various levels starting with the Mamallapuram informal summit in
October 2019 where PM Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping. Evidently, the
two leaders were trying to build upon their constructive engagement at the
Wuhan informal summit a year earlier. The positive vibes created at Wuhan
managed to patch up, if not mend, the frayed relations after the standoff at
Doklam at the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction.
But a month before Xi’s participation
in the Mamallapuram Connect, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in a
scuffle on the banks of Pangong Tso. Though it was defused after talks between
the commanders from the two sides, it was a stronger reminder that no amount of
bonhomie can wish away the border disputes acting as a drag on bilateral
relations.
However, Xi did not
raise or discuss the Kashmir issue, though Pakistan PM Imran Khan had made a
number of visits to Beijing seeking China’s support to internationalise it
after India abolished the special status of J&K. After the Mamallapuram
meeting, Xi said: “We will seek a fair and reasonable solution to the border
issue that is acceptable to both sides in to both sides in accordance with the
agreement on political guiding principles.” He also suggested that both
countries needed to improve levels of military and security exchanges and
cooperation, which was followed up. Even Covid-19 did not halt interaction
between the two countries. They went ahead with the “Hand-in-Hand-2019”, the
eighth edition of the India-China joint military exercise on counterterrorism
and disaster relief. The objective of it was to build and promote positive
relations between the two armies. The PLA contingent of 130 troops from the
Tibet Military Command participated in the exercise.
In the same month, the 22nd round of
talks between the special representatives, National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit
Doval and China’s State Councillor Wang Yi, was held in Delhi. They involved
the most complex part of the negotiations—agreeing on a framework to resolve
the dispute in all sectors. After that, the final step will be delineating and
demarcating the boundary in maps and on the ground.
In spite of all the
bonhomie, why does China create a military crisis in Ladakh when India is on
the back foot fighting Covid-19? The answer lies in the importance of Ladakh
for the strategic security of Xinjiang and Tibet, which form China’s longest
land border with India. This is not the first time that Indian troops manning
the border here have confronted Chinese troops transgressing the LAC because
they do not accept its alignment. However, on the ground, Indian and Chinese
troops have been maintaining patrolling limits that generally pass for the LAC.
This makes the present standoff in Ladakh strategically more important for both
China and India than Doklam was.
India had deferred improvement of
border road connectivity, particularly in unpopulated regions of Ladakh and
Arunachal Pradesh, till 2011. The Chinese took full advantage of this to occupy
more and more territory to buttress their claim. Shyam Saran, then NSA, was
reported to have submitted a report to the PMO on Ladakh in which he said the
PLA had “incrementally” occupied nearly 640 sq-km area at DBO, Chumar and
Pangong Tso Lake. Media reports alleged that he had stated that the entire
Depsang Bulge was now inaccessible to India.
Chinese intrusions across the LAC
came at critical moments. China’s muscular assertions in the Ladakh region have
increased in frequency, particularly after India started 61 infrastructure
projects to improve connectivity to the western, central and eastern sectors
from 2011 onwards.
In April 2013, when the Manmohan
Singh government was getting ready for a general election a year later, Chinese
troops intruded into the Depsang Bulge, a table-top plateau, threatening to cut
off 750 sq km of northern Ladakh. After a 23-day standoff, they withdrew after
Indian diplomatic efforts at the highest level.
This intrusion was strategically
significant as it was just 35 km from the Karakoram Pass at the tri-junction of
the India-Pakistan-China border and overlooks the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge
to the west and the Indian observation post at Chumar in the east. Equally
significant was that the Chinese intrusion took place before China’s Premier Li
Keqiang’s scheduled visit on May 20, 2013.
Even as PM Modi extended a red carpet
welcome to Xi during his maiden visit to India in September 2014, the
atmosphere was marred by confrontation with Chinese troops intruding across the
LAC in Ladakh. Apparently irked by such conduct, Modi did not mince words when
he drew Xi’s attention to the incident in his statement at the end of the
talks. And Xi took note of it.
Former foreign secretary and
ambassador to China Nirupama Rao summed up the present situation in her tweet
on May 25: “Given absence of line of separation and mutual distancing between
sides, no jointly highlighted areas of difference of perception of LAC, we are
bound to see more such incidents which now, additionally, have potential to
turn into armed confrontation and conflict.”
India will have to take a serious
look at China under Xi, which is more aggressive and ambitious. It is in a
hurry to become a global power and create a new world order on its own terms.
At the same time, Xi is under tremendous international pressure on many fronts
after Covid played havoc with global trade and the economy. The US is
spearheading a global campaign to hold China responsible for the spread of the
virus due to its opaque public health practices.
China’s diplomats have become raucous
in their response to them, earning the sobriquet of wolf warriors. China’s “one
country-two systems” is under severe strain after Hong Kong’s quest for
autonomy started getting out of hand. Taiwan has elected for a second time
President Tsai whose party stands for independence and the US has announced it
would resume arms sales to Taiwan. Tensions are at a new high in the South
China Sea as China is trying to consolidate its control over the sea,
brow-beating smaller neighbours like Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam from
exploring offshore gas and oil resources.
These vulnerabilities of China could
be turned into opportunities for India, with a mix of deft diplomacy, show of
strength and imaginative trade and economic policy. That is the only option for
India because it works better than empty rhetoric or muscle-flexing when the
country is already under tremendous pressure from the pandemic.
The writer is a military
intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Cehnnai Centre for
China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute.