In an effort at
cost-cutting, the Army is considering a Tour of Duty concept to induct young
people for three years on a “trial basis”. Critics say this could erode its professional
capabilities.
By
Col R Hariharan |India Legal | May 23, 2020 |
The Indian Army is facing an unprecedented shortage
of manpower. In June 2019, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh informed the Rajya
Sabha in a written reply that there were 45,634 vacancies in the Army as on
January 1, 2019. This included 7,399 vacancies in the officer cadre. Would they
be made up in the near future? Unlikely, if we go by past experience.
Of course, there has been no dearth of volunteers
eager to join the Army at recruiting rallies because joining it is a way of
life for many. In rural India, it is still considered an honourable profession.
But invariably, most of the youths fail to clear the minimum physical fitness
and literacy standards set for various branches of the Army.
There are many reasons for this. The Army has
uncompromisingly tough physical fitness and medical standards for recruitment.
In the case of officers, there are psychological and leadership aptitude tests
in which many fail. Continuous deployment of troops in difficult terrain
away from their families for prolonged periods makes it less attractive than a
civilian job in an increasingly urbanised setting. Better opportunities for
promotion and perks in private undertakings siphon off well-qualified youth
from job markets. High achievers are attracted by civilian government jobs which
offer better opportunities for quick promotion and perks than offered by the
Army.
Manpower deficiencies in the Army are nothing new.
It is a hardy, perennial experience in the entire career of many commanding
officers. Manpower deficiency is only the tip of the iceberg of problems that
the armed forces are trapped in, along with the tangle of political
indifference, revamping the national security apparatus and military and civil
red tape. Over the years, a number of committees have examined various issues
affecting the armed forces. However, implementation of their recommendations
had been tardy, subject to lack of the political leadership’s commitment,
financial crunch, bureaucratic indifference and the military’s own internal
rivalries.
In 2016, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar
constituted an 11-member committee of experts under Lt Gen DB Shekatkar (Retd.)
to recommend measures to enhance combat capability while rebalancing defence
expenditure of the armed forces. The Shekatkar Committee made 99 recommendations
in its report submitted in December 2016. These ranged from optimising the
defence budget to the need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). These
recommendations, if implemented, could result in saving up to Rs 25,000 crore
in defence expenditure over the next five years.
A recent news report that the Army was considering
a proposal titled “Tour of Duty” (ToD) to induct young men and women as
officers and soldiers for three years on a “trial basis” has to be viewed in
the overall context of the Army’s structural reforms undertaken to implement
the Shekatkar Committee recommendations. The ToD concept was to tap “resurgence
of nationalism and patriotism” among youth who wish to experience military
life for a temporary duration rather than taking it up as a profession. The
report added the “game changer” proposal was being examined by top commanders
and its main aim was to bring people closer to the force by giving them an
opportunity to experience military life. “If approved it will be a voluntary engagement
and there will be no dilution in selection criteria. Initially, 100 officers
and 1,000 men are being considered for recruitment as part of test bedding of
the project,” said Col Aman Anand, PRO, Army.
Not unexpectedly, the ToD news
report received both brickbats and bouquets from senior veterans. Lt General
Raj Kadyan, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, has been sharply critical of ToD.
He said the ToD officer aspirant’s likely pre-commission training period was
three to six months as against three and a half years of an NDA cadet or one
and a half years’ training given to cadets through the Indian Military Academy
(IMA). So ToD officers are “likely to end up at best as semi-trained leaders”.
This is not wholly correct.
After the Army’s 1962 debacle, to meet the manpower
needs of sudden expansion of the forces, the Army introduced emergency
commission (EC). EC officers were given basic training for six months and
inducted into the units. I, as an EC officer, was a witness to their stellar
performance on the front lines as young officers in both the 1965 and 1971
wars. Many of them sacrificed their lives in these wars. It was no less
than that of permanent commissioners.
General Kadyan also said that because of the
difference in training period, jawans are unlikely to respect a ToD officer the
way they do a normal officer. Their faith and confidence in him and his
judgement in times of crisis will be a lot less. It is difficult to accept this
argument because ToDs will be exposed to a tough training regimen in their
units, which is a unit commander’s responsibility. A modern jawan is smart
enough not to be impressed by just labels or pedigree. Thirdly, he said that
the attitude and commitment of the ToD officer, a “transient”, will not be the
same as that of the normal officer. Of course, it will not be the same, but the
ToD has a greater urge “to prove himself” as EC commissioned officers would
vouch. This can motivate him to perform better.
Lastly, the General said that the impact of the
ToD concept on the Army will be adverse, eroding its professional capabilities.
Fortunately, the Army’s professional capabilities are not dependent upon the
performance of a handful of ToD officers but on the units and formations as a
whole. The Army has a culture of taking things in its stride and turning them
into what it needs.
As against these arguments, exposure to the Army’s
training, discipline and management skills under difficult conditions would
help the ToDs who would later join civilian occupations. This would be a
welcome addition to corporate culture and civil society. But yes, the Army has
its own internal elitist crony system based on pedigree—military schools, NDA
entries, IMA graduates and short service officers. ToD cadres are likely to end
at the base of this pecking order. However, performance usually outweighs this
system unlike the caste system we are accustomed to which forms an unenviable
part of our socio-political culture.
Shorn of such lofty concept, the ToD seems to be
yet another aspect of the current cost-cutting exercise that the armed forces
has undertaken, while making up manpower deficiencies. According to an analysis
in The Print, the cumulative cost for a three-year ToD service
officer, including pre-commission training, pay and allowances, is expected to
be Rs 80-85 lakh as against Rs 5.12 crore and Rs 6.83 crore, respectively, for
an SSC officer after 10 and 14 years of service, respectively.
Already, General Bipin Rawat, CDS, has taken up a
number of cost-cutting initiatives like extending the retiring age of armed
forces personnel below the rank of officers to 58 and asking the forces to get
rid of their overwhelming dependence on exorbitant foreign weapon systems and
support “Make in India”. Commenting on the ToD concept, the CDS said it was at
a nascent stage and under the Army chief’s consideration. According to the
media report, he said, if it works out, it is good, but added that its
viability needs to be studied. He reportedly said: “It will require a year of
training. The ToD will be in Kashmir and the Northeast…. One year of training
cost… equipping him and doing everything for him and then losing him after four
years. Is it going to balance out? It will require a study.” This reflects the
CDS’s reservations about this concept.
But the core issue in military manpower is only
one: will the soldier be able to meet the emerging battlefield expectations of
performance? President Abdul Kalam, during his maiden visit to J&K in June
2004, visualised the “future soldier” when he spoke to the troops: “When I see
you, I visualise in a few decades that the configuration of the soldier in the
planet will undergo a change, with the focus on him carrying a payload with
lighter and high performance weapons, high calorie food and intelligent
clothing to meet temperature variance and self-contained networked
communication system. These features will assist mobility and survivability in
the battlefield. Mobility, lethality and survivability will be provided through
the integrated helmet, body protection and weapon instrumentation.”
Kalam saw the integrated helmet with a computer
system, sensor display, night vision instruments, communication systems, video
cameras and image intensifier. Body protection was achieved through smart
clothing with ballistic protection, reduced weight, smart shoes and NBC suits
with mine sensors. He told the soldiers: “I can imagine that a few years from
now, you will have intelligence-gathering apparatus and computer and
communication systems being made part of your apparel.”
Kalam’s futuristic vision is no fiction. The Indian
Army conceptualised the F-INSAS (Future Infantry Soldier As a System), a
futuristic modernisation plan, between 2007 and 2012. In 2015, due to high
costs, it decided to implement it in two components: one to arm the future
infantry soldier with the best available assault rifle, carbines and personal
equipment such as helmets and bulletproof vests and the second, battlefield
management systems. The Indian soldier’s helmet will be made of a
lighter-weight composite material so that it balances out the additions of
visor, camera and internal communication system, but still protects him from
9mm carbine rounds and shrapnel. It is possible that armoured clothing could
include a shear-thickening capability that not only disperses the impact of a
gunshot or blast, but potentially harnesses and transfers that energy for its
own internal energy system.
There is no end to modernisation as many countries
have realised. It is an expensive process as technology and tactics keep it
dynamic. Can the Indian Army upgrade the entry level of its soldier to absorb
and deliver the requirements of fighting in the modern battlefield? Only the
country, not merely the Army, can answer this question.
—The writer is a military
intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for
China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute
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