INDIA’S SRI LANKA WAR: INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVES

Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd.)

[This paper was presented at a seminar "Indian Experience in Force Projection" organised by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) at New Delhi on September 15 and 16, 2008.] 

South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.6684 of 20-Sept-2020. 

This Paper was presented eleven years ago. But the points mentioned are still relevant for those Scholars and Military Officials interested in Strategic Issues –Director

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2683

1.0   Introduction

1.1   When we look at India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-90) now, after two decades, we are doing with the benefit of hindsight. The two decades since then have been remarkable for a number of global developments. These include the phenomenal growth in communication and multimedia technology, introduction of liberalised world trade order, and the realignment of global power equation following the break up of the Soviet Union. As a result the concept of strategic security has expanded in scope.

 

1.2    In order to make a realistic assessment of the Indian Army’s operations in Sri Lanka, we need to look at the strategic environment of the period. Some of the developments of special interest of that era were –

 

1.21   The Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at its peak following the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, where India also had a strategic interest.

1.22   India’s security focus was largely on Pakistan. As a corollary, Sri Lanka was not one of the focus areas of Military Intelligence. In fact, Operation Brass Tacks had just been completed in May 1987, two months before the Army had to send a task force to Sri Lanka following the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) in July 1987.

1.23   There was no integrated national security body to take informed decisions on issues affecting national security. Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was the only forum to carry out this task. During the Sri Lanka operations a Core Group was formed to look after the day to day issues. This empowered group functioned under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State, External Affairs and in his absence the Cabinet Secretary.[1]Similarly the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) was the only palliative to meet the requirements of Joint Services operations.

1.24 Communication technology was just making its early breakthroughs. Much of its benefits had not yet enhanced our battlefield competencies.

1.25   The advantage imparted by information technology and its applications in battle field, particularly in the field of intelligence were not available

1.3    Armed forces had fought wars in 1965 and 1971 with similar decision making structures probably with its attendant deficiencies. However, India’s Sri Lanka operation qualitatively differed from all of them because it was conducted overseas. The Indian force in Sri Lanka got involved in a conflict that was neither contemplated nor planned for. More than that, for the first time the three services of Indian security forces operated jointly to carry out a counterinsurgency campaign in a foreign country.    

2.0   Aim

The aim of this presentation is to study issues relating to intelligence (with special focus on intelligence coordination) in the operations of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka.[2] Electronic and communications intelligence aspects are not covered in this presentation.

3.0    Presentation

3.1   Part 1 – Intelligence on Sri Lanka before and during IPKF operations. .

3.2   Part 2 – Intelligence coordination at various levels.

3.3   Part 3 - Third thoughts on intelligence in overseas operations.

PART 1 – INTELLIGENCE BEFORE AND DURING IPKF OPERATIONS

4.0   Dedicated MI resources earmarked for Sri Lanka

4.1   Intelligence Corps is the main field and staff resource of MI. It is the only Corps of the Indian Army whose strength was reduced when the Gen Krishna Rao Committee recommendations were implemented. In 1987, before the IPKF operations started, the Intelligence Corps had a total strength not exceeding 2500 all ranks. Classified as a minor corps, traditionally employment of MI was largely confined to security and combat intelligence, with limited intelligence planning and battle field acquisition capabilities. The MI had no mandate or dedicated capability to acquire cross border intelligence till 1980 when it was given the task of acquiring limited trans-border intelligence.  Intelligence acquisition units created for this purpose had a mandate to collect only military intelligence of tactical value. In the field of counter insurgency, over the years the MI had gained certain amount of expertise in interrogation and source operation for meeting the intelligence requirement of troops involved in operations. For this purpose, a divisional intelligence unit was created in each of the three divisions deployed in counter insurgency role the northeast.

4.2   During that period in the Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), Sri Lanka was grouped with the section dealing with Indian Ocean nations of peripheral interest to India like the ASEAN. On the other hand, both Bangladesh and Burma were clubbed with the section dealing with insurgency in the northeast. The terrain analysis section was totally focused on Pakistan and to a limited extent on Tibet. It was evident that Sri Lanka enjoyed a low priority in MI’s areas of interest. As a result no dedicated intelligence resource was allocated to Sri Lanka for intelligence acquisition. No special effort was made to acquire intelligence of military interest on Sri Lanka from the civil intelligence agencies till 1987. 

4.3   Prior to the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA), around May 1987 an intelligence team of one officer and six NCOs was moved to Chennai from the parent unit in Gorakhpur for collecting intelligence from Sri Lanka. Till the end of the IPKF operations this was the only dedicated intelligence resource available to the DGMI. (Subsequently it was built up into an intelligence unit.) Thus DGMI was entirely dependent upon the inputs from the external intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) which had rich resources dedicated for Sri Lanka. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), the counter intelligence arm of the government, had been keeping a close watch on the activities of thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees present in Tamil Nadu. Of course, the DGMI had a regular flow of the periodic intelligence reports and summaries from the Advance HQ of the Overall Force Commander (OFC) after it was created.

4.4   Headquarters Southern Command had a team from Southern Command Liaison Unit in Chennai. Though the LU was a counter intelligence unit, the LU team provided the Command Headquarters an interface with the state and central intelligence agencies in Chennai during the IPKF operations. 

4.5   After the induction of 54 Infantry Division in the first week of August 1987 in Sri Lanka, a few Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs were attached to the OFC HQ at Chennai. Clearly it was a temporary arrangement as there was no specific tasking of the MI team except to collect information on the activities of both the Tamil militants and the Sri Lanka army. The intelligence personnel were dispatched to Palali on August 5, 2007 with no functional resources, other than the attached personnel.

 

4.6   They were not under command 54 Infantry Division. Though they were nominally under the HQ OFC, the DGMI had asked them to submit their reports directly to them till their status was formalised. The two MI officers of the team resurrected their personal contacts with Sri Lanka Tamils to send periodic reports to the DGMI. There was little intelligence input from either DGMI or from the civil intelligence agencies to 54 Infantry Division.

 

4.7   In September 1987, when the situation became murky in the Indian interaction with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 57 Mtn Div Int & FS coy with about 60 personnel was moved to Palali. Its OC was upgraded to a Lt Col’s appointment. Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs culled from various intelligence units were posted to the unit. And there were never enough of them and the unit was always under strength.

 

4.8   This intelligence unit continued to be under the HQ OFC and this caused some avoidable confusion in HQ 54 Infantry Division. Its intelligence officers were scrupulously excluded from all deliberations of the Div HQ. They were asked to stay out of all interactions with the LTTE during the political parleys. Though they had collected information and built some useful local contacts that provided valuable assessments these inputs were never asked for. Nor did the Division project its requirement of specific intelligence of any kind. The intelligence team’s officers were kept out of operational planning process prior to the Jaffna operations. (According to the RAW, the Army neither took the RAW into confidence nor sought its advice before Jaffna operations). 

 

4.9   As the Jaffna operation commenced and the induction of troops took place rapidly, the OC 57 Div Int & FS Coy was asked to brief the troops prior to their operational induction. Similarly, the unit was tasked to interrogate all and sundry rounded up in the first flush of operations. This clearly indicated that troops in combat had no inkling of how to handle suspects or conduct combat interrogations. Similarly no advance planning was evident in the AG’s Branch at the OFC HQ and the Div HQ for screening of civilian population or holding prisoners.  This was in direct contrast to our experience during 1971 operations when we had meticulously planned in advance on handling and holding of prisoners. Thus in the early stages of war valuable opportunity to gain tactical information through interrogation was lost.

5.0   Intelligence resources of the Advance HQ OFC

5.1   However, by the time two more divisions were inducted into Sri Lanka and the structure of the Advance HQ of the OFC was formalised, an intelligence unit specifically structured for the IPKF operations designated as the Ad Hoc Liaison Unit was raised. The unit had both intelligence acquisition and interrogation capabilities. The unit commanded by a Lt Col had its headquarters in Chennai with a team each deployed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. It also had three rehabilitation centres (with one interrogator each) for the three divisions. In all, it had 12 officers and over 100 other ranks. An effort was made to induct as many Tamil or South Indian officers and NCOs of Intelligence Corps into the unit. One Sinhala knowing officer was also posted sometime towards end 1988. 57 Int and FS Coy provided the intelligence cover for 54 Div sector including Kilinochchi. Both the units served under the command of Col GS (Int) of the Advance HQ OFC.

5.2   Communication intelligence was provided by the EWCP. It worked closely with the troops and provided accurate real time information.

5.3   Though the RAW had complained that they were not consulted prior to the launching of Jafffna operations, after the formation of the Advance HQ OFC, the Chennai RAW unit maintained close touch and provided valuable inputs particularly on political developments in Sri Lanka. However its contribution on militant disposition and assessment of LTTE capabilities was neither timely nor exhaustive. 

5.4   Despite enjoying excellent personal relations at the senior level with MI officers, the Q Branch of the Tamil Nadu State Police and the Joint Directorate of the IB, Chennai provided no information throughout the entire IPKF operation.  They had enormous information on the LTTE and its tentacles in Tamil Nadu which could have helped us in our operations against the LTTE. However such information was never provided. In the case of the Q Branch this was mainly due to the absence of formal orders from the state government which had taken a politically hostile stand against the IPKF operations. The IB usually fobbed off our requests saying that they had only political information, though in counter insurgency political information also had a great relevance on military operations.

6.0   MI performance: positives and negatives

6.1   The MI personnel despite the initial glitches of command and control and resource limitations made some positive contributions. A few of these were as under:

6.11   As early as September 1987, the MI detachment in its assessment to the DGMI had said that if the IPKF went to war it would take three years to reduce it to manageable proportions. This assessment almost came true.  

6.12   Despite the lack of clarity in the early stages, the DGMI managed to rise to the occasion to extend maximum possible support in identifying intelligence resources and moving them within a couple of months. It also made efforts to recruit Sinhala knowing Tamils, who had migrated from Sri Lanka.

6.12   Even during the period of troubled peace from August to October 1987, the MI officers had made some useful contacts both within the LTTE and among influential pro-LTTE civilians particularly in Jaffna and Trincomalee. These contacts came in handy, when the operations started. They provided valuable inputs on political moves of the LTTE as well as on some key issues like LTTE’s contact with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which was carrying out its own insurgency in Sinhala areas, procurement of MANPADS by the LTTE, contacts between the Sri Lanka President Premadasa and the LTTE leadership etc.

6.13   Well before the operation, we videographed the LTTE inspired civilian agitations in Jaffna and Trincomalee and identified key ring leaders. When the operation started, some of them were picked up and successfully turned into informers who gave useful tactical information on movement of LTTE pistol groups and ambushes. 

6.14   In two cases we managed to get clinching evidence in the form of photographs and wiretaps of collusion between Sri Lankan army elements and the LTTE. These helped us to understand the extent of collusion between the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.

6.15   Useful contacts were built in Sri Lanka’s National Intelligence Bureau. Though some of their information was misleading, it helped to insulate us against some of the counter intelligence threats MI was facing.

6.2   There were also some weaknesses in the MI functioning; these were as follows:

6.21   Lack of MI resources allocated prior to the operation by the DGMI had resulted in absence of intelligence assets in Sri Lanka. This had an adverse impact on the initial inability of the MI to provide timely and useful information to 54 Inf Div for the Jaffna operations.

6.22   Despite receiving inputs from both RAW and IB and other agencies on a regular basis, the DGMI did not provide assessments that could have helped the IPKF operations. Similarly the HQ Southern Command also failed to provide useful assessments or inputs.

6.23   There was little MI input on LTTE activity in Tamil Nadu. This was mainly due to the completely negative attitude of Tamil Nadu Government resulting in total denial of access to information on the LTTE available with the state intelligence. Action taken to rectify this by the DGMI and the Army HQ, if any, had little impact on their attitude.

6.24   The LTTE was acting with impunity in Tamil Nadu during the entire period of operations, exposing the troops to potential LTTE threat. This created a great feeling of insecurity among our Tamil sources, who felt that we were not seriously involved in tackling the LTTE. They were reluctant to work for us as they felt we did not have enough “influence” in this ambience. This affected MI’s performance.

6.25   Most of the MI officers had little background knowledge on Sri Lanka or its environment when they were inducted. There is perhaps a requirement for building regional specialists in the course of MI officers’ careers so that they could improve their expertise.

6.26   Intelligence NCOs performance was far below par. They had no capability to carry out elementary interrogations. Nor were they clear about their duties in a counter insurgency environment. Both officers and NCOs tended to accept un- assessed information from sources without vetting the credibility.

6.27   Intelligence staffing was poor in formation headquarters. At one stage, in three of the four divisions the GSO1 (Int) were low medical category officers; a few of them had no intelligence exposure. As intelligence had limited dedicated staff resources, their posting in divisions was far from prudent.

6.28   Quality of frontline soldiers’ knowledge of handling prisoners, segregating them for detailed interrogation etc was poor. The Command HQ was in the best position to address such lacunae to provide short term training to officers and NCOs from all arms on a rotational basis. This was probably not even contemplated, though it had been done in the past in 1971. 

6.29   There was practically no input from Air or Naval Intelligence sources. This was surprising because in Colombo more than one merchant ship officer reported seeing fishing boats flashing ‘LTTE’ in semaphore signals in Gulf of Mannar indicating regular movement of boats supplying the LTTE from Tamil Nadu.

6.291   The Tamil media in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka was rich open source information which went untapped due to shortage of manpower. Similarly, there was not enough inter face with Indian media men who had travelled into LTTE areas either covertly or openly. This rich source also went unexploited.

6.292   At the end of the IPKF operations, there was no formal MI arrangement for taking over the network of intelligence sources built over the period of IPKF operations in Sri Lanka. Similarly the rich data base on the LTTE militants went unused.

6.293   Few formation commanders only had used MI resources as part of their overall intelligence planning. Generally they expected MI to produce tactical information reactively. Thus often there was lack of convergence between their expectations and results. 

PART-2 INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AT VARIOUS LEVELS

7.0   Lack of intelligence coordination and cooperation among various intelligence agencies is a hardy perennial in the investigative studies of all most all operations in India. The most reason report of this genre is the K Subrahmanyam Committee report on Kargil operations. And probably in spite of findings of such committees, this problem is likely to persist because intelligence agencies apply the principle of Need to Know (from their point of view) to often withhold information. This is inherent in the nature of intelligence operations which carry enormous risks for the individuals who originate such information.

 

8.0   Unfortunately, in the Sri Lanka operational scene despite our best efforts intelligence coordination with civil agencies produced very little useful intelligence. The Core Group was supposed to be a body to handle such issues. Some of those who had attended its meetings said the Core Group probably spent more time discussing the situation in Afghanistan than resolving difficult problems that had cropped up during IPKF operations. The problems faced by the IPKF due to political developments in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka that required Core Group directions were left unresolved. This left the IPKF with the fall out of such aberrations. Many such decisions though outside the scope of intelligence coordination, had their impact on the MI operations. MI’s intelligence acquisition effort was handicapped as a direct consequence of absence of meaningful coordination in both letter and spirit at the top level.

 

9.0   Coordination with civil intelligence agencies

 

9.1   Coordination between the MI as the user and the RAW as the provider had always been one sided. The DGMI had always found that focused military intelligence requirements were usually not met because RAW had its own priorities. However, after initial hiccups on this count in Sri Lanka, the RAW attempted to rectify the situation after the Advance HQ OFC was created. However, RAW could not provide specific information on the LTTE’s military capabilities or cogent assessments on LTTE strengths. This was surprising, considering the enormous depth of its knowledge about the LTTE.

 

9.2   Ideally, when the IPKF was inducted the RAW had the capability to produce a comprehensive handbook on Sri Lanka containing all the information the forces require. The fact that neither the Army projected such a requirement to the RAW, nor the RAW anticipated it speaks for itself. This is due to the enormous cultural gap that exists between the two organisations. I am not confident such aberration would not exist in the next overseas operation. After all how many country studies of the type produced by the CIA have been made available to the security forces from any Indian intelligence agency? With the MI acting as a bridge, this gap could easily be closed if the two premier agencies make up their mind to do so.

 

9.3   In the counter insurgency scene, top level agency coordination alone will not suffice.  It has to come down to formation level. At present interaction between the Army and RAW counterparts is based only on personal equation established between the two in the absence of standard operating procedures for information sharing. Thus officers on both sides grow up in a culture of denial rather than sharing. Perhaps we can take a leaf out of the Japanese industrial management practice of forming Small Group Activity for the user and producer for better understanding of the user problems to evolve a solution.

 

9.3    As far as the IB is concerned, internal political intelligence has been occupying an increasing horizon in their activities. This is happening at a time when internal threats to national security are growing enormously. Functionally in such critical internal situations the IB representatives had been forthcoming in sharing information of military interest. However, in the case of counter insurgency operations overseas the fine line dividing political and operational intelligence gets blurred. Perhaps the failure of the IB to understand this explains its reluctance to share information with the IPKF. In an overseas theatre our forces need political information as much as military related information as they are operating in an external environment. This needs be brought home to improve IB’s information sharing record in future overseas operations.

 

9.4   The failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the IPKF represents the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national security for political reasons had kept up the morale of Tamil militant combating our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain Commission report. It is disturbing to see the continued downgrading of national security needs to meet the demands of political priorities. The precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count appears to have taken roots now in the political culture. A similar contingency could  arise in our future overseas operations also. In order to face such a situation, it would be prudent for the armed forces to get clear mandates on such issues in advance while going on overseas operations of the future. In any case as armed forces are not the sole guardians of national security; we need to draw the attention of other stakeholders to this aspect.

10.0   Internal intelligence coordination

10.1   The experience in intelligence sharing between the three services intelligence wings was minimal. In the Sri Lanka operational situation, the lack interest shown by the air force and naval intelligence counterparts was probably because the MI had not articulated its needs where they could have usefully contributed. Perhaps it was also due to the lack of smoothness in the overall command and control equation involving the three services. As far as intelligence is concerned the creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency is only a first step to resolve this impasse; it has a long way to go to overcome the existing grittiness in this process.

10.2   During the entire period of IPKF operations other than ELINT and SIGINT inputs, there was little else from top down the army chain. Political decisions taken at home impacted intelligence operations of both MI and RAW with tectonic effects in Sri Lanka. The DGMI could have helped MI planning process in the IPKF with appropriate and timely inputs.

10.3   Generally there was high expectation of tactical intelligence from MI among frontline troops. Unfortunately collecting such information in less populated and jungle terrain in areas like Mullaitivu district is not possible. So there has to be a blend of tactical intelligence devices with HUMINT inputs for the use of troops in combat. This was absent in Sri Lanka. However, this also requires a degree of intelligence awareness among the front line infantry units. Only Para Commando units showed such awareness and this gave certain amount of ‘muscle’ to MI operations conducted with their help. Perhaps their well rounded training has enabled them to understand the intelligence requirements peculiar to counter insurgency operations. There is a need to inculcate this awareness among other infantry units for better intelligence coordination with frontline troops.

10.4   Communication and electronic intelligence produced valuable inputs. However, such information was not validated adequately due to paucity of intelligence staff. In future operations of force projection such inputs are likely to increase enormously. In order to assess the overall picture perhaps we will have to train intelligence staff at the formation level to combine HUMINT, ELINT and SIGINT inputs to evolve realistic assessments. 

PART 3 - THIRD THOUGHTS ON INTELLIGENCE IN

OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

11.0   Perspective planning and intelligence

I am not very clear whether intelligence needs form part of perspective planning. If not it has to be rectified. This will help MI make its own long term plans to build expertise as per projected operational requirements. That should also include inputs required from civil intelligence agencies. This would require close cooperation and coordination with civil intelligence agencies. Unless we plan and act on evolving such an information matrix, as success in overseas operations are dependent upon the performance of the external intelligence agency. Such a plan if executed would fill in gaps in strategic intelligence picture over a period of time. This would have its happy fall out on MI’s own intelligence acquisition plans that would also include ELINT inputs which would become the real time intelligence purveyor of the future. It would also help identification of other secondary requirements like specialised language requirements and country specialisation.

12.0   Intelligence staffing

Military intelligence is a specialised job that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information needs of the battle field and provide useful assessments to the fighting forces. Skill sets required for MI staff in future operations of force projection have widened in scope requiring real time assessment capability. No doubt the quantum jump in communication and information technology provides useful tools for the MI to meet this requirement. However, much of its success would depend upon the training imparted to intelligence staff to be technologically savvy in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging battle field needs.

13.0   HUMINT planning

Sri Lanka experience has shown MI’s HUMINT success is directly proportional to the investment made prior to the operation. It takes about 18 months to two years to develop useful HUMINT sources in a green field, overseas territory. Fortunately, in Sri Lanka among Tamils and Sinhalas we had sympathetic sections that were prepared to help us out. The local government and armed forces were also generally friendly. Future overseas operations might not enjoy such advantages. Intelligence planners will have to assess and understand the environmental dynamics in an overseas setting in advance to meaningfully develop HUMINT resources organically and coordinate with other intelligence providers to fulfil the expectations of our forces in overseas operations of the future.  

14.0   Getting ready for technology driven overseas theatres of war

With the nation poised to emerge as a regional power in the near future, MI has to transform itself into a technology driven organisation to meld TECHINT, ELINT, SIGINT and HUMINT inputs on a real time basis to meet the requirements of force projection overseas. Focus on intelligence management rather than mere information management is likely to be the order of the day in the near future. That would by and large remove the aberrations of intelligence acquisition and coordination and contribute meaningfully to assist operational planning and execution. 

 

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[1] Apart from the MOS, MEA/Cabinet Secretary, the members of the Core Group included the three vice chiefs of staff, Joint Secretary MEA, Joint Secretary PMO, DGMO, DGMI, Director IB, Director (Secretary) RAW and Principal Information Officer.

[2] The designation of the force as Indian Peace Keeping Force was formalized only a few years after Indian troops were withdrawn from Sri Lanka in 1990. In this paper the term IPKF denotes the employment of Indian troops during the period from August 1987 to March1990

 

It’s SNAFU time in India-China relations

Military disengagement between the two troops at the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh not in sight anytime soon despite high-level India-China diplomatic engagements.

Col R Hariharan | September 17, 2020 | The Daily Guardian |Opinion

https://thedailyguardian.com/its-snafu-time-in-india-china-relations/

The World War II troops enriched English language with a lot of creative acronyms, given the armies penchant for officially using abbreviations to suit wireless transmission of those days. Among them, SNAFU, an acronym for “Situation Normal, All F****d Up", was an all-time favourites adopted by armies over the world. It is now firmly established as part of conventional English usage, though 20^th century prudery has provided “Fouled up” as convenient fig leaf to the last two words of the acronym.  

SNAFU aptly describes the current state of India-China relations, even after the foreign ministers of the two countries met in Moscow on 10 September. This is the sad conclusion one can draw after carefully reading the joint press statement issued by the MEA after External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, had a two-and-half-hour meeting. The photo op at the meeting tells it all: Jaishankar with a half-smile, a beaming Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, having “successfully arranged” the meeting, and Wang Yi with a painful smile.

Two key operative words germane to resolving the border confrontation — the LAC and status quo ante — are missing in the joint statement. It is logical to conclude that the core differences between these two aspects will continue to dominate relations in the coming days. The short preamble and the five points of the joint press statement give an inkling of what happened (and did not happen) at the meeting.

1. It is obvious the only thing the two ministers have agreed on is that both sides should take guidance from the series of consensus of the two leaders — Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping — on developing India-China relations, “including not allowing differences to become disputes”. The purpose of the whole meeting was just to do that; apparently, little progress has been made on this respect. Now, it has been left to PM Modi and President Xi to take a further call on this.

2. The two ministers “agreed that the current situation in the border areas is not in the interest of either side”. Therefore, they agreed that “the border troops of both sides should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions”. This is what the local and regional commanders had been trying to do May 2020 onwards, without success. Otherwise, the violent clash in Galwan heights in June 2020 would not have happened. So, the situation on the ground, after Indian troops had occupied key heights to deny further ingress of Chinese troops, can be expected to continue just as the Chinese deployment will. While they can continue the dialogue, it is not clear how they can be expected to quickly disengage and maintain ‘proper distance’ (military confrontation is not a coronavirus precaution. In military parlance, there is no such thing as ‘proper distance’.)

3. They “agreed that both sides shall abide by all the existing agreements and protocol on China-India boundary affairs, maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas and avoid any action that could escalate matters”. Actually, the Galwan clash and the Indian troops’ recent actions to vitiate further attempts of Chinese troops to occupy territory have shown how China’s repeated violation of these agreements and protocols has made them ineffective. It is facile to expect that they would do so when they are confronting each other eyeball to eyeball.

4. “The two sides also agreed to continue to have dialogue and communication through the Special Representative mechanism on the India-China boundary question.” Does this mean that what could not be achieved after 22 rounds of discussion should continue? Perhaps, it is to buy time for Xi to find a face-saving method to “manage” the mess in India. “They also agreed in this context that the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on IndiaChina border affairs (WMCC) should also continue its meetings.” What will they discuss? India’s continuing ban on Chinese apps? Or the process of vetting Chinese investments in India? No wonder, the Chinese press release issued one hour before the joint press statement, giving its own construct and quoting Jaishankar telling Wang Yi, said India did not want “tension to escalate” along its disputed border with China. He was also quoted as saying that India’s policy toward China had not changed and that New Delhi believed that China’s policy toward India had also not changed.

5. The ministers agreed that “as the situation eases”, the two sides should “expedite work to conclude new Confidence Building Measures to maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity in the border areas”. It is difficult to imagine that local military regional commanders would agree to “ease the situation” by talking to each other without higher direction from their governments. Regarding Confidence Building Measures, the less said the better. The Chinese have shown by their actions over the years that these measures are a one-way street for them to grab more territory.

It is difficult to view this as a genuine “constructive engagement” as claimed in the statement when the obvious has been reiterated. It does not require tea leaves to foresee that the India-China standoff is in for a long haul. And for the troops freezing on the inhospitable heights, it is SNAFU, in short.

The writer is a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism. He is actively associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies.

Reworking India-Sri Lanka relations under Rajapaksas -Deccan Herald, September 13, 2020

 

Talk to TBC: Part 2 of Col Hariharan's interview

 

Talk to TBC: Col R Hariharan's Interview on Sri Lanka -Pt I

 

Eelam Tamils & Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: Then & Now

 

Sri Lanka Perspectives August 2020 - Rajapaksa's chart a new bumpy course

Col R Hariharan | August 31, 2020|South Asia Security Trends, Sept 2020 |

www.security-risks.com

 

As expected the Rajapaksas bounced back to power with all guns blazing, with their Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party by winning 145 seats, 25 seats more than their own forecast. With the SLPP-led the Sri Lanka Nidahas Podujana Permauna (SLPNS)’s three minor partners chipping in 6 seats, the SLPP now commands two thirds majority in the 225-member parliament.   

 

Coming in the wake of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory in 2019 presidential poll, the results are only popular reaffirmation of trust in the Rajapaksa ‘power’, the brothers Gotabaya and Mahinda project. Obviously, the public expect them to take the nation through the double whammy of critical economic situation and the negative impact of global Covid pandemic on the island nation. It also indicated further consolidation of Sinhala Buddhist majority in support of the Rajapaksas, who had been stressing the need to safeguard the Sinhala Therawada Buddhist identity and culture.

 

Equally important is the accumulation of unchallenged power in the hands of the Rajapaksa famiy. Apart from President and Prime Minister, brother Chamal and Mahinda’s son Namal are cabinet ministers; in addition Chamal’s son Shasheendra is a state minister. Between them, the family controls all key ‘power’ portfolios: defence, finance, agriculture and  Buddha Sasaana among others. According to an opposition member in all 421 departments, institutions and government bodies are under the control of the family. In addition to this, four elected members of President Rajapaksa’s elite group of ‘Viyathagamea loyalist’, professionals who campaigned for him, are state ministers. Basil Rajapaksa, the other brother, heads the powerful 40-member “Presidential Task Force for Continuous Services for Sustenance of Overall Community Life.” The task force has a hand in every aspect of planned activity, including control of Corona virus pandemic activity, which have been entrusted execution and development activity of the government.

 

The failure of the much heralded Yahapana (good governance) government formed by the contrived collaboration between President Maithripala Sirisena of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFPP) and Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the opposition United National Party (UNP). It has damaged not only their personal credibility, but also of their parties, which had been ruling Sri Lanka for over 70 years.

 

This is a huge setback for the civil society, which wanted to provide a democratic alternative to the Rajapaksa clan and worked hard for its success. To add to their disappointment, both the mainstream political parties are emasculated. The UNP, which won 106 seats in the last election, was wiped off the screen, securing just one seat in the national list. It is yet to nominate a member to fill it, as its leadership has not been able to recover from the aftershock of elections.  The SLFP is only a little better, becoming a marginal player of, the mainstream, which it had dominated earlier. Former President Sirisena realized early that capitulation was better, even before the election and agreed that SLFP candidates would contest under the neophyte SLPP’s ‘pohotuwa’ (lotus bud) symbol. In Sri Lanka party politics, election symbols have important role in rallying loyal party supporters. A powerful national party sacrificing it to contest under the symbol of an untested new party, is an anathema for party workers. 

While the SLFPP has suffered such a fate, the UNP is likely to do so if it contests the forthcoming provincial council elections with the symbol of its clone which drained its followers during the parliamentary election. Former deputy leader of the UNP Sajith Premadasa, who broke away from the UNP, led the Samagi Jana Baalawegaya (SJB) managed to win 54 seats to emerge as the main opposition party. The SJB is likely to attract the rest of the UNP old guard during future elections. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the powerful Tamil political combine, is also showing signs of losing steam winning only 10 seats, as against 16 in the outgoing parliament. Six seats have gone to smaller Tamil parties. The Muslim representation in parliament has equally declined.

 

In the absence of a strong opposition, the temptation for the Rajapaksas to single mindedly pursue their own agenda seems to be coming true. Are they planning to ignore one fourth of population formed by minorities? It would seem so if we go by President Rajapaksa’s statement delivered at the inaugural of the new parliament. He said, “priority will be given to the concept of one country, one law for all the people. As a representative of the people, we always represent the aspirations of the majority. It is only then that the sovereignty of the people can be safeguarded. In accordance of he supreme constitution of our country, I have pledged to protect the unitary status of the country and to protect the Buddha Sasana during my tenure.” He added that he had set up “an advisory council comprising leading Buddhist monks to seek advice on governance.”

 

The President’s statement sounds ominous, if read in the rush to do away with the 19^th Amendment, which had increased the accountability of the President to the parliament and curbed some of his powers, and introduce 20^th Amendment, whose form and content are not clear. Equally unclear is the face of the new constitution which is being drafted. Jehan Perara, peace activist, writing on the subject of drafting a new constitution, has pointed out the election campaign that led to the election of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in November 2019 was “an extremely divisive one. This could be seen in the way that the electorate voted highlighting the ethnic and religious divides in the country.”

 

In view of this, Perera says the “nationalism should be balanced by an emphasis on equality based pluralism” for citizens to share a common space. He advocates the need to “ensure there is equal rights, equal treatment and equal protection to all citizens” by evolving a concept of “inclusive nationalism” in place of an exclusive one, while drafting the constitution. It will be worth the effort if civil societies take up this idea with political parties to ensure once again Sri Lanka does not end up with a constitution skewed by the perceptions of the majority party. And that would be a recipe for disaster for Sri Lanka, if SLPP in its moment of triumphalism forgets the hard earned lessons of the past, earned with the blood and sweat of thousands of people.

 

[Col R Hariharan, a retire MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com web: https://col.hariharan.info ]

 

Why Islamic world ignores Uyghur plight in China?

Col R Hariharan | August 30, 2014| Dinamalar, Chennai |

[Translated from Tamil original published in the daily newspaper.]

Earlier this month, the United States banned the Chinese government-run Xinjiang Production Construction Core (XPCC), a paramilitary and business organization, and two of its top officials for depriving basic rights to Uyghur people working in their organisation.

The action was taken under the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act passed by the United States last May for their actions. At that time, the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo said "the ongoing human rights abuses by the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang, especially against the Uyghur people and other Islamic minorities, are the biggest black spot of this century." He also listed China's ongoing actions against the Uyghurs including repression, incarceration of civilians without cause, constant surveillance, forced labour and compulsory family planning.

The Chinese government has condemned the United States, saying it was "constantly interfering in China's internal affairs" and warned that the government would take appropriate action. This could be considered a major turning point in the rapidly declining US-China relationship.

In the world affected by the continuing Cold War between these two great nations, the attention is turning towards Uyghur people. As a result, support for them is growing in many countries. But Muslims of the world have not been so sympathetic to Uyghur Muslims.

Who are Uyghurs?

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, on the north western tip of China, is the largest part of the country. Of the 218 million people of 40 ethnic groups living there, more than 113 million are Uyghur Muslims. Uyghurs are of Turkik descent living in the area since the fourth century. The Uyghur language is also of the same descent.

According to history, though they came under Chinese domination from time to time, the Uyghur people invariably managed to regain their power to rule. Uyghurs of the region twice managed to form the independent state of "Republic of East Turkestan". It functioned as an independent country in 1933 and for a second time from 1944 to 1949. However, after the Chinese Communist government came to power in 1949, it brought the region under the complete control of China.

Chinese Communist Domination

During the Mao Zedong regime in 1955, Chinese troops and veterans were resettled in the region and the now-banned XPCCC, the para military manufacturing company, was formed. After that, the Chinese government has been resettling the Han Chinese population in the region. As a result, the proportion of the Uyghur ethnic majority has been declining. In addition, it has been reported that last year, the birth rate among the Uyghurs fell by 80 percent below the national average, thanks to government efforts to reduce the Uyghur population, though China attributes it to better education and family planning awareness.

Several Uyghur liberation movements have emerged to oppose the increasing dominance of the Chinese. The most important of these are the East Turkestan Liberation Organization and the East Turkestan Liberation Movement. Outside China, there are a total of 1.6 million Uyghurs living in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Kazakhstan.

They along with Uyghurs who have immigrated to the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Europe, have formed the "World Uyghur Congress." It had been exposing China's ongoing atrocities against the Uyghur people at the global level.

In Afghanistan, many Uyghurs took part in the Al Qaeda Islamic extremist movement started by Osama bin Laden. Since then, Uyghur Islamic extremism has become a nightmare for China. Fearing its impact, China is monitoring the activities of the Uyghur people, who work in Pakistan and the Gulf countries with the help of local governments.

A violent anti-Chinese riot erupted in July 2009 in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. The Uyghur population attacked the Chinese population, properties, shops and companies. The government had to use the Public Security Force, a paramilitary force, to bring the situation under control.

According to the government, a total of 197 people were killed and 1721 injured in the attacks that followed the riots. according Most of them were Uyghurs. Since then, the Chinese government has taken a number of steps toward crush independence struggles of not only the Uyghur but also the Tibetan minorities.

The new Terrorism Act, deprives even the right include to talk of secession. In order to improve the Public Security Force, they have been brought under military control. There is camera surveillance of people in public places.  ‘Alternative education’ halls are being run to brainwash Uyghur people gradually. This is in keeping with the government’s ongoing efforts to control the activities of Islam and Christianity in China.

In the aftermath of the Uyghur riots, Islamic prayer, and all religious activities, have been brought under state control. Madrassas are banned. Prayer halls are allowed to operate only under the supervision of the government. In addition, fasting during Ramadan, the use of halal meat, and the wearing of Islamic symbols such as Uyghur clothing and keeping of beard are prohibited. These concerted efforts by the Chinese government have cramped the work environment of tens of thousands of Uyghurs intellectuals, teachers, clergy and journalists creating enormous pressure on them.

Brainwashing camps

According to a report published by the UN in 2018, more than a million Uyghur Muslims have been imprisoned in alternative education detention camps since 2017. They are being brainwashed in these camps in the name of alternative education in order to forget their religion and culture, the report added. However, according to several media reports, there are more than five million Uyghurs in these detention camp. In these brainwashing camps, Uyghur men and women separated from their families, are kept in solitary confinement. They are taught the Chinese language, the principles of the Chinese Communist Party, and the ideology of Chinese Prime Minister Xi Jinping as a compulsory subject, forgetting the Islamic religion and renouncing Uyghur culture.

The Xinjiang region is vital to China's security because it borders Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China’s ambitious infrastructure initiative begins in Kashgar, Xinjiang's main city. The multi-pronged project continues through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and ends in the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar. Therefore, Xinjiang region will increasingly play an important role in the emerging China-Pakistan defence strategy against India.

Pakistan’s double role

The human rights abuses that China has unleashed on the Uyghur Muslim population over the years continue to be criticized in the world media. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, who daily screams that Muslims are being wiped out in India and their rights are being eroded in Kashmir strangely does not notice the plight of Uighur Muslims, who form the majority Xinjiang region on Pakistan’s northern border. When asked, strangely Imran Khan says he does not know the details about it. PM Imran Khan has no choice but to play dumb charade because Pakistan owes a great deal to China to survive its economic crisis. The silence of the Pakistani people on the issue, shows how deeply China has been able to influence them.

It is not just Pakistan; even the World Islamic Council, created for the protection of the Islamic people, has never spoken out against China. Perhaps in the eyes of the Islamic world, China's actions to separate Uighur Islamists from their families, suppress their fundamental rights and imprison them in so-called "hotels" are better ignored. There are two reasons for this ‘double vision’ of Islamic countries.

 

 

 

One, they are influenced by China’s money power in various ways. So, they suppress any hate-China comments. For example, in July last year, 22 countries, including the United States, Australia, Britain, France and Japan, wrote to the President of the UN Human Rights Council. In it, they expressed their concern about Chinese government's actions violating the human rights of the Uyghur people in China. They also demanded that the Chinese government lift such restrictions.

But there was not a single Islamic country among the 22 countries! In response, 55 countries issued a rejoinder addressed to the President of the UN Human Rights Council expressing their support for China's stand on the Xinjiang issue. The countries included Islamic countries including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as Pakistan. However, only the Gulf state of Qatar withdrew its support for the letter, claiming that the Uyghur Islamic people were suffering human rights abuses in China.

Democracy and human rights are only nominal in  vast majority of countries that support China's position on Xinjiang Muslims. In practice, many of these countries’ rulers are notorious for human rights abuses. So probably, the human rights abuses of the Uyghur people does not seem to have created a major impact on them. Why criticize those countries only? The various Islamic organizations and parties operating in our own country do not care to bother about the plight of the Uyghurs. They seem to have made no effort in favour of the Uyghur people.

India’s position

India continues to be neutral on the Uyghur issue, avoiding criticism of the Chinese government. Will India change its position, in view of the ongoing standoff Indo-Chinese relationship? In this regard, we must remember China's recent abortive attempt to bring up the Kashmir issue at the UN, in support of Pakistan. In view of this, I find nothing wrong with India expressing its concern over China's violation of human rights of  the Uyghur. Why are we not doing it?