Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd.)
[This paper was presented at a seminar "Indian Experience in Force Projection" organised by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) at New Delhi on September 15 and 16, 2008.]
South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.6684 of 20-Sept-2020.
This Paper was presented eleven years ago. But the points mentioned are still relevant for those Scholars and Military Officials interested in Strategic Issues –Director
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2683
1.0 Introduction
1.1 When we
look at India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-90) now, after two
decades, we are doing with the benefit of hindsight. The two decades since then
have been remarkable for a number of global developments. These include the
phenomenal growth in communication and multimedia technology, introduction of
liberalised world trade order, and the realignment of global power equation
following the break up of the Soviet Union. As a result the concept of
strategic security has expanded in scope.
1.2 In order
to make a realistic assessment of the Indian Army’s operations in Sri Lanka, we
need to look at the strategic environment of the period. Some of the
developments of special interest of that era were –
1.21 The Cold War confrontation between the
Soviet Union and the U.S. was at its peak following the Soviet military
presence in Afghanistan, where India also had a strategic interest.
1.22 India’s security focus was largely on
Pakistan. As a corollary, Sri Lanka was not one of the focus areas of Military
Intelligence. In fact, Operation Brass Tacks had just been completed in
May 1987, two months before the Army had to send a task force to Sri Lanka
following the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) in July 1987.
1.23 There was no integrated national security
body to take informed decisions on issues affecting national security. Cabinet
Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was the only forum to carry out this
task. During the Sri Lanka operations a Core Group was formed to look after the
day to day issues. This empowered group functioned under the Chairmanship of
the Minister of State, External Affairs and in his absence the Cabinet
Secretary.[1]Similarly
the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) was the only palliative to meet the
requirements of Joint Services operations.
1.24 Communication technology
was just making its early breakthroughs. Much of its benefits had not yet
enhanced our battlefield competencies.
1.25 The advantage imparted by information
technology and its applications in battle field, particularly in the field of
intelligence were not available
1.3 Armed forces had fought wars in 1965 and 1971 with similar decision making structures probably with its attendant deficiencies. However, India’s Sri Lanka operation qualitatively differed from all of them because it was conducted overseas. The Indian force in Sri Lanka got involved in a conflict that was neither contemplated nor planned for. More than that, for the first time the three services of Indian security forces operated jointly to carry out a counterinsurgency campaign in a foreign country.
2.0 Aim
The aim of this presentation is to study issues relating to intelligence (with special focus on intelligence coordination) in the operations of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka.[2] Electronic and communications intelligence aspects are not covered in this presentation.
3.0 Presentation
3.1 Part 1 – Intelligence on Sri Lanka before and during IPKF operations. .
3.2 Part 2 – Intelligence coordination at various levels.
3.3 Part 3 - Third thoughts on intelligence in overseas operations.
PART 1 – INTELLIGENCE BEFORE AND DURING IPKF OPERATIONS
4.0 Dedicated MI resources earmarked for Sri Lanka
4.1
Intelligence Corps is the main field and staff resource of MI. It is the
only Corps of the Indian Army whose strength was reduced when the Gen Krishna
Rao Committee recommendations were implemented. In 1987, before the IPKF
operations started, the Intelligence Corps had a total strength not exceeding
2500 all ranks. Classified as a minor corps, traditionally employment of MI was
largely confined to security and combat intelligence, with limited intelligence
planning and battle field acquisition capabilities. The MI had no mandate or
dedicated capability to acquire cross border intelligence till 1980 when it was
given the task of acquiring limited trans-border intelligence. Intelligence acquisition units created for
this purpose had a mandate to collect only military intelligence of tactical
value. In the field of counter insurgency, over the years the MI had gained
certain amount of expertise in interrogation and source operation for meeting
the intelligence requirement of troops involved in operations. For this
purpose, a divisional intelligence unit was created in each of the three
divisions deployed in counter insurgency role the northeast.
4.2 During
that period in the Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), Sri
Lanka was grouped with the section dealing with Indian Ocean nations of
peripheral interest to India like the ASEAN. On the other hand, both Bangladesh
and Burma were clubbed with the section dealing with insurgency in the
northeast. The terrain analysis section was totally focused on Pakistan and to
a limited extent on Tibet. It was evident that Sri Lanka enjoyed a low priority
in MI’s areas of interest. As a result no dedicated intelligence resource was
allocated to Sri Lanka for intelligence acquisition. No special effort was made
to acquire intelligence of military interest on Sri Lanka from the civil
intelligence agencies till 1987.
4.3 Prior to
the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA), around May 1987 an
intelligence team of one officer and six NCOs was moved to Chennai from the
parent unit in Gorakhpur for collecting intelligence from Sri Lanka. Till the
end of the IPKF operations this was the only dedicated intelligence resource
available to the DGMI. (Subsequently it was built up into an intelligence
unit.) Thus DGMI was entirely dependent upon the inputs from the external
intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) which had rich resources
dedicated for Sri Lanka. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), the counter intelligence
arm of the government, had been keeping a close watch on the activities of
thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees present in Tamil Nadu. Of course, the
DGMI had a regular flow of the periodic intelligence reports and summaries from
the Advance HQ of the Overall Force Commander (OFC) after it was created.
4.4 Headquarters Southern Command had a team from Southern Command Liaison Unit in Chennai. Though the LU was a counter intelligence unit, the LU team provided the Command Headquarters an interface with the state and central intelligence agencies in Chennai during the IPKF operations.
4.5 After the
induction of 54 Infantry Division in the first week of August 1987 in Sri
Lanka, a few Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs were attached
to the OFC HQ at Chennai. Clearly it was a temporary arrangement as there was
no specific tasking of the MI team except to collect information on the
activities of both the Tamil militants and the Sri Lanka army. The intelligence
personnel were dispatched to Palali on August 5, 2007 with no functional
resources, other than the attached personnel.
4.6 They were
not under command 54 Infantry Division. Though they were nominally under the HQ
OFC, the DGMI had asked them to submit their reports directly to them till
their status was formalised. The two MI officers of the team resurrected their
personal contacts with Sri Lanka Tamils to send periodic reports to the DGMI.
There was little intelligence input from either DGMI or from the civil
intelligence agencies to 54 Infantry Division.
4.7 In
September 1987, when the situation became murky in the Indian interaction with
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 57 Mtn Div Int & FS coy with
about 60 personnel was moved to Palali. Its OC was upgraded to a Lt Col’s
appointment. Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs culled from
various intelligence units were posted to the unit. And there were never enough
of them and the unit was always under strength.
4.8 This
intelligence unit continued to be under the HQ OFC and this caused some
avoidable confusion in HQ 54 Infantry Division. Its intelligence officers were
scrupulously excluded from all deliberations of the Div HQ. They were asked to
stay out of all interactions with the LTTE during the political parleys. Though
they had collected information and built some useful local contacts that
provided valuable assessments these inputs were never asked for. Nor did the
Division project its requirement of specific intelligence of any kind. The
intelligence team’s officers were kept out of operational planning process
prior to the Jaffna operations. (According to the RAW, the Army neither took
the RAW into confidence nor sought its advice before Jaffna operations).
4.9 As the Jaffna operation commenced and the induction of troops took place rapidly, the OC 57 Div Int & FS Coy was asked to brief the troops prior to their operational induction. Similarly, the unit was tasked to interrogate all and sundry rounded up in the first flush of operations. This clearly indicated that troops in combat had no inkling of how to handle suspects or conduct combat interrogations. Similarly no advance planning was evident in the AG’s Branch at the OFC HQ and the Div HQ for screening of civilian population or holding prisoners. This was in direct contrast to our experience during 1971 operations when we had meticulously planned in advance on handling and holding of prisoners. Thus in the early stages of war valuable opportunity to gain tactical information through interrogation was lost.
5.0 Intelligence resources of the Advance HQ OFC
5.1 However, by the time two more divisions were inducted into Sri Lanka and the structure of the Advance HQ of the OFC was formalised, an intelligence unit specifically structured for the IPKF operations designated as the Ad Hoc Liaison Unit was raised. The unit had both intelligence acquisition and interrogation capabilities. The unit commanded by a Lt Col had its headquarters in Chennai with a team each deployed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. It also had three rehabilitation centres (with one interrogator each) for the three divisions. In all, it had 12 officers and over 100 other ranks. An effort was made to induct as many Tamil or South Indian officers and NCOs of Intelligence Corps into the unit. One Sinhala knowing officer was also posted sometime towards end 1988. 57 Int and FS Coy provided the intelligence cover for 54 Div sector including Kilinochchi. Both the units served under the command of Col GS (Int) of the Advance HQ OFC.
5.2 Communication intelligence was provided by the EWCP. It worked closely with the troops and provided accurate real time information.
5.3 Though the RAW had complained that they were not consulted prior to the launching of Jafffna operations, after the formation of the Advance HQ OFC, the Chennai RAW unit maintained close touch and provided valuable inputs particularly on political developments in Sri Lanka. However its contribution on militant disposition and assessment of LTTE capabilities was neither timely nor exhaustive.
5.4 Despite enjoying excellent personal relations at the senior level with MI officers, the Q Branch of the Tamil Nadu State Police and the Joint Directorate of the IB, Chennai provided no information throughout the entire IPKF operation. They had enormous information on the LTTE and its tentacles in Tamil Nadu which could have helped us in our operations against the LTTE. However such information was never provided. In the case of the Q Branch this was mainly due to the absence of formal orders from the state government which had taken a politically hostile stand against the IPKF operations. The IB usually fobbed off our requests saying that they had only political information, though in counter insurgency political information also had a great relevance on military operations.
6.0 MI performance: positives and negatives
6.1 The MI personnel despite the initial glitches of command and control and resource limitations made some positive contributions. A few of these were as under:
6.11 As early as September 1987, the MI detachment
in its assessment to the DGMI had said that if the IPKF went to war it would
take three years to reduce it to manageable proportions. This assessment almost
came true.
6.12 Despite the lack of clarity in the early
stages, the DGMI managed to rise to the occasion to extend maximum possible
support in identifying intelligence resources and moving them within a couple
of months. It also made efforts to recruit Sinhala knowing Tamils, who had
migrated from Sri Lanka.
6.12 Even during the period of troubled peace
from August to October 1987, the MI officers had made some useful contacts both
within the LTTE and among influential pro-LTTE civilians particularly in Jaffna
and Trincomalee. These contacts came in handy, when the operations started. They
provided valuable inputs on political moves of the LTTE as well as on some key
issues like LTTE’s contact with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which was
carrying out its own insurgency in Sinhala areas, procurement of MANPADS by the
LTTE, contacts between the Sri Lanka President Premadasa and the LTTE
leadership etc.
6.13 Well before the operation, we videographed
the LTTE inspired civilian agitations in Jaffna and Trincomalee and identified
key ring leaders. When the operation started, some of them were picked up and
successfully turned into informers who gave useful tactical information on
movement of LTTE pistol groups and ambushes.
6.14 In two cases we managed to get clinching
evidence in the form of photographs and wiretaps of collusion between Sri
Lankan army elements and the LTTE. These helped us to understand the extent of
collusion between the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.
6.15 Useful contacts were built in Sri Lanka’s
National Intelligence Bureau. Though some of their information was misleading,
it helped to insulate us against some of the counter intelligence threats MI
was facing.
6.2 There were
also some weaknesses in the MI functioning; these were as follows:
6.21 Lack of MI resources allocated prior to the
operation by the DGMI had resulted in absence of intelligence assets in Sri
Lanka. This had an adverse impact on the initial inability of the MI to provide
timely and useful information to 54 Inf Div for the Jaffna operations.
6.22 Despite receiving inputs from both RAW and
IB and other agencies on a regular basis, the DGMI did not provide assessments
that could have helped the IPKF operations. Similarly the HQ Southern Command
also failed to provide useful assessments or inputs.
6.23 There was little MI input on LTTE activity
in Tamil Nadu. This was mainly due to the completely negative attitude of Tamil
Nadu Government resulting in total denial of access to information on the LTTE
available with the state intelligence. Action taken to rectify this by the DGMI
and the Army HQ, if any, had little impact on their attitude.
6.24 The LTTE was acting with impunity in Tamil
Nadu during the entire period of operations, exposing the troops to potential
LTTE threat. This created a great feeling of insecurity among our Tamil
sources, who felt that we were not seriously involved in tackling the LTTE.
They were reluctant to work for us as they felt we did not have enough
“influence” in this ambience. This affected MI’s performance.
6.25 Most of the MI officers had little
background knowledge on Sri Lanka or its environment when they were inducted.
There is perhaps a requirement for building regional specialists in the course
of MI officers’ careers so that they could improve their expertise.
6.26 Intelligence NCOs performance was far below
par. They had no capability to carry out elementary interrogations. Nor were
they clear about their duties in a counter insurgency environment. Both
officers and NCOs tended to accept un- assessed information from sources
without vetting the credibility.
6.27 Intelligence staffing was poor in formation
headquarters. At one stage, in three of the four divisions the GSO1 (Int) were
low medical category officers; a few of them had no intelligence exposure. As
intelligence had limited dedicated staff resources, their posting in divisions
was far from prudent.
6.28 Quality of frontline soldiers’ knowledge of
handling prisoners, segregating them for detailed interrogation etc was poor.
The Command HQ was in the best position to address such lacunae to provide
short term training to officers and NCOs from all arms on a rotational basis.
This was probably not even contemplated, though it had been done in the past in
1971.
6.29 There was practically no input from Air or
Naval Intelligence sources. This was surprising because in Colombo more than
one merchant ship officer reported seeing fishing boats flashing ‘LTTE’ in
semaphore signals in Gulf of Mannar indicating regular movement of boats supplying
the LTTE from Tamil Nadu.
6.291 The Tamil media in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka
was rich open source information which went untapped due to shortage of
manpower. Similarly, there was not enough inter face with Indian media men who
had travelled into LTTE areas either covertly or openly. This rich source also
went unexploited.
6.292 At the end of the IPKF operations, there was
no formal MI arrangement for taking over the network of intelligence sources
built over the period of IPKF operations in Sri Lanka. Similarly the rich data
base on the LTTE militants went unused.
6.293 Few formation commanders only had used MI
resources as part of their overall intelligence planning. Generally they
expected MI to produce tactical information reactively. Thus often there was
lack of convergence between their expectations and results.
PART-2 INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AT VARIOUS LEVELS
7.0 Lack of
intelligence coordination and cooperation among various intelligence agencies
is a hardy perennial in the investigative studies of all most all operations in
India. The most reason report of this genre is the K Subrahmanyam Committee
report on Kargil operations. And probably in spite of findings of such
committees, this problem is likely to persist because intelligence agencies
apply the principle of Need to Know (from their point of view) to often
withhold information. This is inherent in the nature of intelligence operations
which carry enormous risks for the individuals who originate such information.
8.0 Unfortunately,
in the Sri Lanka operational scene despite our best efforts intelligence
coordination with civil agencies produced very little useful intelligence. The
Core Group was supposed to be a body to handle such issues. Some of those who
had attended its meetings said the Core Group probably spent more time
discussing the situation in Afghanistan than resolving difficult problems that
had cropped up during IPKF operations. The problems faced by the IPKF due to
political developments in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka that required Core Group
directions were left unresolved. This left the IPKF with the fall out of such
aberrations. Many such decisions though outside the scope of intelligence
coordination, had their impact on the MI operations. MI’s intelligence acquisition
effort was handicapped as a direct consequence of absence of meaningful
coordination in both letter and spirit at the top level.
9.0 Coordination with civil intelligence
agencies
9.1
Coordination between the MI as the user and the RAW as the provider had
always been one sided. The DGMI had always found that focused military
intelligence requirements were usually not met because RAW had its own
priorities. However, after initial hiccups on this count in Sri Lanka, the RAW
attempted to rectify the situation after the Advance HQ OFC was created.
However, RAW could not provide specific information on the LTTE’s military
capabilities or cogent assessments on LTTE strengths. This was surprising,
considering the enormous depth of its knowledge about the LTTE.
9.2 Ideally,
when the IPKF was inducted the RAW had the capability to produce a
comprehensive handbook on Sri Lanka containing all the information the forces
require. The fact that neither the Army projected such a requirement to the
RAW, nor the RAW anticipated it speaks for itself. This is due to the enormous
cultural gap that exists between the two organisations. I am not confident such
aberration would not exist in the next overseas operation. After all how many
country studies of the type produced by the CIA have been made available to the
security forces from any Indian intelligence agency? With the MI acting as a
bridge, this gap could easily be closed if the two premier agencies make up
their mind to do so.
9.3 In the
counter insurgency scene, top level agency coordination alone will not
suffice. It has to come down to
formation level. At present interaction between the Army and RAW counterparts
is based only on personal equation established between the two in the absence
of standard operating procedures for information sharing. Thus officers on both
sides grow up in a culture of denial rather than sharing. Perhaps we can take a
leaf out of the Japanese industrial management practice of forming Small Group
Activity for the user and producer for better understanding of the user
problems to evolve a solution.
9.3 As far as
the IB is concerned, internal political intelligence has been occupying an
increasing horizon in their activities. This is happening at a time when
internal threats to national security are growing enormously. Functionally in
such critical internal situations the IB representatives had been forthcoming
in sharing information of military interest. However, in the case of counter
insurgency operations overseas the fine line dividing political and operational
intelligence gets blurred. Perhaps the failure of the IB to understand this
explains its reluctance to share information with the IPKF. In an overseas
theatre our forces need political information as much as military related
information as they are operating in an external environment. This needs be
brought home to improve IB’s information sharing record in future overseas
operations.
9.4 The
failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the
IPKF represents the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The
failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national
security for political reasons had kept up the morale of Tamil militant
combating our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain
Commission report. It is disturbing to see the continued downgrading of
national security needs to meet the demands of political priorities. The
precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count
appears to have taken roots now in the political culture. A similar contingency
could arise in our future overseas
operations also. In order to face such a situation, it would be prudent for the
armed forces to get clear mandates on such issues in advance while going on
overseas operations of the future. In any case as armed forces are not the sole
guardians of national security; we need to draw the attention of other
stakeholders to this aspect.
10.0 Internal intelligence coordination
10.1 The
experience in intelligence sharing between the three services intelligence
wings was minimal. In the Sri Lanka operational situation, the lack interest
shown by the air force and naval intelligence counterparts was probably because
the MI had not articulated its needs where they could have usefully
contributed. Perhaps it was also due to the lack of smoothness in the overall
command and control equation involving the three services. As far as intelligence
is concerned the creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency is only a first
step to resolve this impasse; it has a long way to go to overcome the existing
grittiness in this process.
10.2 During
the entire period of IPKF operations other than ELINT and SIGINT inputs, there
was little else from top down the army chain. Political decisions taken at home
impacted intelligence operations of both MI and RAW with tectonic effects in
Sri Lanka. The DGMI could have helped MI planning process in the IPKF with
appropriate and timely inputs.
10.3 Generally
there was high expectation of tactical intelligence from MI among frontline
troops. Unfortunately collecting such information in less populated and jungle
terrain in areas like Mullaitivu district is not possible. So there has to be a
blend of tactical intelligence devices with HUMINT inputs for the use of troops
in combat. This was absent in Sri Lanka. However, this also requires a degree
of intelligence awareness among the front line infantry units. Only Para
Commando units showed such awareness and this gave certain amount of ‘muscle’
to MI operations conducted with their help. Perhaps their well rounded training
has enabled them to understand the intelligence requirements peculiar to
counter insurgency operations. There is a need to inculcate this awareness
among other infantry units for better intelligence coordination with frontline
troops.
10.4
Communication and electronic intelligence produced valuable inputs.
However, such information was not validated adequately due to paucity of
intelligence staff. In future operations of force projection such inputs are
likely to increase enormously. In order to assess the overall picture perhaps
we will have to train intelligence staff at the formation level to combine
HUMINT, ELINT and SIGINT inputs to evolve realistic assessments.
PART 3 - THIRD THOUGHTS ON INTELLIGENCE IN
OVERSEAS OPERATIONS
11.0 Perspective planning and intelligence
I am not very clear whether intelligence needs form
part of perspective planning. If not it has to be rectified. This will help MI
make its own long term plans to build expertise as per projected operational
requirements. That should also include inputs required from civil intelligence
agencies. This would require close cooperation and coordination with civil
intelligence agencies. Unless we plan and act on evolving such an information
matrix, as success in overseas operations are dependent upon the performance of
the external intelligence agency. Such a plan if executed would fill in gaps in
strategic intelligence picture over a period of time. This would have its happy
fall out on MI’s own intelligence acquisition plans that would also include
ELINT inputs which would become the real time intelligence purveyor of the future.
It would also help identification of other secondary requirements like
specialised language requirements and country specialisation.
12.0 Intelligence staffing
Military intelligence is a specialised job that
requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information
needs of the battle field and provide useful assessments to the fighting
forces. Skill sets required for MI staff in future operations of force
projection have widened in scope requiring real time assessment capability. No
doubt the quantum jump in communication and information technology provides
useful tools for the MI to meet this requirement. However, much of its success
would depend upon the training imparted to intelligence staff to be
technologically savvy in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging battle field
needs.
13.0 HUMINT planning
Sri Lanka experience has shown MI’s HUMINT success is
directly proportional to the investment made prior to the operation. It takes
about 18 months to two years to develop useful HUMINT sources in a green field,
overseas territory. Fortunately, in Sri Lanka among Tamils and Sinhalas we had
sympathetic sections that were prepared to help us out. The local government
and armed forces were also generally friendly. Future overseas operations might
not enjoy such advantages. Intelligence planners will have to assess and
understand the environmental dynamics in an overseas setting in advance to
meaningfully develop HUMINT resources organically and coordinate with other
intelligence providers to fulfil the expectations of our forces in overseas
operations of the future.
14.0 Getting ready for technology driven overseas theatres of war
With the nation poised to emerge as a regional power
in the near future, MI has to transform itself into a technology driven
organisation to meld TECHINT, ELINT, SIGINT and HUMINT inputs on a real time
basis to meet the requirements of force projection overseas. Focus on
intelligence management rather than mere information management is likely to be
the order of the day in the near future. That would by and large remove the
aberrations of intelligence acquisition and coordination and contribute
meaningfully to assist operational planning and execution.
---------------------***------------------------
[1] Apart from the MOS, MEA/Cabinet Secretary, the members of the Core
Group included the three vice chiefs of staff, Joint Secretary MEA, Joint
Secretary PMO, DGMO, DGMI, Director IB, Director (Secretary) RAW and Principal
Information Officer.
[2] The designation of the force as Indian Peace Keeping Force was
formalized only a few years after Indian troops were withdrawn from
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