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இந்தியா-சீனா-இலங்கை உறவுகள் – கேள்வியும், பதிலும்

கர்னல் ஆர் ஹரிஹரன் | மே 27, 2021

(ஒரு இலங்கை ஊடக நேர்காணலுக்கு நான் உபயோகித்த குறிப்புகளை கீழே காணலாம்.}

1. இலங்கையில் சீன முதலீடுகளின் அதிகரிப்பை பிராந்திய வல்லரசாக இருக்கும் இந்தியா எப்படி பார்க்கும்?

இலங்கையில் மட்டுமல்ல, தெற்காசிய நாடுகள் எல்லாவற்றிலும் சீன முதலீடுகளும், அதன் உடமைகளும் பல மடங்கு அதிகரித்துள்ளன. இதன் முக்கிய காரணம் சீனாவின் ஈடு இணை இல்லாத பண பலம். அதை பொருளாதார அடிப்படையில் இந்தியா எதிர் கொள்ள முடியாது. ஆகவேதான், இந்தியா தனது வெளியுறவுக் கொள்கையில் சில மாற்றங்களை ஏற்படுத்தி, சீனாவின் அதிகரிக்கும் ஆளுமையைக் கண்டு கவலை கொள்ளும் மற்ற நாடுகளுடன் ஒருங்கிணைந்து முதலீடு செய்யும் முயற்சியில் ஈடுபட்டு வருகிறது. இலங்கையில் இந்திய-ஜப்பான் கூட்டாக திரிகோணமலையில் மேற்கொள்ள இருக்கும் வளர்ச்சி திட்டம் இதற்கு ஒரு உதாரணம் என்று கூறலாம். 

2. கிழக்கு முனையத்திற்கு உள்நாட்டு எதிர்ப்பு காரணம் காட்டப்பட்டது. ஆனால், பல எதிர்ப்புக்களை மீறி Port City சட்டமூலம் உருவாக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. இதனை எப்படி பார்க்கின்றீர்கள்?

இது இலங்கை அரசு மேற்கொள்ளும் முடிவுகளில் சீனாவின் கை ஓங்கி இருப்பதை காட்டுகிறது. இதன் காரணம் ராஜபக்ச குடும்பத்தினர் சீனாவிடம் காட்டும் கரிசனத்தை, இந்தியாவிடம் காட்ட தயாராக இல்லை என்பதே. எனது பார்வையில், இந்திய-பசிபிக் பிராந்தியத்தில் அமெரிக்கா, இந்தியா, ஜப்பான் மற்றும் ஆஸ்திரேலியா புதிதாக உருவாக்கியுள்ள குவாட் அமைப்புக்கு, இலங்கை ஈடுபாடு காட்டக்கூடாது என்பதற்கு சீனா இலங்கை அரசின் மீது அளிக்கும் பன்முனை அழுத்தங்களுக்கு போர்ட் சிடி முடிவு ஒரு முன்னுதாரணம். இத்தகைய சீன அழுத்தங்களை வருங்காலத்தில் இலங்கை மக்கள் மேலும் எதிர் கொள்ளுவார்கள் என்பது என் கணிப்பு.  

3. இலங்கையில் விடுதலைப்புலிகள் இருந்த காலத்தில் சீனாவின் ஆதிக்கம் இருக்கவில்லை. புலிகளின் அழிவுக்கு இந்தியாவும் உழைத்தது. இவை எல்லாம் இந்திய இராஜதந்திரத்தின் தோல்வியாக பார்க்கப்படுகின்றது? அது சரியா?

இந்தக் கேள்வி இந்தியாவின் மீது உள்ள காழ்புணர்ச்சி  சரித்திரத்தை எப்படி மாற்றப் பார்க்கிறது என்பதற்கு ஒரு உதாரணம்.  முதலாவது, 2009ல் சீனா உலக அளவில் ஒரு வல்லரசாகவில்லை. ஆகவே அப்போது, இலங்கையில அதற்கு தற்போதுள்ள அளவு ஈடுபாடு கிடையாது. 

இப்போது நான் சரித்திரம் கண்ட உண்மைகளை உங்களுக்கு அளிக்கிறேன். 

விடுதலைப் புலிகள் இந்தியாவில் புகலிடம் கண்டு பலம் வாய்ந்த அமைப்பாக இலங்கை திரும்பியது மறுக்க முடியாத உண்மை.

இந்தியப்படையை இலங்கையிலிருந்து வெளிக்கிளப்ப புலிகள் அதுவரை விரோதியாக பாவித்த பிரேமதாசவுடன் கைகோத்தது உண்மை.

இந்தியப் படைகள் நாடு திரும்பிய பிறகு இந்திய முன்னாள் பிரதமர் ராஜீவ் காந்தியை வெடிகுண்டு தாக்குதலில் புலிகள் கொன்றது உலகமே அறிந்த உண்மை. 

அதற்கு பிறகு இந்தியா புலிகளை அழிக்க எந்த பெருமுயற்சியும் எடுக்கவில்லை. 2019ம் ஆண்டு ஈழப் போரில் புலிகள் அழிவுக்கு இலங்கைக்கு சீனா ஆயுதங்களை பெருமளவில் உதவியது முக்கிய காரணம். 

இந்த சரித்திரத்தை படிக்காத விரும்பாமல், திரித்து பார்ப்பவர்களுக்கு நான் ஒன்றுதான் சொல்வேன். இலங்கைத் தமிழர்களின் விடிவுகாலம் இன்னும் நெருங்கவில்லை என்று தெரிகிறது . 

4. இந்திய இலங்கை ஒப்பந்தம் மூலம் உருவாக்கப்பட்ட 13 ஆம் திருத்தத்தினை இலங்கை நடைமுறைபடுத்தவில்லை. அது ஒரு அதிகார பரவலாக்கம். தற்போது Port City க்கு அதிகார பகிர்வையே கொடுத்திருக்கின்றார்கள். இதன் மூலம் இந்தியாவை இலங்கை மதிக்கவில்லை என எடுத்து​ ​கொள்ளலாமா? 

இந்தக் கேள்விக்கு நான் ஏற்கனவே கேள்வி 2க்கு அளித்த பதிலைப் பார்க்கவும். ​​இரண்டு​ தனித்தனி விடயல்களு​க்கு​ ​முடிச்சு போடுவது அரசியல். ​​

5. தமிழர்கள் சமஷ்டியை கோருகின்ற போது இந்தியா 13 யை பேசுவது என்பது சுயநலமா இல்லை தமிழர் நலமா?

இந்தியா ஒரு பிராந்திய வல்லரசு. இலங்கையில் வாழும் தமிழர்களை விட, இந்தியாவில் பல மடங்கு அதிகமான தமிழர்கள் வாழ்கிறார்கள். இந்திய ஜனநாயகம் எப்போதுமே தனது நாட்டு மக்களுக்கு நன்மை பயக்கவே எல்லா முடிவுகளையும் எடுக்கிறது. 13ம் சட்ட திருத்தம் தமிழர்களுக்கு சில அடிப்படை உரிமைகளை அளிக்கிறது. அதை செயலாக்க, தமிழர் நலம் பேசுவோர், இந்தியாவை குற்றம் காண்பதை விட்டுவிட்டு, முயற்சி மேற்கொள்ள வேண்டும். 

6. ஈழம் உருவாக இந்தியா விரும்பாததுக்கு தமிழ்நாடு இந்தியாவிருந்து பிரியும் எனும் பயமா காரணம்?

நீங்கள் தமிழ்நாடு பிரிவினை என்ற வெத்து வேட்டை போட்டு, பயமா என்று கேட்கிறீர்கள். இந்திய இலங்கை ஒப்பந்தத்தை எடுத்து படியுங்கள். அந்த ஒப்பந்தத்தின் அடிப்படையே ஒருங்கிணைந்த இலங்கை. 

7. இந்திய இராணுவம் இலங்கையில் தமிழர்கள் மீது நடாத்திய படுகொலைகள், பாலியல் நடத்தைகள் மற்றும் யுத்த மீறல்களுக்கு பரிகாரம் என்ன?

இதற்கு நீங்கள்தான் விடை அளிக்கவேண்டும். ஏனெனில், அது நீங்கள் என்ன பரிகாரம் தேடுகிறீர்கள், அதைப் பெற என்ன முயற்சி எடுக்கிறீர்கள் என்பதைப் பொறுத்ததாகும். ஆனால் அந்த கால கட்டத்தில் யுத்த மனித உரிமை மீறல்கள் அரசியல் முக்கியத்துவம் அளிக்கப் படவில்லை என்பது உண்மை. 

போரிலும் சமாதான காலங்களிலும், மனித உரிமை மீறல்கள் ராணுவத்தின் அடிப்படைக் கட்டுப்பாடுகளை மீரும் செயல். ஆகவே ராணுவங்கள் மனித உரிமை மீறல்களை அனுமதிக்க கூடாது. தற்போது இந்திய ராணுவத் தலைமை அகத்தில் அத்தகைய குற்றங்களை விசாரிக்க தனிப் பிரிவை அமைத்துள்ளது. இதை இலங்கையும் செய்ய வேண்டும்.

8. இந்திய இராணுவம் இலங்கைக்கு அமைதி காக்கும் படையாக வரும்போது தமிழர்கள் வரவேற்றார்கள். பின் அவர்கள் மீது படுகொலை செய்ய காரணம் என்ன?

இதற்கு விடைகாண, நீங்கள் இந்தியப்படை மீது போர் தடுத்த தமிழ் ஈழ விடுதலைப் புலிகளை அணுக வேண்டும்.

 8. மாத்தையா, பிரபாகரன், கிட்டு, வரதராஐபெருமாள், சிறிசபாரட்ணம் தொடர்பில் உங்கள் பார்வை எத்தகையது?

அவர்கள் எல்லோரும் தனி ஈழம் அமைக்க தமது வழிமுறையில் பாடுபட்டவர்கள். 

9. அமைதி படைப்பிரிவின் புலனாய்வு பொறுப்பிலிருந்த உங்களுக்கு இந்திய படைகளின் போக்கு எதிர்காலத்தை கேள்விக்கு உட்படுத்த போகின்றது என்று அறிந்திருக்கவில்லையா?

நுண்ணறிவுப் பிரிவு எதிர் காலத்தில் என்ன நடக்கப் போவது என்பதைக் கண்டறிய ஆரூடம் பார்ப்பதற்கு அமைக்கப் பட்டதல்ல. அது போருக்கு தோவையான உத்திகளை உருவாக்க அமைக்கப் பட்டுள்ளது. போருக்கு என்ன தேவையோ அதை மட்டுமே செய்யும்.

 

 

 

Remembering Dr Chandrasekharan

Col R Hariharan

It is hard for me to think of Dr Chandrasekharan, as the Late Dr Chandrasekharan. I have limited professional knowledge of him based on our interactions during Sri Lanka operations, and later in the course of my fortunate association with him, I understood his deep knowledge of Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh. when he inspired me by example to write in South Asia Analysis Group website.

Online writing was still in its infancy, but thanks to my post retirement exposure as Director of the Madras Management Association for a decade, my online skills improved. I also had a few stints teaching management communication skills in business schools including two IIMs. These enabled me to gain a wider world view and broaden my perspective.

I should confess my ignorance in rating his career in the Cabinet Secretariat, because I never believed in finding out about it. As John Le Carre, the ubiquitous MI6 man turned novelist quipped in one of his novels, "It is the oldest question George, who can spy on the spies?" We hardly knew each other, other than two professionals. We rarely exchanged personal details, or professional palaver of past experience. I gathered nuggets of analysis and assessments in our conversations during his busy Sri Lanka days.

During my MI years, I had gathered both field and staff experience from the highest to the lowest echelons of MI in the army. By the time I was involved in Sri Lanka operations, I had experience of dealing with around 22 insurgent groups operating in India and its neighbouring countries. It was more by accident than intent, I became a specialist of sorts in terrorism, thanks to MI exposure with Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founding father of Tamil Tigers, who melded terrorist methods into separatist insurgency.  

I owe the LTTE leader also for two other things that changed my career curve. I was inducted into Sri Lanka in August 1987, after Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed. By then, I had received advance notice of my impending retirement by end March 1988. However, after Prabhakaran decided to take on the Indian army and suc into the Sri Lanka ethnic quagmire, the Army Headquarters decided to extend my service by three years, though I had not thought of asking for it.

But Prabhakaran's overkill, also brought on the good fortune of meeting Dr Chandrasekharan. I continued to keep my contact with him after both of us exited the Sri Lanka scene in 1991. Sri Nagar was "hot" in those days, with Pandits exodus and Sikh militancy was peaking in Punjab. As an intelligence pointsman of the Army's reserve Corps, I had to keep track of both the situations, even as the chimes of my retirement were ready to ring. But it was after my retirement, my association with Chandran firmed up. 

I am speaking here today to remember him, not only because of his professional prowess, but because of his human quality of inspiring others to do things they never thought of. Before I took up my military career, like the late B Raman, I was a journalist both by qualification and experience. In spite of my background, it was Dr Chandrasekharan's encouragement that made me turn my writing skills to analyse, on a broad spectrum, strategic security affairs of India's neighbourhood based upon my quarter century of MI experience. He opened the portal of South Asia Analysis Group for my writing around 2004 and I have continued writing for nearly two decades now.

Thanks to Dr Chandrasekharan's inspiration, writing has come to stay as an indispensable part of my life. I realise Graham Greene, another MI man turned novelist was true, in saying "The great advantage of being a writer is that you can spy on people. You're there, listening to every word, but part of you is observing. Everything is useful to a writer, you see - every scrap, even the longest and most boring of luncheon parties."  Graham Greene is so true, particularly in times when your horizons are constricted by lockdowns and masks.

How are we going to remember Chandran?

He was a true friend of Sri Lankan Tamils. Unfortunately, his dream of Tamils getting their just rights in Sri Lanka remains unfulfilled. I would appeal to the innumerable Sri Lankan Tamil friends to remember him when they write the history of Sri Lanka Tamil struggle for equity.

A fitting remembrance for him would be to continue  the South Asia Analysis Group, with more vigour and professionalism. It can bring out perhaps edited volumes of his writings on Sri Lanka and Nepal. I am not privy to other documentation available with the SAAG and the family; they will be invaluable sources of history. I am also not aware whether Cabinet Secretariat documents its personalities in their history, if it exists. If so, I am sure Dr Chandrasekharan will find a special space in it.

A rare quality of Dr Chandrasekharan was that he never judgemental when we differed in our assessments, many times. He respected my military knowledge, which guided my assessments during military operations. I remember every second day or so during Sri Lanka operations in the last Eelam War, I had been sharing my assessments with him. They found their way to both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.

He kept me informed of the broad contours of his line of reasoning, whenever I was stumped in understanding tricky political moves. I will miss him in sharing our views of the world at large, without our personal prejudices colouring our metaphor. On the human side, I will always remember his equanimity and smiling presence and, of course, his partiality for ghee roast, which I shared. Its taste still lingers when I think of both of us had it in Ratna Café. Bravo Dr Chandrasekharan! There is a special niche for you not only in my memories, but in many other friends’ too.

[This text was used for my speech at a memorial meeting organised by Dr Chandrasekharan’s friends on May 24, 2021]

 

 

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Visit Hariharan's Intelligence blog at:
https://col.hariharan.info

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China gets tough with Bangladesh

By Colonel R HARIHARAN | May 17, 2021 | News | Rediff.com

https://www.rediff.com/news/column/colonel-r-hariharan-china-gets-tough-with-bangladesh/20210517.htm

We can expect to see more Chinese wolf warrior diplomats on the prowl, in India's neighbourhood, though its mailed fist is not so visible while dealing with India, observes Colonel R Hariharan (retd).

 

China's 'wolf-warrior diplomacy' -- that started with a public spat between State Councillor Yang Jiechi, China's top foreign policy official, and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at their meeting in Alaska in March -- showed its fangs recently in Dhaka.

The first-ever Quad summit initiated by the US attended by India, Japan and Australia held in March 12 seem to have triggered the wolf warrior reaction.

On May 10, Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming speaking at a public platformed warned that Bangladesh's relations with China will 'substantially get damaged' if the country joins the Quad, a US-led initiative.

Li added,obviously it will not be a good idea for Bangladesh to participate in this small club of four countries.

He undiplomatically added from the public forum, 'So, we don't like to see any form of participation by Bangladesh to this small group of elite countries"'

Li called the Quad a 'narrow purposed' geopolitical clique, intent on working against China's resurgence and its relationship with neighbours.

'Quad says it's for economic purpose and security and so on. But that is not true. We know that it is aimed at China,' Li added after the first-ever Quad summit of leaders of the US, India, Japan and Australia held in March.

The Chinese ambassador's 'warning' on Quad comes shortly after China's State Councillor and Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe's more diplomatic remarks, when he made a fleeting visit to Dhaka in the last week of April.

After meeting with Bangladesh President Abdul Hamid, General Wei added that to jointly maintain regional peace and stability, the two sides should make joint efforts against powers outside the region setting up military alliances in South Asia and practising hegemonism, an obvious reference to the Quad.

Bangladesh Foreign Minister A K Abdul Momen reacting to the Chinese envoy's unsavoury comments called it 'very regrettable'.

Bangladesh, Momen said, maintained a non-aligned and balanced foreign policy and it would decide what to do following that principle.

'We are an independent and sovereign State. We decide our [own] foreign policy. But yes, any country can uphold its position,' he said.

Momen said China can state its position and Bangladesh always welcomes what others say.

'We will listen to what they say. But we will decide what is good for us.'

The Bangladesh foreign minister added they recall with respect what others say, but did not expect such behaviour from China.

Bangladesh and China turned their relationship into a strategic partnership in October 2016 with a deal signed between Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the two countries have signed deals worth about $21 billion for upgrading infrastructure, particularly in transport, power and IT sector.

China has emerged as Bangladesh's largest development partner in recent years. Its lending has surged since 2018.

Perhaps, this conditioned the Bangladesh foreign minister to be careful in expressing his nation's unhappiness at the Chinese ambassador's comments, close on heels of advice from the Chinese defence minister a few weeks earlier.

The Daily Star of Dhaka in its editorial minced no words, calling the Chinese representative's comments as 'undiplomatic, uncalled-for and therefore unacceptable.'

The newspaper reminded that China was welcome to express their opinion, 'it shouldn't extend to telling us what we can or cannot do as an independent nation.'

It is not surprising that the Chinese foreign ministry has defended its ambassador's 'warning' against Dhaka's participation in the anti-China 'club' would result in substantial damage to its relations with China.

Asked for her reaction to the Bangladesh foreign minister's comments, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying told the media that she had not seen the remarks.

'China and Bangladesh are very good neighbours. We have been developing bilateral relations based on mutual trust and peaceful co-existence, and we have been firmly supporting each other, on issues bearing on respective core interests and major concerns,' Hua said.

'We all know what kind of mechanism the Quad is. China opposes certain countries' efforts to form an exclusive clique, portray China as a challenge, and sow discord between regional countries and China,' Hua added, justifying the ambassador's remarks.

The Chinese Communist party tabloid Global Times, hailing the Alaska spat in April as China's 'wolf-warrior diplomacy', had pompously declared 'The arrogant Western world led by the US is no longer eligible to deal with the world's second-largest economy with a condescending attitude.'

This is probably the backdrop to the wolf warrior mindset used to browbeat small neighbours of Quad countries, particularly in India's neighbourhood.

Sri Lanka is yet to recover from Chinese Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe's visit to Colombo after his Dhaka visit, when the government was locked in passing the controversial Colombo Port City project Bill in parliament.

The project developed with China's assistance is a prestigious one of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Undoubtedly. the Chinese defence minister's visit was to apply pressure on Sri Lanka, when it is taking a crucial decision affecting China.

General Wei called on President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and discussed ways to further cement bilateral ties.

After the meeting, General Wei remarked peaceful development and win-win cooperation is the global trend and the 'right way' forward.

In an unstated reference to the Quad, he said certain major countries were keen to form cliques and factions and seek regional hegemony, which goes against peoples shared aspiration and severely harms the interests of regional countries.

Analyst Maria Siow writing in the South China Morning Post on April 17, 2021 posted the question 'Himalayan Quad: Is China about to start its own security bloc with Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan?' The rhetorical question has some relevance considering that peaceful borders and territorial integrity are China's core concerns.

The moot point is how does such a strategic alliance add value to China, which is already well entrenched, either overtly or covertly, in the body politics of all the three neighbours of India.

While China is the lynch pin of Quad, there is no common motivating factor for Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan to form a security bloc, unless it is India.

As Andrew Small, author of the book The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's new geopolitics says China-Pakistan relations 'are based on shared hostility towards India, thrive on many common interests. A long history of secret deals between the two armies overrides the problems of Islamic extremism.’

But this is not the case with Afghanistan or Nepal.

Their strategic narratives in relation to India are substantially different and complex, dictated by prevailing geo-strategic realities.

China's own strategic end goals widely differ in respect of the three countries.

China's substantial economic assistance and loans as members of the Bridge and Road Initiative is perhaps the common factor among them. Nepal is a case in point.

Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi had been trying to settle the differences between Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli and former prime minister Prachanda who are locked in a factional fight within the Communist party of Nepal.

Though she has not succeeded so far, there is less visible success of China is in whittling down Nepal's dependency on Indian investments.

A Xinhua report last September quoted Nepal government statistics to say the country had received FDI pledges from China amounting to $220 million in fiscal 2019-2020 against pledges of $116 million in 2018-2019, in spite of the Covid pandemic in 2020.

It was two thirds of the total investments committed by foreign investors, according to the industry department.

Quoting a Nepal government official, it said Chinese investment pledges in some hydropower projects, which are more capital-intensive industries, contributed to a surge in overall Chinese investment commitments.

We can expect to see more Chinese wolf warrior diplomats on the prowl in India's neighbourhood, though its mailed fist is not so visible while dealing with India.

Colonel R Hariharan, a retired military intelligence officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group.

 

C3S - IIT Kanpur Workshop on 'PRC, PLA and China's Defense Capability' w...

American exceptionalism continues within Quad

 While the Quad meets India’s aspiration of becoming “a stabilising power”, the “India way” is not only being tested by China, but by other members of the group, particularly the US.

 

Col R Hariharan | Cover Story |IL Feature| India Legal | May 4, 2021

https://www.indialegallive.com/cover-story-articles/il-feature-news/quad-us-japan-india-australia/

 

India’s strategic security challenges have become more complex after the “coming of age” of the Quad—the Quadrilateral strategic grouping of the US, Japan, India and Australia. The Quad is no doubt China centric and was formed to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific. However, the virtual summit meeting of the leaders of the four countries, held on March 12, identified a whole array of interests, well beyond the traditional contours of the Indo-Pacific.

The smorgasbord of Quad objectives typically include “the economic and health impacts of Covid-19” and climate change. Universal issues like managing cyberspace, critical technologies, counter-terrorism, quality infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as managing maritime domains, also figure in Quad’s areas of interest.

India is the only Quad member sharing a 3,488-km-long land border with China. Since the last decade, China had been creating maritime assets in the Indian Ocean in Myanmar, Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Gwadar (Pakistan) and Djibouti (Africa). India has a pivotal role in not only managing the maritime security of the Indian Ocean, but also in interdicting any threat to international sea lanes at choke points. This was evident from the number of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral exercises conducted with the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean this year.

On the other hand, the Quad meets India’s aspiration of becoming “a stabilising power”, as articulated by External Affairs minister Dr S Jaishankar at the ORF’s Raisina Dialogue in April 2020. He said it was “not the India way to be a disruptionist power internationally”. The “India way” was not to be “self-centred or mercantilist”. Therefore, it was important to be global and law-abiding (or rule-based) and consultative.

Jaishankar identified “four or five sharp descriptions” in his vision of the “India Way”. These included bringing India’s capacities for global good to provide security and connectivity and firmly dealing with challenges like terrorism and climate change. India would be a “decider or a shaper” than “abstainer” on issues like climate change and connectivity and a “just and fair standard bearer for the South by political inheritance”. Finally, Brand India would be unique as a power, connected by an extraordinary diaspora, shaping the international discourse while being rooted in Indian tradition and heritage.

India had always been proud of its strategic autonomy. But Jaishankar’s intervention during the Dialogue indicated India’s readiness to adapt it to the strategic needs of the “India Way”. He said the world was moving towards “multipolarity, rebalancing and plurilateralism. Shared values and comforts are creating new combinations”.

We can expect the lofty vision of the “India Way” to be tested at every stage of the country’s participation as an active member of the Quad. It will now be circumscribed not only by the compulsions of managing delicate bilateral relationship with China, but also other members of the Quad, particularly the US.

The US is known for ignoring the sensitivities of friends, as much as foes. On April 7, the US 7th Fleet announced that one of its warships, USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) “asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s exclusive economic zone, without requesting India’s prior consent, consistent with international law”. It is strange that the US 7th Fleet talks of taking “a position consistent with the international law”, though the US has neither signed nor ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) unlike India or China.

This raised the hackles of New Delhi. The statement of the ministry of external affairs on the incident pointed out that India’s stated position as per the Convention does not authorise other States to carry out “military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal state” in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the continental shelf. This is consistent with the two declarations India made while ratifying the UNCLOS in June 1995. 

The incident came close on the heels of the Quad summit meeting where the US shared a commitment to a “shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific” and a region that is “inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained coercion”. India now enjoys a close defence relationship with the US on par with NATO allies. The US had in the past rushed defence armament and equipment to meet India’s urgent needs during its confrontation with China in Ladakh.

Admiral Phillip Davidson, commander of the US Navy’s Indo-Pacific Command, had recently said: “Our relationship with India remains one of Indo-Pacific Command’s highest priority.” He called India a “vital partner in strengthening the security and stability” in the region. “A strong US-India strategic partnership is indispensable for peace, prosperity and security in the Indo-Pacific,” he said.

Against this backdrop, what was the 7th Fleet trying to prove by conducting the Freedom of Navigation of Operation (FONOP) in India’s EEZ? It could only be called American exceptionalism, which shaped Trump’s America First slogan.   

According to a Pew survey of March 2021, 89 percent of US adults consider China a competitor or enemy, rather than a partner. Many also support taking a firmer approach to the bilateral relationship, whether by promoting human rights in China or getting tougher on it economically. The percentage of Americans who think limiting China’s power and influence should be a top foreign policy priority has gone up to 48 percent from 32 percent in 2018.

US President Joe Biden’s China policy reflects the popular perceptions inherited from Trump’s fractured relationship with that country. It includes ongoing trade war and mutually imposed sanctions on senior Chinese officials for belligerence in South China Sea, particularly against Taiwan and Japan, and human rights aberrations. However, on other global issues like climate change and participation in the UN Human Rights Council, Biden has reversed Trump’s policies. 

As the 7th Fleet incident showed, the US wears its national interest on its sleeve as much as China. Building India’s relationship with the US within the Quad’s ambit will require a lot of deliberation on crucial issues. This was demonstrated initially by the US reluctance to comply with India’s request for assistance in combating the Covid-19 pandemic. Of course, it came with full force after a lot furore was raised within and outside the US.

China’s lukewarm reaction to the Quad in the early years appears to be undergoing a change in the second half of 2020, coinciding with its deteriorating relations with India. Probably, the trigger was the Quad foreign ministers meeting in October 2020, when they discussed a coordinated approach to fight Covid-19 and a regional infrastructure for development. The latter was probably construed as the beginnings of a response to the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative. China was also probably disappointed at the newly elected POTUS broadly reiterating Trump’s China policy.

But the touchstone was probably the Quad summit meeting which transformed the informal framework into a formal grouping with a broad set of objectives, challenging China’s quest for a new world order. China’s reaction to the transformation was caustic. Foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian saw Quad as a mechanism to contain China’s global rise. He accused the group of being dedicated to undermine China’s interests. After the Quad summit, China’s defence ministry said the group “hangs on to Cold War mentality, pursues group confrontation, is keen on geopolitical games, uses the so called China challenge as an excuse to form cliques, and openly incites discord between regional countries”.

Now China seems to have decided to enter into a no-holds barred action in South Asia. Its State Councillor and defence minister Gen Wei Fenghe made a fleeting visit to Dhaka on May 27. He called upon President Abdul Hamid and discussed furthering military cooperation between the two countries.

During the meeting, Wei said that China and Bangladesh are at a crucial time in national rejuvenation and development. To jointly maintain regional peace and stability, the two sides should make joint efforts against powers outside by setting up a military alliance in South Asia and practising hegemonism, a not so apparent reference to the Quad grouping. He also discussed the international and regional situation with Bangladesh COAS Gen Aziz Ahmed.

From Dhaka, Wei flew to Colombo, where after meeting President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, he said that peaceful development and win-win cooperation is the global trend and the “right way” forward. He added that certain major countries were keen to form cliques and factions and seek regional hegemony, which goes against people’s shared aspiration and severely harms the interests of regional countries.

It is clear that China’s multifaceted focus will now be on India’s South Asian neighbours. This was evident from a video conference organised between the South Asian countries and China to discuss Covid. High- level representatives of Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal and Pakistan participated in it. India, Bhutan and the Maldives did not participate in the conference.   [Written on April 29, 2021]

[The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies Institute.]

Sri Lanka Perspectives – April 2021: Sri Lanka: Chinese come calling

 Col R Hariharan | April 30, 2021|

South Asia Security Trends, May 1, 2021 | www.security-risk.com

 

Chinese defence minister’s visit

 

The recently held Quad summit, which transformed an informal frame work of the US, India, Japan and Australia, into a formal grouping with a broad range of objectives in the Indo-Pacific seems to have triggered China into action in South Asia. 

China’s State Councillor and defence minister Gen Wei Fenghe made a two-day visit to Colombo after making a fleeting visit to Dhaka on May 27. 

The Chinese defence minister called upon President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and discussed ways to further cement bilateral ties, including defence cooperation and post pandemic economic recovery. The Chinese minister’s high-level delegation included Deputy Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Department under China’s Central Military Commission Lt General Shao Yuanming and Major General Ci Guowei. This would indicate Indian Ocean strategic security issues, in the wake of the Quad summit, could be one of the topics of discussion.

However, the President tweeted “Had a fruitful discussion with #china defense minister General Wei Fenghe this morning. This visit will further strengthen the ties between the two countries.”

After he met with Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, the PM tweeted, “I conveyed my gratitude to the govt of China for the generation donation of Sinopharm vaccines & PPE kits since the outbreak of the Covid 19 pandemic.” Of course, 600,000 doses of Sinopharm vaccine has not yet been cleared for use by Sri Lankan health authorities so far, for want of trial documentation, is a matter of detail.

After meeting with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, Gen Wei remarked peaceful development and win-win cooperation is the global trend and ‘right way’ forward. He added, in a not-so-subtle reference to the Quad, that certain major countries were keen to form cliques and factions and seek regional hegemony, which goes against peoples shared aspiration and severely harms the interests of regional countries.

The Chinese minister had made similar reference during his Dhaka visit, when he met President Abdul Hamid and discussed furthering military cooperation between the two countries. He added to jointly maintain regional peace and stability, the two sides should make joint efforts against powers outside the region setting up military alliance in South Asia and practising hegemonism.

Gen Wei is the second highest ranking visitor to Sri Lanka from China after the onset of Covid 19 pandemic. In October 2020, Director of the Office of the Central Commission for foreign affairs of the CCP Yeng Jiechi  visited Colombo. His visit came in the wake of the four Quad members meeting in Tokyo pledging to increase their participation in a regional initiative – “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” – aimed at countering China’s growing assertiveness in the region.

Even as General Wei was waxing eloquent about China’s relations with Sri Lanka, a political controversy was raging over the control mechanism for  the prestigious Chinese-aided Colom Port City project, which is getting ready to go on stream. The infrastructure is now being developed for building a modern city. The project is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Sri Lanka executed by the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), by investing $1.4 billion in reclaiming land. It is now preparing to market and build support facilities.

The Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill (CPECE) to regulate the special economic zone to be created there, was presented in parliament during the month. The bill is now before the Supreme Country for clearance as required by Sri Lankan law, before it is voted in parliament. Though the project to create Colombo Port Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on reclaimed land with Chinese assistance had the blessings of previous governments, it has triggered a huge controversy. Many fear it would further plunge the country in China’s debt trap diplomacy, like the Hambantota port project did.

The Bill provides for setting up of a Colombo Port City Commission consisting of five or seven members. The Commission would be the decision maker on all matters of the SEZ, to include clearing of applications to do business, giving tax breaks and concessions on customs, VAT, import and export provisions and gaming laws, not available at present to investors elsewhere.

According to the Bill, the President shall nominate the members of the Commission, with power to  unilaterally and replace them. The process totally excludes the collective responsibility of the Cabinet and parliament. This has reinforced the existing fears of the people that the Executive President was concentrating too much power in his hands, after the 20^th amendment to the constitution.

Not unexpectedly, though the opposition parties the United National Party (UNP) and its clone the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) welcomed the project, they are opposed to the bill. Leader of the opposition Sajith Premadasa of the SJB has said if the Bill was enacted, “the country will become servile to foreigners.” He called it an insidious tactic “violating the Constitution in a blatant attempt to betray the sovereignty of the country.” SJB leader Lakshman Kiriella pointed out that 25 laws of parliament would not apply to the SEZ. He wanted the government to ensure the SEZ is overseen by parliamentary panels. The Jantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) leader said the Bill was tantamount to creating a “Chinese province” in Sri Lanka.

As many as 12 petitions including those of the opposition parties are before the Supreme Court challenging the Bill. Sri Lanka government can present an amended Bill based on Supreme Court’s recommendations and pass it in parliament.

Mounting Covid-19 concerns

There are indications that Sri Lanka is also facing a new wave of Covid-19 pandemic which has hit many countries, particularly India. From a low figure of 220 new cases on April 7, during the last three weeks of the month, daily figure touched an all- time high of 1466 new cases on May 28.  With Covid pandemic count recording over 1000 fresh cases on two successive days towards the end of the month, public health inspectors have urged the government to implement a complete lockdown for a period of two weeks to prevent a complete breakdown of health services in the country.  

According to Sri Lanka government’s published data, the country has recorded 106, 484 confirmed Covid cases up to April 30. Out of this 95445 people have recovered, while 667 people have died.  

Sri Lanka had been following the isolating of Covid clusters as a strategy though there is evidence of community transmission. Former speaker Karu Jayasuriya and leader of the National Justice Movement has cautioned the government not to underestimate the looming pandemic threat. He said the country had only 300, 000 doses of vaccine and nearly 900,000 people need to be given second dose. He appealed to the government for urgent action on this. He also urged the government to take all measures to provide adequate hospital facilities to cope with any situation. He appealed to all parties to come together on this issue.

However, in spite the mounting Covid numbers, Sri Lanka has not yet decided to close the airport or restrict tourist arrivals. Tourism Minister Prasanna Ranatunga said a decision on this would be taken after considering all parties concerned and in accordance with health authority recommendations. Sri Lanka had been keen to encourage tourists from India, one of the biggest markets for Sri Lanka tourism and creating a travel bubble with India was aggressively pursued so far. However, the huge spike of pandemic cases in India has dampened the move, at least for the time being.

It is significant that China had pledged to set up a reserve of “emergency supplies’ with South Asian nations, during talks with five countries in the region on combating Covid-19. In an online conference held on May 27, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi and his counterparts from Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan discussed ways to against Covid-19” according to the Chinese ministry statement. India, Bhutan and Maldives did not attend the conference.  

[Col R Hariharan, a retire MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@gmail.com Website: https://col.hariharan.info]