Saturday, 14 January 2017

Japan-Sri Lanka relations: Q&A


Japan-Sri Lanka relations: Q&A

Col R Hariharan

[This is an edited extract of an e-mail interview with a Nikkei Asian Review correspondent in the backdrop of Japan extending nearly ¥ 2 billion package to Sri Lanka to implement a maritime safety project in 2016 and its possible impact on the security of Sri Lanka’s maritime boundaries and geopolitics of the region.]

1. In your opinion do you believe Japan is specifically supporting Sri Lanka's maritime related functions? Could it be due to Sri Lanka’s strategic maritime location and Japan’s desire to help reinforce the country’s maritime security?

Japan and Sri Lanka relations are 65 years old. It is multi-faceted now and includes Japan’s active involvement in upgrading Sri Lanka’s human resource development and assistance to development projects to improve the quality of life of the people and increase their livelihood. The two countries share Buddhist heritage which adds to their affinity. Perhaps this explains Japan’s sustained interest in peace building between ethnic communities. During the 2002 peace process Japan played an active part in furthering Sri Lanka’s bid to end the ethnic conflict. Unlike other Western powers, Japan had always been sympathetic to Sri Lanka’s concerns.  

So Japan’s maritime cooperation with Sri Lanka forms a part of the overall matrix of this relationship. Sri Lanka strategic location midway on global maritime trade and commerce routes in Indian Ocean between Asia and Europe/Africa makes it very important for Japan to protect its own maritime trade routes.  So developments in Sri Lanka’s maritime affairs will always of interest to Japan. Of late, both economic and strategic interests of both countries have come to the fore in fostering their relations due to the entry of China in a big way in South Asia particularly in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean Region.

2. Could this be a way of Japan's indirect way of reinforcing its ties with Sri Lanka especially in the backdrop of China's increasing role in Sri Lanka, by way of large scale investments? 

Yes, there is an increasing Chinese angle to Sri Lanka-Japan relations. But it should be considered in the overall big power realignments taking place in the Indo-Pacific region ever since China started to flex its global economic and military muscle to further its ambition to be a world power. In the initial years, when China started becoming a global manufacturing hub, Japan became the main source of investment in China. However, both the regional and global economic and strategic scenes have changed since then. China’s economic power grew even as world economy was adversely affected by recession in the US and Europe. China’s managed to dethrone Japan’s exalted status as an economic superpower, next only to the US.

Buoyed by its power, there was a revival of shrill anti-Japan rhetoric in China leading to worsening relations with the Japanese which soured the relations and Japanese investments started declining in China. China’s relentless pursuit of territorial claims over the whole of South China Sea including the ownership of its islets has been causing concern to Japan as its territorial sovereignty over two islets in its vicinity have been disputed by China.

The PLA naval and air forces’ belligerent manoeuvres in support of China’s claims to South China Sea and increasing confrontation with the US and its Asia-Pacific allies  have increased Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s national security concerns. As part of revamping Japan’s strategic relationship Abe’s overtures to build closer strategic ties with India have been reciprocated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

As Sri Lanka has close strategic defence relationship with India particularly in protecting its maritime space, inevitably India-Japan strategic security relationship will have its own impact on Sri Lanka. This could come through when Japan’s self defence forces are converted into regular armed forces. Japan’s concerns about China are also probably reciprocated by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government which has been trying to correct the tilt in Sri Lanka’s foreign relations in favour of China during the Rajapaksa regime.

In fact, Sri Lanka’s foreign minister Mangala Samaraweera while visiting Japan in June 2015 in an interview with NHK had indicated Sri Lanka’s unhappiness with Chinese development aid led that to rampant corruption under previous government.

When Prime Minister Wickremesinghe visited Japan in Octber 2015 and met with Prime Minister Abe, Japan agreed to provide ¥ 45 billion ($ 380 million dollar) loan under a ‘comprehensive partnership’ arrangement. The partnership emphasized investment and trade, cooperation on national development in Sri Lanka and national reconciliation and peace building. Accordingly Japan had been financing infrastructure projects including urban planning and transport infrastructure development including Western Mega polis plan and projects in Northern Province as a part of helping national reconciliation. Given these developments, we can expect Japan’s direct investment in Sri Lanka which was SL Rs 1.5 billion in 2014 is likely to grow much more in the coming years, though it may not match China. Trade between the two countries was worth ¥174 billion in 2015, though Sri Lanka’s exports were only one fifth of imports from Japan.


Maritime security and cooperation has also become an important component of this relationship since then. Already Japan has financed Sri Lanka’s acquisition of two patrol boats. Colombo is becoming a frequent destination for the goodwill visits of Japanese self defence forces. This is also likely to grow in the coming years.

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia, has been associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies since inception. His analytical articles focus on his areas of specialization including South Asian countries, terrorism and insurgency and China’s relations with South Asian countries and littorals of the Indian Ocean Region. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com; blog http://col.hariharan.info 

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