[Next month, it will be nine years since
the LTTE was defeated in Sri Lanka. Written in 2016, Col Hariharan’s paper is
still relevant. It may republished or used with author's permission. The views
expressed are author’s own - Director]
Introduction
The U.S. led global war against
Islamic terrorism, launched in the wake of Al Qaeda jihadi terrorist attacks in
the U.S. on 11 September 2001, seems to be never ending. More and more nations
across the globe in Africa, Asia and Europe are getting involved in the war
against Islamic terrorist groups with only marginal success, particularly after
the rise of the Islamic State. The Syria based group, originally an affiliate
of the Al Qaeda, years has emerged as the world’s most dreaded terror
organization within a span of three years. The Islamic State (also referred
also as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant - ISIL and the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria –ISIS) has internationalized the worst manifestation of Islamic
terrorism attracting Islamic youth not only from the Arab World and Asia but
from Europe and the U.S. as well.
According to the University of
Maryland Global Terrorism Data Base (Table-1 given below) in the year 2014
alone there were as many as 12,571 terrorist attacks carried out in the top ten
nations with most attacks resulting in 34,647 fatalities. Most of the attacks
were carried out by Islamic terrorist groups affiliated to the Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State. The Table shows that South Asia has continued to remain the hot
bed of Islamic terrorist activity with Pakistan, Afghanistan and India
occupying the second, third and sixth position respectively with 2146, 1820 and
859 terrorist attacks among the top ten nations contained in the list.
TAB LE-1 Countries with most
attacks
Country
|
# Attacks
|
# Fatalities
|
Iraq
|
3925
|
13076
|
Pakistan
|
2146
|
2409
|
Afghanistan
|
1820
|
5411
|
Ukraine
|
889
|
1396
|
Somalia
|
862
|
1582
|
India
|
859
|
488
|
Yemen
|
760
|
1349
|
Libya
|
729
|
690
|
Nigeria
|
713
|
7774
|
Philippines
|
597
|
472
|
In the context of global war on
terror, Sri Lanka government’s decisive victory over the internationally
networked Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also
known as the Tamil Tigers, in the fourth episode
of the Eelam War in May 2009 stands as one of the few success stories. The
LTTE had been fighting for the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka for over two
and a half decades. Sri Lanka army’s success came after 22 years of failure in
the earlier episodes of the war. Sri Lanka success in completely wiping out the
Tamil Tigers can provide valuable lessons for nations fighting Jihadi terrorism
across the globe.[i]
Background to the rise of LTTE
The
LTTE is a degenerated manifestation of the failure of the democratic polity of
Sri Lanka to address the grievances of the ethnic Tamil minority population
articulated for the over five decades from 1956. Over the years the LTTE had
cleverly used the historical grievances of the Tamils to emerge as the self
styled saviour of Tamils. It exploited
the Tamil minority populations feeling of alienation from the mainstream and their
desire for an independent Tamil Eelam to transform itself into a transnational
terrorist movement in a span of 25 years.
The
LTTE had no clear-cut ideology for Tamil Eelam, although in 1983 it articulated
its aspiration for the creation of a socialist Eelam.[ii]
But later on socialism as an ideology was not to be found in its political
tracts. It ingeniously utilized Tamil nationalism raised often to chauvinist
proportion as the rallying point to draw support for its war efforts from
Tamils the world over.
At its peak in 2005, the LTTE
was perhaps the best-organised insurgent body in the world controlling
approximately nine districts of Northern and Eastern provinces largely
populated by Tamil minority. In the areas under its control the LTTE had
organized a judicial system, opened a bank and raised its own police force. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in a press release on 10 January 2008 rated
the Tamil Tigers as “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the
world.” [iii]
The FBI said the LTTE had “quite a
resume; perfected the use of suicide bombers; invented the suicide belt;
pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks; murdered some 4000 people in the
past two years; and assassinated two world leaders – the only group to do so.”
The report answered its own poser “Why should you care?” saying “because its
ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda
in Iraq.”
The LTTE was probably the only
insurgent force with capability to carry out conventional and unconventional
operations on land, sea, and air. It effectively used propaganda and psychological
warfare techniques in cyber space to support its overt and covert operations. The
LTTE’s highly motivated Black Tiger
suicide cadres were employed to create shock effect by killing of
prominent leaders, government officials or destroy lucrative high value targets
like the Bandaranaike international airport and the Central Bank in Colombo
causing heavy loss of men and material.[iv]
Prominent
Black Tigers victims included Sri Lanka President Ranasinga Premadasa and
India’s former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and scores of Sri Lanka ministers
including Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, parliamentarians, senior army officers
and leaders of rival Tamil militant groups and well known Tamil political
leaders like Appapillai Amirthalingam and Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam. These attacks struck
terror among the population, demoralized the national leadership and helped propagate
the myth of LTTE’s invincibility.
Describing the LTTE as “no ordinary terrorist
group,” Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s defence secretary during the war, emphasized
its special features while addressing at the Galle Dialogue Maritime Conference
in 2010: The first was its “well-organised international network that provided
both funding and logistical support to its domestic outfit. It also had a
network of operatives within Sri Lanka that had infiltrated every part of the
country. It had a ruthless ground force, a fledgling air force and a sophisticated
naval wing. At its height the LTTE not only controlled large area of land, “but
crucially up to two thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastline.” [v]
According to him its ability to control the coastline and attack Sri Lankan
naval vessels as well as attack targets on the mainland posed a grave security
challenge to the country.
The LTTE’s naval arm—the Sea Tigers—had an
estimated strength of 1500 cadres. It had a variety of operational craft
including a few Fast Attack Craft (FAC) captured from the Sri Lanka Navy. The
Sea Tigers boats were generally armed with machine guns, rocket launchers and
cannons. In all probability, command boats were fitted with radar. The Black Sea Tigers with their stealth
capability using fishing fleets as cover destroyed over 30l naval craft
crippling the Sri Lanka navy till 2002.
The LTTE was perhaps the only insurgent force in
the world to boast of an “air force.” Its technological improvisation had seen
the conversion of its air force fleet of piston-engine light aircraft into a
rudimentary light bomber force. Though it was a small force of about four light
aircraft, two helicopters and a few micro light aircraft with limited
operational capability, it carried out three daring bombing missions of the
Katunayake Sri Lankan air force base near Colombo, the forces Jaffna air base
at Palali and some oil storages near Colombo in the year 2007. Though these
forays caused no major damage to the Sri Lankan installations, they had
tremendous psychological impact causing panic among the civilian population.
Through this financial and logistical chain, the
LTTE obtained various sophisticated equipment, all sorts of heavy weaponry and
enormous quantities of ammunition with which it engaged our Defence Forces over
the years. It is pertinent as well as disturbing to note that much of this
activity took place in a post 9-11 world, despite increased global awareness
and sensitivity about the dangers posed by international terrorism. The LTTE's
financial network operated with varying levels of impunity in many countries.
The weapons they procured quite often came from unscrupulous sources within
respectable nations. Finally, their cargo ships travelled mostly unimpeded
through international waters. However, by 2007-08 on obtaining of intelligence
about LTTE’s floating warehouses, the Sri Lanka Navy was able to engage and
destroy ten vessels even as far as a thousand miles away in sea. The
destruction of these ships was a key factor in crippling the LTTE's ability to
sustain itself during the Eelam War IV.
The LTTE had shown great resilience to bounce
back from operational setbacks in the three earlier episodes of Eelam War
between 1983 and 2002 as well as in its war against the Indian Peace Keeping
force from 1987 to 1990. However, in the fourth and final episode of
the Eelam War the
Sri Lanka army dealt a mortal blow to LTTE with the killing of
LTTE’s charismatic leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and the his entire leadership
team in the final stages of the war in May 2009. The LTTE suffered a crippling loss
of over 22,247 cadres
and auxiliaries in the Eelam War IV alone.[vi] As against this Sri Lanka Security Forces’ lost 23,790 men in the entire
Eelam wars spread over nearly 26 years! [vii]
Sri
Lanka Tamil Diaspora
Tamil
is an ancient Dravidian language; spoken by nearly 74 million people according
to an estimate.[viii] Most of them live in the state of Tamil Nadu
in south India and in the north eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Tamil is a live and
vibrant language with a rich literary and cultural tradition. The language
serves as a focus of identity and heritage for Tamils all over the world.
During the last two centuries, Tamils have migrated from India and Sri Lanka to
different parts of the world. In many countries like Australia, Canada, Fiji,
France (Réunion), Germany, Malaysia, Mauritius, South Africa, Singapore, and
the United Kingdom, Tamils form an important population segment among migrants
of South Asian origin.
The
Tamils living overseas include Tamils of Indian and Sri Lankan origin. There
are subtle social and cultural differences between these two communities. They
have been broadly maintaining their distinct identities overseas also. However,
despite such minor differences, Tamil ethnic populations across the globe have
retained their strong allegiance to Tamil cultural traditions.
Historically,
the growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora came about in three distinct
waves. These coincided with the periods
of ethnic upheavals and riots. The language riots of 1958, introduction of
standardization rule in 1971, and the 1983 anti-Tamil riots were the major
happenings that triggered the large scale movement of Sri Lanka Tamil
population as emigrants and refugees. The first two waves were smaller and made
up of people aspiring to improve their opportunities in more equitable
societies. However, the 1983 pogrom saw the exodus of nearly 200,000 Tamils
during the course of a decade. These refugees spread over 50 countries form the
hardcore of Tamil Diaspora directly affected by the Sinhala-Tamil confrontation.
Unlike the earlier emigrants, many of them belong to the poor and less
qualified segments of population. The LTTE’s armed insurgency had a special
appeal in this category of Tamils.
Geo-strategically,
the LTTE had shown that even in an island nation it was possible to overcome
the limitations of manoeuvring space to carry out successful insurgency
operations. The LTTE made it possible by innovatively organising an international
logistics and supply chain using sympathetic sections of Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora.
This helped the LTTE to establish a foothold in 42 countries. The network operated both overtly (in countries where
non-militant activity was permitted) and covertly in three ways: fund
collection and proxy business operations for financial support, international
lobbying and public relations, trafficking in humans and drugs and clandestine
procurement of arms and military equipment.
Typically, LTTE sympathisers infiltrated into existing
expatriate Tamil social, cultural and religious bodies and take control of them
over to use them as vehicles of social
communication, propaganda and fund collection. LTTE had even grabbed the
ownership of places of worship to exert such influence. With the help of Tamil
Diaspora, LTTE’s overseas elements also ran both legitimate and illegitimate
businesses. According to one report the annual Tamil Diaspora funding for the
LTTE was estimated at US$ 100 million. Jane's International Review in August
2007 had assessed LTTE's revenue through worldwide legal and illegal businesses
at $ 200-300 million a year.[ix]
Important foreign centres of LTTE were located in
Australia, Canada, France, Norway, Denmark, South Africa, Switzerland,
Thailand, UK and USA. Actually, after 32 countries proscribed LTTE activities,
activities of a number of LTTE front
organisations and NGOs came under scrutiny and many lost their status and their
assets were frozen in the US, UK and Canada.[x] However even
after the defeat of LTTE in 2009, remnants of the overseas network have
continued their existence, though with diminished visibility.
The LTTE's overseas centres carried out propaganda and
public relations work by taking control of ethnic Tamil organizations and
turning them into their own front organisations for their covert activity. The
centres liaised with the local political parties particularly at the local and
provincial level to act as LTTE pressure groups. In Canada, Norway, U.K., and
even in the U.S., LTTE had used the latent sympathy of political parties for
the Tamil struggle for equity to influence elected representatives.
Tamil Diaspora all over the world contributed
financially, either voluntarily or under coercion to the LTTE coffers. The
Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a report published in March 2006 had documented the
LTTE's use of extortion and intimidation against Canadian Tamils to raise funds
for its operations, and to silence critics of its human rights practices. Such
reports of coercive fund collection were reported in Europe also. According to
HRW study many individual families and businesses were approached to pay sums
of money ranging from £2000 to £100,000.[xi] Perhaps this report influenced Canada’s decision to
proscribe LTTE as a terrorist entity on April 8, 2006.
Role of
Tamil nationalism
Sri Lanka’s ethnic Tamils form 11.15 per cent of
Sri Lanka’s 20.36 million population according to Sri Lanka Department of
Census and Statistics figures published in 2012.[xii]
However, two other Tamil
speaking communities Muslims (9.3 per cent)–listed officially as Moors – and
Tamils of Indian origin (4.12 per cent) have maintained their distinct
political and social identities.
The
rise of Dravidian ethnic consciousness as a dominant political force in Tamil
Nadu in the 1950s influenced the thinking of large sections of ethnic Tamils in
Sri Lanka.[xiii]
The Sri Lankan Tamils struggling for their rights against Sinhala majority
domination found the Dravidian political parties’ emphasis on the distinctness
of Tamil identity relevant to their situation.
However, from 1956 onwards Sinhala nationalism
became a major factor in politics with increased dominance of Sinhala language
and culture, leading to progressive alienation of Tamils from the national
mainstream. The non-violent protests of Tamils yielded no results. On the other
hand, in 1972 a revised national constitution favouring the Sinhala majority
was introduced. The Tamil demand for a federal structure to
preserve their distinct identity found no satisfactory response from the
majority community. As a result, even moderate Tamil leaders
started talking of creating an independent Tamil Eelam state as the only
solution.[xiv]
In the 1977
elections, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a political front
demanding the creation of Tamil Eelam, scored a thumping victory in Tamil
areas. However, the government used political trade-offs to stave them off
rather than incorporate them. The failure of TULF politicians to produce
results eroded their credibility among Tamils and Tamil militant groups took
over the political leadership. Between 1977 and 1987 as many as 35 Tamil
militant groups sprouted all over the north and east of Sri Lanka. This period
also saw the rise of Velupillai Prabhakaran and the emergence of the LTTE as a
powerful insurgent force. At the same time the use of armed forces by the state
to stamp out the militant activity also increased.
Indian Influence
India
and Sri Lanka enjoy close political, cultural and religious links. Tamils in
India with their linguistic, cultural, and family ties have always been
sympathetic to the Sri Lanka Tamils struggle. The 1983 pogrom against the
Tamils in Sri Lanka came as a rude shock to the people of India. Tamil Nadu
received thousands of Tamil refugees including militants who came in the wake
of the riots with open arms. A sympathetic government of India helped the
militant groups with arms and military training. An India Today article of 31
March 1984 said “Indian intelligence sources estimate that nearly 2,000 armed
men, belonging to the various groups of Tamil insurgents were trained.” [xv] The Colombo weekly Sunday Times in an article
has quoted from terrorism analyst Rohan Gunaratne’s book to say 32 camps were set up in India to train
495 LTTE insurgents between 1983 and 1987.[xvi]
At the
same time, India also made efforts to reconcile the differences between the Sri
Lanka government and the Tamils. Although the efforts failed, they culminated
in the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in July 1987. Under the
agreement, Sri Lanka agreed to devolve limited autonomy to a united northeast
province, considered as the traditional Tamil homeland. India agreed to help
end Tamil militancy and disarm the militants. Though the Agreement did not meet
all the demands of Tamils, it provided a good opportunity for both sides to
create a climate of confidence to resolve the issue peacefully.
India
dispatched an Indian peace keeping force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka to facilitate
enforcing the agreement. All Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had
initially agreed to conform to the terms of the agreement and handover their
arms. However, the LTTE refused to give up its arms because it doubted India’s
sincerity in helping Sri Lanka Tamils. It considered the ISLA as a means to
keep the LTTE under control. It also doubted Sri Lanka’s intentions in adhering
to the agreement to devolve equitable powers to Tamils. Moreover, the agreement
did not meet LTTE’s goal of creating independent Tamil Eelam.[xvii]
In a bid to disarm the LTTE, Indian troops were locked in battle with them from
1987 to 1990. The LTTE suffered heavy casualties at the hand of Indian troops
and took refuge in the jungles of Vanni.
The
political changes in India and Sri Lanka in 1989-90 ultimately resulted in the
withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in 1990. The Indian operations drew a lot
of global attention to the LTTE as it had managed to survive the onslaught of
the Indian army. It was LTTE’s strong political links in Tamil Nadu that
influenced the change in Indian government policies that resulted in the pull
out of Indian troops from Sri Lanka.
The war
with India was a valuable learning experience for the LTTE. With the Jaffna and Mannar coasts in northern
Sri Lanka within an hour’s journey by speedboat, Tamil Nadu offered an
attractive sanctuary and supply base for the LTTE even during the war.
Moreover, about 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils who had taken refuge in Tamil Nadu
enabled the LTTE to operate clandestinely. The LTTE built strong asset base in
Tamil Nadu ever since it gained a foothold in 1983. It also established
contacts to garner support from politicians and officials of Tamil Nadu.
Therefore, it was comparatively easy for the LTTE to merge with the population
and operate with some impunity in Tamil Nadu.
Status
of LTTE in 2002
After
the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90) mauled the LTTE, it was too weak to
face conventional forces resulting in loss of control over Jaffna to the Sri
Lanka forces t in the Eelam War II in 1990-91. For example the LTTE’s bid to
capture Elephant Pass in 1991 ended disastrously with the loss of 1,100 cadres.
Perhaps this made the Sri Lankan forces a little complacent in 1991.
However, based on its experience, the LTTE re-organized
its cadres into military formations under the middle level leadership which had
shown strong motivation and battlefield innovation operations. Fire power was
augmented with mortars and anti tank weapons. Women’s battalions were raised to
beef up the strength. The LTTE naval wing - Sea Tigers – developed innovative
techniques to use suicide boats to effectively attack naval craft. Modern
technology innovations in communications were introduced to improve operational
capability.
In-house capability for
production of grenades and claymore mines was established. A lot of innovation was introduced in
designing and use of improvised explosive devices. This period also saw the
firming up of the LTTE’s overseas support network in Canada, Europe and the U.S
to support the LTTE’s growth as a modern fighting force with conventional and
unconventional operational capability.
The Sri Lanka army strength was a little over
16,000 even as late as 1985. However, when Tamil militancy increased
phenomenally in the nineties military force levels tried to cope with it
through additional recruitment. Though the Eelam War III (1995-2002) ended as a
stalemate, the Sri Lanka security forces’ performance was far from satisfactory.
By then the LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and President Premadasa had
earned the dubious reputation as the most feared terrorist group which put its
opponents on the defensive. While defending Mullaitivu, army lost 1600
soldiers; similarly it sustained a loss of 204 soldiers when it was forced
withdraw from Elephant Pass established as a fortress defence. In the Elephant
Pass operation, the LTTE captured three 152 mm guns, two 122 mm guns, 12 x120
mm heavy mortars, and several .50 machine guns, and thousands of automatic
rifles. The LTTE also captured several armoured vehicles, tanks, military
trucks, bulldozers and high-tech communication systems. The Sea Tigers inflicted
heavy losses on Sri Lanka navy, which lost two naval ships due to sabotage
operations.
The Black
Tiger suicide attack on Colombo’s Bandaranaike international airport on 24 July
2001 which killed 18 people and destroyed 11 military and civilian aircraft (including
two attack helicopters and three jet fighters of air force and three civilian passenger
planes), stunned Sri Lankan establishment and caught global attention.[xviii]
This
attack, coming in the wake of the crushing defeat of Sri Lankan forces in
Elephant Pass, demoralized the Sri Lankan leadership as well as armed forces.
Peace Process
2002
The
LTTE had outgrown its political patrons including India when it reneged on the
ISLA and went to war with the IPKF. In the presidential elections held in 1988,
Ranasinga Premadasa of the UNP who had always opposed the presence of Indian
troops used the rapidly turning public mood against the presence of Indian
troops to his advantage. He got elected as president by narrow margin in
December 1988. Soon after assuming office, Premadasa demanded India withdraw
its troops from the island. In order to speed up the process, Premadasa went to
the extent of supplying arms to the LTTE to fight the Indian troops!
At that time in the South, the
government was facing a serious threat from the rapidly growing extremist
activities of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Marxist insurgent group which
was staging a strong revival. Apparently, Premadasa felt a negotiated
settlement with the LTTE would enable him to focus on destroying the JVP rebels
and put out feelers to the LTTE. The LTTE already weakened by Indian troops
found it expedient to reciprocate the President’s desire for peace talks to
find a “Sri Lankan solution.” However, talks failed as the President Premadasa refused
to accept the LTTE demand for the abolition of 6th Amendment to the
Sri Lanka constitution which forbade the advocacy of a separate state within
Sri Lanka, although he agreed to the abolition of the Northeastern provincial
council and ordering of fresh elections there as demanded by the Tamil Tigers.[xix]
However, both sides seemed to have failed to create a climate of trust during
the talks and this only increased their mutual suspicion of each other’s end
goals.[xx]
The failure of SriLanka-LTTE 1989-90 talks was
not surprising. As events that followed showed both sides had no intention of a
peaceful settlement as they were importing arms in large quantities even as
they talked peace. Moreover, even when the LTTE agreed to talk, rarely it went
beyond the preliminaries. Usually they floundered upon the LTTE’s insistence on
two issues: refusal to accept any political solution other than the autonomy of
Tamil Eelam; and to be the sole representative of Tamils at the talks to the
exclusion of other Tamil politicians and militant groups.[xxi]
The government also had its own
problem of political indecisiveness. Whenever the government fought the LTTE, its
goal was limited to use the armed forces to whittle down the strength of the
Tamil Tigers to bring them to negotiating table. Sri Lanka army had to get adjusted to swings
between war and peace which created confusion and cramped strategic planning
for operations. It also resulted in lack
of coordination of actions between the leadership, executive and military which
resulted in failure to mutually reinforce each other’s strength. Apparently,
successive Sri Lankan governments also failed to read the LTTE leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran’s overwhelming ambition was to use his military prowess to
create the independent Tamil Eelam state. He had shown little faith in settling
issues through political discourse because of his deep distrust of intellectuals
and politicians. However, the LTTE found peace pauses between wars as useful
periods to recoup losses, strengthen its armed forces and consolidate its hold
on the territory under its control.
The daring attack on
Bandaranaike international airport which crippled the air force and the state
owned airlines in July 2001 was a moment of truth for President Chandrika Kumaratunga
as it highlighted the helplessness of elected governments against terrorist
attacks. The global perceptions of terrorism underwent a drastic change two
months later when al Qaeda terrorists hijacked civilian aircraft and attacked
the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon to inflict huge causalities on 11
September 2001. The US vowed to destroy al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden
and launched the global war on terror.
The international mood sympathetic to
the US collective action against all acts of extremism against the state became
the watchword. After suffering huge losses in the Eelam War III Ms Kumaratunga invited
Norway’s offer to mediate and evolve peace process with the Tamil Tigers. Anton
Balasingham, LTTE’s international representative and close confidante of
Prabhakaran also realised that the world environment after the 9/11 attacks was
turning against insurgency and terrorism. The international community was
tightening a whole range of protocols to check trafficking in arms and men,
shipping and container traffic across the globe that would make it difficult
for terrorists to transport arms and men across the world. Considering these developments
Balasingham prevailed upon Prabhakaran to accept the Norwegian mediated peace
process.[xxii]
The Peace Process 2002 was different from earlier
international efforts at peace in Sri Lanka as it enjoyed wide support
particularly from the US and the European Union. For the first time the LTTE
agreed to evolve a solution within a federal framework; on the other hand Sri
Lanka government agreed to accept the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil
minority. This created the illusion that both the negotiating parties were on
par in status, though the government had legitimacy as it was elected by the
people, while the LTTE was an insurgent group with marked fascist tendencies.
Both sides agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement
as a prelude to the Norwegian-led peace process which had wide international
support. Four co-chairs – the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S
–presided over the peace process, while India kept itself in the loop without direct
involvement. [xxiii]A
ceasefire between the two sides came in force in 2002. The Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) was established with 20 officers from Norway and 10 officers
from Iceland.[xxiv]
However, though the two sides had six rounds of
talks between 2002 and 2003, the peace process could make only halting progress
in the first three years. However, after the 2001 elections when President
Chandrika Kumaratunga of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP) who were political
opponents came to power, frictions developed between them. As a result Sri
Lanka government was virtually paralysed in the face of LTTE’s large scale
violations of ceasefire. The government could neither take decisive action
against the LTTE’s ceasefire violations nor respond with a credible alternative
to the LTTE’s interim self governing authority (ISGA) proposal.[xxv]
It became untenable for the Sri Lanka government
to continue with the peace process after the LTTE assassinated Foreign Minister
Lakshman Kadirgamar in Colombo on 12 August 2005. The international community
supported Norway’s repeated efforts to resuscitate the process. However, the
LTTE stood firm on its demand for parity with the government in all respects
and demanded the acceptance of the ISGA it had proposed. The LTTE refused to
own up responsibility for attacks that continued against SLSF officers and intelligence
operatives. The government could not act decisively on these issues which
affected the morale of the armed forces as the ceasefire agreement prevented
them from retaliating to LTTE’s suicide bombings and attacks. [xxvi]
The peace process also lost its credibility among the public who aspired for
end of cycle of violence and lasting peace. The SLMM also came in for
widespread criticism as it could not put a stop to the LTTE’s gross ceasefire
violations. As a result the public lost
their faith not only in the peace process but also in the Wickremesinghe government
which was elected on its promise to bring peace.
Nationalist feelings were running high against
the LTTE and the presidential aspirant Mahinda Rajapaksa of SLFP found it
expedient to whip up nationalist sentiments to turn the public disenchantment
with the ceasefire agreement and the peace process in the run up to the 2005
presidential election. The Southern Sinhala masses welcomed
Rajapaksa’s call to end the ceasefire and to use the army to eliminate the LTTE.
They voted him to power with a slender margin over his UNP rival Ranil
Wickremesinghe. In a way, the LTTE aided Rajapaksa’s election as
Prabhakaran passed a mindless order asking Tamils to boycott the elections in the
areas under its control. The LTTE dictum deprived Tamil votes that would have
gone to his rival Ranil Wickremasinghe and helped Rajapaksa’s victory. [xxvii]
Eelam War IV and the defeat of LTTE
Mahinda Rajapaksa did
not end the ceasefire agreement immediately on coming to power; but he promoted an aggressive, explicitly nationalist strategy
for ending the conflict. It set off a new cycle of violence and retaliation –
including attacks on security forces, extra-judicial killings, suicide bombings
and military action. This left the peace talks with no takers. A LTTE
suicide attack on the army commander Lt General Sarath Fonseka 25 April 2006 provided
an ideal opportunity for Rajapaksa to hit at the LTTE in strength. Sri Lanka
air force carried out heavy air strikes on the LTTE headquarters. This heralded
the unofficial beginning of Eelam War IV.
However, in real terms the Eelam War started only
in July 2006, when the army was asked to rid of the LTTE which had closed the
sluice gates of a weir at Mavil Aru in eastern province, cutting off water
supply to downstream Sinhala villages under government control. Though the SLMM
claimed success in the negotiations with the LTTE to open the sluice gates, the
government ignored it as it considered basic services non negotiable. After the
army evicted the LTTE from Mavil Aru weir in “Operation Watershed,” it systematically
proceeded to clear the entire LTTE deployed in the province. The army
established total control over the eastern province when it captured the LTTE
stronghold of Thoppigala on 11 July 2007.
Though the army took nearly a year (from 21 July
2006 to 11 July 2007) to wrest control of the eastern province from the LTTE, its
success gave a big boost to its morale. After the army’s made a dent in the
public image of ‘invincibility’ of the LTT, President Rajapaksa’s national
popularity soared. For the first time
after Eelam War III, military initiative swung in favour of the army. The
victory in the east also helped the President to sell the idea of a “military
solution” - launching a full scale war to defeat the LTTE - to the public who
were not confident of its success. On the political front, the government called
the war in the East a “war for liberation of Tamils”and the President promised to
restore full powers to Tamils promised under the 13th amendment of
the constitution to the newly “liberated” eastern province.
The President seemed to have decided to launch
the operation in the north keeping three core aspects in mind: no peace talks
till the LTTE’s military power is crushed, international community
(particularly India) to be kept at bay till victory is achieved and allow no local
or external pressure to affect the war plans. All his political and diplomatic
actions during the entire period of war were conducted within these three
parameters. This enabled him to stick to his goal of destroying the LTTE and
take internal and external actions required to thwart any internal or external pressure
interfering with military operations.
The
President’s plans were put into action by his executive team consisting of his
brothers Basil Rajapakse and Gotabaya Rajapakse, who were inducted as the
Presidential Advisor and the Defence Secretary respectively, and Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka,
the Army Commander. While Basil Rajapakse provided the political interface to
facilitate operational requirements, Gotabaya Rajapakse provided the government
interface for the military operations. Thus almost all government initiatives during
the period of war were coordinated to facilitate the military operations. As
the defence ministry also controlled law and order and public security,
paramilitary forces, civil defence forces and the police were seamlessly
coordinated with operational requirements of the army.
President Rajapaksa seemed to have given a free
hand for the Army Commander in planning and conduct of operations in
coordination with Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was a veteran with
shared experience in earlier episodes of war. As a result there was good
coordination between the army and the ministry of defence particularly in
processing the demand for raising new units and importing additional military
equipment on a real time basis. Inevitably,
concentration of such power in the hands of a few persons led to misuse of the
provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and human rights violations
resulting in absence of rule of law and curtailing of fundamental freedom of
the citizen and the media. This caused concern both during and after the war
among the international community, civil rights groups and international NGOs
working on human rights issues. After the war these issues snowballed into a
major problem for Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council which sought its
accountability to for alleged war crimes and human rights violations committed
during the war.
Sri Lanka forces made significant efforts to
rectify past mistakes when they went into Eelam War IV. Despite this, the
euphoria of victory in the initial phases in the east probably clouded army’s
ability when it made an abortive attack the LTTE forward lines cutting off the Jaffna
peninsula in October 2006.
The army suffered 129 killed and 515 wounded in the LTTE
counter offensive. Similarly on April 23, 2008 in another military offensive
against the LTTE defence line in Muhamalai failed, resulting in the loss of 165
soldiers. After these failures, Lt General Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander,
tackled three weaknesses that had affected the operations: inadequate force
levels, better coordination with naval and air forces and of operations on
multiple fronts, and flexibility in battlefield strategy to overcome
bottlenecks. At the same time he exploited the inherent weakness of the LTTE: inability
to fight on multiple axes, limitations of reserves, and inadequate artillery support.
His strategy for northern offensive envisaged to keep the LTTE troops pinned
down in the frontline in the areas under their control while the army launched
offensives along two broad axes: along the west coast of northern province to
cut off A32 road running from south to north which would block supply boats
from India’s southern coast reaching the LTTE and along the eastern coast from south
to north to cut off supplies reaching from the eastern sea front.
As the Sri
Lankan operations successfully progressed, LTTE supply chain which had worked
in the past was ripped. Naval and air operations coordinated to maximise
support to ground operations ensured the military success. Air operations using
helicopter gunships and fighters to destroy the LTTE support infrastructure and
prevent free movement of cadres crippled the LTTE from reinforcing its strong
points.
The army employed Special Forces units
effectively to penetrate front line and soften up LTTE defences prior to main
offensive. Similarly, long range reconnaissance patrols struck in depth to take
on opportunity targets. Special Boat Squadrons patrolled lagoons and offensively
carried out special missions against targets in the coastal areas.
The army expanded the strength phenomenally to
meet the requirements of war in the North. In the year 2008 alone the army
recruited 40,000 persons to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, 4 task
force contingents, and two divisions. By the time the army went in for final
phase of operation in February-March 2009, it had 13 divisions, three task
forces, and one armoured brigade. It deployed nine divisions, three task forces
and an armoured brigade between Jaffna and Wanni in the Northern Province and while
three divisions were deployed in the east.
On the other hand, the LTTE fought only a
defensive battle based on points established strong at communication centres in
layers of defences to block all the major axes of advance. Inevitably, it had
long gaps between strong points which were undermanned due to inadequate force
levels. To overcome this limitation, the LTTE used locals to construct strong
bunds between strong points to delay the advancing forces. The LTTE during 2007
and the first six months of 2008 managed to successfully carryout a series of
bomb blasts and unconventional operations mainly in the vicinity of Colombo and
Anuradhapura. In the six months of 2008, the LTTE carried out as many as nine
blasts in which killing 76 civilians and injuring 454. After this the LTTE
could not effectively break heightened security measures. Increased security
checks and public awareness led to averting at least a dozen blasts. This
exposed the failure of the LTTE unable to use its strength in unconventional warfare
as a force multiplier against the main offensive.
In the preparatory stage of the main offensive,
the army destroyed as many as 250 bunkers in LTTE defences particularly along the
salient joining the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the Northern Province. The
army launched the main offensive in strength only the second quarter of 2008,
after building up adequate strength. The offensive to clear LTTE strongholds
along the western coast started in July 2008, was completed by October 2008 and
threatened the LTTE administrative capital Kilinochchi.
However, the offensive on the eastern half had a
more difficult time as LTTE’s Charles Anthony Brigadeinflicted heavy casualty between
October and December when the troops were caught in the monsoon rains. But the army
offensive astride main A9 road linking Jaffna with the rest of Sri Lanka dividing
the province into two halves managed to drive a wedge between Kilinochchi and
Elephant Pass.
By first week of January 2009, the LTTE lost
Kilinochchi as well as Elephant Pass, the key stronghold linking Jaffna
peninsula. However, the LTTE pulled back
its troops and civilians westwards along the coast to fight smaller operations.
During the month, the international community notably the US tried to
intervene, suggesting a ceasefire which was firmly rejected by Sri Lanka. The
US even offered to send Marines to extract the LTTE leadership from the
operational area, which irritated the Sri Lankan leadership as it was nearing
it was nearing total victory over the LTTE. The LTTE’s back was broken when it
lost Pudukkudiyiruppu west of Mullaitivu after stiff battle. The army finally
captured Mullaittivu area, the last LTTE bastion in January, 2009.
However, by April 2009 the operations were
slowed down to allow over 200,000 civilians who were with the last of the LTTE
forces to get out of the war zone. By then the remnants of the LTTE forces
including its top leadership along with civilians were confined to a narrow
strip in the eastern coastal front. The security forces
stepped up the use of artillery including multi barrel rocket fire and air
power causing heavy casualties among
civilians trapped in the war zone. Sri Lanka was prevailed upon to
declare no war safety zone to enable civilians to get out from the LTTE
controlled areas which were shrinking every day. However the LTTE would not
allow them; the UN critically commented upon the cynical strategy which had
little concern for avoidable deaths of civilians. [xxviii]
Despite this, 196,000 people fled the conflict zone according to a report of
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to escape
death and privation while at least 50,000 people were trapped there.[xxix]
The Air Force (SLAF) carried out 1,345 missions
(2582 sorties of jets and helicopter gunships) in the Eelam War IV from June
2006 onwards till January 2009. Three fighter squadrons undertook 1,116
missions while helicopter gunships were used 229 times. The extensive use of
air support for land and sea operations was a key factor in preventing the LTTE
from launching counter attacks. Usually, the fighters flying in close support
softened up the targets before an offensive. Based on intelligence, the air
force managed successfully eliminate some of the leaders of the LTTE like the political
wing leader SP Thamilchelvan killed in an air raid.
However, the successful suicide attack by
21Black Tiger commandos on Anuradhapura air base on October 27, 2007 in which
10 troops were killed while 19 aircraft were put out of action, exposed the
weakness in the security of the air force installations. The air force also
failed to effectively counter the eight sneak raids carried out by the Air
Tiger light aircraft. These low flying light aircraft cleverly dodged the
security forces and managed to raid even the Katunayake air base near Colombo. Though
the LTTE aircraft bombing sorties did not cause much damage, their psychological
impact on the public was immense. The air force could not destroy them in the
air, though they flew a number of sorties against them. However, after air
defence was well coordinated by the newly created Air Defence Command two LTTE
planes were prevented from carrying out a suicide attack on Katunayake air base
and the Air Headquarters in Colombo on February 20, 2009.
The navy gave a good account of itself in Eelam
War IV, though during 2006-07 it suffered considerable loss. It improved its
tactics to take on the Black Tiger suicide boats and command boats before the
attack could materalise. The LTTE’s naval operations also exposed the
limitations of suicide attacks. They deprived the service of experienced Sea
Tigers as the operation progressed and resulting in making suicide strike a
self defeating proposition. The navy countered the Sea Tiger ‘wolf packs’ using
FACs armed with 30 mm cannons in tandem. Their surface search radars and long
range electro optic systems located Sea Tiger boats well in advance so that
they were well prepared for the LTTE boats.
Future
of Tamil separatist insurgency
From the remnants
of the overseas net work, the LTTE
militants who want to keep the LTTE and the cause of independent Tamil Eelam
alive are now organised into two groups which operate covertly. According to
Sri Lanka army, P Sivaparan alias Nediyawan based in Norway leads a covert
group that has established its cells in various Western countries. Former LTTE
intelligence operative Vinayagam, based in Paris, leads the Headquarter Group. He is
aided by the LTTE’s underworld members and criminal elements.
He is involved in
activities like smuggling of people to Canada and takeover of LTTE investments
abroad. The local intelligence organsiations as well as Sri Lanka government
had been monitoring their activities as it strongly suspected them of being
involved in reviving LTTE in the island nation. However, except for few
instances of former LTTE cadres making feeble attempts, there are no signs of
the revival of the LTTE in the island.[xxx]
However, many Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora
organizations actively involved in keeping the spirit of Tamil identity and
nationalism alive; most of them are in favour of supporting Tamil political
moves in the island to fulfil the long pending demands of Tamil minority. However, sections of Eelam sympathizers and
LTTE acolytes have organized themselves to keep the quest for Tamil Eelam alive.
Almost all Diaspora organsiations have been vociferously asking for the
prosecution of Sri Lanka leaders and army men allegedly involved in war crimes
during the Eelam war. They have been demanding an international investigation
to into these allegations under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council
where the issue is progressing. Among
the myriads of Diaspora organizations, the most influential ones are the
Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), the Global Tamil Forum (GTF),
the British Tamil Forum (BTF) and the Tamil Youth Organisation (TYO).
The TGTE is a political formation projecting the
political face of LTTE. It has offices in 12 countries; its secretariat is
located in Geneva. It is led by “Prime Minister” Rudrakumaran, LTTE’s attorney
based in the US, three “deputy prime ministers” and seven “ministers” with a
parliament elected by the Tamil Diaspora supporters and sympathizers of the
LTTE. According to its website its objective is to win freedom for the Tamil
people in Sri Lanka based on principles of nationhood, homeland and right to
self determination. These were the same principles based on which the demand
for independent Tamil Eelam became a political issue 1977 and then morphed into
insurgency movement led by the LTTE. It has limited influence among the Tamil
Diaspora and its activities help to keep the memory of the LTTE and Prabhakaran
alive among the Diaspora.[xxxi]
The Global Tamil Forum (GTF) was established
after the end of the Eelam War IV in 2009. Its main objective is to achieve a
negotiated political settlement to end the marginalization of Tamils. The
organization with its office located in Croydon, UK, is working with Diaspora
groups and Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka to evolve a common declaration containing
conditions conducive for arriving at a political settlement that addresses the
grievances of the Tamil people. It has been with Sri Lanka’s Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) on this issue as well as on for the creation of an independent
international war crimes accountability mechanism in Sri Lanka as well as help
internally displaced persons to resettle in their original places. It is led by one-time LTTE acolyte Father
Emmanuel who hopes to build it into a vocal and powerful Diaspora body enjoying
wide support. [xxxii]
The BTF is the largest Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora
body in the United Kingdom. It aims at highlighting the grievances of Tamils in
Sri Lanka to the international community and actively works with parliamentary Tamil
lobby groups of the three major parties in parliament. It has been vigorously
pursuing the demand for bringing to book Sri Lankan leaders for alleged war
crimes and human rights violations committed before and during the Eelam War. During
the war, in January 2009 BTF spearheaded the huge protest march in London in
support of the demand for Tamil Eelam and a permanent ceasefire in Sri Lanka.[xxxiii]
The TYO is an international Tamil youth
organization with branches in UK, Canada, Australia, France, Norway, New
Zealand, Sweden and the US. According to its website it focuses on uniting the
Tamil youth across the country and helps promote and understand Tamil language,
history, culture and identity. It organizes sports and cultural events for
Tamils; in addition to this it has been supportive of the demand for separate Tamil
Eelam.[xxxiv]
[ ]
Conclusion
Sri Lanka has shown how to successfully combat
the LTTE, a networked transnational insurgent organization, using the conventional
army. The national leadership under President Rajapaksa’s objectives were: to
end the ceasefire with the LTTE, abort the peace process, retain military
initiative at all times to destroy the LTTE. He evolved holistic strategy,
coordinating political actions and diplomatic initiatives to help the armed
forces in furthering the war. President Rajapaksa highlighted to India and the
US the danger of allowing a terrorist organization like the LTTE to continue to
flourish and they to help him out in their own ways. Though India could not supply arms due to
internal political compulsions, it shared vital intelligence on LTTE movements
and procurement of arms and supplies abroad and chipped in with some military
equipment like radar. The US provided electronic surveillance equipment and
maritime intelligence which were effectively used by Sri Lanka to cripple the
LTTE’s international logistic chain during the war.
The Army Commander General Fonseka adopted a
realistic strategy that aimed at exploiting the LTTE’s strategic weaknesses to
his advantage. Adoption of multiple thrust lines, excellent coordination of the
three services with fighting formations operating and providing adequate forces
paved the way for success. The military also showed strong motivation at the
junior leadership level to carry on with the task despite casualties. However,
the extensive use of air force and artillery against the country’s own citizens
who have turned into insurgents as well as civilians is a questionable strategy.
This had undoubtedly resulted in avoidable civilian casualties during the war.
This has come under severe criticism from the international community and the
UN Human Rights Council.
The key takeaways from Sri Lanka’s success at
the national level are: effective national leadership with clear goals, making
available required resources to the armed forces to achieve success, complete
coordination and integration of military objectives to achieve national goals, empowering
armed forces to plan and adopt innovative methods to achieve operational goals,
beefing up infrastructure to effectively use social networks and world wide web
to counter LTTE propaganda, strengthening
internal security apparatus to foil extremist threats to public services and
personalities and prevent political interference from extraneous sources.
At the international level the takeaways are:
taking advantage of existing global mood against terrorism to further
operational goals, use of political and civil society channels to muster
international community’s help to get LTTE’s front organizations and support
networks proscribed or rendered non effective and keeping channels open with
friendly countries to gain and share intelligence relevant to the operations.
President Rajapaksa’s post war strategy had
shown major weaknesses. He failed to take advantage of military success to
resolve the ethnic confrontation once and for all. He did not care to take
meaningful action to address the fundamental demands of the Tamils for
political autonomy even after five years of war. He chose to ignore
international demand for accountability for alleged war crimes and gross human
rights violations committed during the war.
Instead, he used the bogey of LTTE revival to garner political mileage
to strengthen his support base among Southern Sinhala supporters. In the last
two years of his rule, he pandered to the Sinhala Buddhist chauvinist
organizations causing ethnic friction. His post war rule was also marred by poor governance,
misuse of office, concentration of power within the family, corruption and
absence of rule of law.
This led to Rajapaksa’s defeat in the 2015
presidential elections and his former aide and successor President Maithripala
Sirisena has been saddled with all the post war problems. Rajapaksa’s post war
failure has brought out the important learning of all: it is not enough to win
the war against terrorism, equally important is to reap full benefit of the
elimination of terrorism.
Notes
[i] Sri Lanka had fought the LTTE for over 25 years from
23 July 1983 to 18 May 2009 in four spells of Eelam War – Eelam War I
(1983-87), Eelam War II (1990-95), Eelam War III (1995-2002) and Eelam War IV
(2006-09). The Indian Peace Keeping Forces fought the LTTE between 1987 and
1990.
[iv] LTTE carried out its first ever suicide attack on 5
July 1987 when Black Tiger ‘Miller’ drove an explosive laden truck into a
school in Vadamarachchi (in Jaffna peninsula) where Sri Lanka troops were
billeted, killing about 40 soldiers. According to a report which quoted Tamil
Eelam Heroes Secretariat since their inception in 1987 until 30 June 2007 a
total 322 Black Tigers were killed in action. [Iqbal Athas, ‘The terrible truth behind the freezer truck’
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070708/Columns/sitreport.html ] However,
more Black Tigers lost their lives in naval operations, than on land. According to the report out of the total 322
Black Tigers who died in action 81 (63 men and 18 women) died in land
operations while 241 Black Sea Tigers including 169 men and 72 women died at
sea. By the end of war in May 2009 an
estimated 330 Black Tigers had lost their lives.
[vi] See
LLRC 2011: section 3.30.
[x] IANS, Washington, ‘US freezes assets of Tamil charity
for supporting LTTE’ 12 February 2009
[xiii] The
TULF leader Amirthalingam had referred to this aspect in a conversation with
the author in 1988.
[xiv] Nesiah, Devanesan, “Sri
Lankan nationalism, ethnic identity and community”, Sri Lanka Peace Without
Process, (New Delhi, Samskriti
2006) pp 53-89.
[xvii] For an analysis of the
failure of the agreement see Hariharan R, “The discarded accord and the
unwanted war,” The
Hindu, 7 August 2007. http://www.thehindu.com
[xix] Bradman Weerakone,
Sri Lanka-LTTE talks 1989/90, A Report http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/89talks.htm
[xxi] The LTTE considered
other militant groups as traitors to the Eelam cause as they had supported the
India-Sri Lanka peace accord 1987.
[xxii]
BBC report “Brain behind the brawn” of 15
December 2006 quotes Balasingham’s memoirs to say he managed to persuade a reluctant
leadership to engage in peace talks, arguing his point time and time again that
this was the right course of action. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6180653.stm
[xxvii]
Prabhakaran's
decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and his advice to Tamils to
boycott the Presidential poll 2005 created long term problems for LTTE. The
first decision alienated the Indians and the second one helped Mahinda
Rajapaksa, who was against all that LTTE sought in the peace process, to get
elected.
[xxx] Udeshi Amarasinghe,
“Modus Operandi: Tamil Diaspora and LTTE organisation” June 5, 2014. www.defence.lk
This account based on Sri Lanka intelligence sources may not be wholly
accurate; but it broadly conforms to the emerging separatist support groups
abroad.
