Colonel R Hariharan
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 6371 | 26 April
2018 | http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2291
Prime Minister
Narendra Modi is meeting President Xi Jinping in what is described as informal
summit on April 27 and 28, 2018. They are expected to try and reboot their
relations which had come under strain after the Doklam confrontation. China’s
increasing in roads among smaller neighbours in India’s own backyard has become
a matter of concern for India. The decision of all the neighbours’ of India, except Bhutan, to join the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), much to India’s
discomfort, speaks for itself. Does the Indian establishment
continues to see the smaller neighbours through eyes of a big brother? Can
India deal with ever increasing in Chinese influence in South Asia?
These questions
will have to be answered collectively because there is a seamless connectivity
between Modi’s the external and internal policy initiatives to ensure India
gains its rightful place in the international community, taking advantage of
its size, growing economic power and geostrategic location.
His foreign policy
initiatives are linked to benefit national development, trigger
entrepreneurship and increase employment opportunities. In this respect,
his foreign policy differs qualitatively from earlier initiatives, which lacked
an overall vision. PM Modi’s relationship building
initiatives with other countries are applied at three geo-strategic levels -
neighbourhood, regional and global. They are not mutually exclusive and need to
be considered holistically.
At the strategic
level, he is de-hyphenating India's relations with other countries in keeping with the dynamics of
strategic power play to come to terms with China’s efforts to create a new
world order. This will explain Modi’s efforts to strengthen India-US relations,
while maintaining existing close links with Russia. He has also de-hyphenated
India’s growing relations with Israel from India’s stand on
Palestine, while strengthening traditional links with other Islamic states like
Iran, Saudi Arabia and the GCC. This has enabled India to strengthen national
security as well as ensure energy security. With these initiatives, India hopes
to expand trade and commerce and increase foreign investment in manufacturing
and infrastructure.
India's national security
responsibilities have also increased, in keeping with its increasing
international foot print, resulting at times in competing interests with China. However, it would be
incorrect to equate PM Modi's initiatives as a response to China's own
enlarging international presence. This is more so in our neighbourhood -
Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and for that matter
Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in IOR. India's relations with these
countries are multi-faceted and special (in some cases unique) due to umbilical
links of geographical connectivity and shared history.
India by sheer size of its land
mass, population, economy and military power at times makes its neighbours
uneasy. On some occasions, India’s own complacency in handling its power has
resulted in browbeating some of the smaller neighbours to agree to its
dispensation, reinforcing the notion of the big brother. Though this is
inevitable in the world of realpolitick, India's inability to fine tune its
architecture in handling the smaller neighbours’s concerns over the years has
given rise to anti-Indian sentiment within the body politics of neighbouring
countries. Conscious of this, India seems to be improving its approach in
treating them as equal partners, in its own national interest.
PM Modi's initiatives have
addressed some of these glitches affecting the neighbours with mixed results.
To a large extent, during the last three years India has managed to improve its
relations with neighbours (barring Pakistan) to retain its status as their key
partner. However, India is still slow on delivering upon its promises,
thanks to its internal “democratic” political decision-making process and
limitations of bureaucracy to think out of the box. Of course, the same
weaknesses apply to India’s neighbours in making good of India’s readiness to
help.
China's has come as a huge
attraction for the impoverished smaller countries in South Asia. It
promises to bring in Chinese investment to develop their capacities and open up
global markets through better infrastructure. However, China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) project in Pakistan, the 21st Maritime Silk Road project in Sri
Lanka and BRI linkages in Nepal and Bangladesh are much more than development
initiatives. . India has to watch these developments carefully and turn them
to its advantage. This is more easily said than done. This can be achieved not
by arm twisting, but by creating conditions for smaller neighbours to benefit
from India's own development agenda. This has to be ingrained in our
policy implementation.
Whether China’s projects in our
neighbourhood are economically viable or not, they boost China's power
assertion in South Asia. China’s strategic assets created in South Asia and
Indian Ocean region is already leading to stationing of Chinese troops to
protect its interests. The BRI also improves China's global competitiveness; so
it is not surprising that large chunks of Chinese investments are being made in
BRI in South Asia with an eye on the huge underserviced markets.
The reality is India cannot match
China's political and economic power and capabilities or its unbridled global
ambitions. PM Modi is heading a
vibrant democracy with its checks and balances operating on a different
political plane, unlike President Xi Jinping who enjoys total political support as the leader of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ruling the country.
However, the two countries differ
in their aspirations. India’s efforts in this region aim to protect its
interest, rather than neutralize China’s entry. So India would like to maintain
cordial, than confrontational, relations with its northern neighbour. Unlike
India, China’s ambitions are global, in keeping with its massive
economic clout supported by growing military power. So it would be logical for
China to ensure normal relations with India are maintained, lest its global
ambitions are queered by getting bogged down in confrontation with India, a
regional power with its own strengths of size and growing economic and military
power.
Moreover, China would like to
continue to profit from India’s rapidly growing economy. Already China has
emerged as the number one player in India’s huge mobile phone market. This does
not mean China would give up its territorial claims on India or to settle the
border problem. They serve as useful levers to periodically assert China’s
strategic power. So, it would be incorrect to award brownie points to India's
foreign policy based only on China’s (or any other power’s) performance in
India’s neighbourhood.
India will continue to loom larger
than China in competitive politics of neighbouring countries for reasons of
geography and soft power influence. Sections of political class in these
countries find it profitable to leverage latent anti-India feelings to their
advantage. China has increased its influence with these sections. Combined with
its economic clout and selective use of anti-Indian sentiments, China is poised
to enlarge its political influence in these countries. India will be keeping
this in mind in building both bilateral relations as well as in evolving
multi-lateral strategies with other likeminded nations. India's quadrilateral
initiative with the US, Japan and Australia is one such move; however it has to
grow beyond its military content.
India is trying to build
qualitatively different initiatives with countries where China’s economic and
military power loom larger than India i.e., Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia. PM Modi's invitation to ASEAN heads of state to attend the Republic
Day celebrations in New Delhi is an example of such an initiative in
action. India and Japan are closely cooperating in many projects in the region
including in Sri Lanka, where they are jointly involved in building an LPG
terminal. Japan is also investing in Chahbahar project in Iran, which is an
India-Iran project. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is also in the
offing.
But India is perhaps under
performing in progressing its initiatives in South Asia as it is bogged down by
its preoccupation with Pakistan. China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan has
qualitatively changed India’ strategic threat perceptions. This has probably
encouraged Pakistan army to renew its effort to pursue its tactics of ‘bleeding
India’ using Jihadi terrorist groups to tie-down Indian security forces in
Jammu and Kashmir. PM Modi has been fairly successful in his efforts to
internationally highlight Pakistan’s state- sponsored terrorism, which has
embarrassed Pakistan. This may not be enough for Pakistan army to loosen its
stranglehold on national policy making in respect of national security and
India. It is in this complex environment PM Modi will be meeting with President
Xi.
The Indian PM’s success in
implementing his vision is directly related to his political fortunes as
India's democracy validates national leadership every five years. President Xi
does not enjoy such limitations as he is poised to lead the monolithic country
perhaps for "life time." So it is advantage China and President Xi as
of now. We have to wait and watch, how the cookie crumbles. In this context,
probably Lord Palmerston of Great Britain’s cliché that in international
relations there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent
interests is true more than ever before. But our permanent interests will
always rest in the neighbourhood and that has to include China.
Col
R Hariharan is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated
with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the
International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com
Web: http://col.hariharan.info
Also: Chennai Centre for China Studies Article No
023/2018
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