Col R Hariharan | January 1, 2020 |
[Here are my
short answers to questions relating to India-China relations and Indo-Pacific
strategic security.]
1. What will be the think tank’s view or recommendations on
how the Indian government's decision would be regarding BRI?
I can speak only in my personal capacity. There are both
positives and negatives about BRI. Positive side: it infuses investment in
infrastructure projects in countries starved of investment which will encourage
increase business and trade as well as jobs and open up international trade
opportunities.
But there are many negatives. The whole process is opaque. It
comes with terms largely dictated by China. Often because credit is available
infrastructure projects have been taken up without due diligence about their viability.
It increases China's strategic reach which could go beyond the smaller
country's ability to manage in times of confrontation. Of course, it would
dislocate regional stability as obvious in Indo-Pacific neighborhood.
2. How will the issue of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC)
passing through the Pakistan occupied Kashmir be resolved? Can it be resolved?
There are three major issues relating to CPEC
running through Pakistan Occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir.
a. Pakistan-India standoff for 70 years over Pak
claim on Indian Territory.
b. Pakistan providing sanctuary to terrorists to
carry out terror strikes in India and Afghanistan.
c. China-Pakistan strategic connectivity
facilitated by CPEC increases joint threat to India.
Unless the two nations (China and Pakistan) decide
to resolve the threat potential against India convincingly (will it ever
happen?), I don't expect any change in present situation.
3. Recently India had rejected the RCEP, which
could have given us a good hold in the Southeast Asian countries. What are the
other ways we can counter the theory of string of pearls?
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) is a proposed free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region between
the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and their five FTA partners namely, Australia,
China, Japan, India and New Zealand.
I don't subscribe to the string of pearls (SOP)
theory that China's entire strategic outreach is designed to contain India,
though the US would like us to believe it. The so-called SOP has happened
because China has embarked upon making its ambition to become a global power as
per CPC's vision. President Xi Jinping launched BRI in 2013 to fulfill this
vision.
RCEP could also become a vehicle of it and India
runs the risk of becoming a dumping ground for other members of RCEP dominated
by China. When RCEP’s terms are redrawn, India can take a call on joining it
based upon our national interest.
4. With the Sri Lankan government not being pro -
Indian, how do you think our strategy or relation be with Sri Lanka, while keeping
in mind that the Hambantota port has a possibility of becoming China's military
base?
India has never wanted Sri Lanka should be pro
Indian; India wants Sri Lanka to be a friendly neighbor in view of its shared history and culture with India.
Under PM Modi's neighborhood first policy, Sri Lanka-India relations now are
most cordial than ever before. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is fully aware of
India's concerns about China using Hambantota port for its warships. Actually,
when I met President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006, he described India as ‘family’
and China as ‘friend’. China knows India’s special relationship with Sri Lanka.
India is the most powerful naval power in Indian
Ocean Region (IOR) and its naval reconnaissance planes are maintaining
surveillance of all choke points of IOR 24x7.
Indian navy has functional security arrangements
with Sri Lanka navy to coordinate their coastal surveillance. Similarly
Singapore, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles have security linkages with
India. India and France have signed a strategic co-operation agreement which
make available French bases in Indian Ocean to India.
Given this situation, neither China nor Sri Lanka
is stupid to turn this it into an existential crisis for India by triggering
full-fledged confrontation in IOR.
5. Will the Indo Pacific region policy of India
counter balance BRI and help in getting a hold on the Indian Ocean?
I think answers to earlier questions cover most of
this aspect except India's emerging participation in the Strategic
Quadrilateral of US, India, Japan and Australia. Quad is in nascent stage and
it is to improve mutual security cooperation between members in Indo-Pacific,
where the presence of PLAN warships has increased. I think Quad in its present
form is not to contain BRI, but only a precautionary arrangement to handle the
situation if and when China's
belligerence seen in South China Sea, spills over in Indo- Pacific to the
detriment of trade and commerce and security interests of Quad members.
6. While the US has started its talks on space
warfare, will it become the next chapter of national security and should India
think about the same?
Of course, India is already a reckonable power with
proven capabilities in space. You must have seen the DRDO float of an
India-designed anti- satellite missile in the Republic Day parade on January 26.
India has become the fourth nation which has anti-satellite missile capability.
That shows the baby steps we are taking in space security. But space warfare
has a long way to go before it becomes the "next chapter" of our
national security. It still remains only as an appendix to India’s national
security matrix.
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