Monday, 3 February 2020

Quick takes on Indo-Pacific security environment


Col R Hariharan | January 1, 2020 |

[Here are my short answers to questions relating to India-China relations and Indo-Pacific strategic security.]

1. What will be the think tank’s view or recommendations on how the Indian government's decision would be regarding BRI?

I can speak only in my personal capacity. There are both positives and negatives about BRI. Positive side: it infuses investment in infrastructure projects in countries starved of investment which will encourage increase business and trade as well as jobs and open up international trade opportunities. 

But there are many negatives. The whole process is opaque. It comes with terms largely dictated by China. Often because credit is available infrastructure projects have been taken up without due diligence about their viability. It increases China's strategic reach which could go beyond the smaller country's ability to manage in times of confrontation. Of course, it would dislocate regional stability as obvious in Indo-Pacific neighborhood.

2. How will the issue of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC) passing through the Pakistan occupied Kashmir be resolved? Can it be resolved?

There are three major issues relating to CPEC running through Pakistan Occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir.

a. Pakistan-India standoff for 70 years over Pak claim on Indian Territory. 
b. Pakistan providing sanctuary to terrorists to carry out terror strikes in India and Afghanistan.
c. China-Pakistan strategic connectivity facilitated by CPEC increases joint threat to India.

Unless the two nations (China and Pakistan) decide to resolve the threat potential against India convincingly (will it ever happen?), I don't expect any change in present situation.

3. Recently India had rejected the RCEP, which could have given us a good hold in the Southeast Asian countries. What are the other ways we can counter the theory of string of pearls?

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region between the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and their five FTA partners namely, Australia, China, Japan, India and New Zealand.

I don't subscribe to the string of pearls (SOP) theory that China's entire strategic outreach is designed to contain India, though the US would like us to believe it. The so-called SOP has happened because China has embarked upon making its ambition to become a global power as per CPC's vision. President Xi Jinping launched BRI in 2013 to fulfill this vision. 

RCEP could also become a vehicle of it and India runs the risk of becoming a dumping ground for other members of RCEP dominated by China. When RCEP’s terms are redrawn, India can take a call on joining it based upon our national interest.

4. With the Sri Lankan government not being pro - Indian, how do you think our strategy or relation be with Sri Lanka, while keeping in mind that the Hambantota port has a possibility of becoming China's military base?

India has never wanted Sri Lanka should be pro Indian; India wants Sri Lanka to be a friendly neighbor in view of  its shared history and culture with India. Under PM Modi's neighborhood first policy, Sri Lanka-India relations now are most cordial than ever before. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is fully aware of India's concerns about China using Hambantota port for its warships. Actually, when I met President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006, he described India as ‘family’ and China as ‘friend’. China knows India’s special relationship with Sri Lanka.

India is the most powerful naval power in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its naval reconnaissance planes are maintaining surveillance of all choke points of IOR 24x7. 

Indian navy has functional security arrangements with Sri Lanka navy to coordinate their coastal surveillance. Similarly Singapore, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles have security linkages with India. India and France have signed a strategic co-operation agreement which make available French bases in Indian Ocean to India. 

Given this situation, neither China nor Sri Lanka is stupid to turn this it into an existential crisis for India by triggering full-fledged confrontation in IOR.

5. Will the Indo Pacific region policy of India counter balance BRI and help in getting a hold on the Indian Ocean?

I think answers to earlier questions cover most of this aspect except India's emerging participation in the Strategic Quadrilateral of US, India, Japan and Australia. Quad is in nascent stage and it is to improve mutual security cooperation between members in Indo-Pacific, where the presence of PLAN warships has increased. I think Quad in its present form is not to contain BRI, but only a precautionary arrangement to handle the situation if  and when China's belligerence seen in South China Sea, spills over in Indo- Pacific to the detriment of trade and commerce and security interests of Quad members.

6. While the US has started its talks on space warfare, will it become the next chapter of national security and should India think about the same?

Of course, India is already a reckonable power with proven capabilities in space. You must have seen the DRDO float of an India-designed anti- satellite missile in the Republic Day parade on January 26. India has become the fourth nation which has anti-satellite missile capability. That shows the baby steps we are taking in space security. But space warfare has a long way to go before it becomes the "next chapter" of our national security. It still remains only as an appendix to India’s national security matrix.



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