By: Col R Hariharan| India Weekly |Sunday August 15, 2021
https://www.indiaweekly.biz/india-at-74-coming-to-terms-with-national-security/
ON February 26, 2019, a dozen Mirage 2000 fighter jets of the IAF crossed
the Line of Control (LoC) penetrated to deep inside Pakistan to carryout a
pre-dawn strike at the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist camps in Balakot in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and in Muzaffarabad and Chakothi in POK. Operation
Bandar, as the Balakot mission was called, was India’s muscular response to
punish JeM which had killed 40 CRPF troops in an IED attack on a bus carrying
them at Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir on February 14, 2019.
Though India’s response came 12 days after Pulwama attack, it was well
planned to cover political, diplomatic and military aspects. This was evident
in the way the air force had planned meticulously planned to ensure total
surprise. IAF Mirage2000 strike was supported by airborne early warning and
control aircraft (AEW&C) radar systems designed to detect and track
aircraft, missiles and ships and air defence cover by Sukhoi 30MkI aircraft.
Heron drone conducted real time surveillance of the LOC. In order to achieve
total surprise, Mirage fighters were inducted directly into operation from
Gwalior base with Ilyushin 78 aircraft providing mid-air fuelling
facility. It was a demonstration of IAF’s capability to operate a complex air
operation in the modern C3S and I command and control system in place.
Indie clarified that the operation was not targeted against the
people of Pakistan. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale called it “an intelligence
led operation.” He said “credible intelligence was received that JeM was
attempting another suicide terror attack in various parts of thecountry.” He
termed the action as a “non-military pre-emptive action” specifically targeted
at JeM camps.
The Balakot air strike is unprecedented on many counts in India’s history.
Never before, not even after the 26/11 Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) terrorist attacks
in Mumbai, India has demonstrated its ability to take decisive retaliatory
action beyond its borders. Thus, it represents an important milestone in
India’s quest to articulate its national security strategy.
It also showed the benefit of taking the first steps in reforming the
national security framework. In May 2018, the newly created Defence Planning
Committee (DPC) under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor and
with the three service chiefs, foreign secretary, secretary (expenditure) in
the finance ministry as members met for the first time. The DPC was to
consider the draft national security strategy (NSS) and the long pending issues
of reforms in national security, particularly in creating integrated commands
to promote jointness, creation of triservice commands for cyberspace, space and
special operations. The DPC is also tasked to prepare drafts of a strategic
defence review, an international defence engagement strategy, a road map to
build a defence manufacturing echo system, a strategy to boost arms exports and
prioritised capability development plans for armed forces.
The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), an expert group of
non-officials, under the National Security Council (NSC) is also reported
to have prepared a draft NSS on the directions of the PMO. This will also be
reviewed by the DPC.
While all these are all welcome moves, how far and how fast they will yield
results is the big question, because the nation has demonstrated it lacks a
strategic culture.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not identify national security with
military threats, but saw it in a broader perspective of the need to develop
its political, economic technological and military capabilities in that order.
The debacle in the war with China in 1962, was perhaps a short-lived wake
up call, to the nation revelling in its role as a peacemaker. However, the
conceptual vacuum in its national security strategy showed up glaringly, when
Pakistan triggered the 1965 war it ended in a stalemate, because India lacked
strategic goals. Cold War compulsions and the increasing synergy between the US
and China, came to the fore in the wake of 1971 war that saw the birth of
Bangladesh. Though the country lacked a well-articulated security doctrine,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi leveraged the cold war animosities to India’s
strategic advantage to come out victorious. India’s ill-fated military
intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987-90 again demonstrated the price the nation
had to pay for the strategic confusion in the minds of national leadership.
The Kargil war in 1999 showed up the glaring weaknesses in the nation’s
intelligence apparatus, when Pakistani troops stealthily managed to occupy commanding
heights to harass the troops. It took extraordinary courage and bravery of the
Indian soldier, to emerge victorious after paying a heavy price with 527 lives.
The Kargil Review Committee under strategist K Subrahmanyam laid bare not only
the weakness in the intelligence process but in a whole range of security
issues – decision making at the top, national security management, integrated
operations and military modernization.
The Committee had recommended a full time National Security Adviser (NSA),
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a National Intelligence Agency (NIA), National
Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and deputing military officers to the Ministry
of Defence. But till it was dusted up in 2011 by the Naresh Chandra Committee,
there was no progress. Bureaucratic resistance ensured tardy implementation of
the recommendation.
The resistance of the Ministry of Defence to implement the One Rank One
Pension (OROP) even after the government had given the go ahead, created
avoidable bitterness among veterans. The appointment of the CDS in December
2019, nearly two decades after the idea was mooted showed the low priority
national security issues occupy in the government scheme of things.
The Galwan incident on June 20 last year in which Indian troops and Chinese
troops clashed along the line of control in Eastern Ladakh resulting in the
death of 20 Indian soldiers has underlined the urgency of coordinated national
security response. It showed our weaknesses in timely procurement of modern
weapon systems, construction of border roads and in assessing potential
threats. So we are still a long way in coordinating our national security
strategy.
We are in for a long haul in dealing with China. China’s approach to India
will be transactional, selective and based on the hard reality of its national
self-interest rather than ephemeral notions of harmony and bonhomie.
We need to be hard headed to benefit from the quadrilateral framework being
formed to prevent predatory moves of China in the Indo-Pacific. While participating
in such frameworks it is good to remember what Chanakya said long ago: “There
is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without
self-interest. This is a bitter truth.”
[The writer is a retired military Intelligence
specialist on South Asia with rich experience in terrorism and insurgency
operations. He is the former intelligence chief of IPKF in Sri Lanka].
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