Sri Lanka: LTTE’s moment of truth at Sampur (Reprint)

[ This is a reprint of the author's Sri Lanka Updte No 101 published by the South Asia Analysis Group Note No 331 dated 08.09. 2006 as part of the archives.] 

By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

In the wake of the fall of Sampur to the Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) on September 4, 2006, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have said the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) has “ended.” S.P. Tamilselvan, LTTE’s political head, met with the visiting Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar, and the new Deputy Ambassador Laegreid, at Kilinochchi on September 6, 2006. After the meeting Tamilselvan explained to the press that the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)’s occupation of Sampur violated the basic requirement of CFA, which was respecting the existing borders of control. “By this occupation (of Sampur) GOSL has brought an end to the CFA” he added.

Does this mean LTTE has formally renounced the CFA? It is not clear.

However, the fall of Sampur means a major shift in the power equation between the two sides in the east in the on going series of military confrontations since mid July 2006. LTTE artillery based in the Sampur area had posed a strategic threat to the movement of Sri Lanka naval ships from Trincomalee harbour across the Koddiyar Bay. And that meant the GOSL and SLSF supply chains to Jaffna from Trincomalee were under LTTE’s threat and surveillance.

The LTTE had termed the loss of Sampur as a tactical withdrawal rather than a defeat. In spite of this, Sampur represents a big loss of face for LTTE as it comes in the wake its successive failures against the SLSF in operations that started with Mavil Aru (See SAAG Paper No 1908 dated Aug 12, 2006 “Mavil Aru operation and after-an analysis” for details) and continued with the LTTE’s offensive in the north (See SAAG Note 325 dated Aug 15, 2006 “LTTE strikes back Up date 98” and SAAG Note 327 dated Aug 25, 2006 “LTTE under duress Up date 99” for details).

Media reports indicate that LTTE had managed to pull out the bulk of its artillery to safer areas further southeast around Eechchalmpattu. Thus, LTTE still retains to a certain extent the capability to use its long-range artillery from positions in depth to interfere with shipping in and out of Trincomalee. So the SLSF can be expected to continue their operation to its logical conclusion of clearing the whole of the Muttur East ? Sampur bulge, in case the LTTE artillery opens up once again. But LTTE is unlikely to do so in this sector as its manoeuvring space has been restricted.

There is some dispute whether LTTE was in possession of Sampur at the time of ceasefire. However LTTE insists it was so. LTTE would probably choose a time and place where it is assured of success, to avenge its losses with a spectacular action. Considered in this background, Tamilselvan’s warning that the majority Sinhalese would have to “face the consequences soon” sounds ominous.

LTTE’s strategic errors

LTTE appear to have committed a number of strategic errors in the on going series of operations.

1. The first error was in triggering the SLSF operations in Trincomalee sector, where LTTE’s tactically weak. The region has Tamil villages interspersed between Sinhala and Muslim villages. Traditionally the Sinhala response in this sector to Tamil confrontation had been violent. Army, navy and air force units based in Trincomalee are readily available in close proximity. So any confrontation in this area was bound to gain quick retaliation.
2. The attack on the Army Commander provided the motivation and excuse for the SLSF to pound LTTE positions in Sampur area intermittently from air and ground since April 2006. This would have prevented the LTTE cadres from aggressively patrolling and dominating the ground.
3. The blocking of Mavil Aru waters gave a legitimate reason for President Rajapaksa to launch a military offensive for a “humanitarian” cause. This was despite the offer of the Tamil population to hold talks to consider the opening of the sluice gates and resume the supply of water. And this should have been a strong indication for his intention to use force rather than talk in any confrontation with LTTE.
4. LTTE’s military escalation was done at the worst possible time. LTTE had already stretched the patience of the four Co-chairs and had not heeded their pleas for restraining its conduct. On the other hand it defied them and continued its attacks on Army officers and naval ships. When the operations started, the attitude of the international community appeared to silently allow LTTE “to stew in its own juices” for sometime.
5. LTTE had rendered the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) ineffective with its insistence on the withdrawal of its monitors belonging to EU countries. This put Norway on the defensive and kept it busy in sorting out the SLMM staffing problems.
6. Most importantly, LTTE failed to gauge the mood of President Rajapaksa to go for a full-scale military option against LTTE. The air strikes carried out on his orders on April 26, 2006 on Sampur defences was a clear indication that the President had decided on the hard option and would strike at an opportune moment.

Analysis of operational performance

In the absence of complete information, probably it is too early to make an assessment on operational performance; after all one swallow does not make a summer, as the cliché goes. Still it is difficult to ignore some tell tale signs that show up in the performance of both sides.

1. Overall LTTE’s operational performance had shown its weakness in handling conventional operations. However, in the north LTTE showed its ability to launch operations on multiple axes, a luxury considering its limited availability of troops. This dissipated its thrust on the main A9 axis.
2. On the other hand SLSF with its successes has gained increasing confidence. Despite a few flaws, it has come out better. The SLSF’s training and modernisation efforts appear to have paid off. The Army had excellent close support from the air force and navy during the operations. In a way the air force fighters and the multi-barrel artillery paved the way for SLSF successes.
3. LTTE appear to have underestimated the staying power of the SLSF defenders. They not only held on but also broke up LTTE’s repeated assaults and counter attacks, which indicated high morale of troops. LTTE’s problem was probably in believing one’s own propaganda. A careful study of the rigorous training that SLSF had undertaken during the last four years should have opened the eyes of LTTE. Under Lt General Fonseka, the Army has shown better level of junior leadership, which showed  it could take as well as inflict casualties and continue with the operations.
4. The Mavil Aru operations exposed LTTE’s tactical limitations in conventional operation in the face of overwhelming firepower. In spite of this experience, it is surprising that LTTE went in for a conventional offensive in Muhamalai-Nagarkovil area, where the SLSF was fully entrenched. The SLSF had been preparing the defences in these areas for sometime. LTTE’s sporadic sniping and Claymore attacks in this region in the earlier months had kept them alert and on their toes.
5. LTTE showed it could bring up accurate long-range artillery fire. Its artillery strike on Jaffna air base put it out of action. However, it could not sustain the fire, which showed limited availability of artillery ammunition. The SLSF enjoyed the freedom of the air to carry out air operations in support of ground attacks. It knocked off the LTTE guns interfering with Jaffna airport operation, which was resumed after a break for a few days. This clearly showed LTTE’s Achilles heel ? air defence. LTTE had no worthwhile anti-aircraft or surface to air missile (SAM) capability. (LTTE was said to possess a few SAMs. However they were not seen in action. This could be due to the aging of missiles in stock. Or they were too few and kept as critical reserves). SLSF is likely to exploit LTTE’s vulnerability to air attacks in future operations. (The paucity of SAMs would explain LTTE’s desperate efforts to procure them in the U.S. Even as the operations were in progress, the FBI busted a U.S.-Canadian LTTE ring and arrested over a dozen Tamils who were trying to procure missiles and electronic devices for LTTE. )
6. LTTE could not reinforce Sampur from north or east. Presumably Karuna and his cadres in Batticaloa bottled up LTTE in the east, while SLSF aircraft made large scale LTTE movement elsewhere untenable. Considering this, the military wisdom of going for an offensive in the northern front even as the guns had not cooled in Mavil Aru is questionable.
7. During the course of the operation, Sea Tiger attempts to strike at Sri Lanka naval ships at Trincomalee and off the coast of Point Pedro in Jaffna peninsula failed dismally. The SLSF claimed to have sunk 15 LTTE boats during the Point Pedro operation. Alertness and faster response to situation of the Sri Lanka navy to the LTTE threat probably was responsible for these successes.

Did Karuna affect the operations?It is clear LTTE’s strength has been severely affected due to Karuna’s break away. The eastern region was a major recruitment area for LTTE. Karuna also probably has a hand in strengthening Sri Lankan intelligence network as more and more LTTE operations, particularly in the sea and in the vicinity of Colombo are being compromised. Even as the guns are going silent in Sampur, Karuna’s Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) in a press release have claimed to have driven away LTTE cadres from as many as six bases in Amparai district in an overnight operation and killing15 LTTE cadres, while losing one of their own cadres. The TMVP captured 15 T-56 assault rifles, one RPG and two LMGs, apart from grenades and ammunition in these operations.  If this claim is correct, it is clear that Karuna is taking advantage of the destabilisation of LTTE in Trincomalee to wrest control of areas under LTTE control.

Humanitarian issues

While the war hogged the headlines, sufferings of the common man in the war zone have been pushed to the back burner. Both sides have shown little concern for the suffering of civilian population or casualties. Scores of houses have been destroyed in Mutur town and in nearly a dozen villages in Sampur bulge. Jaffna has been choked as A9- the highway link for supplies has been cut off. Over 230,000 people from the war affected regions of north and east have been displaced and are living in make shift camps. The UN has estimated that their maintenance cost for three months would work out to $ 37 million.

There had been a number of extra judicial killings. The hand of Sri Lankan security personnel is suspected in the killing of 17 aid workers of Tamil origin belonging to a French NGO. The ill-planned SLSF bombing of Chencholai camp in the heartland of LTTE killed 61 school kids, in the belief they were Black Tigers. (Sri Lanka government has disputed both of these allegations.)  LTTE manipulated the operations to drive away over 30,000 Muslims from their homes in Mutur. It also shot and killed 35 Muslims picked up from the fleeing crowds. Of course, a bigger tragedy was the wanton gunning down of Ketheswaran Loganathan, a widely respected Tamil intellectual, who had been striving for peace in Sri Lanka at his Colombo home.

LTTE’s moment of truth

Though it has lost a few battles, LTTE war machine is intact. It holds sizeable territory fully in its control. It also holds the destiny of Tamils living in those areas in its hands. It is possible that LTTE’s recent offensive in the north was only a dress rehearsal of the main offensive yet to come to capture Jaffna. In spite of all this, the fall of Sampur as a culmination of recent military confrontations offers a moment of truth for LTTE to re-examine its undiluted faith in the military option.

Unlike the earlier generation of LTTE fighters, for LTTE’s present rank and file anti Tamil pogroms of `1983 are only oral history. Can they be motivated to launch a mother of all operations to recapture Jaffna? Even if they succeed in doing so after another few rounds of bloody battle, can they regain east? Even a month long war has shown that Tamils were suffering “absolute misery,” in the words of Tamilselvan. He has accused the international community of not taking action to help them and adopting a soft approach to the violence against Tamils. Will these things improve with more military operations? The sections of Tamil Diaspora that feed the LTTE war machine are going to find it more and more difficult in the coming months, as the West is tightening up its anti terrorism operations. In such an environment is an all out war a viable option? These are some of the questions that the LTTE leadership need to introspect. The writing on the wall is clear – GOSL and LTTE will have to put aside their guns, sit down and discuss. There is no other way out of the tunnel.

(Col R Hariharan, a Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, was the Head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com )

SRI LANKA: MAVIL ARU OPERATION & AFTER – An Analysis (Reprint)

 

This is a reprint of South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 1908 dated 12.08.06 as part of archives of the author's work. Paper no.1908

SRI LANKA: MAVIL ARU OPERATION & AFTER – An Analysis By Col R Hariharan (retd.) 1.   Operation Watershed, the Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF)’s bloody confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for achieving what both sides called ‘humanitarian objectives’ over the water supply from the Mavil Aru reservoir in eastern Sri Lanka has been going on since July 26, 2006. People heaved a sigh of relief on August 8, 2006 when LTTE announced it was restoring the water supply, which was the basic reason for the confrontation. Everyone expected the SLSF to call off the offensive when LTTE lifted the blockade. But it was not to be and the Operation Watershed continued as the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) announced that operations would end only when it gained control of the sluice gates controlling the water flow. On August 10, 2006 the GOSL announced that they had gained full control of the sluice gates of the reservoir and they only had opened them. But the fighting has continued on August 11, 2006 as the GOSL said it wanted to make the area fully secure. The SLSF is said to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Tigers. 2.   As though to underline his newfound determination to ‘bash on regardless’, President Rajapakse said that the supply of water was a non-negotiable fundamental human right. “If any one tries to obstruct it by laying down conditions, the Government will do everything within its means to overcome such obstructions and cater to the people’s needs,” he cautioned. 3.   With the Tigers faring not so well in Mavil Aru, as they were comparatively weak in the east, it was expected they would strike in a big way in the North. As though to justify this expectation on the morning of August 12, 2006, the LTTE claimed to have destroyed Muhamalai post which is the entry point for Jaffna. Reuters quoted a LTTE official as saying: “We have completely destroyed the army checkpoints at the Muhamalai (border) crossing, and we are advancing on Jaffna”. 4.   According to him the LTTE the Sea Tigers had also attacked just south of Jaffna town and assaulted a navy base at the island’s northern tip before dawn. At the time of writing it is not clear at which point this attack has taken place. Analysis of Mavil Aru operation 5.   This paper presents an analysis of the Mavil Aru confrontation up to the SLSF recapture of the reservoir on August 8, 2006 and its consolidation of the area up to August 10, 2006. As it appears to be an ongoing operation the analysis has its own limitations due to paucity of objective information in media reports. 6.   The Mavil Aru confrontation  had started when Tamils of Mutur East-Ichchilampattai area closed the sluice gates to block the supply of water to about 30,000 acres of ripe paddy affecting about 60,000 Sinhalas depending upon it for their livelihood. Of course as these Tamils were living in areas under LTTE control, there was no question of taking such a drastic action without LTTE’s support. In the earlier years of ceasefire, such an issue would have been resolved through negotiations. But this time it was not to be. The GOSL decided to use the SLSF to lift the blockade, and resume the water supply. 7.   After the ceasefire came in force in 2002, this is the biggest military confrontation between the SLSF and LTTE. The SLSF operation was a full-fledged war using army, navy and the air force for the offensive. SLSF did not confine its offensive only to this region; its air force engaged Tigers locations in Batticaloa, and Vavuniya also. Significantly the SLSF probed well within territory under LTTE control, in defiance of the ceasefire agreement (CFA). The GOSL in a major departure of policy appears to have decided not to bother about the niceties of CFA violation any more. This probably portends the resumption of full-scale war between the two rivals in all sectors, even though it may not be termed as Eelam War IV as the ceasefire is still on in paper. 8.   During the operation LTTE showed its strength and limitations in not only in the use of conventional forces including artillery, but also in continuing its guerrilla operations to carry out killings, intimidation and propaganda even during the operation. Why Mavil Aru operations? 9.   The Mavil Aru operations are in a sense precipitation of the war clouds that had been darkening the skies of ceasefire in Sri Lanka, ever since LTTE made an abortive suicide attack on Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka on April 25, 2006. The SLSF had been smarting under a large number of LTTE attacks affecting its morale and efficiency during the first three years of ceasefire. But the attack on the Army Commander was an affront neither President Rajapakse nor SLSF could ignore. Since then both SLSF and LTTE had been flexing their muscles for a full-fledged confrontation. Though SLSF stepped up its retaliation, LTTE had continued hitting at selected targets, the latest one being an suicide bomber’s attack on former Tamil M.P. and Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) leader Sivathasan on August 8, 2006. 10.   Both sides appear to have chosen Mavil Aru as the scene for a show down for their own reasons. These may be grouped under the heads of geo-strategy, ethnic, political and international environments. Geo-strategic reasons 11.   Geographically, Mavil Aru is located in an ethnically sensitive area where Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil villages are located almost nudging each other. Operations in this area impact all the three communities. Strategically, it is south of Mutur bulge, which dominates the entry into Koddiyar Bay, the inlet for Trincomalee port and naval base. LTTE presence in the area has always posed a threat SLSF domination of the seas and free naval movement in and out of the base. LTTE has always ensured its presence in this region particularly along Mutur East ? Ichchilampattai ? Verugal Ferry. In the past it has been the scene of all conflicts with LTTE. The dense forests of Somawathie sanctuary on the Southwest restrict free movement of troops and facilitate easy dispersal of insurgents. The highway A-15, linking Trincomalee and Batticaloa areas, runs along this coast. A-15 has gained added tactical significance in LTTE’s struggle to re-establish its writ in the east ever since the eastern leader Karuna broke away. Thus this area has gained greater significance now. Ethnic environment 12.   A spark of conflict anywhere in Sri Lanka usually has an incendiary response in this region. This is linked to the long simmering issue of ‘colonisation’ of Tamil areas. The region has seen the progressive rise of Sinhala population and consolidation of Muslim population. Three decades ago the GOSL created the Mavil Aru project to benefit the state sponsored Sinhala settlements in the region. To the Tamils it is a visible example of Sinhala colonisation in areas traditionally considered as Tamil land. In the past Eelam wars, Mavil Aru reservoir had changed hands twice. In 1991 conflict LTTE failed to capture the reservoir but blew up the sluice gates. The SLSF captured it and lost it in Eelam War III in 1997. After the ceasefire in 2002, Mavil Aru came within the LTTE controlled area. However, it continues to water the fields in government-controlled area. According to government spokesman GOSL’s engineers of the Irrigation Department had been visiting the area. And that is where the catch is. The reservoir waters are vital for farmers in government-controlled area. The present crisis started when GOSL announced an Asian Development Bank Project to supply drinking water from Mavil Aru to villages in government-controlled areas. This drew a lot of protest from people in areas under LTTE control from Mutur east and Ichchilampattai division. The ADB then agreed to extend the project to both the areas. 13.   In normal course, this issue would have been resolved through negotiations. But the area had been far from normal after April 25, 2006 when SLSF stepped up operations against LTTE. Since then LTTE strongholds in this area had come under frequent SLSF air and artillery attacks, putting the local population under great stress. Their movement to other areas have been restricted due to operations of SLSF and as well as LTTE. Thousands have fled their homes and are living in camps as refugees with inadequate food supplies. So when the GOSL went ahead with the drinking water project in areas under its control, the people in LTTE-controlled area cut off water supply to press home their demand for security to life and property and supply of essential rations for refugees, in addition to the extension of the water supply scheme to their area. Political environment 14.   Ever since he was elected, President Mahinda Rajapakse had been facing pressure on two fronts ? LTTE, and anti-Eelam lobby including the Janatha Vimukthi Permana (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the Sinhala right. LTTE had been putting had escalated its violent attacks targeting the army and naval movements in land and sea, causing huge casualties since November 2005. The President had been hard pressed to show tangible results to overcome LTTE militarily to re-establish the credibility of SLSF. Politically Rajapakse had chosen to take a strong stand against LTTE and a federal solution to the Tamil problem. This gained him the support of anti-Eelam lobby as well as the Sinhala south during his election. When he started retaliating LTTE with force, they were applauding his action. He had also been building up his party strength in the parliament. He has successfully persuaded a number of opposition M.P.s to join him. When LTTE precipitated a crisis over Mavil Aru affecting the livelihood of 60,000 Sinhala peasants, launching a military operation rather than negotiating probably appeared to the President as a more attractive political option. Use of armed forces to resume water supply to peasants starved of Mavil Aru water would not only provide ‘humanitarian relief’ to them but also satisfy the anti-Eelam lobby clamouring for action from the President. 15.   For some time now LTTE had been losing its grip over the east, as Karuna and his followers slowly extended their sway. As a result, free movement of LTTE’s local leaders in the region had been curtailed. East has ceased to be a lucrative source of recruits for LTTE. Pro-LTTE elements were being attacked and killed. At the same time the SLSF was now attacking its locations in Mutur-Sampoor areas with impunity unlike earlier years when they observed the niceties of ceasefire. These activities had been making life harder for LTTE cadres in this region. Thus LTTE has been under pressure to re-establish its credibility as a viable force in the east. If LTTE can prove itself as a fighting force that could withstand a face-to-face confrontation with SLSF in the east it would help boost its image. In Mutur East-Ichchampattai area LTTE has been strong and strategically located where it had better chances of achieving such success. LTTE success in the area also had the advantage of impacting all the three major ethnic communities. And it would show them that LTTE controlled the destinies of not only Tamils but also others in the east. Mavil Aru issue offered a good opportunity to rally the Tamils of the area on a humanitarian question that touched their lives while preparing the ground for confrontation with the GOSL. It also offered LTTE an option to show the GOSL as a weak and ineffective body that would be struck in prolonged negotiations. International environment 16.   The timing of the confrontation is also significant. The Israeli operations against Hizbollah in Lebanon have been hogging global news headlines. The U.S. and the EU, two key sponsors of the Sri Lanka peace process, have been busy trying to ward off the fall out of the Israeli foray into Lebanon. The monitoring process in Sri Lanka has almost ground to a halt after a confrontation between the navy and Sea Tigers in April 2006, when the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) categorically refused to recognize LTTE’s claim to operate in the Sri Lanka waters as a de facto power. The banning of LTTE first in Canada and later in the EU in May 2006 were severe blows to LTTE’s grandiose image. It had been peeved with its worsening international credibility and freedom of action. After the EU ban was announced the Tamil insurgents had asked to the SLMM representatives from Denmark, Finland and Sweden who are members of EU, to quit the body. Already Finland and Denmark have announced they were withdrawing their monitors from September 1. The SLMM had been limping ever since. Norway had been vainly trying to sort out the monitoring issue and appears to have put the mediation process in the cold storage for the time being. The opportunity for a confrontation that had minimal international complications could not have escaped the notice of both GOSL and LTTE. Human cost 17.   Nearly 800 civilians are estimated to have died in 2006 in Sri Lanka as a result of the SLSF-LTTE conflict. And Operation Watershed appears to have caused at least 100 to 200 more civilian casualties. It has displaced nearly 50,000 people, who have fled the town of Mutur and a number of villages around. International agencies have not been able to gain access to the war zone to provide succour to the refugees. Large numbers of Muslims were caught in the LTTE attack on Mutur and later in the SLSF counterattack. They have accused LTTE of intimidation and killing. Their properties have been destroyed. Seventeen aid workers of a French NGO Action Contre la Faim engaged in tsunami relief work were found murdered in Mutur. This has caused consternation among NGOs and raised UN concern. Barring one, all of them were Tamils; this has caused the suspicion to fall on the Army. On the other hand LTTE’s record as far as such killings are concerned is equally dismal. 18.   Both sides have shown a remarkable lack of concern, except for making sympathetic noises, to the human cost of the operation. There is a discernable downtrend in human rights consideration also, with more and more reports of summary killings allegedly perpetrated by both sides indicating increasing brutalisation of those involved in the conflict. The brutalisation goes hand in hand with the hardening of top decision makers’ attitudes and becomes counterproductive to government forces in low intensity warfare. While LTTE, as an insurgent body outside the pale of law, can afford to carry out acts of human rights violation, the government has to show greater accountability. The GOSL appears to be aware of this aspect, as it had quickly sought Australian forensic assistance to investigate the murder of 17 aid workers. However, its past record shows lack of transparency in such investigations. One can only hope that it would overcome this aberration and tighten up discipline among the ranks. As far as the 50,000 displaced persons are concerned a major human tragedy is in the making. Having achieved his aim of freeing the water source, President Rajapakse should now focus on ensuring that the people displaced due to the operation are cared for. This would improve his credibility among the affected people. Military performance 19.   It is perhaps too early to carry out an after action analysis of the operation in the Mavil Aru area during the last two weeks as full details are not available. However, SLSF was able to put together a plan and execute it, though ponderously, to achieve its objective. On the other hand, LTTE after initially holding up the progress of SLSF broke contact and was satisfied with opting to voluntarily open the sluice gates that closing of which had been the bone of contention. This indicated that LTTE was not keen or ready for a determined engagement with SLSF. This only underlines the weakness of LTTE in east. Though both sides had claimed inflicting considerable casualties, LTTE with its limited number of cadres in the east and limited recruiting base, was at a disadvantage in taking casualties. Overall, LTTE appears to have suffered about 100-150 casualties including the auxiliaries while the SLSF probably had a toll of around 50.Of course these figures do not include civilians killed during the operations. From the available details certain strengths and weaknesses of both sides during the operation have come to light. 20.  LTTE: 20.1     GOSL’s decision to use force to resolve the Mavil Aru issue appears to have caught the LTTE by surprise. Though LTTE initially appeared to have warded off the multi-pronged attack, it could not sustain. Similarly after infiltrating into Mutur, LTTE did not appear to have productively used the initiative. It could not hold on to the gains and inflict casualties when SLSF responded in strength. [Choice of Mutur, which is a Muslim majority town as objective, itself is a questionable decision.] This showed inadequate operational planning and excessive reliance on irregular warfare techniques of mining. In my SAAG Note “Sri Lanka: How strong are the Tigers? Up date 84” dated February 28, 2006, I had pointed out two weaknesses of LTTE in handling conventional operations: (1) inability to build upon its success and (2) inadequate use or employment of support weapons. Evidently, this operation has shown that these problems have not been overcome. 20.2     Another aspect is LTTE’s inability to carry out anti-aircraft operations; this gave a major advantage to SLSF, which effectively used Kfirs before, during and after the operations. This vulnerability is likely to be fully exploited by SLSF in future operations. (Of course, this could be due to paucity of antiaircraft weapons and systems or trained personnel with LTTE in the east.) These weaknesses could also be due to the changes effected in the LTTE command set up in the region, as the new set up perhaps could not react in time. Though LTTE had shown it could handle 122 mm artillery, its limited impact on the SLSF would indicate shortage of artillery weapons and or ammunition. 20.3     People are insurgent forces’ strength. LTTE has continued to falter in handling Muslim population, who dominate this region. This was exhibited in the callous way it handled Muslim population. This is its major weakness in gaining control of east and will be fully exploited by its opponents. 20.4     On the positive side, LTTE had shown the ability to stand up and delay the advance of SLSF, imposing caution on them. It had also shown that it could employ civilian auxiliary force in tandem with its main forces. There had been no reports of surrender or capture of prisoners, which would indicate that its morale is intact. 21.  The SLSF: 21.1 Broadly the SLSF appears to have been able to carry out a coordinated Operation. This shows the better morale and impact of training on troops. It as sent a clear message that LTTE should not under estimate its capability. The SLSF appears to have been able to coordinate its air operations with ground operations for maximum effect. It has claimed precision bombing of targets; however, it is not clear whether air strike was carried out to silence LTTE artillery or put them out of action. 21.2 From the beginning SLSF appear to have had a clear objective: to capture Mavil Aru sluice gates rather than succumb to the temptation of holding on to the gains. Though this might appear contrary to the political stand that it was a ‘Humanitarian operation’, in military terms, the steadfast maintenance of aim is to be commended. 21.3  Overall planning to keep LTTE engaged in other sectors through air and ground operations showed considerable thought given to the planning of the operation. In the past in Vanni operations SLSF failure to maintain momentum after the initial success reflected a static mindset at the strategic level. Similarly its defensive operations had lacked innovation and mobility. Considered in this background, the SLSF appears to have considerably improved, overcoming the mental limitations imposed by the CFA. However, its progress was extremely cautious giving adequate time for LTTE to slip out and mine the Mavil Aru area. 21.4  It is also to the credit of SLSF that it could prevent any major LTTEinterference in Trincomalee naval base or at Mutur naval base during the entire period. 21.5  However, the accusations of human rights violations that have emanated during the course of operations indicate SLSF needs to work on this to improve its credibility. This is a major problem faced by any uniformed service involved in counterinsurgency operations especially with an uncanny organisation like LTTE, which uses propaganda as a weapon. But SLSF has no option but to improve this situation. Conclusion 22.   LTTE appears to have made a tactical mistake in selecting Mavil Aru as a point of confrontation with the GOSL. While it probably rallied the Tamil population who had legitimate grievances on sharing of waters of the reservoir, LTTE does not appear to have been prepared for the President’s essentially military approach to solve the issue and establish the authority of GOSL on the water resources of the reservoir. LTTE has tried to play down the military operations and its performance after the first few days of operation. It has focused on the humanitarian aspect of what was actually a military situation, though Muslims of the region have been further alienated. All that the LTTE political wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan could tell Reuters as fighting continued last Sunday was: “We consider this a declaration of war and strongly condemn the attitude of the government”. Overall the Mavil Aru operation has shown LTTE’s serious limitations in progressing operations in east. LTTE is unlikely to take it lying and launch major operation in North where it is strong on ground. The attack on Muhamalai post on August 12, 2006 may well be precursor of a bigger LTTE operation. 23.   LTTE is also likely to carry out major stealth attack in depth areas under government control on lucrative economic targets. Colombo and Trincomalee could be under its sights for such attacks. If carried out successfully it could hope to restore some of the shine it had lost in Mavil Aru operation. 23.   Despite the slow progress initially, SLSF has shown that it could be successfully achieve its objective in the face of LTTE opposition. This should come as a boost to its morale. SLSF has also shown it can employ and coordinate SLAF with its ground operations with telling effect. However, whether it can sustain such performance for prolonged periods in more adverse circumstances over a wider front is still an open question. But it is clear that its re-equipment and training are paying dividends. 21.   It is clear the objective of the GOSL from the beginning was not merely humanitarian but to re-establish its credibility in its ongoing cold war with LTTE. It had totally sidelined the SLMM efforts to negotiate a solution with the LTTE and resolve the Mavil Aru issue. This is a clear shift in the strategy of GOSL – to adopt a tough approach towards LTTE as the SLMM has been weakened by the impending departure of nearly half its strength. Thus a dangerous situation is developing towards full-fledged war in Sri Lanka and Operation Watershed appears to be an overture for that. One can only hope President Rajapakse encouraged by his political and military success in this episode does not go for the military option. An episode does not make a whole story and such a foray may prove too costly, ending in yet another stalemate. (Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com)

Sri Lanka Economic Crisis & Global Power Play: Q & A

Col R Hariharan | June 19, 2022 

Here are my answers to questions from a Russian media on Sri Lanka’s economic crisis:

Q: The Sri Lanka government said that the existing fuel supplies would last only till June 21 as Sri Lanka awaits a confirmation from India for another $500 million credit line to buy petrol and diesel. By helping Sri Lanka during its ongoing crisis, does New Delhi gained a strategic advantage?

Geography has already conferred a huge strategic advantage to India as Sri Lanka is located within 40 km from India's southern tip. Traditionally, India and Sri Lanka have multifaceted relations including strategic cooperation. In particular, India has rendered valuable help to train Sri Lanka naval forces. So, it would be incorrect to see New Delhi's help to Sri Lanka {during its economic crisis) as an act to gain strategic advantage. 'Neighbourhood First' is an important component of PM Narndra Modi's foreign policy strategy and Sri Lanka as a close friend and neighbour has always depended upon India's help in times of distress. India under PM Modi has also been promoting Project SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) to increase maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region including Sri Lanka.

Q: Beijing has not budged so far on restructuring its debt as requested by Sri Lanka, though it is blocking the negotiations between IMF and Colombo. Has Sri Lanka's increased dependance on New Delhi to manage its crisis, affected the further development of Sri Lanka's close ties with China under the Rajapaksas? Your comments please. 

China's policy equation with Sri Lanka has to be understood on the larger plane of Indo-Pacific security, which is emerging as a challenge for China's desire to dominate the Indo-Pacific region as part of realising the Chinese Dream. Geostrategically, Sri Lanka dominates the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean making it a strategic pivot of the region. China is aware of this. Even before President Xi Jinping embarked upon his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its maritime component in 2013, China had developed close relations with Sri Lanka by coming to the help of Sri Lanka during the Eelam War against Tamil separatist insurgency. China became an indispensable arms supplier to the island nation. It pandered to the Rajapaksa's quest for glory and gained control of Sri Lanka's Hambantota port in the South, Colombo port as well as the Colombo Port City project which has just come up in land reclaimed from sea. 

So China's presence in Sri Lanka cannot be wished away either by the Sri Lanka government and its leaders. It holds true to other powers including India. Both Rajapaksas and PM Ranil Wickremesinghe have striven to maintain good relations with Beijing to improve the small country's bargaining power in the world of strategic rivalry. 

China's ambassador to Colombo has lauded India's help to keep Sri Lankan economy going and has spoken of readiness to cooperate with other powers including the US to help Sri Lanka. He has also spoken of China's economy going through tough times. China's strict lockdown policy to fight Covid has dislocated  the global supply chain dependent upon Chinese goods.  The UKraine war and its attendant geo-political realignment has added to China's woes. Apart from Sri Lanka, other South Asian states like Pakistan and Nepal have not been able to service China's debts. Other BRI members have also fared poorly. This has stretched China's finances. China has explained these limitations to Sri Lanka. It is ready to extend commercial loans which is not welcome to Sri Lanka. China has extended RMB 500 million credit line, which has not found enthusiastic response from Sri Lanka. 

As far as China's debt restructuring is concerned, China has always been a stickler to enforce the terms of agreement and as a policy reluctant China to change them when Sri Lanka is bankrupt. Still, we can expect China to relax the repayment terms  in the coming days after dragging its feet as a "special favour" to Sri Lanka. I think it has more to do with China's style of economic diplomacy than IMF intervention in Sri Lanka; China has made this clear in a statement.

Q: The western powers and the Gulf states haven't helped Sri Lanka? Does this give an opportunity for Russia to step in, perhaps supply fuel to the country?

To say Western powers and Gulf states have not helped Sri Lanka is not wholly correct. The ripple effect of the Ukraine war and its attendant sanctions on Russia has skewed the global economy, which was taking baby steps to recover from Covid pandemic. Prices of oil and commodities like rice, wheat, corn and edible oil prices have skyrocketed. The US economy is also under pressure; it has raised its Federal Rate by one percentage point to fight inflation for the first time in 28 years. These developments have hit hard, not only Sri Lanka, but also most of the smaller Asian and African economies, as they have not been able to restructure their credits for other countries to lend them money.

Standard & Poor has downgraded Sri Lanka's credit rating from CC to SD (Selective Downgrade) because Sri Lanka could not pay the interest for the international sovereign bonds it had issued. Sri Lanka is negotiating with the debtor entities to defer the  repayment of its loans. Only India has done it. We can expect others to follow when Sri Lanka comes out with a coherent economic recovery plan. 

As far as Gulf states are concerned, Sri Lanka is looking for their investment and employment opportunities for Sri Lankan, who are a main source of foreign remittance.

There had been reports of some consignments of Russian oil reaching Sri Lanka, but the Sri Lankan importer could not pay the berthing charges in time. There are a lot of impediments to importing oil from Russia for a small country like Sri Lanka due to unprecedented Western sanctions imposed on Russia. Sri Lanka would not like to offend Western powers by opting for Russian trade as they are capable of arm twisting international monetary bodies who can bail out Sri Lanka from its economic logjam. Sri Lanka might change its mind, if and when India evolves a methodology for its trade with Russia. In such a case probably Sri Lanka would be able to use it to improve its trade with Russia.   

Q: Can India, with Russia's help, be a force to reckon within Sri Lanka and compete with China's influence?

Answering an earlier question, I have illustrated how China has managed to firmly establish itself in Sri Lanka. China has emerged as a global power and a major challenger in India's strategic sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region. In spite of this, both India and China are trying to maintain a balanced relationship to avoid any confrontation along their disputed land border. India and China are keeping their diplomatic and military communications open to improve their fractured relations.   On the other hand, strategic relations between Russia and China are closer than ever before, after the Ukraine war has resulted in a strategic realignment in Europe and America.  

So, I feel the hypothetical situation of Russia and India coming together to curb China's influence in Sri Lanka has little strategic rationale.   On the contrary, Russia, China and India as members of the BRICS have been trying to coordinate their efforts to create a new equitable world order. These efforts have suffered a setback due to strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific which has resulted in the forming of the Quad framework. The Ukraine war has further stirred up the fears of a resurgent Cold War 2.0 in Europe.  

India - Russia relations continue to be robust in spite of these developments. However, there is little incentive for them to cooperate in Sri Lanka to bring down Chinese influence. 

 

West Creating ‘Impediments’ For Sri Lanka to Buy Cheaper Russian Oil Amid Fuel Crisis, Says Analyst

Dhairya Maheshwari |Sputnik International | June 20, 2022

https://sputniknews.com/20220620/west-creating-impediments-for-sri-lanka-to-buy-cheaper-russian-oil-amid-fuel-crisis-says-analyst-1096488537.html

Sri Lankan PM Ranil Wickremesinghe said this month that Colombo will have to return to Russian oil imports if it fails to procure oil from other sources. Colombo reportedly bought a 90,000-metric ton shipment of Russian crude last month to restart its only refinery, but has been wary of buying more, owing to its fear of offending the West.

Western states, including the US, are creating “impediments” for Sri Lanka as it tries to source discounted Russian crude in order to ease its ongoing fuel crisis, a former Indian Army colonel who has previously served as a military intelligence (MI) specialist in Sri Lanka has told Sputnik.

“Sri Lanka would not like to offend Western powers by opting for Russian trade as they are capable of arm twisting international monetary bodies who can bail out Sri Lanka from its economic logjam,” says Colonel R. Hariharan, an expert at the Indian security think tank Chennai Centre for Chinese Studies (C3S). He was also part of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka in the 1980s.

The observations by Hariharan came as Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe began deliberations on a bailout package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Colombo on Monday.

The Sri Lankan government warned its citizens last week that the ongoing fuel supplies would only last till 21 June. Meanwhile, Colombo awaits, as of Monday evening, an official confirmation on another credit line of $500 million from New Delhi meant to import fuel.

Sri Lanka is facing its worst economic crisis since 1948, caused by depleting foreign exchange reserves. The government has been unable to pay for its fuel, food and other essential imports, triggering crippling shortages, runaway inflation and even violence among riled-up citizens.

Hariharan further underlines that anti-Russia sanctions in the wake of the special military operation in Ukraine have further “complicated” matters for Sri Lanka.

“[The sanctions] on Russia has skewed the global economy, which was taking baby steps to recover from Covid pandemic. Prices of oil and commodities like rice, wheat, corn and edible oil prices have skyrocketed,” the ex-Indian military officer notes.

With regards to importing Russian crude, Hariharan feels that Sri Lanka “might change its mind” if and when New Delhi introduces a “clear cut methodology” for trade with Moscow.

“In such a case, Sri Lanka would probably be able to use it to improve its trade with Russia,” he says.

In spite of growing pressure from Washington and the EU on New Delhi to tone down its strategic and business ties with Moscow, the Indian government has doubled down on its decades-long strategic partnership with Russia amid the Ukraine conflict.

As per media reports, Moscow has overtaken Saudi Arabia to become New Delhi’s second-biggest oil supplier in May, providing for about 16 percent of the overall imports. India imported just around 1 percent of its overall crude from Russia in January-March’22 quarter.

Hariharan believes that a “robust” India-Russia ties in energy sector could be a precursor for Sri Lanka to shed its inhibitions on ramping up ties with Moscow.

“Geography has conferred a huge strategic advantage to India, as Sri Lanka is located within 40 km from India's southern tip,” says Hariharan, as he explains the close ties between New Delhi and Colombo.

He notes that New Delhi has emerged as one of the biggest donors to Sri Lanka since the eruption of the economic crisis this year, having allotted around $3 billion in bilateral assistance, aside from credit lines for meeting the fuel shortages among others.

“Neighborhood First (New Delhi’s preference for interests of the neighboring nations in its foreign dealings) is an important component of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's foreign policy strategy and Sri Lanka as a close friend and neighbor has always depended upon India's help in times of distress,” recalls the Indian expert.

China’s Presence in Sri Lanka ‘Can’t be Wished Away’

 

Hariharan reckons in spite of misgivings in New Delhi and in some Western capitals about Beijing’s growing influence in Colombo, China is “firmly established” there and its presence can’t be “wished away”.

Besides being a large external creditor of Sri Lanka, state-backed China Merchant Port Holdings, a Hong Kong-headquartered company, was awarded a 99-year lease in the Hambantota port in 2017. Beijing is also developing several state-of-the-art infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka under the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative.

While Hariharan notes that Beijing has emerged as a “strategic rival” of New Delhi in south Asia in recent years, Hariharan also believes that India and China could collaborate in Sri Lanka to help it overcome the economic crisis.

“That would be in line with the BRICS’ vision of creating an equitable world order,” he says, referring to the five-nation grouping comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

“Geo-strategically, Sri Lanka dominates the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, making it a strategic pivot of the region. China is aware of this,” the former Indian colonel says.

He further notes Beijing became an “indispensable” military partner for Sri Lanka in the final stages of the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a more than two-decade long insurgency which ended in 2009.

Hariharan says that Beijing would eventually agree to restructure Sri Lanka's debt, in spite of being non-committal to do so, so far.

“We can expect China to relax the repayment terms in the coming days after dragging its feet as a special favor to Sri Lanka. I think it has more to do with China's style of economic diplomacy than IMF intervention in Sri Lanka,” he says.

One of the sticking points between the IMF and the Sri Lankan government is the restructuring of external debt that Colombo owes to Beijing.

The IMF has a policy of not agreeing to a bailout package unless all the lenders write down their loans.

Sri Lanka’s central bank governor P. Nandalal Weerasinghe governor said last week that Chinese debt accounts for 15 percent of Colombo’s overall foreign borrowings. Sri Lanka has asked China to renegotiate the terms of the debt, in line with the IMF’s demand.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sputnik.

 

 

 

 

Lanka's Quest for Stability

Even as the rule of law continues to be flouted, the appointment of Ranil Wickremesinghe as Lankan PM could salvage the economic crisis dogging it. As Lanka’s pointsman, it will be an ordeal by fire for him

 

By Col R Hariharan | Special | India Legal | January 17, 2022    

https://www.indialegallive.com/special/sri-lanka-ranil-wickremesinghe-gotabaya-rajapaksa-unp-slpp-slfp-bankruptcy/ 

Interim Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, on his sixth term, has just completed a month in office. Nobody expects the newly anointed PM to come charging on a white steed like a modern-day Sir Galahad to save the country from economic bankruptcy. From the start, there is a lot of skepticism about his success as PM as the fully empowered President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is riding on his back. Many protesters see him as a proxy of Gotabaya, who refuses to resign.

A second reason for doubts about Wickremesinghe’s credentials as PM is that he is serving at the pleasure of the president, who is seen as the source of Sri Lanka’s economic woes. The PM draws his parliamentary support from Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) and its cohorts, as well as the UNP’s traditional political rivals, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

The last time Wickremesinghe served as PM of the uneasy UNP-SLFP coalition, with SLFP leader Maithripala Sirisena as president, the Yahapalana (good governance) government did not cover itself with glory. The president and the PM spent more time wrestling for power than delivering the good governance they had promised the people. They had no time to heed early warnings of an impending attack by homegrown Islamic terrorists that led to the infamous Easter Sunday attacks which resulted in the avoidable death of nearly 300 people. In a way, the Easter Sunday attacks paved the way for Gotabaya Rajapaksa to be elected president and the Rajapaksas to bounce back to power with massive support from Sinhala nationalist voters in the last presidential and parliamentary elections.

In this respect, Wickremesinghe’s handicaps remind one of Sammy Davis Jr, the legendary American pop singer of the 90s. When asked about his golf handicap, the singer quipped: “My handicap? Man, I am a one-eyed Black Jew! That’s my handicap.”

A SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threats) analysis of the PM is revealing. Wickremesinghe’s strength is his political experience of over half a century. During this period, he has ridden both the crests and troughs of Sri Lanka’s elitist politics and its by-products—cycles of ethnic conflict, revolutionary insurgency, political violence and periodic assertion of hegemonic Sinhala Buddhist nationalism to the detriment of religious and ethnic harmony.

Probably, the secret of Wickremesinghe’s survival in the acrimonious island politics is his mastery of using the Middle Path of Theravada Buddhism (Majjhima-patipadā in Pali). It advocates avoiding the extremes of self-gratification on the one hand and self-mortification on the other. Middle Path in politics can be construed as not taking hard decisions that could tread on many feet. It has not only helped him to survive, but also remain relevant as a man for all seasons both in victory and defeat in the turbulent politics of the island nation.

This is perhaps one reason why President Rajapaksa chose him for the PM’s post despite the disastrous performance of the UNP under his leadership in the last elections. Agreeing to become PM after the ignominious exit of Mahinda Rajapaksa as PM when the ship of state threatens to capsize requires a lot of self-confidence. Wickremesinghe seems to have plenty of it, though the elected representative of the UNP is absent in the parliament, perhaps for the first time.  

On the flip side, that is also his weakness. His political past is strewn with the failure of many well-meaning efforts. The 2002 Norwegian initiated peace process with the LTTE is one example. If successfully implemented, it could have saved at least 1,00,000 lives which were lost in the Eelam War 4. 

During the peace process, the political and personality differences between Wickremesinghe and President Chandrika Kumaratunga were taken advantage of by LTTE leader Prabhakaran, leading to its collapse. Similar leadership weakness led to the failure of the Yahapalana government, under Wickremesinghe’s joint stewardship with Sirisena. These are just a few examples of Wickremesinghe’s failure to deliver upon his promises.

However, it is to the PM’s credit that since coming to power, in his public discourses he has repeatedly warned the people of privations and shortages that would continue for some more months. Even conservative estimates look at six months to one year lead time for the economic process to firm in.  

The PM’s cabinet that is supposed to implement the national recovery plan is a mixed bag of good, bad and ugly. In the one month, the PM has achieved some semblance of stability after seeing the exit of Basil Rajapaksa, the finance minister. He is out of the cabinet, but he still influences the SLPP and is capable of pulling the rug. Prof GL Peiris, the foreign minister, had been active to cash in on the international goodwill Sri Lanka enjoys. But there are elements in the cabinet that bring no credit to any government.

Wickremesinghe is one of the few Sri Lankan leaders acceptable to a wide cross-section of the international community. That includes most of the Sri Lanka Tamil bodies abroad, with whom he had struck a working equation during his earlier avatar as PM of the Yahapalana government. President Rajapaksa must have realised that he needed him in his team when the country desperately needs international goodwill and support to rescue the beleaguered economy.

Within a month of Wickremesinghe becoming PM, there has been a positive international response to Lanka’s economic woes. Of course, Sri Lanka is not the only country facing the after-effects of Covid. This, compounded by the Ukraine War has crippled the economy and endangered the livelihood of the people everywhere.

Of course, India has extended a lifeline to Sri Lanka, providing over $3.5 line of credit to import fuel, medicine and essential food supplies. A separate credit line of $500 million has been extended for the purchase of fuel. But help is also flowing from unexpected sources in India. Tamil Nadu is donating 40,000 tons of rice, over 100 lifesaving drugs and 500 tons of milk powder. Tamil Nadu’s ruling DMK party has donated Rs ten million and its MPs have pledged a month’s salary for CM MK Stalin’s fund for assistance to Sri Lanka.

In a rare gesture, the ambassadors of the US and China met in Colombo on May 13. They “had a friendly discussion on broad topics of mutual interest”, according to a tweet from the Chinese embassy. It added: “China and the United States could work together to help Sri Lanka to overcome current difficulties.”

The meeting is significant because the same day, US Secretary of State Antony J Blinken spoke to Wickremesinghe and discussed Lanka’s current economic and political challenges. According to the State Department spokesman, the Secretary affirmed the US’ commitment to the Sri Lankan people during this challenging time and the importance of supporting reforms that address their concerns, including democratic governance and human rights. The PM’s media unit said that the PM in his conversation explained the current status of the discussions with the IMF and looked to work closely with the US.

But foreign aid can only flow if Sri Lanka pays attention to international concerns over its poor accountability for violation of human rights, war crimes, absence of rule of law and ethnic strife.

There are three threats that could vitiate Sri Lanka’s return to stability. First is the leaderless protests that have snowballed into a national movement, a sort of colour revolution. The GotaGoGama (Gota Go Village) protestors are established firmly in the minds of youth and the middle class, who are disillusioned with the political class as a whole and the Rajapaksas in particular. Their main demand now is the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. They are watching from the wings to see how the government goes about organising the essential supply of food stuff, fuel and sustenance of the poor. The government cannot afford to ignore them, lest nihilists take over the protests to spread disorder.

Second, is the demand to curb the executive president’s powers to make him accountable to the parliament. This has near unanimous support of the public and almost all political parties, including sections of the ruling SLPP. The president also seems to have realised this. This requires the abolition of the 20^th Amendment to the Constitution introduced by President Rajapaksa soon after he came to power. There are two drafts of the 21st Amendment floating—one proposed by the PM and the other from the SJB opposition. Its passage in parliament could be problematic. Even after the amendment is passed, implementing it both in letter and spirit with Gotabaya on top is going to be a problem. It will require a sagacious leader to do it. People are still looking over the horizon for such a leader.

The third problem is sustaining public support for implementing the common economic recovery plan for at least a year. There are a few drafts of such a plan evolved by civil society organisations. One is the Common Minimum Programme for Economic Recovery drafted by the National Movement for Social Justice. It examines eight underlying aspects of the crisis: macroeconomic stability, revenue consolidation, primary expenditure control, public sector and state-owned enterprises management, social safety net, energy and utilities, trade and industry and specialised legislation critical to recovery. Any economic recovery plan will be on a similar model, with short, medium and long term goals to be achieved in a time-bound manner.  

Without going into the nitty gritty of economic reforms or legislation, the moot point is the ability of the government to sustain the plan for a year. It will not only require leadership commitment and continuity, but holistic support of the political class to see through the crisis. Good governance, rule of law and corruption free administration can only sustain such an effort. If Sri Lanka can do it, under any leader, it would be a great achievement.

For the present, PM Wickremesinghe is saddled with the job. He cannot do the “Candy Man” act (to quote the lyrics of Sammy Davis Jr’s 1985 classic) to “take a sunrise, sprinkle it with dew nor cover it with chocolate and a miracle or two” or “take a rainbow and wrap it in a sigh, soak it in the sun” to make “a groovy lemon pie”.

Wickremesinghe has the unviable task of maintaining stability of the country to keep it going, feed the hungry, encourage investment, resuscitate tourism trade and agriculture and keep the money flowing. As the country’s pointsman, it is going to be an ordeal by fire. He will need more than good wishes; solid support of the people to see through this arduous task is what he needs. And that means less political bickering and more action. 

Corruption Reigns

Absence of rule of law has vitiated governance in Sri Lanka for a long time. The present government is no exception. Recently, the Colombo High Court sentenced Sri Lanka’s newly sworn-in minister for public security and tourism Prasanna Ranatunga to two years rigorous imprisonment. He was found guilty of threatening businessman G Mendis and demanding Rs 64 million to evict unauthorised occupants of a land and to refill the land. 

The High Court also imposed a fine of Rs 25 million on Ranatunga and ordered him to pay Rs 1 million to Mendis as compensation. If the minister fails to do so, three more months will be added to the prison sentence, which, of course, has been suspended. 

It is not surprising that Ranatunga had a victorious smirk on his face when the media clicked him after the trial. Thereafter, the man on suspended sentence for a criminal offence entered the parliament and sat with cabinet ministers. 

The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies.