SRI LANKA: MAVIL ARU OPERATION & AFTER – An Analysis (Reprint)

 

This is a reprint of South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 1908 dated 12.08.06 as part of archives of the author's work. Paper no.1908

SRI LANKA: MAVIL ARU OPERATION & AFTER – An Analysis By Col R Hariharan (retd.) 1.   Operation Watershed, the Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF)’s bloody confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for achieving what both sides called ‘humanitarian objectives’ over the water supply from the Mavil Aru reservoir in eastern Sri Lanka has been going on since July 26, 2006. People heaved a sigh of relief on August 8, 2006 when LTTE announced it was restoring the water supply, which was the basic reason for the confrontation. Everyone expected the SLSF to call off the offensive when LTTE lifted the blockade. But it was not to be and the Operation Watershed continued as the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) announced that operations would end only when it gained control of the sluice gates controlling the water flow. On August 10, 2006 the GOSL announced that they had gained full control of the sluice gates of the reservoir and they only had opened them. But the fighting has continued on August 11, 2006 as the GOSL said it wanted to make the area fully secure. The SLSF is said to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Tigers. 2.   As though to underline his newfound determination to ‘bash on regardless’, President Rajapakse said that the supply of water was a non-negotiable fundamental human right. “If any one tries to obstruct it by laying down conditions, the Government will do everything within its means to overcome such obstructions and cater to the people’s needs,” he cautioned. 3.   With the Tigers faring not so well in Mavil Aru, as they were comparatively weak in the east, it was expected they would strike in a big way in the North. As though to justify this expectation on the morning of August 12, 2006, the LTTE claimed to have destroyed Muhamalai post which is the entry point for Jaffna. Reuters quoted a LTTE official as saying: “We have completely destroyed the army checkpoints at the Muhamalai (border) crossing, and we are advancing on Jaffna”. 4.   According to him the LTTE the Sea Tigers had also attacked just south of Jaffna town and assaulted a navy base at the island’s northern tip before dawn. At the time of writing it is not clear at which point this attack has taken place. Analysis of Mavil Aru operation 5.   This paper presents an analysis of the Mavil Aru confrontation up to the SLSF recapture of the reservoir on August 8, 2006 and its consolidation of the area up to August 10, 2006. As it appears to be an ongoing operation the analysis has its own limitations due to paucity of objective information in media reports. 6.   The Mavil Aru confrontation  had started when Tamils of Mutur East-Ichchilampattai area closed the sluice gates to block the supply of water to about 30,000 acres of ripe paddy affecting about 60,000 Sinhalas depending upon it for their livelihood. Of course as these Tamils were living in areas under LTTE control, there was no question of taking such a drastic action without LTTE’s support. In the earlier years of ceasefire, such an issue would have been resolved through negotiations. But this time it was not to be. The GOSL decided to use the SLSF to lift the blockade, and resume the water supply. 7.   After the ceasefire came in force in 2002, this is the biggest military confrontation between the SLSF and LTTE. The SLSF operation was a full-fledged war using army, navy and the air force for the offensive. SLSF did not confine its offensive only to this region; its air force engaged Tigers locations in Batticaloa, and Vavuniya also. Significantly the SLSF probed well within territory under LTTE control, in defiance of the ceasefire agreement (CFA). The GOSL in a major departure of policy appears to have decided not to bother about the niceties of CFA violation any more. This probably portends the resumption of full-scale war between the two rivals in all sectors, even though it may not be termed as Eelam War IV as the ceasefire is still on in paper. 8.   During the operation LTTE showed its strength and limitations in not only in the use of conventional forces including artillery, but also in continuing its guerrilla operations to carry out killings, intimidation and propaganda even during the operation. Why Mavil Aru operations? 9.   The Mavil Aru operations are in a sense precipitation of the war clouds that had been darkening the skies of ceasefire in Sri Lanka, ever since LTTE made an abortive suicide attack on Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka on April 25, 2006. The SLSF had been smarting under a large number of LTTE attacks affecting its morale and efficiency during the first three years of ceasefire. But the attack on the Army Commander was an affront neither President Rajapakse nor SLSF could ignore. Since then both SLSF and LTTE had been flexing their muscles for a full-fledged confrontation. Though SLSF stepped up its retaliation, LTTE had continued hitting at selected targets, the latest one being an suicide bomber’s attack on former Tamil M.P. and Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) leader Sivathasan on August 8, 2006. 10.   Both sides appear to have chosen Mavil Aru as the scene for a show down for their own reasons. These may be grouped under the heads of geo-strategy, ethnic, political and international environments. Geo-strategic reasons 11.   Geographically, Mavil Aru is located in an ethnically sensitive area where Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil villages are located almost nudging each other. Operations in this area impact all the three communities. Strategically, it is south of Mutur bulge, which dominates the entry into Koddiyar Bay, the inlet for Trincomalee port and naval base. LTTE presence in the area has always posed a threat SLSF domination of the seas and free naval movement in and out of the base. LTTE has always ensured its presence in this region particularly along Mutur East ? Ichchilampattai ? Verugal Ferry. In the past it has been the scene of all conflicts with LTTE. The dense forests of Somawathie sanctuary on the Southwest restrict free movement of troops and facilitate easy dispersal of insurgents. The highway A-15, linking Trincomalee and Batticaloa areas, runs along this coast. A-15 has gained added tactical significance in LTTE’s struggle to re-establish its writ in the east ever since the eastern leader Karuna broke away. Thus this area has gained greater significance now. Ethnic environment 12.   A spark of conflict anywhere in Sri Lanka usually has an incendiary response in this region. This is linked to the long simmering issue of ‘colonisation’ of Tamil areas. The region has seen the progressive rise of Sinhala population and consolidation of Muslim population. Three decades ago the GOSL created the Mavil Aru project to benefit the state sponsored Sinhala settlements in the region. To the Tamils it is a visible example of Sinhala colonisation in areas traditionally considered as Tamil land. In the past Eelam wars, Mavil Aru reservoir had changed hands twice. In 1991 conflict LTTE failed to capture the reservoir but blew up the sluice gates. The SLSF captured it and lost it in Eelam War III in 1997. After the ceasefire in 2002, Mavil Aru came within the LTTE controlled area. However, it continues to water the fields in government-controlled area. According to government spokesman GOSL’s engineers of the Irrigation Department had been visiting the area. And that is where the catch is. The reservoir waters are vital for farmers in government-controlled area. The present crisis started when GOSL announced an Asian Development Bank Project to supply drinking water from Mavil Aru to villages in government-controlled areas. This drew a lot of protest from people in areas under LTTE control from Mutur east and Ichchilampattai division. The ADB then agreed to extend the project to both the areas. 13.   In normal course, this issue would have been resolved through negotiations. But the area had been far from normal after April 25, 2006 when SLSF stepped up operations against LTTE. Since then LTTE strongholds in this area had come under frequent SLSF air and artillery attacks, putting the local population under great stress. Their movement to other areas have been restricted due to operations of SLSF and as well as LTTE. Thousands have fled their homes and are living in camps as refugees with inadequate food supplies. So when the GOSL went ahead with the drinking water project in areas under its control, the people in LTTE-controlled area cut off water supply to press home their demand for security to life and property and supply of essential rations for refugees, in addition to the extension of the water supply scheme to their area. Political environment 14.   Ever since he was elected, President Mahinda Rajapakse had been facing pressure on two fronts ? LTTE, and anti-Eelam lobby including the Janatha Vimukthi Permana (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the Sinhala right. LTTE had been putting had escalated its violent attacks targeting the army and naval movements in land and sea, causing huge casualties since November 2005. The President had been hard pressed to show tangible results to overcome LTTE militarily to re-establish the credibility of SLSF. Politically Rajapakse had chosen to take a strong stand against LTTE and a federal solution to the Tamil problem. This gained him the support of anti-Eelam lobby as well as the Sinhala south during his election. When he started retaliating LTTE with force, they were applauding his action. He had also been building up his party strength in the parliament. He has successfully persuaded a number of opposition M.P.s to join him. When LTTE precipitated a crisis over Mavil Aru affecting the livelihood of 60,000 Sinhala peasants, launching a military operation rather than negotiating probably appeared to the President as a more attractive political option. Use of armed forces to resume water supply to peasants starved of Mavil Aru water would not only provide ‘humanitarian relief’ to them but also satisfy the anti-Eelam lobby clamouring for action from the President. 15.   For some time now LTTE had been losing its grip over the east, as Karuna and his followers slowly extended their sway. As a result, free movement of LTTE’s local leaders in the region had been curtailed. East has ceased to be a lucrative source of recruits for LTTE. Pro-LTTE elements were being attacked and killed. At the same time the SLSF was now attacking its locations in Mutur-Sampoor areas with impunity unlike earlier years when they observed the niceties of ceasefire. These activities had been making life harder for LTTE cadres in this region. Thus LTTE has been under pressure to re-establish its credibility as a viable force in the east. If LTTE can prove itself as a fighting force that could withstand a face-to-face confrontation with SLSF in the east it would help boost its image. In Mutur East-Ichchampattai area LTTE has been strong and strategically located where it had better chances of achieving such success. LTTE success in the area also had the advantage of impacting all the three major ethnic communities. And it would show them that LTTE controlled the destinies of not only Tamils but also others in the east. Mavil Aru issue offered a good opportunity to rally the Tamils of the area on a humanitarian question that touched their lives while preparing the ground for confrontation with the GOSL. It also offered LTTE an option to show the GOSL as a weak and ineffective body that would be struck in prolonged negotiations. International environment 16.   The timing of the confrontation is also significant. The Israeli operations against Hizbollah in Lebanon have been hogging global news headlines. The U.S. and the EU, two key sponsors of the Sri Lanka peace process, have been busy trying to ward off the fall out of the Israeli foray into Lebanon. The monitoring process in Sri Lanka has almost ground to a halt after a confrontation between the navy and Sea Tigers in April 2006, when the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) categorically refused to recognize LTTE’s claim to operate in the Sri Lanka waters as a de facto power. The banning of LTTE first in Canada and later in the EU in May 2006 were severe blows to LTTE’s grandiose image. It had been peeved with its worsening international credibility and freedom of action. After the EU ban was announced the Tamil insurgents had asked to the SLMM representatives from Denmark, Finland and Sweden who are members of EU, to quit the body. Already Finland and Denmark have announced they were withdrawing their monitors from September 1. The SLMM had been limping ever since. Norway had been vainly trying to sort out the monitoring issue and appears to have put the mediation process in the cold storage for the time being. The opportunity for a confrontation that had minimal international complications could not have escaped the notice of both GOSL and LTTE. Human cost 17.   Nearly 800 civilians are estimated to have died in 2006 in Sri Lanka as a result of the SLSF-LTTE conflict. And Operation Watershed appears to have caused at least 100 to 200 more civilian casualties. It has displaced nearly 50,000 people, who have fled the town of Mutur and a number of villages around. International agencies have not been able to gain access to the war zone to provide succour to the refugees. Large numbers of Muslims were caught in the LTTE attack on Mutur and later in the SLSF counterattack. They have accused LTTE of intimidation and killing. Their properties have been destroyed. Seventeen aid workers of a French NGO Action Contre la Faim engaged in tsunami relief work were found murdered in Mutur. This has caused consternation among NGOs and raised UN concern. Barring one, all of them were Tamils; this has caused the suspicion to fall on the Army. On the other hand LTTE’s record as far as such killings are concerned is equally dismal. 18.   Both sides have shown a remarkable lack of concern, except for making sympathetic noises, to the human cost of the operation. There is a discernable downtrend in human rights consideration also, with more and more reports of summary killings allegedly perpetrated by both sides indicating increasing brutalisation of those involved in the conflict. The brutalisation goes hand in hand with the hardening of top decision makers’ attitudes and becomes counterproductive to government forces in low intensity warfare. While LTTE, as an insurgent body outside the pale of law, can afford to carry out acts of human rights violation, the government has to show greater accountability. The GOSL appears to be aware of this aspect, as it had quickly sought Australian forensic assistance to investigate the murder of 17 aid workers. However, its past record shows lack of transparency in such investigations. One can only hope that it would overcome this aberration and tighten up discipline among the ranks. As far as the 50,000 displaced persons are concerned a major human tragedy is in the making. Having achieved his aim of freeing the water source, President Rajapakse should now focus on ensuring that the people displaced due to the operation are cared for. This would improve his credibility among the affected people. Military performance 19.   It is perhaps too early to carry out an after action analysis of the operation in the Mavil Aru area during the last two weeks as full details are not available. However, SLSF was able to put together a plan and execute it, though ponderously, to achieve its objective. On the other hand, LTTE after initially holding up the progress of SLSF broke contact and was satisfied with opting to voluntarily open the sluice gates that closing of which had been the bone of contention. This indicated that LTTE was not keen or ready for a determined engagement with SLSF. This only underlines the weakness of LTTE in east. Though both sides had claimed inflicting considerable casualties, LTTE with its limited number of cadres in the east and limited recruiting base, was at a disadvantage in taking casualties. Overall, LTTE appears to have suffered about 100-150 casualties including the auxiliaries while the SLSF probably had a toll of around 50.Of course these figures do not include civilians killed during the operations. From the available details certain strengths and weaknesses of both sides during the operation have come to light. 20.  LTTE: 20.1     GOSL’s decision to use force to resolve the Mavil Aru issue appears to have caught the LTTE by surprise. Though LTTE initially appeared to have warded off the multi-pronged attack, it could not sustain. Similarly after infiltrating into Mutur, LTTE did not appear to have productively used the initiative. It could not hold on to the gains and inflict casualties when SLSF responded in strength. [Choice of Mutur, which is a Muslim majority town as objective, itself is a questionable decision.] This showed inadequate operational planning and excessive reliance on irregular warfare techniques of mining. In my SAAG Note “Sri Lanka: How strong are the Tigers? Up date 84” dated February 28, 2006, I had pointed out two weaknesses of LTTE in handling conventional operations: (1) inability to build upon its success and (2) inadequate use or employment of support weapons. Evidently, this operation has shown that these problems have not been overcome. 20.2     Another aspect is LTTE’s inability to carry out anti-aircraft operations; this gave a major advantage to SLSF, which effectively used Kfirs before, during and after the operations. This vulnerability is likely to be fully exploited by SLSF in future operations. (Of course, this could be due to paucity of antiaircraft weapons and systems or trained personnel with LTTE in the east.) These weaknesses could also be due to the changes effected in the LTTE command set up in the region, as the new set up perhaps could not react in time. Though LTTE had shown it could handle 122 mm artillery, its limited impact on the SLSF would indicate shortage of artillery weapons and or ammunition. 20.3     People are insurgent forces’ strength. LTTE has continued to falter in handling Muslim population, who dominate this region. This was exhibited in the callous way it handled Muslim population. This is its major weakness in gaining control of east and will be fully exploited by its opponents. 20.4     On the positive side, LTTE had shown the ability to stand up and delay the advance of SLSF, imposing caution on them. It had also shown that it could employ civilian auxiliary force in tandem with its main forces. There had been no reports of surrender or capture of prisoners, which would indicate that its morale is intact. 21.  The SLSF: 21.1 Broadly the SLSF appears to have been able to carry out a coordinated Operation. This shows the better morale and impact of training on troops. It as sent a clear message that LTTE should not under estimate its capability. The SLSF appears to have been able to coordinate its air operations with ground operations for maximum effect. It has claimed precision bombing of targets; however, it is not clear whether air strike was carried out to silence LTTE artillery or put them out of action. 21.2 From the beginning SLSF appear to have had a clear objective: to capture Mavil Aru sluice gates rather than succumb to the temptation of holding on to the gains. Though this might appear contrary to the political stand that it was a ‘Humanitarian operation’, in military terms, the steadfast maintenance of aim is to be commended. 21.3  Overall planning to keep LTTE engaged in other sectors through air and ground operations showed considerable thought given to the planning of the operation. In the past in Vanni operations SLSF failure to maintain momentum after the initial success reflected a static mindset at the strategic level. Similarly its defensive operations had lacked innovation and mobility. Considered in this background, the SLSF appears to have considerably improved, overcoming the mental limitations imposed by the CFA. However, its progress was extremely cautious giving adequate time for LTTE to slip out and mine the Mavil Aru area. 21.4  It is also to the credit of SLSF that it could prevent any major LTTEinterference in Trincomalee naval base or at Mutur naval base during the entire period. 21.5  However, the accusations of human rights violations that have emanated during the course of operations indicate SLSF needs to work on this to improve its credibility. This is a major problem faced by any uniformed service involved in counterinsurgency operations especially with an uncanny organisation like LTTE, which uses propaganda as a weapon. But SLSF has no option but to improve this situation. Conclusion 22.   LTTE appears to have made a tactical mistake in selecting Mavil Aru as a point of confrontation with the GOSL. While it probably rallied the Tamil population who had legitimate grievances on sharing of waters of the reservoir, LTTE does not appear to have been prepared for the President’s essentially military approach to solve the issue and establish the authority of GOSL on the water resources of the reservoir. LTTE has tried to play down the military operations and its performance after the first few days of operation. It has focused on the humanitarian aspect of what was actually a military situation, though Muslims of the region have been further alienated. All that the LTTE political wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan could tell Reuters as fighting continued last Sunday was: “We consider this a declaration of war and strongly condemn the attitude of the government”. Overall the Mavil Aru operation has shown LTTE’s serious limitations in progressing operations in east. LTTE is unlikely to take it lying and launch major operation in North where it is strong on ground. The attack on Muhamalai post on August 12, 2006 may well be precursor of a bigger LTTE operation. 23.   LTTE is also likely to carry out major stealth attack in depth areas under government control on lucrative economic targets. Colombo and Trincomalee could be under its sights for such attacks. If carried out successfully it could hope to restore some of the shine it had lost in Mavil Aru operation. 23.   Despite the slow progress initially, SLSF has shown that it could be successfully achieve its objective in the face of LTTE opposition. This should come as a boost to its morale. SLSF has also shown it can employ and coordinate SLAF with its ground operations with telling effect. However, whether it can sustain such performance for prolonged periods in more adverse circumstances over a wider front is still an open question. But it is clear that its re-equipment and training are paying dividends. 21.   It is clear the objective of the GOSL from the beginning was not merely humanitarian but to re-establish its credibility in its ongoing cold war with LTTE. It had totally sidelined the SLMM efforts to negotiate a solution with the LTTE and resolve the Mavil Aru issue. This is a clear shift in the strategy of GOSL – to adopt a tough approach towards LTTE as the SLMM has been weakened by the impending departure of nearly half its strength. Thus a dangerous situation is developing towards full-fledged war in Sri Lanka and Operation Watershed appears to be an overture for that. One can only hope President Rajapakse encouraged by his political and military success in this episode does not go for the military option. An episode does not make a whole story and such a foray may prove too costly, ending in yet another stalemate. (Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com)