Col R Hariharan
Introduction
Recently there was a lot of media hype in Sri Lanka
about the attempts of the LTTE’s overseas remnants to reactivate the Tamil
insurgent movement in the island. As it invariably happens in Sri Lanka, the
reports appear to be a mixture of facts and fiction.
Tamil detractors tried to trash the reports saying
they were issued to draw the public attention away from the UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) March 2014-session in Geneva.
Probably there is some truth in
this as Sri Lanka was facing the flak at the UN body meeting over its
accountability for alleged human rights violations in the post war period. But
there is an equally strong case to suspect the overseas LTTE trying to get a foothold
in Sri Lanka.
No nation with a traumatic terrorist attacks that Sri
Lanka had faced at the hands of the LTTE
for nearly three decades can afford to ignore any sign of its revival. More
so, as the LTTE’s overseas network had survived the total destruction of the
LTTE and its entire leadership including its founder V Prabhakaran in May 2009.
The overseas network has access to LTTE’s assets created and stashed abroad
over the years. These include financial
resources and benami holdings overseas in businesses and property. They are
waiting to be fully tapped. So Sri Lanka’s concerns on this count are real; it
simply cannot afford to allow the LTTE to stage a comeback on its soil.
LTTE’s
overseas network
After the
war, the remnants of LTTE abroad and its supporters were in a scramble for
leadership. It would have enabled them to gain legitimacy to get hold of the
LTTE’s assets. The former militants are
now organised into two major groups led by P Sivaparan alias Nediyawan and
Vinayagam respectively with the aim of furthering LTTE objectives.
According to
Sri Lanka army, Nediyawan based in Norway, leads a covert group that keeps
changing its name for fear of being compromised by intelligence agencies. It is
believed to have established its cells in various Western countries. Vinayagam,
former LTTE intelligence operative based in Paris, leads the Headquarter Group. He is said to be in touch with the LTTE
underworld members and criminal elements. Vinayagam had been involved in activities
like smuggling of people to Canada, taking care of LTTE investments abroad etc.[i]
The LTTE supporters who have disowned
militancy are organised in two segments. The Transnational Government of Tamil
Eelam (TGTE) to “democratically” struggle for the creation of independent Tamil
Eelam is led by ‘Prime Minister’ Rudrakumaran, LTTE’s attorney in the U.S. It
has all the trappings of an elected ‘parliament’, ministers etc. Its ‘parliament’ has two members nominated from Tamil Nadu also!
The Global Tamil Forum (GTF) led by
one-time LTTE acolyte Father Emmanuel is a vocal and powerful Diaspora body enjoying
wider support. It purports to work for finding ways to meet Tamil aspirations
within Sri Lanka’s existing political set up. It also articulates Sri Lanka
Tamil grievances to the world at large. It has been supporting the Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) in Sri Lanka and has links with the Tamil Eelam
Supporters Organisation (TESO) revived by the DMK party in Tamil Nadu three
years back. The British Tamil Forum (BTF), considered more radical than the GTF,
parted ways with the latter after a short period of unification.
Internationally, these organisations have
been campaigning against President Rajapaksa for alleged war crimes and
genocide during the Eelam War and want him to be hauled up before the
International Criminal Court (ICC). And they come together to voice their
protests whenever President Rajapaksa or any Sri Lankan “war criminals” visit
the Western countries.
Sri Lanka Defence Secretary Gotabaya
Rajapaksa recently drew attention to the LTTE network that continued to
sustain an international propaganda against Sri Lanka “through front
organisations that have put on a democratic face.” He estimated the scale of
funds mobilised by the LTTE between US $ 50 to 70 million on an annual basis
from 1993 to 2002, and $ 200 million per annum from 2002 to 2008.[ii]
It is not surprising that Sri Lanka is
nervous at the rallying of Tamil Diaspora elements particularly the two
organisations led by former LTTE leaders. But these set ups are far from the
highly disciplined and networked organisation that LTTE had established. Nor do
they enjoy wide support among the Diaspora.
And the reports about the Tamil Diaspora trying to revive the LTTE in
Sri Lanka have heightened the state’s anxiety.
LTTE revival attempts in Sri Lanka
According to reports based on Sri Lanka army sources,
overseas LTTE elements made three attempts to establish a LTTE foothold in Sri
Lanka between 2012 and 2014.[iii]
None of the attempts have been successful; of Indian interest is their Tamil
Nadu connection which has serious connotations for security.
The three attempts are –
a.
March 2012: The
investigation of a cadre of Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) (a partner in
the ruling UPFA coalition) in Trincomalee District (Eastern Province) led
to the revelation about overseas LTTE’s revival attempts. Interrogation of
suspects revealed that Kumaran of the Vinayagam faction in
Paris recruited 15 former LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu and organized
them into three cells of five members each. One of these cells
was sent to Trincomalee in order to carry out the killing of the EPDP
cadre in March 2012 who was branded as traitor by them.
b.
December 2012: The arrest and interrogation of
a former LTTE cadre in Colombo revealed a clandestine campaign financed by
overseas LTTE elements that was underway in Tamil Nadu to recruit and
indoctrinate Sri Lankan Tamil youth with LTTE ideology. Tamil Nadu police
arrested four occupants of a house in Chennai outskirt of Pammal based on
information given by Sri Lanka. One of them was found to head an LTTE team
that made explosives. Police recovered incriminating documents,
electronic circuit boards and panels from the house.
c.
March 2014: The hunt for a former LTTE cadre
Ponniah Selvanayagam Kajeepan, aka Gobi who opened fire on a
policeman during a routine check in the Kilinochchi area led to a small LTTE
cell. The security forces hunted down and killed not only Gobi, but two
other former LTTE cadres, Suntharalingam Gajatheeban, aka Theiveegan,
and Navaratnam Navaneethan, aka Appan. Further investigations revealed
Theiveegan, a former bodyguard of V Prabhakaran, was in touch with
leaders of both the LTTE factions abroad. He had also made many trips
to India to keep in touch with contacts there. Subsequently, Sri Lanka has arrested three suspected members of Nediyawan group from Malaysia and their interrogation is underway in Colombo.
Following
this, in March 2014 Sri Lanka ordered the freezing of all funds, assets and
economic resources belonging to 16 Tamil Diaspora organisations and 424
individuals believed to be “facilitating or participating” in acts of
terrorism. Though follow up action on the notification has not yet been
activated yet, it gives the option of Sri Lanka government to apply pressure on
Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora bodies to desist from supporting the overseas factions
of the LTTE. The list of proscribed individuals included 32 persons said to be
living in Tamil Nadu.
Paranoia about Tamil terrorism
On the flip side, Sri Lanka government has been
keeping the paranoia of Tamil terrorism alive for political reasons. The
lingering threat of revival of Tamil terrorism keeps reminding the people of
President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s achievement in ending Prabhakaran’s “terror
regime” once and for all.
Rajapaksa’s achievement in eliminating the LTTE is
truly remarkable; it stands out as one of the few success stories against
terrorism the world over. His success has restored the shattered morale of the
Sinhala majority. As an adroit politician he has cashed on his national
popularity to get elected a second time as president. It also helped him to
secure an absolute majority in parliament for the United Peoples Freedom
Alliance (UPFA) coalition.[iv]
Rajapaksa established his grip on power more firmly, by using the parliamentary
majority to amend the constitution to remove the bar on incumbent President holding
office beyond the second term.[v]
Under the Sri Lankan constitution the President enjoys
vast executive powers. He heads the government; he is also commander in chief
of armed forces. His brothers Basil and Gotabya are in key jobs wielding
enormous power. Basil is the economic development minister while Gotabaya is
serving as the Defence Secretary in charge of the armed forces and internal
security.
After the war, the army has emerged as an important instrument of
power. Thus with Basil controlling development projects and finance, and the
Defence Secretary in charge of the armed forces, the President’s family has gathered
enormous power in its hand to shape Sri
Lanka’s policies and practices.
The threat of LTTE revival has also enabled President
Rajapaksa to justify maintaining an oversized army of about 200,000
well-trained soldiers.[vi]
Around 30-35 percent of the army is based in permanent camps in the Tamil predominant
Northern and Eastern provinces. As the troops are mostly Sinhalas, their large
overt presence in the area would discourage any revival of separatist activity.
However, large presence of the army in their midst even after their war has
caused serious misgivings about the government’s intentions among Tamils.
An environment for LTTE revival
While the revival of the LTTE in Sri Lanka is
possible, the current socio-political environment does not appear conducive for
it. Neither the historical context nor the popular upsurge supporting
independent Eelam of the 80s that fostered Tamil militancy exists today.
India’s forceful and overt support for the Tamil minority that existed till
1990 has also undergone a sea change. India-Sri Lanka relations have grown
manifold and multifaceted diminishing the importance of the Tamil issue.
The rise of Tamil insurgency was the logical sequence
to the failure of Sri Lanka to satisfy Tamils political demand for autonomy in
the face of State’s increasing emphasis on Sinhala Buddhist culture and
language since 1956.
However, after Sri
Lanka politically failed to resolve the demand, an independent Tamil state
(Tamil Eelam) became the political watchword of Tamils to preserve their
identity, language and traditional areas of habitation. Soon politicians lost
their credibility and gave way to Tamil extremism.
The 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo gave credence to
Tamil extremism.[vii] Indian intervention in its wake resulted in
the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 [ISLA].[viii]
The Accord compelled Sri Lanka government to grant a level of autonomy to
Northern and Eastern provinces; this was done through the 13th
Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution. India had agreed to disarm the
militants to enable them to join mainstream politics. When LTTE refused to
comply, India got involved in a long drawn war with LTTE.
India withdrew its forces from Sri Lanka due to
political changes in both countries in 1990 giving the LTTE a lease of life.
India-Sri Lanka relations turned bitter for a while thereafter. India
maintained a low profile on Sri Lanka Tamil issue from then onwards. Its stand
against the LTTE hardened particularly after Prabhakaran carried out the
mindless killing of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Perhaps Tamil
militancy lost India’s sympathy forever.
After the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the US, the
international environment against terrorism has undergone radical changes. The
world is more united than ever before in fighting terrorism of all hues. Thanks
to modern technology tools, the dividing line between militancy and terrorism
is fading. Classical militant movements of the 60 cannot survive now unless
they have political backing. So the external support of the kind that LTTE
enjoyed in 80s is available anymore for the LTTE revival exercise.
Internally, the Tamil population has been demoralized
after the war. They have lost their livelihood, kith and kin and habitations in
three decades of militancy. They are looking for survival strategies rather than
separate homeland. With huge military presence in their midst, Tamils would be
wary of supporting any militancy for fear of retribution from the state. In
this environment, any leader attempting to revive LTTE will find it extremely
difficult to find support among the population.
Prabhakaran’s leadership
Prabhakaran’s charismatic leadership was responsible
for motivating Tamil youth to sacrifice their lives for the Cause of
separatism. Such a leader is essential to revive the LTTE presence in Sri Lanka.
No such leader is in the horizon either within the island or overseas. The LTTE
experience has shown the limitations of charismatic leadership for militancy
alone cannot win a war against a legitimately organized state.
Despite Prabhakaran’s advantages of immense power,
excellent overseas support network and adulatory public support, he failed to exploit
political opportunities that came in his way to achieve his aim. A few examples
of his failure illustrate this weakness:
a.
ISLA: In early years of LTTE’s growth
Prabhakaran benefitted from the immense goodwill Tamils enjoyed in India,
particularly Tamil Nadu. However, after the Indian troops landed he became
paranoid about giving up his arms as he hoped to emerge as the sole arbiter of
Tamils. When India did not agree to it, he started killing rival militant
leaders and refused to lay down arms as required by ISLA. He could have easily
used India’s desire to avoid an armed confrontation with LTTE to garner maximum
political advantage. But he opted for military confrontation that scuttled the full
implementation of the ISLA due to which the Tamil community still feels short
changed.
b. 1989-90: There
were political changes both in India and Sri Lanka and Rajiv Gandhi lost power
in India. The newly elected President Premadasa sought Prabhakaran’s
cooperation to see the Indian troops out of Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran accepted it
as a face saving measure after the mauling LTTE had received at the hands of
Indian forces from 1987 to 89. However, Prabhakaran failed to leverage the political
opportunity Premadasa offered and broke the talks. Instead, he restarted the
militant confrontation again only to lose his control over Jaffna.
c.
Political killings: Prabhakaran gained
notoriety by carrying out political assassination that smacked of personal
vendetta. The victims included Tamil leaders like Appapillai Amirthalingam and
the constitutional lawyer Neelan Thiruchelvan who had strong political
connections both at home and abroad. Their elimination deprived Prabhakaran not
only of sane political advice but their ability as interlocutors with Sinhala
leaders and international community. This weakness showed during the peace
talks 2002 when Sri Lanka was prepared to walk the extra mile to accommodate
the LTTE. Another wanton killing that yielded negative results is the assassination
of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar when the peace process was
in force. This resulted in the banning of LTTE in 32 countries that continues
even now. Of course, the Himalayan blunder was the Rajiv Gandhi assassination that
alienated India and made the LTTE an untouchable
So any new attempt to revive LTTE has to have
political relevance and support base to succeed. This does not exist either in
Sri Lanka or India, where the LTTE cannot count on practical support on any of
the major Tamil parties. The fringe parties that support the LTTE are
compromised and cannot provide worthwhile assistance except rabble rousing.
Current political environment
Since 1990, despite episodic Eelam wars, most of the Sinhala
intelligentsia and politicians are conscious of the need to meet Tamil demands
for durable ethnic amity. The wars have proved very costly for Sri Lanka in
human and economic terms. Probably, no one in the country would want to opt for
war rather than going ahead with the political process over Tamil demands short
of separatism.
In the
post war period, President Rajapaksa focused largely on development
of infrastructure and public services in the war affected areas and achieved
commendable results. However, he has continued to ignore the core issue of
political autonomy for Tamils, perhaps for political reasons. He conducted even
the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections four years after the war with a
lot prodding from India. And the TNA government that came to power has not been
given a free hand in exercising even their limited powers. The continued
retention of a retired General as the governor despite the NPC government’s
request has not only increased their suspicion. The military intelligence
breathing down the necks of civilians has undermined the security and trust of
people in the government. So discontentment over Colombo’s dispensation is
brewing among the Tamil population.
Despite his desire to gain maximum advantage from the
bogey of LTTE revival, Rajapaksa does not seem to have given up his political
options to evolve an equation with Tamils. He has been harping on the
Parliamentary Select Committee as the instrument to resolve the Tamil issue. However,
this has become a non-starter with opposition parties including the TNA
boycotting it. They suspect it as a ploy to delay the process.
In spite of this, the TNA led NPC government has been
articulating the Tamil point of view. And India under Prime Minister Narendra
Modi is exerting renewed pressure on Rajapaksa to enforce the 13th
Amendment in full as prelude to kick starting the political reconciliation
process. Under the circumstances, revival of LTTE is unlikely to be welcomed by
Tamil population.
The prolonged war and migration (both internal and
external) has depleted the Tamil population particularly in Northern Province.[ix]
The Tamils in these regions have lost two generations of youth who had been the
back bone of LTTE insurgency in the war. Thus the sheer paucity of young people
would make the LTT revival exercise a difficult one.
However, in the near term the chances of Tamil polity’s total failure to
get justice from the regime could increase the Tamils’ cup of discontent. But
it is doubtful even a charismatic leader may not be able to transform it into support
for revival of militancy.
There is a tendency to overestimate the political hype in Tamil Nadu over
support to Sri Lanka Tamils. There is widespread sympathy for their plight and
political parties are competing with one another to cash in on this. Despite
their fiery statements from fringe elements, substantively they have done
little to further Eelam cause. Tamil Nadu police had been cooperating with the
Centre in rounding up Sri Lankan extremist elements as the state government is
clearly drawing against the growth of extremism in the state. So the LTTE
overseas elements will find it difficult to get tangible results from political
support in the state. However, the security implications of LTTE networking in
Tamil Nadu cannot be underestimated and both the Centre and the state appear to
be aware of it.
Written on July 29, 2014
Courtesy: CLAWS Scholar Warrior, August 2014
(Col R Hariharan, a retired
Military Intelligence officer, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian
Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990. He is associated with the
Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: http://haridirct@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info )
Notes
[i] Udeshi
Amarasinghe, “Modus Operandi: Tamil Diaspora and LTTE organisation” June 5,
2014. www.defence.lk This account based on Sri Lanka intelligence
sources may not be wholly accurate; but it broadly conforms to the emerging
LTTE support groups abroad.
[iv]
The UPFA
secured an absolute majority in the 225-member House winning 144 seats, an
increase of 39 since the 2004 election. The main opposition United National
Front (UNP) won only 60 seats – 22 less than their earlier score. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8634008.stm
[v]
The 18th
Amendment to the Constitution passed on September 8, 2010 removed the sentence
that mentioned the limit of the re-election of the President and to propose
appointment of a parliamentary council to decide the appointment of independent
posts like commissioners of election and human rights and Supreme Court judges.
This removed the provisions 17th Amendment (passed on October 3,
2001) for creation of the Constitutional Council and independent commissions in
which the opposition had nominees, thereby increasing the powers of the
president. See http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Introduction.htm
[vii]
On July 23, 1983 the LTTE ambushed a military
convoy in the outskirts of Jaffna town killing 13 soldiers. This triggered
politically motivated ethnic riots in Colombo which spread to other cities in
which Sinhalese mobs carried out a pogrom against Tamil population, pillaging,
looting, killing and destroying their property.
When thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in Tamil Nadu to
escape the violence it created a spontaneous upsurge of public outrage and sympathy
in India for the Tamil cause. The events in Sri Lanka created such a terror
that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have emigrated to other
countries.
[ix]
According to the 2012 census there were
2,270,924 Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka, 11.21% (as against 12.7 % as per 1981
census) out of the total of 20,277,594.
They constitute over 93% of the population in the Northern Province and are the
largest ethnic group with over 39 % in the Eastern Province. 70% of Sri Lankan
Tamils in Sri Lanka live in the Northern and Eastern provinces. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/sm/CPH%202011_R1.pdf
