Sulochana Ramiah Mohan/
Interview
Courtesy: Ceylon Today, August
10, 2014 URL: www.ceylontoday.lk
Former India Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF) Intelligence Corps Head Colonel Ramani Hariharan tells Ceylon
Today Sri Lanka’s twin failures, to start a meaningful reconciliation
process with Tamils and the absence of a transparent process to investigate the
alleged human rights violations and war crimes have created a climate of
suspicion among the people about the intentions of the Rajapaksha Government.
He says: “As long as this environment does not change, Tamil Nadu political
parties will use it to political advantage.”
Q: Did India help ‘create’ the
LTTE backed mainly by Ms Indira Gandhi?
A: I am disappointed with this
question because it trivialises the entire struggle of Tamils as a creation of
India. It is hard to imagine anyone would think that without Mrs Indira Gandhi everything
would have been hunky dory in Sri Lanka.
As long as people don’t introspect
and understand the complex phenomenon of Sri Lanka’s ethnic relations I see
little hope for peace and amity in Sri Lanka’s fractured society. And that
would be a pity.
I wish the birth and rise of
LTTE were as simple as India “creating” it. It was one of the 32 odd Tamil
extremist groups that sprouted and thrived when political and democratic
methods of articulating Tamil demands failed to yield results. The TULF contested the polls with a call for
Tamil Eelam and won maximum support from the people in the North and East. But
it failed to turn its electoral victory into tangible political gains. So
extremists pushed them aside and rose up. In short, the rise of Tamil militancy represents
the failure of Sri Lankan polity (including Tamils) to politically resolve their
problems.
In July 1983 when the LTTE –
then a small rag tag body – ambushed a Sri Lankan army vehicle it gave an
opportunity for JRJ to engineer anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo perhaps for
political reasons to pander to Sinhala right. And Indian involvement was
inevitable as thousands of Tamil refugees landed in Tamil Nadu.
I am not fully in picture
about Indian support to Tamil extremist groups. But to the best of my knowledge,
PLOT and TELO hogged Indian attention and support as they had networked better
with Indians.
Q: It’s a well-known fact that
Rajiv Gandhi backed the LTTE later on. What have you to say?
A: India used the militant groups
as a pressure point when its political efforts to help Tamils failed and the
LTTE was one such group. What else you want me to say?
Q: Why was Indian showing keen
interest on retaining the LTTE, the purpose of protecting a guerrilla
organization?
I think there is confusion in
semantics here. India was not “retaining” LTTE or anyone else. My answer to
earlier question holds good for this.
Q: Did did you get instruction
form Rajiv Gandhi to support the LTTE?
A: I never got any instruction
to support LTTE from anyone let alone Rajiv Gandhi who was the Prime Minister.
I got involved with Sri Lanka only when Indian Peace Keeping Force moved into
the island when JRJ asked for it.
To keep the record straight,
we were fighting the LTTE even when President Ranasinghe Premadasa came to
power and got chummy with the LTTE to send the Indian troops back to India. It gave a lease of life to Prabhakaran who
was desperate. And Sri Lanka paid the price for this act of brinkmanship by
prolonging LTTE’s life by another 15 years or so.
Q: When the Sri Lankan Forces
were about to capture LTTE supremo Prabhakaran at the Vadamarachchi
military operation India threatened Sri Lanka not to go with the operation. Why
was that?
A: I do not know. Neither MI
nor Army was privy to such decisions. Kindly address the question to one of the
politicians of that period. He may be able to answer the question.
Q: Is it justifiable India
invaded Sri Lankan skies to drop food parcels.
Was it to end
ties with J R Jayawardane (JRJ)?
A: Probably a diplomat is the
right person to discuss justification issue. As I see it, nation’s do this kind
of thing if they feel it is in their national interest. So we find in
international relations justification comes after the action.
I think the air dropping of
food packets - Operation Poomalai – violating Sri Lankan airspace was one such
action. It would probably be justified by Indian leadership of that time as it served
a humanitarian purpose and forced JRJ to take India seriously.
Q: Can you name the places
where the Tigers had their training camps in India?
A: I do not know. I was
neither involved nor informed of such details as I was working as a faculty in
Military Intelligence School during the period.
Q: Ms Sonia Gandhi government
finally supported the Sri Lankan government to wipe out the Tigers in 2009. Was
it a genuine support to get rid of them, after all Tigers killed her husband,
Rajiv Gandhi.?
A: Mrs Sonia Gandhi was never in
the government. It was led by Dr Manmohan Singh. I have no knowledge of
decisions taken by Govt of India on this count. I can only guess. If you read
my articles of the relevant period (these are available in my blog http://col.hariharan.info) you may be able see that my analyses concerned mostly
military operations and not political backroom decision making in India or Sri
Lanka.
Q: Then Indian High
Commissioner J N Dixit was very powerful. Did he influence JRJ to sign the
Indo-Lanka pact?
A: I think JN Dixit’s book on
his Sri Lanka tenure gives enough information for you to draw your own conclusions.
I never thought of asking him about it when I met him on a few occasions.
Q: Did India force Sri Lanka to sign the
agreement when the country was against it?
A: I think you are
underestimating JRJ’s political skill. He
was one of the best communicators I have heard in the whole of South Asia; he
could talk his way through any gritty situation.
A past master in political manoeuvring
JRJ was far too wily to be “forced” by a political novice like Rajiv Gandi into
signing the Indo Sri Lanka agreement. I think
it was the other way round as Rajiv paid a heavy political price for his
decision and lost his life in its aftermath. I think JRJ consciously signed the
Agreement so that India commits itself to end Tamil militancy. This is borne
out by India’s war with LTTE that followed.
Q: The LTTE in fact started
its activities from India. Being the former military intelligence officer, how
do you assess the rise and fall of the LTTE?
You are wrong on facts; LTTE
started its activities in Jaffna peninsula. As a military man who has dealt
with more than a dozen insurgent groups, I see the rise and fall of LTTE as yet
another example of insurgent movement’s inability to convert their military power
into tangible political assets. Prabhakaran committed a number of strategic
errors that led him to defeat. He put too much faith in force of arms and
failed to use the wonderful opportunity the peace process 2002 offered to negotiate
the best deal for Tamils.
Q: There are unconfirmed
reports that the Indian military officials were present during the last lap of
the war in Wanni . What is your comment on this?
A: I think the question is
best addressed to your own army. Please remember I retired in 1991 and I was
not involved in any capacity in Sri Lanka after 1991. In fact I have not
visited Northern or Eastern province since then. So how can I comment on it?
Q: Being a senior military
officer, at which point did Rajiv Gandhi instruct you to fly troops to Sri
Lanka?
A: Army officers take their
orders from their commanders. I was no exception. I was told to go to Sri Lanka a day after
signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement.
Q: You were aware that Gandhi
was assaulted by a Naval rating in Colombo during a Guard of Honour. How did
Indian Army react on receipt of that incident when India’s PM life was at stake
in a foreign land?
A: We read about it. We are a
professional army; so our reactions are conditioned by orders and not by media
reports.
Q: As an intelligence
officer, what did you learn about Prabhakaran and the IPKF committing
atrocities too?
A: Intelligence acquires
information about the potential or actual enemy. MI mandate did not include collecting
information on any atrocities.
Q: You
have said 'Rajiv Gandhi's move on IPKF was impulsive. Can you elaborate?
A: My comment to the Times of
India reporter was made in reference to the book on Mrs Sonia Gandhi written by
one time close friend of the Gandhi family Natwar Singh.
Rajiv Gandhi became prime
minister without either executive or political experience. He brought in the
much needed young blood into the government. He was impatient to achieve
results and short circuited the systems of governance more than once. I can
cite a number of instances of Rajiv's well meaning but impulsive
decisions.
I experienced its adverse
impact first hand when I went to Sri Lanka along with the Indian troops. We
were moved at short notice at the invitation of JRJ after the signing of the
Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.
Indian troops were inducted
without full brief and clear objectives. The troops were not ready to fight a
shooting wear as they had come with minimum support elements to sustain them
for a short duration. There was little back-end administrative echelons to
conduct operations overseas. People from all over India were moved at short
notice to man temporary headquarters in Chennai.
There were no up to date maps
of the area. I walked the Jaffna peninsula as there was a shortage of vehicles.
There were structural flaws in employment and command and control. When
ops against the LTTE started at short notice troops were flown in to ops directly
from the airport! This caused avoidable casualty.
Troops operate with optimum
efficiency when ops are planned and trained to execute them in the likely
theatre of ops. Only after the Headquarters IPKF into being and took
charge the advantage of joint operations command produced its impact on the operations.
After that the LTTE got the drubbing and sought refuge in Wanni jungles
enabling us to restore all the infrastructure including the railway
communication.
Q: Were you aware that India
put undue pressure on J R Jayawaradene at the behest of LTTE leader?
I am not aware of it; this is the
first time I am hearing it. LTTE was a small organisation at that time and I
cannot believe a big nation like India acting “at the behest of LTTE.” It is
laughable.
Q: There is substantive
evidence that the Tamil Diaspora is helping LTTE remnants in Tamil Nadu to
regroup Do you think the LTTE is capable of regrouping and reverting to a
different tactics be political or otherwise?
I have written an analytical
article on the revival of LTTE in the latest issue of the Centre for Land
Warfare Studies journal ‘Soldier Warrior.’ In the post war period Sri Lanka
government has not shown adequate sensitivity to the grievances of people
traumatised by war. It has failed to create a sense of security and trust in
the government among them. It has not allowed the process of reconciliation to
take place even after five years after war. So the population is not a happy
one though the infrastructure is in place. LTTE remnants will always be on the
look out to exploit local grievances to gain a foot hold for the revival of
LTTE in Sri Lanka.
Despite this unhappy atmosphere,
I doubt whether any Sri Lankan Tamil seriously believes Tamil Eelam is
achievable. After the rout of the LTTE, the overseas remnants do not have a
dynamic leader who can energise and lead them for a revival of LTTE. After all
Prabhakaran took two decades to build an all powerful organisation. So the
attempts to gain a foothold in Sri Lanka for reviving LTTE have been feeble.
Without support from an
external power or agency, in the current global anti-terrorism scenario, no extremist
movement can be exported unless the local people are motivated to go through
the ordeal. I think Tamil people are too weary of war to entertain such notion.
They have lost too much for too long.
Q: In J N Dixit’s book it was
stated that ex National Security Minister Lilith Athulathmudali had the ability
to infiltrate the Indian intelligence network to know details of plans India
had for Sri Lanka at that time. What have you to say?
A: This is a bit of news to
me. I was never privy to what happened in Sri Lanka before 1987.
Q: In that direction, did you
believe that another foreign intelligence network was used by Lalith
Athulathmudali to penetrate the Indian intelligence network?
A: I have no knowledge of this.
Q: Erik Solheim, former
Norwegian peace negotiator, told Ceylon today, that peace could have won
without bloodshed, referring to the last phase of the war. What is
your take on this?
A: I doubt whether the
Norwegian negotiator seriously meant it. As a strategic analyst I feel the last
phase of war was too late for any external body or nation to bring about peace
in Sri Lanka. Too much blood had already been shed by both sides and LTTE was
on its last legs. What was the incentive for Sri Lanka to accept peace as an
option? So probably it was destined not to succeed.
Q: India has been
involved with Sri Lanka throughout during the LTTE facing criticisms as well as
accolades. Should India now keep away from Sri Lanka’s internal
issues and politics?
A: India should keep away from
Sri Lanka’s affairs as long it does not affect India’s national interest and
security.
Despite all the negative hype
in the media, India and Sri Lanka have built a positive multifaceted relationship
to benefit both countries. This networked relationship extends now to strategic,
political, diplomatic and economic spheres. In strategic security of the Indian
Ocean Region there is close cooperation between the armed forces.
Q: Do you see Tamil Nadu being
a stumbling block in Sri Lanka’s progress: CM Jayalalithaa has been very
critical about Sri Lanka and even called for a Eelam in her election
manifesto. How do you view the Tamil Nadu politics and JJ’s staunch
support for a separate Eelam?
A: I don’t think anyone
seriously believes in separate Tamil Eelam anymore though they may raise
slogans. In Tamil Nadu, political parties are using the Eelam issue as a vote
catching device. And I don’t know how many people really vote on the basis of
this issue. All the fringe parties who are vociferous on Eelam have repeatedly
failed to make good in elections.
Sri Lanka’s twin failures (1)
to start a meaningful reconciliation process with Tamils (2) absence of a transparent
process to investigate alleged human rights violations and war crimes have created
a climate of suspicion among the people about the intentions of the Rajapaksa government. As
long as this environment does not change, Tamil Nadu political parties will use
it to political advantage.
I think the biggest stumbling
block for Sri Lanka’s progress is neither Tamil Nadu nor India but its lack of
confidence in its ability to resolve the post war issues. This has impeded the optimal
use of the hard won peace after eliminating the LTTE finally.
Q: Sri Lanka opposed to an
international probe on alleged human rights violations during the last phase of
the war? Is that a right decision?
A: No. The UN probe came about
only after Sri Lanka failed to use the opportunities provided to carry out a
credible domestic investigation. But Sri Lanka apparently seem to have decided
its stand was wrong; otherwise it is difficult to understand why it is now carrying
out a parallel domestic probe with international advisors when UNHRC has
started its probe.
Q: When the government
was asked to let the UN panel probe, Secretary to the President Lalith
Weeratunga stated that, in that case, even the IPKF must also be
investigated. Should that happen?
Instead of all this posturing
to score brownie points in the media about India we should look at it
objectively. Sri Lanka’s action should serve a larger objective; otherwise it
would be a waste of national effort. Already it has wasted five years of peace.
If Sri Lankans feel it would Aserve their national interest to ask for a UN
probe into IPKF’s conduct they should go ahead. It is for Sri Lankans to take a
call.
Personally, I think Sri Lanka should
seriously set its house in order, revamp its corroded system of governance.
There is no point in saying in India also these things exist. Yes; but we are
talking about Sri Lanka’s problems; not India’s.
No comments:
Post a Comment